Grsecurity is about to be discontinued, unless...
Hi,
As most of you probably know, a GPL licensed security solution called grsecurity [1] has been available for the Linux kernel since a while. It has a rather impressive list of features [2]. The lead developer has been maintaining patches for the 2.4 and the 2.6 branch for many years.
According to their developers, the patch includes various advanced security aspects which inspired several further projects [3].
A week ago, the latest - and probably the last - release was published. The main developer lost its sole sponsor due to the financial crisis, so the future of the project is in danger. As a result, the future development of PaX [4], one of the definitive components of grsecurity is also in deep trouble [5].
In the past, there have been several requests toward the Linux developers to include grsecurity and PaX in the mainline kernel [6][7][8], but in vain.
The common opinion of the developers of grsecurity, PaX and their users is that acceptance of the code into the kernel would be the best solution for saving the project, beside finding another long-term sponsor.
Before the project would finally die, I would like to draw your attention to the question of integration into the kernel again.
In short, I would like to know what is your answer to this request. And in the case if you see no chance for the integration, I would like to know what is the reason behind this decision.
[1] http://www.grsecurity.net
[2] http://www.grsecurity.net/features.php
[3] http://grsecurity.net/~spender/grsecurity_pax-influence.png
[4] http://pax.grsecurity.net/
[5] http://www.grsecurity.net/news.php#grsec2112
[6] http://lkml.org/lkml/2003/4/20/13
[7] http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/net/0602.0/0020.html
[8] http://lkml.org/lkml/2005/1/13/184
Thanks and best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Gabor MICSKO - http://hup.hu
Quoted 4 lines · Gabor MICSKO
In short, I would like to know what is your answer to this request. And in the case if you see no chance for the integration, I would like to know what is the reason behind this decision.
Quite frankly, historically the patches have been a mis-match of
- some sane stuff
- lots of totally insane and very annoying and invasive code.
an example of the second class is the totally idiotic "emulate NX bit - badly - with code segment limits" kind of patches. These kinds of patches only add unmaintainable crap that isn't even relevant in the long run, and thus any sane maintainer (me) should refuse to take them.
The apparent inability (and perhaps more importantly - total unwillingless) from the PaX team to be able to see what makes sense in a long-term general kernel and what does not, and split things up and try to push the sensible things up (and know which things are too ugly or too specialized to make sense), caused many PaX features to never be merged.
Much of it did get merged over the years (mostly because some people spent the time to separate things out), but no, we're not going to suddenly start merging code like that just because the project is in trouble. None of the basic issues have been solved.
Linus
Quoted 8 lines · Linus Torvalds
Quoted 3 lines · Gabor MICSKO
In short, I would like to know what is your answer to this request. And in the case if you see no chance for the integration, I would like to know what is the reason behind this decision.
Quite frankly, historically the patches have been a mis-match of
- some sane stuff
Probably the best way to proceed would be for the stakeholders to come to some agreement on which parts are the "sane stuff" (which could be an interesting food fight), split those parts out, and submit them for inclusion as standalone separate patches.
It's a shame that the grsecurity developers had issues with the LSM architecture, as their RBAC would probably be a nice addition to the slowly-growing set of LSM modules.
Quoted 3 lines · Gabor MICSKO
In short, I would like to know what is your answer to this request. And in the case if you see no chance for the integration, I would like to know what is the reason behind this decision.
I think that the main question here is -- what exact features are you missing in the vanilla Linux kernel that grsecurity provides?
Over past months/years, vanilla kernel gained some of the features that were initially present only in the PaX/grsecurity patchsets (address space layout randomization for x86, to name the one that I have been involved in myself).
Other things (roles? && access control stuff ) could be achieved by code that is already present in the vanilla kernel (selinux, smack and friends).
Thanks,
Signature · 2 lines
Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs