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Landlock: Add abstract unix socket connect reastriction

Tahera Fahimi linux-security-module lkml netdev outreachy 1 version In review

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Cover letter [PATCH 0/2] Landlock: Add abstract unix socket connect reastriction

This patch series introduces the optional scoping of abstract unix sockets. This feature aims to scope the connection of an abstract socket from a sandbox process to other sockets outside of the sandbox domain. (see [1, 2])

The following changes are included in this series:
[PATCH 1/2]: Introduce the "scoped" field to the ruleset structure in
the user space interface, and add the restriction mechanism to Landlock.
[PATCH 2/2]: Add three comprehensive tests for the new feature.

Tahera Fahimi (2):
Landlock: Add abstract unix socket connect restriction
Landlock: Abstract unix socket restriction tests

 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h                 |  29 +
 security/landlock/limits.h                    |   3 +
 security/landlock/ruleset.c                   |   7 +-
 security/landlock/ruleset.h                   |  23 +-
 security/landlock/syscalls.c                  |  12 +-
 security/landlock/task.c                      |  62 ++
 .../testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c  | 786 ++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 916 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1

From 2901842a561ee3d205f93f9ba543741f82edf65d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <2901842a561ee3d205f93f9ba543741f82edf65d.1720203255.git.fahimitahera@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
References: <[email protected]>
From: Tahera Fahimi <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 15:23:17 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Landlock: Add abstract unix socket connect restriction

Abstract unix sockets are used for local inter-process communications without a filesystem. Currently a sandboxed process can connect to a socket outside of the sandboxed environment, since Landlock has no restriction for connecting to an abstract socket address. Access to such sockets for a sandboxed process should be scoped the same way ptrace is limited.

Because of compatibility reasons and since landlock should be flexible, we extend the user space interface by adding a new "scoped" field to the ruleset attribute structure. This field optionally contains a "LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET" to specify that the ruleset will deny any connection from within the sandbox to its parents(i.e. any parent sandbox or non-sandbox processes)

-------
v6: Removing tests. Removing curr_ruleset.
v5: Added curr_ruleset to hierarachy_ruleset structure for optional
scoping purpose.
V4: Added tests and changes in task.c to scope different sockets
differently.
V3: Added "scoped" field to landlock_ruleset_attr
V2: Remove wrapper functions
-------

---
 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 29 ++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/limits.h    |  3 ++
 security/landlock/ruleset.c   |  7 ++--
 security/landlock/ruleset.h   | 23 ++++++++++++-
 security/landlock/syscalls.c  | 12 +++++--
 security/landlock/task.c      | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +29 -0
index 68625e728f43..010aaca5b05a 100644
@@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
 	 * rule explicitly allow them.
 	 */
 	__u64 handled_access_net;
+	/**
+	 * @scoped: Bitmask of scopes (cf. `Scope flags`_)
+	 * restricting a Landlock domain from accessing outside
+	 * resources(e.g. IPCs).
+	 */
+	__u64 scoped;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -266,4 +272,27 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
 #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP			(1ULL << 0)
 #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP			(1ULL << 1)
 /* clang-format on */
+
+/**
+ * DOC: scope
+ *
+ * .scoped attribute handles a set of restrictions on kernel IPCs through
+ * the following flags.
+ *
+ * Scope flags
+ * ~~~~~~~~~~~
+ *
+ * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process from a set of IPC
+ * actions. Setting a flag for a ruleset will isolate the Landlock domain
+ * to forbid connections to resources outside the domain.
+ *
+ * IPCs with scoped actions:
+ * - %LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET: Restrict a sandboxed process
+ *   from connecting to an abstract unix socket created by a process
+ *   outside the related Landlock domain (e.g. a parent domain or a process
+ *   which is not sandboxed).
+ */
+/* clang-format off */
+#define LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET		(1ULL << 0)
+/* clang-format on*/
 #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
security/landlock/limits.h +3 -0
index 4eb643077a2a..eb01d0fb2165 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
 #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET	((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1)
 #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET		__const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
 
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_SCOPE		LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET
+#define LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE		((LANDLOCK_LAST_SCOPE << 1) - 1)
+#define LANDLOCK_NUM_SCOPE		__const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE)
 /* clang-format on */
 
 #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H */
security/landlock/ruleset.c +5 -2
index 6ff232f58618..a93bdbf52fff 100644
@@ -52,12 +52,13 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
 
 struct landlock_ruleset *
 landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
-			const access_mask_t net_access_mask)
+			const access_mask_t net_access_mask,
+			const access_mask_t scope_mask)
 {
 	struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset;
 
