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setgid hardening

Andy Lutomirski linux-api linux-fsdevel linux-mm lkml stable 2 versions – In review

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Versions newest first · linked by author and title

  1. v2 Latest2 patches 7 repliesIn review
  2. v12 patches 9 repliesSuperseded

Changes in v2 from the cover letter

- Fix uninitialized variable issue (Willy, Ben)
- Also check current creds in should_remove_suid() (Ben)

Patches in v2 No applies recorded yet

#Subject and filesSizeRepliesApplied
1/2fs: Check f_cred as well as of current's creds in should_remove_suid()fs/inode.c fs/internal.h fs/ocfs2/file.c +2 more+36 -112 replies
2/2fs: Harden against open(..., O_CREAT, 02777) in a setgid directoryfs/inode.c+21 -33 replies

Reviews trailers per patch

All 2 patches have a Reviewed-by or Acked-by.

PatchJeff Layton
1/2R-b
2/2R-b

Trailers given in replies are filled; those carried in the patches from earlier versions are outlined with dashes.

Read the v2 thread

Cover letter [PATCH v2 0/2] setgid hardening

The kernel has some dangerous behavior involving the creation and modification of setgid executables. These issues aren't kernel security bugs per se, but they have been used to turn various filesystem permission oddities into reliably privilege escalation exploits.

See http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation/
for a nice writeup.

Let's fix them for real.

Changes from v1:
- Fix uninitialized variable issue (Willy, Ben)
- Also check current creds in should_remove_suid() (Ben)

Andy Lutomirski (2):
fs: Check f_cred as well as of current's creds in should_remove_suid()
fs: Harden against open(..., O_CREAT, 02777) in a setgid directory

 fs/inode.c         | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 fs/internal.h      |  2 +-
 fs/ocfs2/file.c    |  4 ++--
 fs/open.c          |  2 +-
 include/linux/fs.h |  2 +-
 5 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
Signature · 7 lines
2.9.3

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