collect security labels on user processes generating audit messages
Subsystems (4)
RFC PATCH 1/1 collect security labels on user processes generating audit messages
Hello,
This patch collects the security label for a user process generating audit messages. Traditionally, obtaining the security label of a process in the kernel could be done using security_getprocattr(). However, due to the asynchronous nature of netlink, by the time the kernel gets the audit message, the 'pid' packaged with it, may have already been recycled. Thus, if a task is found with 'pid', it may not be the same task that issued the audit message, and the wrong security label could be collected. One solution to this problem and the solution implemented here, is to collect the 'sid' of the process, while we are running in that process' context. This can be accomplished by attaching the 'sid' to the audit message on the client-side of the netlink interaction much like 'loginuid'. When the message arrives to the kernel and is processed by the audit subsystem, the 'sid' can then be resolved to the correct security label. One thing to keep in mind, is that should the policy be changed and reloaded while an audit message is in transit, the security label the 'sid' associated with that audit message resolves to, may be invalid or incorrect.
Notable details about this implementation:
1) A new SELinux interface was introduced to give other parts of the kernel the ability to resolve 'sids' into security labels.
2) SELinux and LSM were augmented to obtain the 'sid' of a task in a similar manner to ipc and inode.
I've posted this message and patch as an RFC to solicit feedback from the SELinux and audit communities.
I personally think that the Kconfig option could be a bit more descriptive and selinux_getsecurity() could probably find a new home outside of selinux/include/objsec.h, though that seemed to make sense for me, at the time of coding.
Thank you.
-tim
include/linux/netlink.h +1 -0
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms__u32 dst_group;kernel_cap_t eff_cap;__u32 loginuid;/* Login (audit) uid */ +__u32 secid;/* SELinux security id */ };#define NETLINK_CB (skb) (*(struct netlink_skb_parms*)&((skb)->cb))
include/linux/security.h +16 -0
@@ -625,6 +625,11 @@ struct swap_info_struct;* @p contains the task_struct for the task. * @inode contains the inode structure for the inode. * +* @task_getsecurity: +* Copy the security label associated with the task object into +* @buffer. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer +* required. @size indicates the size of @buffer in bytes. Return +* number of bytes used/required on success. * Security hooks for Netlink messaging. * * @netlink_send:
@@ -1169,6 +1174,7 @@ struct security_operations { unsigned long arg5);void (*task_reparent_to_init) (struct task_struct * p);void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode); +int (*task_getsecurity)(struct task_struct *tsk,void *buffer,size_t size);int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp,short flag);int (*ipc_getsecurity)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,void *buffer,size_t size);
@@ -1817,6 +1823,11 @@ static inline void security_task_to_inod security_ops->task_to_inode (p, inode); } +static inline int security_task_getsecurity (struct task_struct *tsk,void *buffer,size_t size) +{ +return security_ops->task_getsecurity (tsk, buffer, size); +} +static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag) {
@@ -2457,6 +2468,11 @@ static inline void security_task_reparenstatic inline void security_task_to_inode (struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode) { } +static inline int security_task_getsecurity (struct task_struct *tsk,void *buffer,size_t size) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag) {
include/linux/selinux_api.h new file +38 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* +* External SELinux API +* +* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +* (at your option) any later version. +* +* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +* GNU General Public License for more details. +* +* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. +* +* Copyright (C) IBM Corporation, 2006 +* +* Author: Timothy R. Chavez <[email protected]> +* +*/ + +#ifndef _LINUX_SELINUX_API_H +#define _LINUX_SELINUX_API_H + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_API +int selinux_sid_to_context (u32 sid,void *ctx,size_t size); +#else +static inline int selinux_sid_to_context (u32 sid,void *ctx,size_t size) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SELINUX_API */ +#endif /* _LINUX_SELINUX_API_H */
kernel/audit.c +22 -3
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@#include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/kthread.h> +#include <linux/selinux_api.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <net/sock.h>
@@ -383,7 +384,7 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_tstatic int audit_receive_msg (struct sk_buff *skb,struct nlmsghdr *nlh) { -u32 uid, pid, seq; +u32 uid, pid, sid, seq;void *data;struct audit_status *status_get, status_set;int err;
@@ -391,6 +392,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_bu16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;uid_t loginuid;/* loginuid of sender */ struct audit_sig_info sig_data; +int len; +char *ctx =NULL ; err =audit_netlink_ok (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, msg_type);if (err)
@@ -409,6 +412,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b pid =NETLINK_CREDS (skb)->pid; uid =NETLINK_CREDS (skb)->uid; loginuid =NETLINK_CB (skb).loginuid; + sid =NETLINK_CB (skb).secid; seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq; data =NLMSG_DATA (nlh);
@@ -460,11 +464,26 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b err =0 ; ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_KERNEL , msg_type);if (ab) { + len =selinux_sid_to_context (sid,NULL ,0 ); +if (len <0 && len != -EOPNOTSUPP ) +return len; +else if (len >0 ) { + ctx = (char *)kmalloc (len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ctx) +return -ENOMEM ; + len =selinux_sid_to_context (sid, ctx, len); +if (len <0 ) { +kfree (ctx); +return len; + } + }audit_log_format (ab, -"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u msg='%.1024s'" , - pid, uid, loginuid, (char *)data); +"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u subj=%s msg='%.1024s'" , + pid, uid, loginuid, (!ctx ?"null" : ctx), + (char *)data);audit_set_pid (ab, pid);audit_log_end (ab); +kfree (ctx); } }break ;
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +1 -0
@@ -1120,6 +1120,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocbNETLINK_CB (skb).dst_pid = dst_pid;NETLINK_CB (skb).dst_group = dst_group;NETLINK_CB (skb).loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current->audit_context); +NETLINK_CB (skb).secid =security_task_getsid (current);memcpy (NETLINK_CREDS (skb), &siocb->scm->creds,sizeof (struct ucred ));/* What can I do? Netlink is asynchronous, so that
security/dummy.c +6 -0
@@ -557,6 +557,11 @@ static void dummy_task_reparent_to_initstatic void dummy_task_to_inode (struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode) { } +static int dummy_task_getsecurity (struct task_struct *tsk,void *buffer,size_t size) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag) {return 0 ;
@@ -934,6 +939,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct securityset_to_dummy_if_null (ops, task_prctl);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, task_reparent_to_init);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, task_to_inode); +set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, task_getsecurity);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, ipc_permission);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, ipc_getsecurity);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
security/selinux/Kconfig +8 -0
@@ -95,3 +95,11 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VAL via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1. + +config SECURITY_SELINUX_API + bool "NSA SELinux API" + depends on SECURITY_SELINUX + default n + help + This option exposes internal SELinux concepts such as a 'security id' + to other parts of the kernel.
security/selinux/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -8,5 +8,7 @@ selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o n selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) += netif.o +selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_API) += selinux_api.o + EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include
security/selinux/hooks.c +9 -1
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock)/* Return security context for a given sid or just the context length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */ -static int selinux_getsecurity (u32 sid,void *buffer,size_t size) +int selinux_getsecurity (u32 sid,void *buffer,size_t size) {char *context;unsigned len;
@@ -2769,6 +2769,13 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(structreturn ; } +static int selinux_task_getsecurity (struct task_struct *tsk,void *buffer,size_t size) +{ +struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; + +return selinux_getsecurity (tsec->sid, buffer, size); +} +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
@@ -4319,6 +4326,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinu .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl, .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init, .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, + .task_getsecurity = selinux_task_getsecurity, .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, .ipc_getsecurity = selinux_ipc_getsecurity,
security/selinux/include/objsec.h +2 -0
@@ -109,4 +109,6 @@ struct sk_security_struct {extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot; +int selinux_getsecurity (u32 sid,void *buffer,size_t size); +#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
security/selinux/selinux_api.c new file +8 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#include <linux/selinux_api.h> + +extern int selinux_getsecurity (u32 sid,void *buffer,size_t size); + +int selinux_sid_to_context (u32 sid,void *ctx,size_t size) +{ +return selinux_getsecurity (sid, ctx, size); +}
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Quoted 2 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
1) A new SELinux interface was introduced to give other parts of the kernel the ability to resolve 'sids' into security labels.
Please look at the way I intend to export SELinux APIs in:
http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/skfilter/kernel/12-skfilter-selinux-exports.patch
include/linux/netlink.h struct netlink_skb_parms · line 147
Quoted 7 lines
+++
b/include/linux/netlink.hinclude/linux/netlink.h +1
-0@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms__u32 dst_group;kernel_cap_t eff_cap;__u32 loginuid;/* Login (audit) uid */ +__u32 secid;/* SELinux security id */ };
You also need to verify the policy serial number.
I wonder if it might be better to use the security context directly.
kernel/audit.c static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b · line 467
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/audit.c +1
-0@@ -460,11 +464,26 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b err =0 ; ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_KERNEL , msg_type);if (ab) { + len =selinux_sid_to_context (sid,NULL ,0 );
This is embedding SELinux specific code into the audit code. I think you need to add some audit/SELinux glue code which disappears if SELinux is not enabled.
net/netlink/af_netlink.c static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb · line 1123
Quoted 1 line
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +1
-0+NETLINK_CB (skb).secid =security_task_getsid (current);
security_task_getsid() doesn't exist.
You created security_task_getsecurity(), which retrieves the security context.
- James
Signature · 10 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 9 lines · James Morris
Quoted 2 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
1) A new SELinux interface was introduced to give other parts of the kernel the ability to resolve 'sids' into security labels.
Please look at the way I intend to export SELinux APIs in:
http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/skfilter/kernel/12-skfilter-selinux-exports.patch
This looks good. I'm also working on some interfaces to export from selinux to enable efficient audit selection based on SELinux context and I was contemplating on exactly where to put the goods. Can we get a consensus on declaration/definition locations? "include/linux/selinux.h" and "security/selinux/exports.c" seem good to me.
--
Darrel
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James Morris
maintainerQuoted 3 lines · James Morris
You also need to verify the policy serial number.
I wonder if it might be better to use the security context directly.
Also consider adding a security field to netlink messages, to managed by the LSM.
- James
Signature · 7 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Hi James,
Thank you for the response (and putting Stephen on the CC list, evolution flubbered my original CC list, hrm). My response below.
Quoted 7 lines · James Morris
Quoted 2 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
1) A new SELinux interface was introduced to give other parts of the kernel the ability to resolve 'sids' into security labels.
Please look at the way I intend to export SELinux APIs in:
http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/skfilter/kernel/12-skfilter-selinux-exports.patch
This looks good. Do you have a schedule for releasing this? I could probably wait until it becomes available in -mm before changing out the API plumbing.
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/netlink.h struct netlink_skb_parms · line 147
Quoted 8 lines
+++
b/include/linux/netlink.hinclude/linux/netlink.h +1
-0@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms__u32 dst_group;kernel_cap_t eff_cap;__u32 loginuid;/* Login (audit) uid */ +__u32 secid;/* SELinux security id */ };You also need to verify the policy serial number.
Ah, thanks.
Quoted 3 lines
I wonder if it might be better to use the security context directly.
I think it'd be the simplest solution, but I was a bit weary about adding a string param... I thought using an integer might be the path of least resistance :)
Quoted 15 lines
kernel/audit.c static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b · line 467
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/audit.c +1
-0@@ -460,11 +464,26 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b err =0 ; ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_KERNEL , msg_type);if (ab) { + len =selinux_sid_to_context (sid,NULL ,0 );This is embedding SELinux specific code into the audit code. I think you need to add some audit/SELinux glue code which disappears if SELinux is not enabled.
net/netlink/af_netlink.c static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb · line 1123
Quoted 1 line
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +1
-0+NETLINK_CB (skb).secid =security_task_getsid (current);
security_task_getsid()doesn't exist.
Quoted 6 lines
You created
security_task_getsecurity(), which retrieves the security context.- James
Actually, security_task_getsid() does exist (or did exist last time I updated the viro/audit-2.6 git tree).
http://www.promethos.org/lxr/http/ident?i=security_task_getsid
Thanks again for the feedback James.
-tim
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James Morris
maintainerQuoted 4 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
Quoted 2 lines
Please look at the way I intend to export SELinux APIs in:
http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/skfilter/kernel/12-skfilter-selinux-exports.patchThis looks good. Do you have a schedule for releasing this?
No, it's blocked on some core netfilter changes. I suggest following its format, though, if needed.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I wonder if it might be better to use the security context directly.
I think it'd be the simplest solution, but I was a bit weary about adding a string param... I thought using an integer might be the path of least resistance :)
As previousl mentioned, also consider adding a security blob to the netlink params.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
security_task_getsid()doesn't exist.You created
security_task_getsecurity(), which retrieves the security context.Actually,
security_task_getsid()does exist (or did exist last time I updated the viro/audit-2.6 git tree).http://www.promethos.org/lxr/http/ident?i=security_task_getsid
Oh, ok.
Where is security_task_getsecurity() used, then?
- James
Signature · 7 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 3 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
Quoted 1 line
You also need to verify the policy serial number.
Ah, thanks.
Not clear actually - the context structs and integer index values for the components need to be tagged with a policy serial number if exported outside of the security server, but the SID itself remains stable across policy reloads; only the context struct contents are remapped. If invalidated, subsequent lookup of the SID will be remapped to the unlabeled SID's context.
Quoted 3 lines
I think it'd be the simplest solution, but I was a bit weary about adding a string param... I thought using an integer might be the path of least resistance :)
Yes, a SID makes sense here and avoids the allocation/lifecycle pain of strings or generic security blobs.
Quoted 2 lines
Actually,
security_task_getsid()does exist (or did exist last time I updated the viro/audit-2.6 git tree).
It doesn't do what you think it does. Look at the inline documentation
for it in security.h.
Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
On Thu, 2006-02-09 at 12:03 -0500, James Morris wrote:
<snip>
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
security_task_getsid()doesn't exist.You created
security_task_getsecurity(), which retrieves the security context.Actually,
security_task_getsid()does exist (or did exist last time I updated the viro/audit-2.6 git tree).
Quoted 8 lines
Oh, ok.
Where is
security_task_getsecurity()used, then?- James
Hm... :) I made it at first because I was just going to extract the context directly and store it with the skb_params, but then decided to go the 'sid' route. I left it in to expand the LSM API a little, but if it's not being used currently, it probably shouldn't be included, eh?
Thanks.
-tim
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Quoted 8 lines · James Morris
Quoted 3 lines · James Morris
You also need to verify the policy serial number.
I wonder if it might be better to use the security context directly.
Also consider adding a security field to netlink messages, to managed by the LSM.
A generic security blob would require full lifecycle maintenance, including the old sk hooks that were rejected for 2.5. I also think it is a mistake to generalize the audit system's use of SELinux, as I don't think that any other LSM is likely to provide LSPP functionality, so we might as well just convert all of these audit-SELinux interfaces into direct SELinux calls IMHO. At least in the long term if not immediately.
Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 7 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
Quoted 2 lines · James Morris
Please look at the way I intend to export SELinux APIs in:
http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/skfilter/kernel/12-skfilter-selinux-exports.patchThis looks good. Do you have a schedule for releasing this? I could probably wait until it becomes available in -mm before changing out the API plumbing.
