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RFC random: a simple vDSO mechanism for reseeding userspace CSPRNGs

Yann Droneaud linux-api linux-crypto lkml 1 version In review

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  1. v1 RFC Latest4 patches 7 repliesIn review

Patches in v1 No applies recorded yet

#Subject and filesSizeRepliesApplied
1/4random: introduce getrandom() GRND_TIMESTAMPdrivers/char/random.c include/linux/random.h include/uapi/linux/random.h+78 -11 reply
2/4random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom(,, GRND_TIMESTAMP) fast pathMAINTAINERS drivers/char/random.c include/vdso/datapage.h +2 more+72 -00 replies
3/4x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation.arch/x86/Kconfig arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S +4 more+82 -10 replies
4/4testing: add a getrandom() GRND_TIMESTAMP vDSO demonstration/benchmarktools/testing/crypto/getrandom/Makefile tools/testing/crypto/getrandom/test-getrandom.c+311 -00 replies

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Cover letter [RFC PATCH 0/4] random: a simple vDSO mechanism for reseeding userspace CSPRNGs

Hi,

Here's my humble hack at improving kernel for a faster secure arc4random() userspace implementation, by allowing userspace to buffer getrandom() generated entropy, discarding it as the kernel's own CSPRNG is reseeded.

It's largely built upon the vDSO work of Jason A. Donenfeld, as part of its latest patchset "[PATCH v14 0/7] implement getrandom() in vDSO" [1] but it's made simpler by making available only one of the missing tools for the userspace to properly buffer the output of getrandom().

Using MADV_WIPEONFORK and mlock(), userspace can reasonably offer forward secrecy*, until something like VM_DROPPABLE[2] is provided by the kernel, to allow for the buffer memory to never, ever be written to the disk before its used, being inherited accross fork(), and isn't limited by RLIMIT_MEMLOCK.

* provided userspace can mlock() the memory and calls mlock() on buffer after fork, as memory locks are not inherited accross fork().

As it's a hack, it's far from perfect. The main drawback I see is the case where fresh entropy has to be discarded as the kernel's CSPRNG generation is updated as the result of calling getrandom() to generate the mentionned entropy. The workaround, is to limit the amount of fresh entropy fetched when a kernel's CSPRNG generation change is detected, and to increase the amount the data retrieved with getrandom() when generation doesn't change between calls.

Performance wise, the improvements are here, as one can check with the test program provided:

    getrandom(,,GRND_TIMESTAMP) test
    getrandom() support GRND_TIMESTAMP
    found getrandom() in vDSO at 0x7ffc3efccc60
    == direct syscall getrandom(), 16777216 u32, 2.866324020 s,   5.853 M u32/s, 170.846 ns/u32
    == direct vDSO getrandom(),    16777216 u32, 2.883473280 s,   5.818 M u32/s, 171.868 ns/u32
    == pooled syscall getrandom(), 16777216 u32, 1.152421219 s,  14.558 M u32/s,  68.690 ns/u32, (0 bytes discarded)
    == pooled vDSO getrandom(),    16777216 u32, 0.162477863 s, 103.258 M u32/s,   9.684 ns/u32, (0 bytes discarded)

With the requirement to mlock() the memory page(s) used to buffer getrandom() output, I'm not sure userspace could afford to allocate 4KBytes per thread, before being hit by RLIMIT_MEMLOCK (or worse, OOM killer). Thus, some form of sharing between threads would be needed, which would require locking, reducing the performances shown above.

Also I haven't studied the security impact of making the kernel base CSPRNG seed generation available to userspace. It can be made more opaque if needed.

Regards.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Jason A. Donenfeld (2):
random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom(,, GRND_TIMESTAMP) fast path
x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation.

Yann Droneaud (2):
random: introduce getrandom() GRND_TIMESTAMP
testing: add a getrandom() GRND_TIMESTAMP vDSO demonstration/benchmark

 MAINTAINERS                                   |   1 +
 arch/x86/Kconfig                              |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile                  |   3 +-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S                |   2 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c              |  17 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h         |  42 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h          |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h                   |  16 +
 drivers/char/random.c                         |  52 ++-
 include/linux/random.h                        |  31 ++
 include/uapi/linux/random.h                   |   2 +
 include/vdso/datapage.h                       |   9 +
 lib/vdso/Kconfig                              |   5 +
 lib/vdso/getrandom.c                          |  51 +++
 tools/testing/crypto/getrandom/Makefile       |   4 +
 .../testing/crypto/getrandom/test-getrandom.c | 307 ++++++++++++++++++
 16 files changed, 543 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h
 create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/crypto/getrandom/Makefile
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/crypto/getrandom/test-getrandom.c
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