Bug in 2.4.19-pre8 drivers/input/joydev.c
Sailesh Krishmurthy and I have found what we believe is an exploitable bug in drivers/input/joydev.c:joydev_ioctl(). It looks like the JSIOCSAXMAP and JSIOCSBTNMAP cases accidentally reverse the arguments to copy_from_user(). A user program could call these ioctls with a maliciously chosen arg to crash the system or gain root access. A patch is attached to this message (though my mailer will probably mangle it -- sorry). We apologize if we have misunderstood the behavior of this function.
We found this bug using the static analysis tool cqual,
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~jfoster/cqual/, developed at UC Berkeley by Jeff Foster, John Kodumal, and many others.
Please CC us in any replies.
Thanks for all your great work on the kernel.
Best,
Rob Johnson ([email protected])
Sailesh Krishnamurthy ([email protected])
joydev_fixed.c Wed May 15 10:37:36 2002 renamed from joydev.c Wed May 15 10:25:26 2002 +0 -0
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ return copy_to_user((struct js_corr *) arg,
joydev->corr,
sizeof(struct js_corr) *joydev->nabs) ? -EFAULT : 0;
case JSIOCSAXMAP:
- if (copy_from_user((__u8 *) arg, joydev->abspam,sizeof(__u8) *ABS_MAX))
+ if (copy_from_user(joydev->abspam, (__u8 *) arg,sizeof(__u8) *ABS_MAX))
return -EFAULT;
for (i = 0; i < ABS_MAX; i++) {
if (joydev->abspam[i] > ABS_MAX) return
-EINVAL;
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@
return copy_to_user((__u8 *) arg,
joydev->abspam,
sizeof(__u8) * ABS_MAX)? -EFAULT : 0;
case JSIOCSBTNMAP:
- if (copy_from_user((__u16 *) arg,joydev->absmap, sizeof(__u16) *
(KEY_MAX - BTN_MISC)))
+ if (copy_from_user(joydev->absmap, (__u16 *)
arg, sizeof(__u16) *
(KEY_MAX - BTN_MISC)))
return -EFAULT;
for (i = 0; i < KEY_MAX - BTN_MISC; i++); {
if (joydev->keypam[i] > KEY_MAX ||joydev->keypam[i] < BTN_MISC)
return -EINVAL;
Quoted 8 lines · Robert T. Johnson
Sailesh Krishmurthy and I have found what we believe is an exploitable bug in drivers/input/joydev.c:joydev_ioctl(). It looks like the JSIOCSAXMAP and JSIOCSBTNMAP cases accidentally reverse the arguments to
copy_from_user(). A user program could call these ioctls with a maliciously chosen arg to crash the system or gain root access. A patch is attached to this message (though my mailer will probably mangle it -- sorry). We apologize if we have misunderstood the behavior of this function.
Thanks for this report, this was found and fixed already.
Quoted 51 lines
We found this bug using the static analysis tool cqual,
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~jfoster/cqual/, developed at UC Berkeley by Jeff Foster, John Kodumal, and many others.Please CC us in any replies.
Thanks for all your great work on the kernel.
Best,
Rob Johnson ([email protected])
Sailesh Krishnamurthy ([email protected])joydev_fixed.c Wed May 15 10:37:36 2002 renamed from joydev.c Wed May 15 10:25:26 2002 +0
-1@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ return copy_to_user((struct js_corr *) arg, joydev->corr, sizeof(struct js_corr) * joydev->nabs) ? -EFAULT : 0; case JSIOCSAXMAP: - if (copy_from_user((__u8 *) arg, joydev->abspam,
sizeof(__u8)*ABS_MAX))
+ if (copy_from_user(joydev->abspam, (__u8*) arg,sizeof(__u8)*ABS_MAX))return -EFAULT; for (i = 0; i < ABS_MAX; i++) { if (joydev->abspam[i] > ABS_MAX) returnjoydev_fixed.c Wed May 15 10:37:36 2002 renamed from joydev.c Wed May 15 10:25:26 2002 +0
-2-EINVAL;@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ return copy_to_user((__u8 *) arg, joydev->abspam, sizeof(__u8) * ABS_MAX) ? -EFAULT : 0; case JSIOCSBTNMAP: - if (copy_from_user((__u16 *) arg,
joydev->absmap,sizeof(__u16)*
(KEY_MAX-BTN_MISC)))
+ if (copy_from_user(joydev->absmap, (__u16*)
arg,sizeof(__u16)*
(KEY_MAX-BTN_MISC)))return -EFAULT; for (i = 0; i < KEY_MAX - BTN_MISC; i++); { if (joydev->keypam[i] > KEY_MAX ||joydev->keypam[i] <
BTN_MISC)
return-EINVAL;
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