Note btw that the advantage of the security_sid_to_context() interface (wrapped by James' selinux_id_to_ctx interface) is that it internally allocates a buffer of the right length for you. You don't have to query for a length and allocate one yourself, unlike the selinux_getsecurity interface. You do still need to free it when done.
Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Hello,
This is an updated patch to collect the SID of a user process sending audit messages while running in its context and then converting it into the corresponding security label once the audit message is received in a kernel context for logging purposes.
This patch:
1) Augments the LSM interface to retrieve a task's SID and scraps the incorrect usage of security_task_getsid (Thanks Stephen ;)).
2) Uses a portion of the James Morris' SELinux API to give the ability to easily convert a SID into a security label / SELinux context.
http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/skfilter/kernel/12-skfilter-selinux-exports.patch
Thanks. Comments and feedback welcome.
include/linux/netlink.h +1 -0
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms__u32 dst_group;kernel_cap_t eff_cap;__u32 loginuid;/* Login (audit) uid */ +__u32 secid;/* SELinux security id */ };#define NETLINK_CB (skb) (*(struct netlink_skb_parms*)&((skb)->cb))
include/linux/security.h +16 -0
@@ -625,6 +625,11 @@ struct swap_info_struct;* @p contains the task_struct for the task. * @inode contains the inode structure for the inode. * +* @task_getsecid: +* Get the SID (security id) of a task. +* @tsk contains the task_struct for the task +* @sid is storage for task SID +* * Security hooks for Netlink messaging. * * @netlink_send:
@@ -1169,6 +1174,7 @@ struct security_operations { unsigned long arg5);void (*task_reparent_to_init) (struct task_struct * p);void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode); +int (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *tsk,__u32 *sid);int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp,short flag);int (*ipc_getsecurity)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,void *buffer,size_t size);
@@ -1817,6 +1823,11 @@ static inline void security_task_to_inod security_ops->task_to_inode (p, inode); } +static inline int security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *tsk,__u32 *sid) +{ +return security_ops->task_getsecid (tsk, sid); +} +static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag) {
@@ -2457,6 +2468,11 @@ static inline void security_task_reparenstatic inline void security_task_to_inode (struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode) { } +static inline int security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *tsk,__u32 *sid) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag) {
include/linux/selinux.h new file +70 -0
70 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/audit.c +13 -3
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@#include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/selinux.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h>
@@ -383,7 +384,7 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_tstatic int audit_receive_msg (struct sk_buff *skb,struct nlmsghdr *nlh) { -u32 uid, pid, seq; +u32 uid, pid, sid, seq;void *data;struct audit_status *status_get, status_set;int err;
@@ -391,6 +392,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_bu16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;uid_t loginuid;/* loginuid of sender */ struct audit_sig_info sig_data; +char * ctx =NULL ; +u32 len; err =audit_netlink_ok (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, msg_type);if (err)
@@ -409,6 +412,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b pid =NETLINK_CREDS (skb)->pid; uid =NETLINK_CREDS (skb)->uid; loginuid =NETLINK_CB (skb).loginuid; + sid =NETLINK_CB (skb).secid; seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq; data =NLMSG_DATA (nlh);
@@ -460,11 +464,17 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b err =0 ; ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_KERNEL , msg_type);if (ab) { +if (selinux_available ()) { + err =selinux_id_to_ctx (sid, &ctx, &len); +if (err <0 ) +return err; + }audit_log_format (ab, -"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u msg='%.1024s'" , - pid, uid, loginuid, (char *)data); +"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u subj=%s msg='%.1024s'" , + pid, uid, loginuid, ctx ? ctx :"null" , (char *)data);audit_set_pid (ab, pid);audit_log_end (ab); +kfree (ctx); } }break ;
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +3 -0
@@ -1120,6 +1120,9 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocbNETLINK_CB (skb).dst_pid = dst_pid;NETLINK_CB (skb).dst_group = dst_group;NETLINK_CB (skb).loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current->audit_context); + err =security_task_getsecid (current, &NETLINK_CB (skb).secid); +if (err <0 && err != -EOPNOTSUPP ) + goto out;memcpy (NETLINK_CREDS (skb), &siocb->scm->creds,sizeof (struct ucred ));/* What can I do? Netlink is asynchronous, so that
security/dummy.c +6 -0
@@ -557,6 +557,11 @@ static void dummy_task_reparent_to_initstatic void dummy_task_to_inode (struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode) { } +static int dummy_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *tsk,__u32 *sid) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag) {return 0 ;
@@ -934,6 +939,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct securityset_to_dummy_if_null (ops, task_prctl);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, task_reparent_to_init);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, task_to_inode); +set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, task_getsecid);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, ipc_permission);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, ipc_getsecurity);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
security/selinux/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o ss/ -selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o +selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o exports.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) += netif.o
security/selinux/exports.c new file +38 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* +* SELinux services exported to the rest of the kernel. +* +* Author: James Morris <[email protected]> +* +* Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <[email protected]> +* +* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, +* as published by the Free Software Foundation. +*/ +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/selinux.h> + +#include "security.h" + +extern int ss_initialized; + +int selinux_available (void ) +{ +return ss_initialized; +} + +int selinux_ctx_to_id (const char *ctx,u32 *ctxid) +{ +return security_context_to_sid (ctx,strlen (ctx), ctxid); +} + +int selinux_id_to_ctx (u32 ctxid,char **ctx,u32 *ctxlen) +{ +return security_sid_to_context (ctxid, ctx, ctxlen); +} + +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (selinux_available); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (selinux_ctx_to_id); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (selinux_id_to_ctx);
security/selinux/hooks.c +8 -0
@@ -2769,6 +2769,13 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(structreturn ; } +static int selinux_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; + +return tsec->sid; +} +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
@@ -4319,6 +4326,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinu .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl, .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init, .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, + .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid, .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, .ipc_getsecurity = selinux_ipc_getsecurity,
security/selinux/include/security.h +1 -1
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsint security_sid_to_context (u32 sid,char **scontext,u32 *scontext_len); -int security_context_to_sid (char *scontext,u32 scontext_len, +int security_context_to_sid (const char *scontext,u32 scontext_len,u32 *out_sid);int security_context_to_sid_default (char *scontext,u32 scontext_len,u32 *out_sid,u32 def_sid);
security/selinux/ss/services.c +2 -2
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ out: } -static int security_context_to_sid_core (char *scontext,u32 scontext_len,u32 *sid,u32 def_sid) +static int security_context_to_sid_core (const char *scontext,u32 scontext_len,u32 *sid,u32 def_sid) {char *scontext2;struct context context;
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ out:* Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient * memory is available, or 0 on success. */ -int security_context_to_sid (char *scontext,u32 scontext_len,u32 *sid) +int security_context_to_sid (const char *scontext,u32 scontext_len,u32 *sid) {return security_context_to_sid_core (scontext, scontext_len, sid,SECSID_NULL );
--
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James Morris
maintainerQuoted 1 line · Timothy R. Chavez
+int
selinux_ctx_to_id(const char *ctx, u32 *ctxid);
You're not using this function, so don't include it for upstream.