 	/* Informs about useless ruleset. */
-	if (!fs_access_mask && !net_access_mask)
+	if (!fs_access_mask && !net_access_mask && !scope_mask)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMSG);
 	new_ruleset = create_ruleset(1);
 	if (IS_ERR(new_ruleset))
@@ -66,6 +67,8 @@ landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
 		landlock_add_fs_access_mask(new_ruleset, fs_access_mask, 0);
 	if (net_access_mask)
 		landlock_add_net_access_mask(new_ruleset, net_access_mask, 0);
+	if (scope_mask)
+		landlock_add_scope_mask(new_ruleset, scope_mask, 0);
 	return new_ruleset;
 }
 
security/landlock/ruleset.h +22 -1
index 0f1b5b4c8f6b..c749fa0b3ecd 100644
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ typedef u16 access_mask_t;
 static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
 /* Makes sure all network access rights can be stored. */
 static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
+/* Makes sure all scoped rights can be stored*/
+static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_SCOPE);
 /* Makes sure for_each_set_bit() and for_each_clear_bit() calls are OK. */
 static_assert(sizeof(unsigned long) >= sizeof(access_mask_t));
 
@@ -42,6 +44,7 @@ static_assert(sizeof(unsigned long) >= sizeof(access_mask_t));
 struct access_masks {
 	access_mask_t fs : LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS;
 	access_mask_t net : LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET;
+	access_mask_t scoped : LANDLOCK_NUM_SCOPE;
 };
 
 typedef u16 layer_mask_t;
@@ -233,7 +236,8 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
 
 struct landlock_ruleset *
 landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t access_mask_fs,
-			const access_mask_t access_mask_net);
+			const access_mask_t access_mask_net,
+			const access_mask_t scope_mask);
 
 void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
 void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
@@ -280,6 +284,16 @@ landlock_add_net_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
 	ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].net |= net_mask;
 }
 
+static inline void
+landlock_add_scope_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			const access_mask_t scope_mask, const u16 layer_level)
+{
+	access_mask_t scoped_mask = scope_mask & LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(scope_mask != scoped_mask);
+	ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].scoped |= scoped_mask;
+}
+
 static inline access_mask_t
 landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
 				const u16 layer_level)
@@ -303,6 +317,13 @@ landlock_get_net_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
 	return ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].net;
 }
 
+static inline access_mask_t
+landlock_get_scope_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			const u16 layer_level)
+{
+	return ruleset->access_masks[layer_level].scoped;
+}
+
 bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
 			    const access_mask_t access_request,
 			    layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[],
security/landlock/syscalls.c +9 -3
index 03b470f5a85a..8ea0a13bee83 100644
@@ -97,8 +97,9 @@ static void build_check_abi(void)
 	 */
 	ruleset_size = sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs);
 	ruleset_size += sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_net);
+	ruleset_size += sizeof(ruleset_attr.scoped);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != ruleset_size);
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 16);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 24);
 
 	path_beneath_size = sizeof(path_beneath_attr.allowed_access);
 	path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd);
@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
  * Possible returned errors are:
  *
  * - %EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
- * - %EINVAL: unknown @flags, or unknown access, or too small @size;
+ * - %EINVAL: unknown @flags, or unknown access, or uknown scope, or too small @size;
  * - %E2BIG or %EFAULT: @attr or @size inconsistencies;
  * - %ENOMSG: empty &landlock_ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs.
  */
@@ -213,9 +214,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset,
 	    LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* Checks IPC scoping content (and 32-bits cast). */
+	if ((ruleset_attr.scoped | LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE) != LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* Checks arguments and transforms to kernel struct. */
 	ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs,
-					  ruleset_attr.handled_access_net);
+					  ruleset_attr.handled_access_net,
+					  ruleset_attr.scoped);
 	if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
 		return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
 
security/landlock/task.c +62 -0

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Signature · 1 line
2.34.1

From 314cc02a23cbf82bca140fe8a0f0ceb75c67ea77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <314cc02a23cbf82bca140fe8a0f0ceb75c67ea77.1720203255.git.fahimitahera@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
References: <[email protected]>
From: Tahera Fahimi <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2024 15:54:25 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Landlock: Abstract unix socket restriction tests

Tests for scoping abstract unix sockets. The patch has three types of tests:
i) unix_socket: base tests the scoping mechanism for a landlocked process, same as the ptrace test.
ii) optional_scoping: generates three processes with different domains and
tests if a process with a non-scoped domain can connect to other processes.
iii) unix_sock_special_cases: since the socket's creator credentials are used
for scoping datagram sockets, this test examines the cases where the socket's credentials are different from the process using it.

---
 .../testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c  | 786 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 786 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c +786 -0

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2.34.1