RFC Anti rollback protection for FIT Images
Get series with b4
b4 am [email protected]Versions newest first
- v1 RFC Latest0 of 1 patch 0 repliesNew
Patches in v1 No applies recorded yet
The patch the cover letter announces is not in this archive.
Reviews trailers per patch
No Reviewed-by, Acked-by or Tested-by trailers for v1 yet.
Cover letter [RFC PATCH 0/1] Anti rollback protection for FIT Images
Hi Rasmus,
Thanks for the review. Please see in-line:
Quoted 11 lines · Rasmus Villemoes
Quoted 4 lines · Thirupathaiah Annapureddy
Anti rollback protection is required when there is a need to retire previous versions of FIT images due to security flaws in them. Currently U-Boot Verified boot does not have rollback protection to protect against known security flaws.
This is definitely something we've had on our todo-list/wishlist. But we haven't had the time to sit down and work out the semantics and implementation, so thanks for doing this.
I think most of this cover letter should be in the commit log instead.
Yes, will do in the formal patch proposal.
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 6 lines
This RFC introduces a proposal to add anti-rollback protection for FIT images. This protection feature prevents U-Boot from accepting an image if it has ever successfully loaded an image with a larger anti-rollback version number.
Quoted 6 lines
Each sub-image node inside /images node has an anti-rollback version number(arbvn) similar to
rollback_indexin Android Verified Boot. This version number is part of signed data and it is incremented as security flaws are discovered and fixed. U-Boot stores the last seen arbvn for a given image type in platform specific tamper-evident storage.
Quoted 7 lines
Hmm. What is the purpose of per-image-type version numbers? That seems to be wrong. For example, we use the the "loadables" property in the U-Boot FIT to get the SPL to load some firmware blob to a known memory address where U-Boot proper then knows it to be. If we happened to have two such blobs for different pieces of hardware, they'd have the same "type" in the FIT image, but that doesn't mean they should follow the same versioning.
I received similar feedback internally to enhance the board specific hooks to take sub-image node name as another input argument. Board specific code can use this additional input to distinguish different images of the same type.
Quoted 27 lines
The way I imagined rollback protection to work (but I really haven't given this too much thought) was to have an extra property in the configuration:
configurations { default = "conf-1"; conf-1 { description = "..."; kernel = "kernel-1"; fdt = "fdt-1"; ramdisk = "ramdisk-1"; arvbn = "arvbn"; /* <-- */ hash-1 { algo = "sha1"; }; signature-foo { algo = "sha1,rsa2048"; sign-images = "kernel", "fdt", "ramdisk", "arvbn"; key-name-hint = "foo"; }; }; };with arvbn simply being a small extra "image" node
Quoted 8 lines
arvbn { description = "BSP version"; data = <0x02 0x03 0x01>; }(which should of course not be loaded to memory). This requires use of signed configurations rather than individually signed images, but that's anyway required for proper security.
The current proposal applies to both signed images and signed configurations.
Quoted 5 lines
The board callbacks would simply be given a pointer to the data part of that node; that would make the versioning scheme rather flexible instead of being limited to a single monotonically increasing u32 (hence also the comparison logic should be in the board callbacks, instead of a
The comparison logic should be in the common code to enforce the checks in a consistent way.
Quoted 4 lines
"get/set" interface). For example, one could have a version composed as $major.$minor;$security, the board logic could prevent both downgrading to another major version and another security version. I.e., suppose we've had several BSP releases (in chronological order):
A BSP could be composed of multiple images and each of them will have their own normal versioning scheme. Anti-rollback version number(arbvn) is an additional complimentary version that can be incremented as security flaws are discovered and fixed in a given image. This does not replace existing versioning scheme for a given image.
Quoted 15 lines
1.0;0
1.1;0
2.0;0
1.2;0
2.1;0
<major bug found and fixed>
1.3;1
2.2;1
2.3;1
1.4;1
<another one...>
2.4;2
1.5;2
Quoted 5 lines
With this, a user on 1.3 cannot update to 2.0; he must go at least to 2.2, or he would expose himself to a flaw that had already been fixed. On the other hand, there should be nothing wrong with downgrading from 1.2 to 1.0. A user on 2.0 must not downgrade to 1.x because the old major version cannot read the data written by the 2.0 application.
Please revisit your normal versioning scheme. If possible try to follow
https://semver.org/. As I mentioned earlier,
Anti-rollback version number(arbvn) is an additional version that can be incremented as security flaws are discovered and fixed in a given image. In other words, it does not replace your existing versioning scheme.
Quoted 11 lines
This sort of thing is hard to implement with just a single rollback
number: At the time 2.0 is released, what rollback number should it get? If we give it 10, we can only produce fixes for nine security bugs in the 1.x series before that series ends up with a rollback version larger than the 2.0 one, after which a user on 2.0 would wrongly be able to downgrade to 1.12.tl;dr: I'd like this to not only be about rollback protection for security bugs,
But this RFC is for rollback protection from security point of view.
Quoted 3 lines
but also be able to set other policies for rollback. And therefore I'd also like it simply to be known as "version" instead of the somewhat odd arvbn acronym.
This is clarified in the previous comments.
Images will continue to maintain their existing normal versioning scheme and you can continue to apply existing policies around that.
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Pseudo code is as follows:
ret =
board_get_arbvn(type, &plat_arbvn);
...Quoted 8 lines
if (image_arbvn < plat_arbvn) { return -EPERM; } else if (image_arbvn > plat_arbvn) { ret = board_set_arbvn(type, image_arbvn); return ret; } else { return 0; }
Quoted 3 lines
Hm, I think you should post-pone writing back the new version number until all other checks have passed, i.e. until just before we pass control to the new image.
I do not think U-Boot will pass control to each and every image in the FIT container. ex: ramdisk.
Board specific code can still have the flexibility to defer and write new version number at a later time ex: board_preboot_os().
Quoted 38 lines
Quoted 38 lines
The following board specific hooks are required to get/set arbvn from platform specific tamper-evident storage.
intboard_get_arbvn(uint8_t ih_type, uint32_t *arbvn); intboard_set_arbvn(uint8_t ih_type, uint32_t arbvn);As an example, consider this FIT:
/ { images { kernel-1 { data = <data for kernel1> arbvn = <1>; hash-1 { algo = "sha1"; value = <...kernel hash 1...> }; }; fdt-1 { data = <data for fdt1>; hash-1 { algo = "sha1"; value = <...fdt hash 1...> }; }; }; configurations { default = "conf-1"; conf-1 { kernel = "kernel-1"; fdt = "fdt-1"; signature-1 { algo = "sha1,rsa2048"; sign-images = "fdt", "kernel"; value = <...conf 1 signature...>; }; }; }; };
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
In the above example, kernel-1 image has an arbvn of 1.
ifplat_arbvnis 1, the system will boot with this FIT image. ifplat_arbvnis 2 or more, U-Boot will prevent the system from booting with this FIT image.Yeah, this seems a bit arbitrary.
This is just an example.
Quoted 2 lines
Why does the kernel have an arvbn, but
not the device tree or (perhaps more importantly) an initramfs?
device tree and initramfs can also have their own arbvn. Have you checked the code patch that came with this RFC? There is nothing in the code that prevents these images from having their own arbvn.
Quoted 1 line
Which images must have such a number?
Any image can have their own arbvn.
Quoted 2 lines
As I said above, I think the version
number should really be a property of the whole configuration.
I have considered the above simpler option. But I believe image specific arbvn is more appropriate as the security features and security bug fixes are implemented in images than in config sub-nodes.
Best Regards,
Thiru