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RFC SSP MITM protection

Timo Mueller linux-bluetooth 1 version In review

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  1. v5 RFC Latest4 patches 1 replyIn review

Patches in v5 No applies recorded yet

#Subject and filesSizeRepliesApplied
1/4Bluetooth: Refactor hci_get_auth_req()net/bluetooth/hci_event.c+22 -150 replies
2/4Bluetooth: Refactor code for outgoing dedicated bondingnet/bluetooth/hci_event.c net/bluetooth/mgmt.c+9 -100 replies
3/4Bluetooth: Use MITM Protection when IO caps allow itnet/bluetooth/hci_event.c+2 -70 replies
4/4Bluetooth: Request MITM Protection when initiatornet/bluetooth/hci_event.c+4 -20 replies

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Cover letter [RFCv5 0/4] SSP MITM protection

From: Timo Mueller <[email protected]>

Hi,

this is an updated version of v4 with the following changes:

1) The management option to relax the MITM Protection was dropped
2) Some minor modifications to the commit messages

Test information from the v4 cover letter:
<snip>
I've successfully tested these changes in the last couple of months at the UPF #46 in Vienna, with the CE4A golden device and the bluetooth PTS (where applicable).
<snip>

Quoted 1 line

From the original cover letter:

The way the kernel handles MITM Protection during pairing is
inconsistent: General Bonding and Dedicated Bonding are not treated equally.
<snip>
Therefore, the safest choice is to always request MITM Protection, also for General Bonding [1]. The proposal here is to do this for both incoming (patch 6/8) and outgoing (patch 7/8) procedures, as it was previously done for Dedicated Bonding. This "conservative" approach is smart enough to fall back to not using MITM Protection if the IO capabilities don't allow it (this policy already existed before for Dedicated Bonding, see patch 5/8).
<snip>

For completeness, a quick recap on the motivation behind this patch set:
In our cars we always want to use SSP methods other than Just Works. We even go as far as rejecting JW connection attempts. In order to still be able to pair all devices that are capable of using any of the remaining SSP methods, we need to make sure that we're not falling back to JW, regardless of the bonding type (Dedicated or General). For example, currently a connection with the iPhone acting as the initiating LM would lead a JW connection which would get rejected.

Best regards
Timo

Mikel Astiz (3):
Bluetooth: Refactor hci_get_auth_req()
Bluetooth: Refactor code for outgoing dedicated bonding
Bluetooth: Request MITM Protection when initiator

Timo Mueller (1):
Bluetooth: Use MITM Protection when IO caps allow it

 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c      |  5 +----
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
1.9.0