- James
Signature · 7 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 15 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
Thanks. Comments and feedback welcome.
include/linux/selinux.h new file +7
-0@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* +* SELinux services exported to the rest of the kernel. +* +* Author: James Morris <[email protected]> +* +* Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <[email protected]> +*
include/linux/selinux.h line 17
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/selinux.h new file +10
-0+* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, +* as published by the Free Software Foundation. +*/ +#ifndef _LINUX_SELINUX_H +#define _LINUX_SELINUX_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX + +struct sock ;
You can omit the above struct declaration for your purposes, since you aren't upstreaming the socket-related interfaces.
include/linux/selinux.h line 66
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/selinux.h new file +4
-0+static inline int selinux_id_to_ctx (u32 ctxid,char **ctx,u32 *ctxlen) +{ +return 0 ; +}
I'd be inclined to return an error here; otherwise, the caller may proceed to use *ctx and *ctxlen. Or, if you want this to return 0 for a graceful degenerate case (e.g. so that you don't need to check selinux_available separately each time), I think you need to initialize *ctx and *ctxlen as well to sane values.
BTW, traditionally, SELinux has viewed the terminating NUL as part of the context string and thus as part of its length in bytes. A concession was made in the security server code to allow context strings that lacked the terminating NUL when we migrated to xattrs because the existing attr package did not include the terminating NUL (e.g. for setfattr).
kernel/audit.c static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b · line 471
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/audit.c +5
-0@@ -460,11 +464,17 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b err =0 ; ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_KERNEL , msg_type);if (ab) { +if (selinux_available ()) { + err =selinux_id_to_ctx (sid, &ctx, &len); +if (err <0 ) +return err; + }
Is simply returning an error sufficient here? What about the ab that has already been allocated?
net/netlink/af_netlink.c static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb · line 1125
Quoted 11 lines
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +3
-0@@ -1120,6 +1120,9 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocbNETLINK_CB (skb).dst_pid = dst_pid;NETLINK_CB (skb).dst_group = dst_group;NETLINK_CB (skb).loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current->audit_context); + err =security_task_getsecid (current, &NETLINK_CB (skb).secid); +if (err <0 && err != -EOPNOTSUPP ) + goto out;
Don't you need to kfree_skb(skb) too? And perhaps the dummy function should just set the sid to 0 and return 0 to avoid the extra test here for -EOPNOTSUPP? In fact, perhaps this hook should just return void, thereby avoiding any need for error handling here? In what case could this fail, as no allocation is happening and no permission check occurs from that hook (happens from security_netlink_send instead)?
Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
James & Stephen,
Thank you for the comments. While implementing your feedback I came across a pretty severe bug. I was basically obtaining the sid and then throwing it away (I was returning it from the function, but not actually assigning it to anything). New patch below. I still need to test this a little more. Thanks!
-tim
include/linux/netlink.h +1 -0
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms__u32 dst_group;kernel_cap_t eff_cap;__u32 loginuid;/* Login (audit) uid */ +__u32 secid;/* SELinux security id */ };#define NETLINK_CB (skb) (*(struct netlink_skb_parms*)&((skb)->cb))
include/linux/security.h +14 -0
@@ -625,6 +625,11 @@ struct swap_info_struct;* @p contains the task_struct for the task. * @inode contains the inode structure for the inode. * +* @task_getsecid: +* Get the SID (security id) of a task. +* @tsk contains the task_struct for the task +* @sid is storage for task SID +* * Security hooks for Netlink messaging. * * @netlink_send:
@@ -1169,6 +1174,7 @@ struct security_operations { unsigned long arg5);void (*task_reparent_to_init) (struct task_struct * p);void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode); +void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *tsk,__u32 *sid);int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp,short flag);int (*ipc_getsecurity)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,void *buffer,size_t size);
@@ -1817,6 +1823,11 @@ static inline void security_task_to_inod security_ops->task_to_inode (p, inode); } +static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *tsk,__u32 *sid) +{ + security_ops->task_getsecid (tsk, sid); +} +static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag) {
@@ -2457,6 +2468,9 @@ static inline void security_task_reparenstatic inline void security_task_to_inode (struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode) { } +static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *tsk,__u32 *sid) +{ } +static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag) {
include/linux/selinux.h new file +52 -0
52 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/audit.c +13 -3
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@#include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/selinux.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h>
@@ -383,7 +384,7 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_tstatic int audit_receive_msg (struct sk_buff *skb,struct nlmsghdr *nlh) { -u32 uid, pid, seq; +u32 uid, pid, sid, seq;void *data;struct audit_status *status_get, status_set;int err;
@@ -391,6 +392,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_bu16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;uid_t loginuid;/* loginuid of sender */ struct audit_sig_info sig_data; +char * ctx =NULL ; +u32 len; err =audit_netlink_ok (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, msg_type);if (err)
@@ -409,6 +412,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b pid =NETLINK_CREDS (skb)->pid; uid =NETLINK_CREDS (skb)->uid; loginuid =NETLINK_CB (skb).loginuid; + sid =NETLINK_CB (skb).secid; seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq; data =NLMSG_DATA (nlh);
@@ -458,14 +462,20 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b err =audit_filter_user (&NETLINK_CB (skb), msg_type);if (err ==1 ) { err =0 ; +if (selinux_available ()) { + err =selinux_id_to_ctx (sid, &ctx, &len); +if (err <0 ) +return err; + } ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_KERNEL , msg_type);if (ab) {audit_log_format (ab, -"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u msg='%.1024s'" , - pid, uid, loginuid, (char *)data); +"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u subj=%s msg='%.1024s'" , + pid, uid, loginuid, ctx ? ctx :"null" , (char *)data);audit_set_pid (ab, pid);audit_log_end (ab); } +kfree (ctx); }break ;case AUDIT_ADD :
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +1 -0
@@ -1120,6 +1120,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocbNETLINK_CB (skb).dst_pid = dst_pid;NETLINK_CB (skb).dst_group = dst_group;NETLINK_CB (skb).loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current->audit_context); +security_task_getsecid (current, &NETLINK_CB (skb).secid);memcpy (NETLINK_CREDS (skb), &siocb->scm->creds,sizeof (struct ucred ));/* What can I do? Netlink is asynchronous, so that
security/dummy.c +7 -0
@@ -557,6 +557,12 @@ static void dummy_task_reparent_to_initstatic void dummy_task_to_inode (struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode) { } +static void dummy_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *tsk,__u32 *sid) +{ + *sid =0 ; +return ; +} +static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag) {return 0 ;
@@ -934,6 +940,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct securityset_to_dummy_if_null (ops, task_prctl);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, task_reparent_to_init);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, task_to_inode); +set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, task_getsecid);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, ipc_permission);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, ipc_getsecurity);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
security/selinux/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o ss/ -selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o +selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o exports.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) += netif.o
security/selinux/exports.c new file +32 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* +* SELinux services exported to the rest of the kernel. +* +* Author: James Morris <[email protected]> +* +* Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <[email protected]> +* +* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, +* as published by the Free Software Foundation. +*/ +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/selinux.h> + +#include "security.h" + +extern int ss_initialized; + +int selinux_available (void ) +{ +return ss_initialized; +} + +int selinux_id_to_ctx (u32 ctxid,char **ctx,u32 *ctxlen) +{ +return security_sid_to_context (ctxid, ctx, ctxlen); +} + +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (selinux_available); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (selinux_id_to_ctx);
security/selinux/hooks.c +9 -0
@@ -2769,6 +2769,14 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(structreturn ; } +static void selinux_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *tsk,__u32 *sid) +{ +struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; + + *sid = tsec->sid; +return ; +} +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
@@ -4319,6 +4327,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinu .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl, .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init, .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, + .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid, .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, .ipc_getsecurity = selinux_ipc_getsecurity,
security/selinux/include/security.h +1 -1
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsint security_sid_to_context (u32 sid,char **scontext,u32 *scontext_len); -int security_context_to_sid (char *scontext,u32 scontext_len, +int security_context_to_sid (const char *scontext,u32 scontext_len,u32 *out_sid);int security_context_to_sid_default (char *scontext,u32 scontext_len,u32 *out_sid,u32 def_sid);
security/selinux/ss/services.c +2 -2
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ out: } -static int security_context_to_sid_core (char *scontext,u32 scontext_len,u32 *sid,u32 def_sid) +static int security_context_to_sid_core (const char *scontext,u32 scontext_len,u32 *sid,u32 def_sid) {char *scontext2;struct context context;
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ out:* Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient * memory is available, or 0 on success. */ -int security_context_to_sid (char *scontext,u32 scontext_len,u32 *sid) +int security_context_to_sid (const char *scontext,u32 scontext_len,u32 *sid) {return security_context_to_sid_core (scontext, scontext_len, sid,SECSID_NULL );
--
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include/linux/netlink.h struct netlink_skb_parms · line 149
Quoted 12 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
include/linux/netlink.h +1
-0@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms__u32 dst_group;kernel_cap_t eff_cap;__u32 loginuid;/* Login (audit) uid */ +__u32 secid;/* SELinux security id */ };#define NETLINK_CB (skb) (*(struct netlink_skb_parms*)&((skb)->cb))
As a minor nit, does anyone know why '__u32' is used here vs. 'u32'? The definition is already wrapped with an #ifdef __KERNEL__. I see that you are being consistent with the existing fields, but then we use just 'u32' in the audit code and in the SELinux interfaces and code. Seems like we should be consistent throughout, and I don't see a real reason to use __u32 vs. just u32 if it is all kernel code and not included in userland (or protected by #ifdef __KERNEL__).
include/linux/security.h struct security_operations { · line 1177
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/security.h +1
-0@@ -1169,6 +1174,7 @@ struct security_operations { unsigned long arg5);void (*task_reparent_to_init) (struct task_struct * p);void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode); +void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *tsk,__u32 *sid);
Same issue for the security hook interfaces.
include/linux/security.h static inline void security_task_reparen · line 2473
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/security.h +3
-0@@ -2457,6 +2468,9 @@ static inline void security_task_reparenstatic inline void security_task_to_inode (struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode) { } +static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *tsk,__u32 *sid) +{ } +
Should we set *sid = 0 here as in the dummy function, just to make sure it doesn't contain garbage?
kernel/audit.c static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b · line 469
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/audit.c +5
-0@@ -458,14 +462,20 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b err =audit_filter_user (&NETLINK_CB (skb), msg_type);if (err ==1 ) { err =0 ; +if (selinux_available ()) { + err =selinux_id_to_ctx (sid, &ctx, &len); +if (err <0 ) +return err; + }
It seems unfortunate to have to wrap each call to a public SELinux interface with a selinux_available() check, and the ! defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) case would actually work without such a check since it just sets (ctx, len) to (NULL, 0). So the selinux_available() check is only necessary for the case where SELinux is disabled at runtime (selinux=0 or /selinux/disable). Possibly it should be moved within selinux_id_to_ctx() so that callers can just call selinux_id_to_ctx() unconditionally?
kernel/audit.c static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b · line 474
Quoted 7 lines
kernel/audit.c +2
-2ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_KERNEL , msg_type);if (ab) {audit_log_format (ab, -"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u msg='%.1024s'" , - pid, uid, loginuid, (char *)data); +"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u subj=%s msg='%.1024s'" , + pid, uid, loginuid, ctx ? ctx :"null" , (char *)data);
Do you want those "subj=null" items in the output when SELinux is disabled, or should there be a different audit_log_format call in the ! ctx case that completely omits "subj="?
Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 12 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 11 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
include/linux/netlink.h +1
-0@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms__u32 dst_group;kernel_cap_t eff_cap;__u32 loginuid;/* Login (audit) uid */ +__u32 secid;/* SELinux security id */ };
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/netlink.h struct netlink_skb_parms · line 149
Quoted 1 line
include/linux/netlink.h +0
-0#define NETLINK_CB (skb) (*(struct netlink_skb_parms*)&((skb)->cb))As a minor nit, does anyone know why '
__u32' is used here vs. 'u32'? The definition is already wrapped with an #ifdef__KERNEL__. I see that you are being consistent with the existing fields, but then we use just 'u32' in the audit code and in the SELinux interfaces and code. Seems like we should be consistent throughout, and I don't see a real reason to use__u32vs. just u32 if it is all kernel code and not included in userland (or protected by #ifdef__KERNEL__).
Yeah.. I was wondering 'bout this myself. I'll just change secid to u32 for the time being.
[..]
Quoted 11 lines
include/linux/security.h struct security_operations { · line 1177
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/security.h +1
-0@@ -1169,6 +1174,7 @@ struct security_operations { unsigned long arg5);void (*task_reparent_to_init) (struct task_struct * p);void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode); +void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *tsk,__u32 *sid);Same issue for the security hook interfaces.
And s/__u32/u32 on all the relevant functions too.
[..]
Quoted 11 lines
include/linux/security.h static inline void security_task_reparen · line 2473
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/security.h +3
-0@@ -2457,6 +2468,9 @@ static inline void security_task_reparenstatic inline void security_task_to_inode (struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode) { } +static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *tsk,__u32 *sid) +{ } +Should we set *sid = 0 here as in the dummy function, just to make sure it doesn't contain garbage?
Yep.
[..]
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/audit.c +0
-0kernel/audit.c static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b · line 469
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/audit.c +5
-0@@ -458,14 +462,20 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b err =audit_filter_user (&NETLINK_CB (skb), msg_type);if (err ==1 ) { err =0 ; +if (selinux_available ()) { + err =selinux_id_to_ctx (sid, &ctx, &len); +if (err <0 ) +return err; + }
Quoted 8 lines
It seems unfortunate to have to wrap each call to a public SELinux interface with a
selinux_available()check, and the !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)case would actually work without such a check since it just sets (ctx, len) to (NULL, 0). So theselinux_available()check is only necessary for the case where SELinux is disabled at runtime (selinux=0 or /selinux/disable). Possibly it should be moved withinselinux_id_to_ctx()so that callers can just callselinux_id_to_ctx()unconditionally?
This makes sense to me. I'll go ahead and make the change. I wouldn't even technically need the function or function call in my patch since selinux_available() simply returns ss_initialized.
[..]
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/audit.c static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b · line 474
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/audit.c +2
-2ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_KERNEL , msg_type);if (ab) {audit_log_format (ab, -"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u msg='%.1024s'" , - pid, uid, loginuid, (char *)data); +"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u subj=%s msg='%.1024s'" , + pid, uid, loginuid, ctx ? ctx :"null" , (char *)data);Do you want those "subj=null" items in the output when SELinux is disabled, or should there be a different
audit_log_formatcall in the ! ctx case that completely omits "subj="?
I remember a while back, Steve wanting to reduce / remove the conditional tokens in records (I think the argument had to do with performance impact and parsing). Did I remember that correctly Steve? Assuming we do want to print the token if ctx == NULL, is there a standard way of printing NULL in the record? I should probably make sure kernel/auditsc.c:audit_log_task_context() is consistent with whatever we decide.
Thanks.
-tim
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Quoted 19 lines
[..]
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/audit.c static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b · line 474
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/audit.c +2
-2ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_KERNEL , msg_type);if (ab) {audit_log_format (ab, -"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u msg='%.1024s'" , - pid, uid, loginuid, (char *)data); +"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u subj=%s msg='%.1024s'" , + pid, uid, loginuid, ctx ? ctx :"null" , (char *)data);Do you want those "subj=null" items in the output when SELinux is disabled, or should there be a different
audit_log_formatcall in the ! ctx case that completely omits "subj="?
Quoted 8 lines
I remember a while back, Steve wanting to reduce / remove the conditional tokens in records (I think the argument had to do with performance impact and parsing). Did I remember that correctly Steve? Assuming we do want to print the token if ctx == NULL, is there a standard way of printing NULL in the record? I should probably make sure kernel/auditsc.c:audit_log_task_context() is consistent with whatever we decide.
Amy submitted a patch a while back to eliminate the "name=" field to avoid "name=(null)" from the audit records if there was no name but I don't think the patch went anywhere.
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2005-November/msg00093.html
It looks like there's a new case (for tty) where "(none)" is used.
It would be nice to avoid having this in the audit records, especially in this case where the value might never be set on a particular system.
-- ljk
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Quoted 3 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
This makes sense to me. I'll go ahead and make the change. I wouldn't even technically need the function or function call in my patch since
selinux_available()simply returnsss_initialized.
Well, I think we want to keep that variable private to the SELinux "module". In the future, we'll likely add proper namespace prefixes to all non-static SELinux symbols to avoid polluting the kernel namespace.
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Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 10 lines · Steve Grubb
This should be a separate thread since the topic is different.
Quoted 3 lines · Linda Knippers
Amy submitted a patch a while back to eliminate the "name=" field to avoid "name=(null)" from the audit records if there was no name but I don't think the patch went anywhere.
Right. I want all audit fields to have name=value. If we have %s in the message and pass NULL to it, snprintf is already going to put "(null)" so what's wrong with just using this precedent?
In that case, Tim doesn't need a special check for !ctx in his code at all. But see below.
Quoted 3 lines
It creates parsing problems without a value. If I saw "tty=" and that's all, I'd think the audit system malfunctioned and file a bugzilla. I don't want that.
OTOH, if I see (null), I tend to assume a bug in the code. Isn't it saner to just omit the name=value pair altogether if the value is NULL? Otherwise, you are adding extra processing on the generation and parsing side for no benefit, along with wasting space in the audit message.
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Quoted 11 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
Quoted 9 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 3 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
This makes sense to me. I'll go ahead and make the change. I wouldn't even technically need the function or function call in my patch since
selinux_available()simply returnsss_initialized.Well, I think we want to keep that variable private to the SELinux "module". In the future, we'll likely add proper namespace prefixes to all non-static SELinux symbols to avoid polluting the kernel namespace.
Quoted 5 lines
I think maybe I miscommunicated my intentions. If I move the check to determine whether or not SELinux is enabled into
selinux_id_to_ctx(), then I can simply usess_initializeddirectly rather then callingselinux_available(), as I'll be making the check within the SELinux "module" (selinux/exports.c).
Ah, ok - no problem then.
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Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 9 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 3 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
This makes sense to me. I'll go ahead and make the change. I wouldn't even technically need the function or function call in my patch since
selinux_available()simply returnsss_initialized.Well, I think we want to keep that variable private to the SELinux "module". In the future, we'll likely add proper namespace prefixes to all non-static SELinux symbols to avoid polluting the kernel namespace.
I think maybe I miscommunicated my intentions. If I move the check to determine whether or not SELinux is enabled into selinux_id_to_ctx(), then I can simply use ss_initialized directly rather then calling selinux_available(), as I'll be making the check within the SELinux "module" (selinux/exports.c).
-tim
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Quoted 21 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 3 lines
It creates parsing problems without a value. If I saw "tty=" and that's all, I'd think the audit system malfunctioned and file a bugzilla. I don't want that.
OTOH, if I see (null), I tend to assume a bug in the code. Isn't it saner to just omit the name=value pair altogether if the value is NULL?
No, cause then I have non-normalized records.
Quoted 2 lines
Otherwise, you are adding extra processing on the generation and parsing side for no benefit, along with wasting space in the audit message.
There is a benefit...no missing fields means that the record is normalized. This is a required step before we create a binary format record.
There are performance benefits in the kernel as well as user space. The kernel doesn't have to have an "if" statement with 2 nearly identical calls to
audit_log_formator 2 back to back calls to the same function adding a new piece of info.
Quoted 5 lines
In userspace, I can parse it faster since I don't have to backtrack and re-parse from the last good token to look for the next field after deciding one is missing.
-Steve
Steve,
I agree with you. Also, we could have 'ausearch' interpret a (null) differently depending on token. So perhaps an ausearch on a record where subj=(null), would return subj=disabled.
-tim
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Quoted 4 lines · Steve Grubb
This should be a separate thread since the topic is different.
On Wednesday 15 February 2006 11:14, Linda Knippers wrote:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Amy submitted a patch a while back to eliminate the "name=" field to avoid "name=(null)" from the audit records if there was no name but I don't think the patch went anywhere.
Right. I want all audit fields to have name=value. If we have %s in the message and pass NULL to it, snprintf is already going to put "(null)" so what's wrong with just using this precedent?
The problem is that "(null)" is a valid file name.
[ljk@cert-e2 ~]$ touch "(null)"
[ljk@cert-e2 ~]$ ls -l "(null)"
-rw-rw-r-- 1 ljk ljk 0 Feb 17 11:14 (null)
When I look at audit records generated by those commands I see records like this:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1140192875.311:3789): arch=c000003e syscall=132 success=yes exit=0 a0=7fbffffc51 a1=0 a2=1b6 a3=0 items=1 pid=2116 auid=501 uid=501 gid=501 euid=501 suid=501 fsuid=501 egid=501 sgid=501 fsgid=501 comm="touch" exe="/bin/touch"
type=CWD msg=audit(1140192875.311:3789): cwd="/home/ljk" type=PATH msg=audit(1140192875.311:3789): name="(null)" flags=1 inode=6537222 dev=fd:01 mode=0100664 ouid=501 ogid=501 rdev=00:00
How can I tell from the audit records that the file name was "(null)" vs. having "(null)" manufactured by the audit system?
-- ljk
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 2 lines
It looks like there's a new case (for tty) where "(none)" is used.
Yes for the same reason.
Quoted 2 lines
It would be nice to avoid having this in the audit records, especially in this case where the value might never be set on a particular system.
Quoted 6 lines
It creates parsing problems without a value. If I saw "tty=" and that's all, I'd think the audit system malfunctioned and file a bugzilla. I don't want that.
-Steve
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Quoted 8 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 7 lines · Steve Grubb
This should be a separate thread since the topic is different.
Quoted 3 lines · Linda Knippers
Amy submitted a patch a while back to eliminate the "name=" field to avoid "name=(null)" from the audit records if there was no name but I don't think the patch went anywhere.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Right. I want all audit fields to have name=value. If we have %s in the message and pass NULL to it, snprintf is already going to put "(null)" so what's wrong with just using this precedent?
In that case, Tim doesn't need a special check for !ctx in his code at all.
FYI, if I just pass NULL to audit_log_format(), then <NULL> is printed to the log, not (null). I just tried this.
-tim
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Quoted 9 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
James & Stephen,
Thank you for the comments. While implementing your feedback I came across a pretty severe bug. I was basically obtaining the sid and then throwing it away (I was returning it from the function, but not actually assigning it to anything). New patch below. I still need to test this a little more. Thanks!
-tim
Should you really be using an lsm interface for getting the sid? The patch is currently allowing any security module to put a secid (whose comment says SELinux security id) into the netlink_skb_params struct. This generic item is then only used in SELinux specific calls. It seems that the getsecid functionality could just fit into an SELinux specific API just like selinux_id_to_ctx and friends. That would also avoid the overhead of lsm and all of the associated code changes. Of course this is probably moot if there are other planned uses for security_task_getsecid().
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Darrel -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 3 lines
It creates parsing problems without a value. If I saw "tty=" and that's all, I'd think the audit system malfunctioned and file a bugzilla. I don't want that.
OTOH, if I see (null), I tend to assume a bug in the code. Isn't it saner to just omit the name=value pair altogether if the value is NULL?
No, cause then I have non-normalized records.
Quoted 2 lines
Otherwise, you are adding extra processing on the generation and parsing side for no benefit, along with wasting space in the audit message.
There is a benefit...no missing fields means that the record is normalized. This is a required step before we create a binary format record.
There are performance benefits in the kernel as well as user space. The kernel doesn't have to have an "if" statement with 2 nearly identical calls to audit_log_format or 2 back to back calls to the same function adding a new piece of info.
In userspace, I can parse it faster since I don't have to backtrack and re-parse from the last good token to look for the next field after deciding one is missing.
-Steve
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Quoted 2 lines · Linda Knippers
type=PATH msg=audit(1140192875.311:3789): name="(null)" flags=1 inode=6537222 dev=fd:01 mode=0100664 ouid=501 ogid=501 rdev=00:00
Wait a second...notice the quote marks around (null). When you have a genuine (null) they are not there.
type=PATH msg=audit(02/14/2006 08:54:27.096:24) : item=1 name=(null) inode=34681 dev=03:06 mode=dir,700 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:automount_tmp_t:s0
-Steve
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This should be a separate thread since the topic is different.
Quoted 3 lines · Linda Knippers
Amy submitted a patch a while back to eliminate the "name=" field to avoid "name=(null)" from the audit records if there was no name but I don't think the patch went anywhere.
Right. I want all audit fields to have name=value. If we have %s in the message and pass NULL to it, snprintf is already going to put "(null)" so what's wrong with just using this precedent?
Quoted 1 line
It looks like there's a new case (for tty) where "(none)" is used.
Yes for the same reason.
Quoted 2 lines
It would be nice to avoid having this in the audit records, especially in this case where the value might never be set on a particular system.
It creates parsing problems without a value. If I saw "tty=" and that's all, I'd think the audit system malfunctioned and file a bugzilla. I don't want that.
-Steve
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Quoted 2 lines · Linda Knippers
How can I tell from the audit records that the file name was "(null)" vs. having "(null)" manufactured by the audit system?
ls -i "(null)"
and then compare inode values.
-Steve
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Quoted 9 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 2 lines
type=PATH msg=audit(1140192875.311:3789): name="(null)" flags=1 inode=6537222 dev=fd:01 mode=0100664 ouid=501 ogid=501 rdev=00:00
Wait a second...notice the quote marks around (null). When you have a genuine (null) they are not there.
type=PATH msg=audit(02/14/2006 08:54:27.096:24) : item=1 name=(null) inode=34681 dev=03:06 mode=dir,700 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:automount_tmp_t:s0
OK, I chased this down to make sure of what is happening. The audit working group has a test kernel, lspp.8, that has all the future audit and lspp patches in it for testing. (it can be found at
http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/files/lspp). There is a patch linux-2.6-audit-git.patch, which is not upstream, but should be in the next kernel. That changes the code in audit_log_exit of auditsc.c to:
if (context->names[i].name)
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
else
audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");The code in audit_log_untrustedstring does this:
while (*p) {
if (*p == '"' || *p == '(' || *p < 0x21 || *p > 0x7f) {
audit_log_hex(ab, string, strlen(string));
return;
}
p++;
}
audit_log_format(ab, "\"%s\"", string);This means that a real NULL will never have the double-quote marks around it, where a file named \(null\) will always have double-quote marks around it. I confirmed this by looking in the audit logs.
However...ausearch does not make this distinction in its output. I will see what I can do to make the necessary adjustments to ausearch so that its more obvious. So, I think that puts this issue to bed...
-Steve
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Quoted 23 lines · Steve Grubb
OK, I chased this down to make sure of what is happening. The audit working group has a test kernel, lspp.8, that has all the future audit and lspp patches in it for testing. (it can be found at
http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/files/lspp). There is a patch linux-2.6-audit-git.patch, which is not upstream, but should be in the next kernel. That changes the code inaudit_log_exitofauditsc.cto:if (context->names[i].name) audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name); else audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");The code in
audit_log_untrustedstringdoes this:while (*p) { if (*p == '"' || *p == '(' || *p < 0x21 || *p > 0x7f) { audit_log_hex(ab, string, strlen(string)); return; } p++; } audit_log_format(ab, "\"%s\"", string);
Quoted 7 lines
This means that a real NULL will never have the double-quote marks around it, where a file named \(null\) will always have double-quote marks around it. I confirmed this by looking in the audit logs.
However...ausearch does not make this distinction in its output. I will see what I can do to make the necessary adjustments to ausearch so that its more obvious. So, I think that puts this issue to bed...
Except for what other code should do about NULL pointers in output. If they defer it to vsnprintf, they will end up with <NULL> in the output. So should Tim's code be checking for !ctx and outputting (null) there as well?
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Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 4 lines · Stephen Smalley
Except for what other code should do about NULL pointers in output. If they defer it to vsnprintf, they will end up with <NULL> in the output. So should Tim's code be checking for !ctx and outputting (null) there as well?
Yes, I think that would be consistent will all the other audit code.
-Steve
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Quoted 10 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 4 lines · Stephen Smalley
Except for what other code should do about NULL pointers in output. If they defer it to vsnprintf, they will end up with <NULL> in the output. So should Tim's code be checking for !ctx and outputting (null) there as well?
Yes, I think that would be consistent will all the other audit code.
-Steve
Yes. I've already made this change. I just saw that Darren's recent patch submission included the API work I just did (that he suggested yesterday)... in the process of testing now.
Thanks.
-tim
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Quoted 29 lines · Linda Knippers
Quoted 10 lines · Steve Grubb
This should be a separate thread since the topic is different.
Quoted 3 lines · Linda Knippers
Amy submitted a patch a while back to eliminate the "name=" field to avoid "name=(null)" from the audit records if there was no name but I don't think the patch went anywhere.
Right. I want all audit fields to have name=value. If we have %s in the message and pass NULL to it, snprintf is already going to put "(null)" so what's wrong with just using this precedent?
The problem is that "(null)" is a valid file name.
[ljk@cert-e2 ~]$ touch "(null)"
[ljk@cert-e2 ~]$ ls -l "(null)"
-rw-rw-r-- 1 ljk ljk 0 Feb 17 11:14 (null)When I look at audit records generated by those commands I see records like this:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1140192875.311:3789): arch=c000003e syscall=132 success=yes exit=0 a0=7fbffffc51 a1=0 a2=1b6 a3=0 items=1 pid=2116 auid=501 uid=501 gid=501 euid=501 suid=501 fsuid=501 egid=501 sgid=501 fsgid=501 comm="touch" exe="/bin/touch"
type=CWD msg=audit(1140192875.311:3789): cwd="/home/ljk" type=PATH msg=audit(1140192875.311:3789): name="(null)" flags=1 inode=6537222 dev=fd:01 mode=0100664 ouid=501 ogid=501 rdev=00:00
Quoted 2 lines
How can I tell from the audit records that the file name was "(null)" vs. having "(null)" manufactured by the audit system?
How about:
type=PATH msg=audit(1140192875.311:3789): name=NULL flags=1
in cases where it truly is NULL? The double-quotes "" are used to quote file-names and without them, we have some kind of meta-value, instead.
[snip]
Signature · 2 lines
Lamont R. Peterson <[email protected]> [ http://www.xmission.com/~lrp/ ]
Quoted 33 lines · Lamont R. Peterson
Quoted 29 lines · Linda Knippers
Quoted 10 lines · Steve Grubb
This should be a separate thread since the topic is different.
Quoted 3 lines · Linda Knippers
Amy submitted a patch a while back to eliminate the "name=" field to avoid "name=(null)" from the audit records if there was no name but I don't think the patch went anywhere.
Right. I want all audit fields to have name=value. If we have %s in the message and pass NULL to it, snprintf is already going to put "(null)" so what's wrong with just using this precedent?
The problem is that "(null)" is a valid file name.
[ljk@cert-e2 ~]$ touch "(null)"
[ljk@cert-e2 ~]$ ls -l "(null)"
-rw-rw-r-- 1 ljk ljk 0 Feb 17 11:14 (null)When I look at audit records generated by those commands I see records like this:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1140192875.311:3789): arch=c000003e syscall=132 success=yes exit=0 a0=7fbffffc51 a1=0 a2=1b6 a3=0 items=1 pid=2116 auid=501 uid=501 gid=501 euid=501 suid=501 fsuid=501 egid=501 sgid=501 fsgid=501 comm="touch" exe="/bin/touch"
type=CWD msg=audit(1140192875.311:3789): cwd="/home/ljk" type=PATH msg=audit(1140192875.311:3789): name="(null)" flags=1 inode=6537222 dev=fd:01 mode=0100664 ouid=501 ogid=501 rdev=00:00Quoted 2 lines
How can I tell from the audit records that the file name was "(null)" vs. having "(null)" manufactured by the audit system?
Quoted 8 lines
How about:
type=PATH msg=audit(1140192875.311:3789): name=NULL flags=1
in cases where it truly is NULL? The double-quotes "" are used to quote file-names and without them, we have some kind of meta-value, instead.
[snip]
The difference is too subtle. I imagine that will get confusing. What we use to represent a NULL value isn't as important is how we distinguish it. For instance, simply encoding "NULL" the filename will make the distinction between 'name=NULL' and
name="NULL" (name="78857676") , clearer.
If we "strongly suggest" the admin use ausearch to read the log, then we could let ausearch make the distinction between quoted and unquoted NULL's clearer, rather than the kernel.
-tim
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On Wed, 2006-02-15 at 15:05 -0600, Darrel Goeddel wrote:
<snip>
Quoted 11 lines
Should you really be using an lsm interface for getting the sid? The patch is currently allowing any security module to put a secid (whose comment says SELinux security id) into the
netlink_skb_paramsstruct. This generic item is then only used in SELinux specific calls. It seems that the getsecid functionality could just fit into an SELinux specific API just likeselinux_id_to_ctxand friends. That would also avoid the overhead of lsm and all of the associated code changes. Of course this is probably moot if there are other planned uses forsecurity_task_getsecid().
Thanks Darrel! New patch attached... so... assuming this is good... how are we going to do this API merger :] ?
include/linux/netlink.h +1 -0
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms__u32 dst_group;kernel_cap_t eff_cap;__u32 loginuid;/* Login (audit) uid */ +u32 secid;/* SELinux security id */ };#define NETLINK_CB (skb) (*(struct netlink_skb_parms*)&((skb)->cb))
include/linux/selinux.h new file +55 -0
55 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/audit.c +11 -4
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@#include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/selinux.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h>
@@ -383,7 +384,7 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_tstatic int audit_receive_msg (struct sk_buff *skb,struct nlmsghdr *nlh) { -u32 uid, pid, seq; +u32 uid, pid, sid, seq;void *data;struct audit_status *status_get, status_set;int err;
@@ -391,6 +392,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_bu16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;uid_t loginuid;/* loginuid of sender */ struct audit_sig_info sig_data; +char * ctx; +u32 len; err =audit_netlink_ok (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, msg_type);if (err)
@@ -409,6 +412,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b pid =NETLINK_CREDS (skb)->pid; uid =NETLINK_CREDS (skb)->uid; loginuid =NETLINK_CB (skb).loginuid; + sid =NETLINK_CB (skb).secid; seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq; data =NLMSG_DATA (nlh);
@@ -457,15 +461,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b err =audit_filter_user (&NETLINK_CB (skb), msg_type);if (err ==1 ) { - err =0 ; + err =selinux_id_to_ctx (sid, &ctx, &len); +if (err <0 ) +return err; ab =audit_log_start (NULL ,GFP_KERNEL , msg_type);if (ab) {audit_log_format (ab, -"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u msg='%.1024s'" , - pid, uid, loginuid, (char *)data); +"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u subj=%s msg='%.1024s'" , + pid, uid, loginuid, ctx ? ctx :"(null)" , (char *)data);audit_set_pid (ab, pid);audit_log_end (ab); } +kfree (ctx); }break ;case AUDIT_ADD :
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +2 -0
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@#include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/selinux.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/scm.h>
@@ -1120,6 +1121,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocbNETLINK_CB (skb).dst_pid = dst_pid;NETLINK_CB (skb).dst_group = dst_group;NETLINK_CB (skb).loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current->audit_context); +NETLINK_CB (skb).secid =selinux_task_getsecid (current);memcpy (NETLINK_CREDS (skb), &siocb->scm->creds,sizeof (struct ucred ));/* What can I do? Netlink is asynchronous, so that
security/selinux/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o ss/ -selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o +selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o exports.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) += netif.o
security/selinux/exports.c new file +47 -0
47 lines not on this page · raw message
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include/linux/selinux.h line 37
Quoted 10 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
Thanks Darrel! New patch attached... so... assuming this is good... how are we going to do this API merger :] ?
include/linux/selinux.h new file +7
-0+/** +* selinux_task_getsecid - return the SID of task +* @tsk: the task whose SID will be returned +* +* Returns 0 if SELinux is disabled, otherwise the SID is returned. +*/ +int selinux_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *tsk);
Ryan noticed that you didn't update this to return u32 yet, unlike the #else case.
security/selinux/exports.c line 44
Quoted 9 lines
security/selinux/exports.c new file +9
-0+u32 selinux_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +u32 sid =0 ; + +if (ss_initialized) + sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)tsk->security)->sid; + +return sid; +}
You don't strictly need to check ss_initialized in this function; all tasks are assigned the kernel SID until policy is loaded, so you can always access the SID. As a matter of style, I'd prefer an explicit task_security_struct* local variable with separate assignment, i.e.
struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; sid = tsec->sid;
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Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 2 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
Thanks Darrel! New patch attached... so... assuming this is good... how are we going to do this API merger :] ?
Looks like your selinux_task_getsecid could be dropped in favor of Darrel's selinux_task_ctxid.
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Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 7 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 2 lines · Timothy R. Chavez
Thanks Darrel! New patch attached... so... assuming this is good... how are we going to do this API merger :] ?
Looks like your
selinux_task_getsecidcould be dropped in favor of Darrel'sselinux_task_ctxid.
Yeah. I'll post an updated patch against his work when it goes upstream. That seems to be the easiest solution. Thanks.
-tim
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On Wed, 2006-02-22 at 09:21 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
<snip>
Quoted 15 lines
security/selinux/exports.c line 44
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security/selinux/exports.c new file +9
-0+u32 selinux_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +u32 sid =0 ; + +if (ss_initialized) + sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)tsk->security)->sid; + +return sid; +}You don't strictly need to check
ss_initializedin this function; all tasks are assigned the kernel SID until policy is loaded, so you can always access the SID. As a matter of style, I'd prefer an explicit task_security_struct* local variable with separate assignment, i.e.
Quoted 3 lines
struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; sid = tsec->sid;
Ok. That change will appear in the patch I post against Darrel's work once it goes upstream.
-tim
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