Generic name to handle and open by handle syscalls
Subsystems (16)
cover Generic name to handle and open by handle syscalls
Hi,
The below set of patches implement open by handle support using exportfs operations. This allows user space application to map a file name to file handle and later open the file using handle. This should be usable for userspace NFS [1] and 9P server [2]. XFS already support this with the ioctls XFS_IOC_PATH_TO_HANDLE and XFS_IOC_OPEN_BY_HANDLE.
[1] http://nfs-ganesha.sourceforge.net/
[2] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.emulators.qemu/68992
git repo for the patchset at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvaneesh/linux-open-handle.git open-by-handle
Changes from V17:
a) Add syscall number to asm-generic/unistd.h
c) Fix wrong put_filep usage in do_handle_open
Changes from V16:
a) mnt_id is now an arg to syscall
b) finish_open_handle is removed. Update finish_open to work with struct path and struct file.
c) Add O_NOACCESS and use that for open_by_handle on symlink
Changes from V15:
a) Add mount id to file handle
b) Add support for optional uuid tag in /proc/<pid>/mountinfo
c) Added MAY_OPEN_LINK to support open on symlink instead of adding a new may_open function. Also limited the open flag to O_RDONLY.
Changes from V14:
a) Use fget_light instead of fget in the patches
b) Drop uuid from struct file_handle as per the last review
Changes from V13:
a) Add support for file descriptor to handle conversion. This is needed so that we find the right file handle for newly created files.
Changes from V12:
a) Use CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH instead of CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE in open_by_handle
b) Return -ENOTDIR if O_DIRECTORY flag is specified in open_by_handle with handle for non directory
Changes from V11:
a) Add necessary documentation to different functions
b) Add null pathname support to faccessat and linkat similar to readlinkat.
c) compile fix on x86_64
Changes from V10:
a) Missed an stg refresh before sending out the patchset. Send updated patchset.
Changes from V9:
a) Fix compile errors with CONFIG_EXPORTFS not defined
b) Return -EOPNOTSUPP if file system doesn't support fh_to_dentry exportfs callback.
Changes from V8:
a) exportfs_decode_fh now returns -ESTALE if export operations is not defined.
b) drop get_fsid super_operations. Instead use superblock to store uuid.
Changes from V7:
a) open_by_handle now use mountdirfd to identify the vfsmount.
b) We don't validate the UUID passed as a part of file handle in open_by_handle. UUID is provided as a part of file handle as an easy way for userspace to use the kernel returned handle as it is. It also helps in finding the 16 byte filessytem UUID in userspace without using file system specific libraries to read file system superblock. If a particular file system doesn't support UUID or any form of unique id this field in the file handle will be zero filled.
c) drop freadlink syscall. Instead use readlinkat with NULL pathname to indicate read the link target name of the link pointed by fd. This is similar to sys_utimensat
d) Instead of opencoding all the open flag related check use helper functions. Did finish_open_by_handle similar to finish_open.
c) Fix may_open to not return ELOOP for symlink when we are called from handle open. open(2) still returns error as expected.
Changes from V6:
a) Add uuid to vfsmount lookup and drop uuid to superblock lookup
b) Return -EOPNOTSUPP in sys_name_to_handle if the file system returned uuid doesn't give the same vfsmount on lookup. This ensure that we fail sys_name_to_handle when we have multiple file system returning same UUID.
Changes from V5:
a) added sys_name_to_handle_at syscall which takes AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag instead of two syscalls sys_name_to_handle and sys_lname_to_handle.
b) addressed review comments from Niel Brown
c) rebased to b91ce4d14a21fc04d165be30319541e0f9204f15
d) Add compat_sys_open_by_handle
Chages from V4:
a) Changed the syscal arguments so that we don't need compat syscalls as suggested by Christoph
c) Added two new syscall sys_lname_to_handle and sys_freadlink to work with symlinks
d) Changed open_by_handle to work with all file types
e) Add ext3 support
Changes from V3:
a) Code cleanup suggested by Andreas
b) x86_64 syscall support
c) add compat syscall
Chages from V2:
a) Support system wide unique handle.
