Software based ECC ?
Hello !
since ECC (speaking in terms of ram/memory) is some widespread hardware technology
within server/enterprise computing for protection of memory failure, i wonder:
Can`t this be done in software, too ?
I didn`t find a referenc on this list, but i found an interesting paper i'd like to share at:
http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/softecc:ddopson-meng/softecc_ddopson-meng.pdf
"SoftECC : A System for Software Memory Integrity Checking"
Is it possible to implement something like this within the Linux virtual memory subsystem ?
If it can be done, wouldn`t this be a great feature ?
regards
Roland K.
system engineer
Quoted 8 lines · On Fri, 10 Aug 2007 23:16:45 +0200 "roland" <[email protected]> wrote:
Hello !
since ECC (speaking in terms of ram/memory) is some widespread hardware technology
within server/enterprise computing for protection of memory failure, i wonder:Can`t this be done in software, too ?
Only one way to find out. If it interest you - have a go at it
Quoted 6 lines · roland
http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/softecc:ddopson-meng/softecc_ddopson-meng.pdf
"SoftECC : A System for Software Memory Integrity Checking"
Is it possible to implement something like this within the Linux virtual memory subsystem ?
Anything that can be simulated with a Turing machine is *possible*.
The question is how many rocket boosters the pig needs for takeoff.
Hint: The thesis talks about why he didn't implement it for Linux.
Quoted 1 line
If it can be done, wouldn`t this be a great feature ?
Read section 5.2 of that thesis, particularly this quote from 5.2.2:
"For random word writes, this implies that SoftECC will need an order of magnitude more compute time than the user-mode code"
Basically, on every single memory page that gets dirtied, we have to then re-checksum the page (blowing away cache lines in the process). If you want to get a feel for it, find the kernel code that recognizes that a page is dirtied, and just add a few lines there:
int foo = 0, i;
for (i=0;i++;<1024) { // adjust for non-4K pages
foo ^= *(page+i);
}and see how much your system crawls.
Personally, I'd recommend just shelling out the bucks for hardware ECC if the reliability matters.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/softecc:ddopson-meng/softecc_ddopson-meng.pdf
"SoftECC : A System for Software Memory Integrity Checking"Personally, I'd recommend just shelling out the bucks for hardware ECC if the reliability matters.
a question and an idea: Q: is ecc guaranteed to detect all bitflips?
Idea: what about a multicore system (3 or more) that runs the same processes on 2 cores and a third core verifying that they both do the same? As I think it is not only ram that can become faulty.
Folkert van Heusden
Signature · 5 lines
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Quoted 4 lines · Folkert van Heusden
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines
http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/softecc:ddopson-meng/softecc_ddopson-meng.pdf
"SoftECC : A System for Software Memory Integrity Checking"
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Personally, I'd recommend just shelling out the bucks for hardware ECC if the reliability matters.
a question and an idea: Q: is ecc guaranteed to detect all bitflips?
Idea: what about a multicore system (3 or more) that runs the same processes on 2 cores and a third core verifying that they both do the same? As I think it is not only ram that can become faulty.
Indeed. And for example BOINC (Seti@home) have to consider this. Hence they recalculate each work unit at least three times and then compare between each. What makes this different from ECC is that the checksum is not calculated on every memory operations, but at the end of a larger block of operations. Of course this may mean that an error can propagate for a while, but the total walltime (including recomputation) is lower. :)
Jan
Quoted 11 lines · Folkert van Heusden
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/softecc:ddopson-meng/softecc_ddopson-meng.pdf
"SoftECC : A System for Software Memory Integrity Checking"Personally, I'd recommend just shelling out the bucks for hardware ECC if the reliability matters.
a question and an idea: Q: is ecc guaranteed to detect all bitflips?
Idea: what about a multicore system (3 or more) that runs the same processes on 2 cores and a third core verifying that they both do the same? As I think it is not only ram that can become faulty.
Such hardware does exist -- for example, Stratus sells systems that run the same OS on two separate boards in lockstep, with a voter to determine what action to take if they ever diverge.
Quoted 1 line · Folkert van Heusden
a question and an idea: Q: is ecc guaranteed to detect all bitflips?
It depends on the exact ECC function the hardware implements. Usually it provides performance such as:
"Correct all 1-bit errors. Detect all 2-bit errors, and most 3 and higher, but not correct".
(Of course, "correct all 1 or 2 bit and detect all 3 bit" can be done, it just takes more bits of ECC.)
Quoted 3 lines
Idea: what about a multicore system (3 or more) that runs the same processes on 2 cores and a third core verifying that they both do the same? As I think it is not only ram that can become faulty.
This is actually done for high-reliability systems (Google for "tell me twice" and "tell me three times"). The problem is that it takes a lot of extra hardware. The G5 and later IBM Z-series mainframe chipsets (not to be confused with the PowerPC G5) implemented dual computation units and a comparator that signals a 'Machine Check' condition if the two CPUs don't end up in the same exact state (as an added bonus, at the end of each instruction that both *do* compare good, it latches the *entire* state of the CPU out, and then does the following:
1) Retry the instruction on the same CPU - if it compares correctly, keep going and flag a "soft" error.
2) If it still fails, read out the last "known good" status latch, and load it into a spare CPU, and fire it up, and flag the failing one as bad.
http://www.research.ibm.com/journal/rd/435/spainhower.pdf
http://www.research.ibm.com/journal/rd/435/mueller.pdf
These guys have forgotten more about designing highly reliable systems than most of us will ever know. ;)
Needless to say, not everybody is willing to pay the costs of the hardware overhead of this approach.