coredump - as root not only if euid switched
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While it's more secure to not dump core at all if the program has switched euid, it's also very unpractical. Since only programs started from root, being setuid root or have
CAP_SETUIDit's far more practical to dump as root.root mode 600. This is the bahavior of Solaris.
Solaris can keep their security holes.
Consider a setuid core dump on removable media which is user-controlled.
Also consider filesystems that don't store full security data, like vfat and smb/cifs.
Core dumps to remote filesystems are a problem in general, because the server might not implement the type of security you expect it to implement.
Here's a better idea: add a sysctl for insecure core dumps. When set, dump all cores as root.root mode 444. Ignore directory permissions when doing so, so that forcing dumps into a MacOS-style /cores directory does not require that users be able to access it normally. This lets appropriately authorized users debug setuid apps and get support for them without adding security holes like Solaris has.
Am Fr, 2004-04-23 um 17.35 schrieb Albert Cahalan:
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While it's more secure to not dump core at all if the program has switched euid, it's also very unpractical. Since only programs started from root, being setuid root or have
CAP_SETUIDit's far more practical to dump as root.root mode 600. This is the bahavior of Solaris.Solaris can keep their security holes.
I checked (older) versions on
HP-UX, True64, AiX, MacOsX
HP-UX didn't dump core on a seteuid 0->n prog Aix,MacOsX and True64 dumped core with ownership of user I could check Irix
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Consider a setuid core dump on removable media which is user-controlled.
boot into rescue system...
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Also consider filesystems that don't store full security data, like vfat and smb/cifs.
Core dumps to remote filesystems are a problem in general, because the server might not implement the type of security you expect it to implement.
mkdir /var/cores
chmod a+rwx,o+t /var/cores
echo /var/cores/%e.core.%p > /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
Quoted 9 lines
Here's a better idea: add a sysctl for insecure core dumps. When set, dump all cores as root.root mode 444. Ignore directory permissions when doing so, so that forcing dumps into a MacOS-style /cores directory does not require that users be able to access it normally. This lets appropriately authorized users debug setuid apps and get support for them without adding security holes like Solaris has.
It's tunable via coreadm
troll, troll
Quoted 11 lines · Peter Wächtler
Am Fr, 2004-04-23 um 17.35 schrieb Albert Cahalan:
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While it's more secure to not dump core at all if the program has switched euid, it's also very unpractical. Since only programs started from root, being setuid root or have
CAP_SETUIDit's far more practical to dump as root.root mode 600. This is the bahavior of Solaris.Solaris can keep their security holes.
Quoted 7 lines
I checked (older) versions on
HP-UX, True64, AiX, MacOsX
HP-UX didn't dump core on a seteuid 0->n prog Aix,MacOsX and True64 dumped core with ownership of user I could check Irix
It would be nice of you to do so, then issue some sort of security alert.
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Consider a setuid core dump on removable media which is user-controlled.
boot into rescue system...
If you're suggesting that user-controlled media implies the ability to boot via that media, you're very wrong.
a. LinuxBIOS
b. OpenFirmware (Mac or Sun) with boot password c. no floppy, and a Zip drive on BIOS-disabled SCSI d. parallel port Zip drive
e. FireWire w/o BIOS support
(the "rip computer open" option is either physically blocked or there is a human nearby that would notice)
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Also consider filesystems that don't store full security data, like vfat and smb/cifs.
Core dumps to remote filesystems are a problem in general, because the server might not implement the type of security you expect it to implement.
mkdir
/var/cores
chmod a+rwx,o+t/var/cores
echo /var/cores/%e.core.%p >/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
Sure, but you shouldn't assume that all admins know to do this. The default must be secure.
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Here's a better idea: add a sysctl for insecure core dumps. When set, dump all cores as root.root mode 444. Ignore directory permissions when doing so, so that forcing dumps into a MacOS-style /cores directory does not require that users be able to access it normally. This lets appropriately authorized users debug setuid apps and get support for them without adding security holes like Solaris has.
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It's tunable via coreadm
troll, troll
You said "This is the bahavior of Solaris." and I took that for the truth. Now you say it's tunable. Well, OK then, so Solaris _doesn't_ have an insecure config as it comes from Sun? I have no problem with supporting an insecure config, but you were suggesting that it would be the new default (and only) behavior.