KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds Read in compat_copy_entries
Subsystems (4)
syzbot
syzbotHello,
syzbot found the following crash on:
HEAD commit: e31736d9 Merge tag 'nios2-v5.5-rc2' of git://git.kernel.or.. git tree: upstream console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=14a4f5dee00000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=79f79de2a27d3e3d dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f68108fed972453a0ad4 compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental) userspace arch: i386 syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=11c105dee00000 C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=12f1e32ee00000
IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2063 [inline] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in compat_copy_entries+0x128b/0x1380 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155 Read of size 4 at addr ffffc900004461f4 by task syz-executor267/7937 CPU: 1 PID: 7937 Comm: syz-executor267 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639 __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:134 size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2063 [inline] compat_copy_entries+0x128b/0x1380 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155 compat_do_replace+0x344/0x720 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2249 compat_do_ebt_set_ctl+0x22f/0x27e net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2333 compat_nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:144 [inline] compat_nf_setsockopt+0x98/0x140 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:156 compat_ip_setsockopt net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1286 [inline] compat_ip_setsockopt+0x106/0x140 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1267 compat_udp_setsockopt+0x68/0xb0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2649 compat_sock_common_setsockopt+0xb2/0x140 net/core/sock.c:3160 __compat_sys_setsockopt+0x185/0x380 net/compat.c:384 __do_compat_sys_setsockopt net/compat.c:397 [inline] __se_compat_sys_setsockopt net/compat.c:394 [inline] __ia32_compat_sys_setsockopt+0xbd/0x150 net/compat.c:394 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:337 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x27b/0xe16 arch/x86/entry/common.c:408 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x70/0x7f arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139 RIP: 0023:0xf7fc3a39 Code: 00 00 00 89 d3 5b 5e 5f 5d c3 b8 80 96 98 00 eb c4 8b 04 24 c3 8b 1c 24 c3 8b 34 24 c3 8b 3c 24 c3 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 eb 0d 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 002b:00000000ffab2b4c EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000016e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000080 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000212 RBP: 0000000000000012 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Memory state around the buggy address: ffffc90000446080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffffc90000446100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Quoted 1 line
ffffc90000446180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
^
ffffc90000446200: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
ffffc90000446280: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
==================================================================
---
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Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 1/1 netfilter: ebtables: compat: reject all padding in matches/watchers
syzbot reported following splat:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2063 [inline] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in compat_copy_entries+0x128b/0x1380 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155 Read of size 4 at addr ffffc900004461f4 by task syz-executor267/7937 CPU: 1 PID: 7937 Comm: syz-executor267 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2063 [inline] compat_copy_entries+0x128b/0x1380 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155 compat_do_replace+0x344/0x720 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2249 compat_do_ebt_set_ctl+0x22f/0x27e net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2333 [..]
Because padding isn't considered during computation of ->buf_user_offset, "total" is decremented by fewer bytes than it should.
Therefore, the first part of
if (*total < sizeof(*entry) || entry->next_offset < sizeof(*entry))
will pass, -- it should not have. This causes oob access:entry->next_offset is past the vmalloced size.
Reject padding and check that computed user offset (sum of ebt_entry structure plus all individual matches/watchers/targets) is same value that userspace gave us as the offset of the next entry.
