general protection fault in shash_async_export
Subsystems (4)
syzbot
syzbotHello,
syzbot found the following issue on:
HEAD commit: 37ff78e977f1 mlxsw: spectrum_nve_vxlan: Fix unsupported fl.. git tree: net-next console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=15a22943280000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=526f919910d4a671 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=472626bb5e7c59fb768f compiler: gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2 syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=133e0463280000 C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1543e995280000
Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/41e829152d3c/disk-37ff78e9.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/a594b97acb02/vmlinux-37ff78e9.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/b41140b53372/bzImage-37ff78e9.xz
The issue was bisected to:
commit c662b043cdca89bf0f03fc37251000ac69a3a548
Author: David Howells <[email protected]> Date: Tue Jun 6 13:08:56 2023 +0000
crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES
bisection log: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=15c78453280000 final oops: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=17c78453280000 console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13c78453280000
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000004: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000020-0x0000000000000027] CPU: 1 PID: 5002 Comm: syz-executor421 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5-syzkaller-00859-g37ff78e977f1 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/25/2023 RIP: 0010:crypto_shash_alg include/crypto/hash.h:827 [inline] RIP: 0010:crypto_shash_export include/crypto/hash.h:956 [inline] RIP: 0010:shash_async_export+0x47/0xa0 crypto/shash.c:389 Code: 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e2 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 4e 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 5b 50 48 8d 7b 20 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 75 40 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 5b 20 48 8d RSP: 0018:ffffc900038afd20 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffffffff83df0723 RDI: 0000000000000020 RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 000000000000064d R12: ffff8880766612f8 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff888077e0aa00 R15: ffff88802927ea48 FS: 00005555557db300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f069bf4bfd8 CR3: 00000000773e6000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> crypto_ahash_export include/crypto/hash.h:523 [inline] hash_accept+0x229/0x670 crypto/algif_hash.c:286 hash_accept_nokey+0x67/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:416 do_accept+0x380/0x510 net/socket.c:1883 __sys_accept4_file net/socket.c:1924 [inline] __sys_accept4+0x9a/0x120 net/socket.c:1954 __do_sys_accept net/socket.c:1971 [inline] __se_sys_accept net/socket.c:1968 [inline] __x64_sys_accept+0x75/0xb0 net/socket.c:1968 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f069bf04c39 Code: 28 c3 e8 2a 14 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffc03b39588 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f069bf04c39 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f069bec8de0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f069bec8e70 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:crypto_shash_alg include/crypto/hash.h:827 [inline] RIP: 0010:crypto_shash_export include/crypto/hash.h:956 [inline] RIP: 0010:shash_async_export+0x47/0xa0 crypto/shash.c:389 Code: 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e2 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 4e 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 5b 50 48 8d 7b 20 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 75 40 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 5b 20 48 8d RSP: 0018:ffffc900038afd20 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffffffff83df0723 RDI: 0000000000000020 RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 000000000000064d R12: ffff8880766612f8 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff888077e0aa00 R15: ffff88802927ea48 FS: 00005555557db300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000558cc7d83000 CR3: 00000000773e6000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 ---------------- Code disassembly (best guess), 3 bytes skipped: 0: df 4c 89 e2 fisttps -0x1e(%rcx,%rcx,4) 4: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx 8: 80 3c 02 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) c: 75 4e jne 0x5c e: 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax 15: fc ff df 18: 48 8b 5b 50 mov 0x50(%rbx),%rbx 1c: 48 8d 7b 20 lea 0x20(%rbx),%rdi 20: 48 89 fa mov %rdi,%rdx 23: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx * 27: 80 3c 02 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) <-- trapping instruction 2b: 75 40 jne 0x6d 2d: 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax 34: fc ff df 37: 48 8b 5b 20 mov 0x20(%rbx),%rbx 3b: 48 rex.W 3c: 8d .byte 0x8d
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#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next.git main
crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)
If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped.
Fix this by always making a pass of the loop, even in the case that no data is provided to the sendmsg().
Fix also extract_iter_to_sg() to handle a zero-length iterator by returning 0 immediately.
Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if we get more than ALG_MAX_PAGES - this shouldn't happen.
crypto/algif_hash.c +5 -16
@@ -83,26 +83,14 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, ctx->more = false; -while (msg_data_left (msg)) { + do { ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl = ctx->sgl.sgl; ctx->sgl.sgt.nents = 0; ctx->sgl.sgt.orig_nents = 0; err = -EIO; npages = iov_iter_npages(&msg->msg_iter, max_pages); -if (npages ==0 ) - goto unlock_free; - -if (npages >ARRAY_SIZE (ctx->sgl.sgl)) { - err = -ENOMEM ; - ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl = -kvmalloc (array_size (npages, -sizeof (*ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl)), -GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl) - goto unlock_free; - } -sg_init_table (ctx->sgl.sgl, npages); + sg_init_table(ctx->sgl.sgl, max_t(size_t, npages, 1)); ctx->sgl.need_unpin = iov_iter_extract_will_pin(&msg->msg_iter);
@@ -111,7 +99,8 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,if (err <0 ) goto unlock_free; len = err; -sg_mark_end (ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl + ctx->sgl.sgt.nents -1 ); +if (len >0 ) +sg_mark_end (ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl + ctx->sgl.sgt.nents -1 );if (!msg_data_left (msg)) { err =hash_alloc_result (sk, ctx);
@@ -148,7 +137,7 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, copied += len;af_alg_free_sg (&ctx->sgl); - } + }while (msg_data_left (msg)); ctx->more = msg->msg_flags &MSG_MORE ; err =0 ;
lib/scatterlist.c +1 -1
@@ -1340,7 +1340,7 @@ ssize_t extract_iter_to_sg(struct iov_iter *iter, size_t maxsize, struct sg_table *sgtable, unsigned int sg_max, iov_iter_extraction_t extraction_flags) { - if (maxsize == 0) + if (!maxsize || !iter->count) return 0; switch (iov_iter_type(iter)) {
syzbot
syzbotsyzbot has tested the proposed patch and the reproducer did not trigger any issue:
Hello,
syzbot has tested the proposed patch and the reproducer did not trigger any issue:
Tested on:
commit: fa0e21fa rtnetlink: extend RTEXT_FILTER_SKIP_STATS to .. git tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next.git main console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=149b6617280000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=526f919910d4a671 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=472626bb5e7c59fb768f compiler: gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2 patch: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=154a41fd280000
Note: testing is done by a robot and is best-effort only.