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KASAN: use-after-free Read in do_mount

PATCH Superseded syzbot 3 participants 4 messages Oct 7, 2019 – Oct 14, 2019 VFS

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

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#0 lore raw

Hello,

syzbot found the following crash on:

HEAD commit:    311ef88a Add linux-next specific files for 20191004
git tree:       linux-next
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=16ce4899600000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=db2e4361e48662f4
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=da4f525235510683d855
compiler:       gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental)
syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=17b672b9600000

The bug was bisected to:

commit 9d14545b05f9eed69fbd4af14b927a462324ea19

Author: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Date:   Fri Aug 30 16:12:15 2019 +0000

Merge branch 'limits' of https://github.com/deepa-hub/vfs into y2038

bisection log:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=16eeee2b600000
final crash:    https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=15eeee2b600000
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=11eeee2b600000

IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 9d14545b05f9 ("Merge branch 'limits' of https://github.com/deepa-hub/vfs into y2038")

==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:2773 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2825 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_mount+0x1b5f/0x1d10 fs/namespace.c:3143
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88809a505b28 by task syz-executor.4/13945

CPU: 1 PID: 13945 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506
 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:634
 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132
 do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:2773 [inline]
 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2825 [inline]
 do_mount+0x1b5f/0x1d10 fs/namespace.c:3143
 ksys_mount+0xdb/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3352
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3366 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3363 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3363
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x760 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x459a59
Code: fd b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f1c10834c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000459a59
RDX: 0000000020000a40 RSI: 00000000200005c0 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1c108356d4
R13: 00000000004c6291 R14: 00000000004db2f8 R15: 00000000ffffffff

Allocated by task 13945:
 save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:69
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:77 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:510 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:483
 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:518
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:584 [inline]
 slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3319 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x121/0x710 mm/slab.c:3483
 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:680 [inline]
 alloc_vfsmnt+0x28/0x680 fs/namespace.c:177
 vfs_create_mount+0x96/0x500 fs/namespace.c:940
 do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:2763 [inline]
 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2825 [inline]
 do_mount+0x17ae/0x1d10 fs/namespace.c:3143
 ksys_mount+0xdb/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3352
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3366 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3363 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3363
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x760 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 16:
 save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:69
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:77 [inline]
 kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:332 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:471
 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:480
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3425 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x320 mm/slab.c:3693
 free_vfsmnt+0x6f/0x90 fs/namespace.c:554
 delayed_free_vfsmnt+0x16/0x20 fs/namespace.c:559
 __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:222 [inline]
 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2157 [inline]
 rcu_core+0x581/0x1560 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2377
 rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2386
 __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88809a505b00
 which belongs to the cache mnt_cache of size 312
The buggy address is located 40 bytes inside of
 312-byte region [ffff88809a505b00, ffff88809a505c38)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002694140 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa5a88c0 index:0x0
flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab)
raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea000274afc8 ffffea0002982688 ffff8880aa5a88c0
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88809a505080 000000010000000a 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88809a505a00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff88809a505a80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Quoted 1 line

ffff88809a505b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

                                  ^

ffff88809a505b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88809a505c00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================

---
This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. syzbot engineers can be reached at [email protected].

syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot. For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
syzbot can test patches for this bug, for details see:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches

#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 fs/namespace.c: fix use-after-free of mount in mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry()

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

After do_add_mount() returns success, the caller doesn't hold a reference to the 'struct mount' anymore. So it's invalid to access it in mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry().

Fix it by instead passing the super_block and the mnt_flags. It's safe to access the super_block because it's pinned by fs_context::root.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes f8b92ba67c5d ("mount: Add mount warning for impending timestamp expiry")
---
 fs/namespace.c | 15 +++++++--------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/namespace.c +7 -8
index fe0e9e1410fe..7ef8edaaed69 100644
@@ -2466,12 +2466,11 @@ static void set_mount_attributes(struct mount *mnt, unsigned int mnt_flags)
 	unlock_mount_hash();
 }
 
-static void mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(struct path *mountpoint, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+static void mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(struct path *mountpoint,
+				      struct super_block *sb, int mnt_flags)
 {
-	struct super_block *sb = mnt->mnt_sb;
-
-	if (!__mnt_is_readonly(mnt) &&
-	   (ktime_get_real_seconds() + TIME_UPTIME_SEC_MAX > sb->s_time_max)) {
+	if (!(mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY) && !sb_rdonly(sb) &&
+	    (ktime_get_real_seconds() + TIME_UPTIME_SEC_MAX > sb->s_time_max)) {
 		char *buf = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 		char *mntpath = buf ? d_path(mountpoint, buf, PAGE_SIZE) : ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 		struct tm tm;
@@ -2512,7 +2511,7 @@ static int do_reconfigure_mnt(struct path *path, unsigned int mnt_flags)
 		set_mount_attributes(mnt, mnt_flags);
 	up_write(&sb->s_umount);
 
-	mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(path, &mnt->mnt);
+	mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(path, sb, mnt_flags);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -2555,7 +2554,7 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int ms_flags, int sb_flags,
 		up_write(&sb->s_umount);
 	}
 
-	mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(path, &mnt->mnt);
+	mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(path, sb, mnt_flags);
 
 	put_fs_context(fc);
 	return err;
@@ -2770,7 +2769,7 @@ static int do_new_mount_fc(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
 		return error;
 	}
 
-	mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(mountpoint, mnt);
+	mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(mountpoint, sb, mnt_flags);
 
 	return error;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] fs/namespace.c: fix use-after-free of mount in mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry()

Thanks for the fix.

Would it be better to move the check and warning to a place where the access is still safe?

-Deepa

Quoted 3 lines · Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Quoted 68 lines · Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

After do_add_mount() returns success, the caller doesn't hold a reference to the 'struct mount' anymore. So it's invalid to access it in mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry().

Fix it by instead passing the super_block and the mnt_flags. It's safe to access the super_block because it's pinned by fs_context::root.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes f8b92ba67c5d ("mount: Add mount warning for impending timestamp expiry")
---
 fs/namespace.c | 15 +++++++--------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/namespace.c +7 -9
index fe0e9e1410fe..7ef8edaaed69 100644
@@ -2466,12 +2466,11 @@ static void set_mount_attributes(struct mount *mnt, unsigned int mnt_flags)
        unlock_mount_hash();
 }
 
-static void mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(struct path *mountpoint, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+static void mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(struct path *mountpoint,
+                                     struct super_block *sb, int mnt_flags)
 {
-       struct super_block *sb = mnt->mnt_sb;
-
-       if (!__mnt_is_readonly(mnt) &&
-          (ktime_get_real_seconds() + TIME_UPTIME_SEC_MAX > sb->s_time_max)) {
+       if (!(mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY) && !sb_rdonly(sb) &&
+           (ktime_get_real_seconds() + TIME_UPTIME_SEC_MAX > sb->s_time_max)) {
                char *buf = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
                char *mntpath = buf ? d_path(mountpoint, buf, PAGE_SIZE) : ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
                struct tm tm;
@@ -2512,7 +2511,7 @@ static int do_reconfigure_mnt(struct path *path, unsigned int mnt_flags)
                set_mount_attributes(mnt, mnt_flags);
        up_write(&sb->s_umount);
 
-       mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(path, &mnt->mnt);
+       mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(path, sb, mnt_flags);
 
        return ret;
 }
@@ -2555,7 +2554,7 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int ms_flags, int sb_flags,
                up_write(&sb->s_umount);
        }
 
-       mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(path, &mnt->mnt);
+       mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(path, sb, mnt_flags);
 
        put_fs_context(fc);
        return err;
@@ -2770,7 +2769,7 @@ static int do_new_mount_fc(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
                return error;
        }
 
-       mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(mountpoint, mnt);
+       mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(mountpoint, sb, mnt_flags);
 
        return error;
 }
--

2.23.0

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] fs/namespace.c: fix use-after-free of mount in mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry()

Quoted 6 lines · Deepa Dinamani

Thanks for the fix.

Would it be better to move the check and warning to a place where the access is still safe?

-Deepa

True, we could just do

fs/namespace.c +2 -2
index fe0e9e1410fe..9f2ceb542f05 100644
@@ -2764,14 +2764,14 @@ static int do_new_mount_fc(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
 	if (IS_ERR(mnt))
 		return PTR_ERR(mnt);
 
+	mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(mountpoint, mnt);
+
 	error = do_add_mount(real_mount(mnt), mountpoint, mnt_flags);
 	if (error < 0) {
 		mntput(mnt);
 		return error;
 	}
 
-	mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry(mountpoint, mnt);
-
 	return error;
 }
 

But then the warning ("Mounted %s file system ...") is printed even if do_add_mount() fails so nothing was actually mounted.

Though, it's just a warning message and I think failures here are rare, so maybe we don't care. Al, what do you think?

- Eric