--- net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +16 -17
@@ -1867,7 +1867,7 @@ static int ebt_buf_count(struct ebt_entries_buf_state *state, unsigned int sz) }static int ebt_buf_add (struct ebt_entries_buf_state *state, -void *data,unsigned int sz) +const void *data,unsigned int sz) {if (state->buf_kern_start ==NULL ) goto count_only;
@@ -1901,7 +1901,7 @@ enum compat_mwt { EBT_COMPAT_TARGET, }; -static int compat_mtw_from_user (struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *mwt, +static int compat_mtw_from_user (const struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *mwt,enum compat_mwt compat_mwt,struct ebt_entries_buf_state *state,const unsigned char *base)
@@ -1979,22 +1979,23 @@ static int compat_mtw_from_user(struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *mwt,/* return size of all matches, watchers or target, including necessary * alignment and padding. */ -static int ebt_size_mwt (struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32, +static int ebt_size_mwt (const struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32,unsigned int size_left,enum compat_mwt type,struct ebt_entries_buf_state *state,const void *base) { +const char *buf = (const char *)match32;int growth =0 ; -char *buf;if (size_left ==0 )return 0 ; - buf = (char *) match32; - -while (size_left >=sizeof (*match32)) { + do { struct ebt_entry_match *match_kern; int ret; + if (size_left < sizeof(*match32)) + return -EINVAL; + match_kern = (struct ebt_entry_match *) state->buf_kern_start; if (match_kern) { char *tmp;
@@ -2031,22 +2032,18 @@ static int ebt_size_mwt(struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32,if (match_kern) match_kern->match_size = ret; -/* rule should have no remaining data after target */ -if (type ==EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left) -return -EINVAL ; - match32 = (struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *) buf; - } + }while (size_left);return growth; }/* called for all ebt_entry structures. */ -static int size_entry_mwt (struct ebt_entry *entry,const unsigned char *base, +static int size_entry_mwt (const struct ebt_entry *entry,const unsigned char *base,unsigned int *total,struct ebt_entries_buf_state *state) { -unsigned int i, j, startoff, new_offset =0 ; +unsigned int i, j, startoff, next_expected_off, new_offset =0 ;/* stores match/watchers/targets & offset of next struct ebt_entry: */ unsigned int offsets[4 ];unsigned int *offsets_update =NULL ;
@@ -2132,11 +2129,13 @@ static int size_entry_mwt(struct ebt_entry *entry, const unsigned char *base,return ret; } - startoff = state->buf_user_offset - startoff; + next_expected_off = state->buf_user_offset - startoff; +if (next_expected_off != entry->next_offset) +return -EINVAL ; -if (WARN_ON (*total < startoff)) +if (*total < entry->next_offset)return -EINVAL ; - *total -= startoff; + *total -= entry->next_offset;return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
Re: [PATCH nf] netfilter: ebtables: compat: reject all padding in matches/watchers
Quoted 18 lines · Florian Westphal
syzbot reported following splat:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2063 [inline] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in compat_copy_entries+0x128b/0x1380 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155 Read of size 4 at addr ffffc900004461f4 by task syz-executor267/7937 CPU: 1 PID: 7937 Comm: syz-executor267 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2063 [inline] compat_copy_entries+0x128b/0x1380 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155 compat_do_replace+0x344/0x720 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2249 compat_do_ebt_set_ctl+0x22f/0x27e net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2333 [..]Because padding isn't considered during computation of ->buf_user_offset, "total" is decremented by fewer bytes than it should.
Therefore, the first part of
Quoted 8 lines
if (*total <
sizeof(*entry)||entry->next_offset<sizeof(*entry))will pass, -- it should not have. This causes oob access:
entry->next_offsetis past the vmalloced size.Reject padding and check that computed user offset (sum of
ebt_entrystructure plus all individual matches/watchers/targets) is same value that userspace gave us as the offset of the next entry.
Applied, thanks.
syzbot
syzbotsyzbot has bisected this bug to:
syzbot has bisected this bug to:
commit 0609ae011deb41c9629b7f5fd626dfa1ac9d16b0
Author: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]> Date: Sun Dec 1 01:55:00 2019 +0000
x86/kasan: support KASAN_VMALLOC
bisection log: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=166d43dee00000 start commit: e31736d9 Merge tag 'nios2-v5.5-rc2' of git://git.kernel.or.. git tree: upstream final crash: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=156d43dee00000 console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=116d43dee00000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=79f79de2a27d3e3d dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f68108fed972453a0ad4 userspace arch: i386 syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=16bc5946e00000 C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=17302361e00000
For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection