integrity: ima policy update patch
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 integrity: ima policy update patch
- This patch adds support for policy definitions defined in terms of LSM subj_role, subj_type, and obj_role.
- Support for uid measurement policy definitions.
- Constrain the default INODE_PERMISSION measurement to only measure files opened for read by root.
Signed-off-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +139 -55
@@ -20,29 +20,51 @@#include "ima.h" +#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6 +enum lsm_rule_types {LSM_OBJ_USER ,LSM_OBJ_ROLE ,LSM_OBJ_TYPE , +LSM_SUBJ_USER ,LSM_SUBJ_ROLE ,LSM_SUBJ_TYPE +}; + +#define audit_type (type) AUDIT_ ##type +#define lsm_type (type) LSM_ ##type +struct ima_measure_rule_entry {struct list_head list;int action; -void *lsm_obj_rule; -void *lsm_subj_rule; -void *lsm_type_rule; +struct { +void *rule; +int type;/* audit type */ + } lsm_field[MAX_LSM_RULES ]; +uint flags;enum lim_hooks func;int mask;ulong fsmagic; +uid_t uid; }; +/* flags definitions */ +#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 +#define IMA_MASK 0x0002 +#define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004 +#define IMA_UID 0x0008 +/* Without LSM specific knowledge, default policy can only * be written in terms of .action, .func, .mask and .fsmagic. */ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { - {.action =DONT_MEASURE ,.fsmagic =PROC_SUPER_MAGIC }, - {.action =DONT_MEASURE ,.fsmagic =SYSFS_MAGIC }, - {.action =DONT_MEASURE ,.fsmagic =DEBUGFS_MAGIC }, - {.action =DONT_MEASURE ,.fsmagic =TMPFS_MAGIC }, - {.action =DONT_MEASURE ,.fsmagic =SECURITYFS_MAGIC }, - {.action =MEASURE ,.func =FILE_MMAP ,.mask =MAY_EXEC }, - {.action =MEASURE ,.func =BPRM_CHECK ,.mask =MAY_EXEC }, - {.action =MEASURE ,.func =INODE_PERMISSION ,.mask =MAY_READ }, + {.action =DONT_MEASURE ,.fsmagic =PROC_SUPER_MAGIC , + .flags =IMA_FSMAGIC }, + {.action =DONT_MEASURE ,.fsmagic =SYSFS_MAGIC ,.flags =IMA_FSMAGIC }, + {.action =DONT_MEASURE ,.fsmagic =DEBUGFS_MAGIC ,.flags =IMA_FSMAGIC }, + {.action =DONT_MEASURE ,.fsmagic =TMPFS_MAGIC ,.flags =IMA_FSMAGIC }, + {.action =DONT_MEASURE ,.fsmagic =SECURITYFS_MAGIC , + .flags =IMA_FSMAGIC }, + {.action =MEASURE ,.func =FILE_MMAP ,.mask =MAY_EXEC , + .flags =IMA_FUNC |IMA_MASK }, + {.action =MEASURE ,.func =BPRM_CHECK ,.mask =MAY_EXEC , + .flags =IMA_FUNC |IMA_MASK }, + {.action =MEASURE ,.func =INODE_PERMISSION ,.mask =MAY_READ ,.uid =0 , + .flags =IMA_FUNC |IMA_MASK |IMA_UID } };static struct list_head measure_default_rules;
@@ -61,45 +83,50 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);* Returns true on rule match, false on failure. */ static bool ima_match_rules (struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule, -struct inode *inode,enum lim_hooks func,int mask) +struct inode *inode,enum lim_hooks func,int mask) { -if (rule->func && rule->func != func) +struct task_struct *tsk = current; +int i; + +if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && rule->func != func)return false; -if (rule->mask && rule->mask != mask) +if ((rule->flags &IMA_MASK ) && rule->mask != mask)return false; -if (rule->fsmagic && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic) +if ((rule->flags &IMA_FSMAGIC ) + && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)return false; -if (rule->lsm_subj_rule) { -struct task_struct *tsk = current; -u32 sid; -int rc; - -security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); - rc =security_filter_rule_match (sid,AUDIT_SUBJ_USER , -AUDIT_EQUAL , - rule->lsm_subj_rule,NULL ); -if (!rc) -return false; - } -if (rule->lsm_obj_rule) { -u32 osid; +if ((rule->flags &IMA_UID ) && rule->uid != tsk->uid) +return false; +for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) {int rc; +u32 osid, sid; -security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); - rc =security_filter_rule_match (osid,AUDIT_OBJ_USER , -AUDIT_EQUAL , - rule->lsm_obj_rule,NULL ); -if (!rc) -return false; - } -if (rule->lsm_type_rule) { -u32 osid; -int rc; +if (!rule->lsm_field[i].rule) +continue ; -security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); - rc =security_filter_rule_match (osid,AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE , -AUDIT_EQUAL , - rule->lsm_type_rule,NULL ); +switch (i) { +case LSM_OBJ_USER : +case LSM_OBJ_ROLE : +case LSM_OBJ_TYPE : +security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); + rc =security_filter_rule_match (osid, + rule->lsm_field[i].type, +AUDIT_EQUAL , + rule->lsm_field[i].rule, +NULL ); +break ; +case LSM_SUBJ_USER : +case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE : +case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE : +security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); + rc =security_filter_rule_match (sid, + rule->lsm_field[i].type, +AUDIT_EQUAL , + rule->lsm_field[i].rule, +NULL ); +default : +break ; + }if (!rc)return false; }
@@ -180,11 +207,13 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)* * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure. */ -int ima_add_rule (int action,char *subj,char *obj,char *type, -char *func,char *mask,char *fsmagic) +int ima_add_rule (int action, +char *subj_user,char *subj_role,char *subj_type, +char *obj_user,char *obj_role,char *obj_type, +char *func,char *mask,char *fsmagic,char *uid) {struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry; -int result =0 ; +int i, result =0 ;/* Prevent installed policy from changing */ if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) {
@@ -199,15 +228,49 @@ int ima_add_rule(int action, char *subj, result = -EINVAL ; else entry->action = action; -if (!result && subj) - result =security_filter_rule_init (AUDIT_SUBJ_USER ,AUDIT_EQUAL , - subj, &entry->lsm_subj_rule); -if (!result && obj) - result =security_filter_rule_init (AUDIT_OBJ_USER ,AUDIT_EQUAL , - obj, &entry->lsm_obj_rule); -if (!result && type) - result =security_filter_rule_init (AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE ,AUDIT_EQUAL , - obj, &entry->lsm_obj_rule); + +if (!result && subj_user) { + i =lsm_type (SUBJ_USER ); + entry->lsm_field[i].type =audit_type (SUBJ_USER ); + result =security_filter_rule_init (entry->lsm_field[i].type, +AUDIT_EQUAL , subj_user, + &entry->lsm_field[i].rule); + } +if (!result && subj_role) { + i =lsm_type (SUBJ_ROLE ); + entry->lsm_field[i].type =audit_type (SUBJ_ROLE ); + result =security_filter_rule_init (entry->lsm_field[i].type, +AUDIT_EQUAL , subj_role, + &entry->lsm_field[i].rule); + } +if (!result && subj_type) { + i =lsm_type (SUBJ_TYPE ); + entry->lsm_field[i].type =audit_type (SUBJ_TYPE ); + result =security_filter_rule_init (entry->lsm_field[i].type, +AUDIT_EQUAL , subj_type, + &entry->lsm_field[i].rule); + } +if (!result && obj_user) { + i =lsm_type (OBJ_USER ); + entry->lsm_field[i].type =audit_type (OBJ_USER ); + result =security_filter_rule_init (entry->lsm_field[i].type, +AUDIT_EQUAL , obj_user, + &entry->lsm_field[i].rule); + } +if (!result && obj_role) { + i =lsm_type (OBJ_ROLE ); + entry->lsm_field[i].type =audit_type (OBJ_ROLE ); + result =security_filter_rule_init (entry->lsm_field[i].type, +AUDIT_EQUAL , obj_role, + &entry->lsm_field[i].rule); + } +if (!result && obj_type) { + i =lsm_type (OBJ_TYPE ); + entry->lsm_field[i].type =audit_type (OBJ_TYPE ); + result =security_filter_rule_init (entry->lsm_field[i].type, +AUDIT_EQUAL , obj_type, + &entry->lsm_field[i].rule); + }if (!result && func) {if (strcmp (func,"INODE_PERMISSION" ) ==0 ) entry->func =INODE_PERMISSION ;
@@ -217,6 +280,8 @@ int ima_add_rule(int action, char *subj, entry->func =BPRM_CHECK ; else result = -EINVAL ; +if (!result) + entry->flags |=IMA_FUNC ; }if (!result && mask) {if (strcmp (mask,"MAY_EXEC" ) ==0 )
@@ -229,6 +294,8 @@ int ima_add_rule(int action, char *subj, entry->mask =MAY_APPEND ; else result = -EINVAL ; +if (!result) + entry->flags |=IMA_MASK ; }if (!result && fsmagic) {int rc;
@@ -236,6 +303,23 @@ int ima_add_rule(int action, char *subj, rc =strict_strtoul (fsmagic,16 , &entry->fsmagic);if (rc) result = -EINVAL ; +else + entry->flags |=IMA_FSMAGIC ; + } +if (!result && uid) { +int rc; +ulong lnum; + + rc =strict_strtoul (uid,10 , &lnum); +if (rc) + result = -EINVAL ; +else { + entry->uid = (uid_t ) lnum; +if (entry->uid != lnum) + result = -EINVAL ; +else + entry->flags |=IMA_UID ; + } }if (!result) {mutex_lock (&ima_measure_mutex);
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +24 -11
@@ -313,8 +313,9 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct fsize_t rc =0 , datalen;int action =0 ;char *data, *datap, *dataend; -char *subj =NULL , *obj =NULL , *type =NULL ; -char *func =NULL , *mask =NULL , *fsmagic =NULL ; +char *subj_user =NULL , *subj_role =NULL , *subj_type =NULL ; +char *obj_user =NULL , *obj_role =NULL , *obj_type =NULL ; +char *func =NULL , *mask =NULL , *fsmagic =NULL , *uid =NULL ;int err =0 ;char *tag;int taglen, i;
@@ -347,18 +348,26 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct f tag =get_tag (datap, dataend,' ' , &taglen);if (!tag)break ; -if (strncmp (tag,"obj=" ,4 ) ==0 ) - obj = tag +4 ; -else if (strncmp (tag,"subj=" ,5 ) ==0 ) - subj = tag +5 ; -else if (strncmp (tag,"type=" ,5 ) ==0 ) - type = tag +5 ; +if (strncmp (tag,"obj_user=" ,9 ) ==0 ) + obj_user = tag +9 ; +else if (strncmp (tag,"obj_role=" ,9 ) ==0 ) + obj_role = tag +9 ; +else if (strncmp (tag,"obj_type=" ,9 ) ==0 ) + obj_type = tag +9 ; +else if (strncmp (tag,"subj_user=" ,10 ) ==0 ) + subj_user = tag +10 ; +else if (strncmp (tag,"subj_role=" ,10 ) ==0 ) + subj_role = tag +10 ; +else if (strncmp (tag,"subj_type=" ,10 ) ==0 ) + subj_type = tag +10 ;else if (strncmp (tag,"func=" ,5 ) ==0 ) func = tag +5 ;else if (strncmp (tag,"mask=" ,5 ) ==0 ) mask = tag +5 ;else if (strncmp (tag,"fsmagic=" ,8 ) ==0 ) fsmagic = tag +8 ; +else if (strncmp (tag,"uid=" ,4 ) ==0 ) + uid = tag +4 ;else {/* bad format */ err =1 ;break ;
@@ -367,10 +376,14 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct f }if (!err) { -ima_info ("%s %s %s %s %s %s %s\n" , +ima_info ("%s subj: %s %s %s obj: %s %s %s %s %s %s %s\n" , action ?"measure " :"dont_measure" , - subj, obj, type, func, mask, fsmagic); -ima_add_rule (action, subj, obj, type, func, mask, fsmagic); + subj_user, subj_role, subj_type, + obj_user, obj_role, obj_type, + func, mask, fsmagic, uid); +ima_add_rule (action, subj_user, subj_role, subj_type, + obj_user, obj_role, obj_type, + func, mask, fsmagic, uid); } out:if (!data)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +3 -1
@@ -78,7 +78,9 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inoenum ima_action {DONT_MEASURE ,MEASURE };int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,enum lim_hooks func,int mask); -int ima_add_rule (int ,char *,char *,char *,char *,char *,char *); +int ima_add_rule (int ,char *subj_user,char *subj_role,char *subj_type, +char *obj_user,char *obj_role,char *obj_type, +char *func,char *mask,char *fsmagic,char *uid);void ima_init_policy (void );void ima_update_policy (void );
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +13 -8
@@ -16,12 +16,14 @@ Description: action: measure | dont_measure condition:= base | lsm - base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=]] - lsm: [[subj=] [obj=] [type=]] + base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=]] + lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=] + [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][INODE_PERMISSION] mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value + uid:= decimal value lsm: are LSM specific default policy:
@@ -35,21 +37,24 @@ Description: dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994 # SECURITYFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673 + # SELINUX_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0xF97CFF8C measure func=BPRM_CHECK measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC - measure func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ + measure func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ uid=0 The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check, all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files - open for read in inode_permission. + open for read by root in inode_permission. Examples of LSM specific definitions: SELinux: - dont_measure type=var_log_t - dont_measure type=auditd_log_t - measure subj=system_u func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ + dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t + dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t + measure subj_user=system_u func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ + measure subj_role=system_r func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ Smack: - measure subj=_ func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ + measure subj_user=_ func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
James Morris
maintainerQuoted 7 lines · Mimi Zohar
- This patch adds support for policy definitions defined in terms of LSM
subj_role,subj_type, andobj_role.
- Support for uid measurement policy definitions.
- Constrain the defaultINODE_PERMISSIONmeasurement to only measure files opened for read by root.Signed-off-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Applied togit://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6.git#devel
Please use a more descriptive subject in the future.
- James
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>