Changes from v1:
a) handle size is now specified in bytes
b) returns -EOVERFLOW if the handle size is small
c) dropped open_handle syscall and added open_by_handle_at syscall open_by_handle_at takes mount_fd as the directory fd of the mount point containing the file
e) handle will only be unique in a given file system. So for an NFS server exporting multiple file system, NFS server will have to internally track the mount point to which a file handle belongs to. We should be able to do it much easily than expecting kernel to give a system wide unique file handle. System wide unique file handle would need much larger changes to the exportfs or VFS interface and I was not sure whether we really need to do that in the kernel or in the user space
f) open_handle_at now only check for DAC_OVERRIDE capability
Example program: (x86_32). (x86_64 would need a different syscall number)
-------
cc <source.c>
--------
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <string.h>
struct file_handle {
int handle_size;
int handle_type;
unsigned char handle[0];
};#define AT_FDCWD -100
#define AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW 0x400
static int name_to_handle(const char *name, struct file_handle *fh, int *mnt_id)
{
return syscall(341, AT_FDCWD, name, fh, mnt_id, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
}static int lname_to_handle(const char *name, struct file_handle *fh, int *mnt_id )
{
return syscall(341, AT_FDCWD, name, fh, mnt_id, 0);
}static int fd_to_handle(int fd, struct file_handle *fh, int *mnt_id)
{
return syscall(341, fd, NULL, fh, mnt_id, 0);
}static int open_by_handle(int mountfd, struct file_handle *fh, int flags)
{
return syscall(342, mountfd, fh, flags);
}#define BUFSZ 100
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd, mnt_id;
int ret, done = 0;
int mountfd;
int handle_sz;
struct stat bufstat;
char buf[BUFSZ];
struct file_handle *fh = NULL;;
if (argc != 3 ) {
printf("Usage: %s <filename> <mount-dir-name>\n", argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
again:
if (fh && fh->handle_size) {
handle_sz = fh->handle_size;
free(fh);
fh = malloc(sizeof(struct file_handle) + handle_sz);
fh->handle_size = handle_sz;
} else {
fh = malloc(sizeof(struct file_handle));
fh->handle_size = 0;
}
errno = 0;
ret = lname_to_handle(argv[1], fh, &mnt_id);
if (ret && errno == EOVERFLOW) {
printf("Found the handle size needed to be %d\n", fh->handle_size);
goto again;
} else if (ret) {
perror("Error:");
exit(1);
}
do_again:
printf("found mount_id %d\n", mnt_id);
printf("Waiting for input");
getchar();
mountfd = open(argv[2], O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
if (mountfd <= 0) {
perror("Error:");
exit(1);
}
fd = open_by_handle(mountfd, fh, O_RDONLY);
if (fd <= 0 ) {
perror("Error:");
exit(1);
}
printf("Reading the content now \n");
fstat(fd, &bufstat);
ret = S_ISLNK(bufstat.st_mode);
if (ret) {
memset(buf, 0 , BUFSZ);
readlinkat(fd, NULL, buf, BUFSZ);
printf("%s is a symlink pointing to %s\n", argv[1], buf);
}
memset(buf, 0 , BUFSZ);
while (1) {
ret = read(fd, buf, BUFSZ -1);
if (ret <= 0)
break;
buf[ret] = '\0';
printf("%s", buf);
memset(buf, 0 , BUFSZ);
}
/* Now check for faccess */
if (faccessat(fd, NULL, W_OK, 0) == 0) {
printf("Got write permission on the file \n");
} else
perror("faccess error");
/* now try to create a hardlink */
if (linkat(fd, NULL, AT_FDCWD, "test", 0) == 0){
printf("created hardlink\n");
} else
perror("linkat error");
if (done)
exit(0);
printf("Map fd to handle \n");
ret = fd_to_handle(fd, fh, &mnt_id);
if (ret) {
perror("Error:");
exit(1);
}
done = 1;
goto do_again;
}PATCH 1/13 exportfs: Return the minimum required handle size
The exportfs encode handle function should return the minimum required handle size. This helps user to find out the handle size by passing 0 handle size in the first step and then redoing to the call again with the returned handle size value.
--- fs/btrfs/export.c | 8 ++++++-- fs/exportfs/expfs.c | 9 +++++++-- fs/fat/inode.c | 4 +++- fs/fuse/inode.c | 4 +++- fs/gfs2/export.c | 8 ++++++-- fs/isofs/export.c | 8 ++++++-- fs/ocfs2/export.c | 8 +++++++- fs/reiserfs/inode.c | 7 ++++++- fs/udf/namei.c | 7 ++++++- fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_export.c | 4 +++- include/linux/exportfs.h | 6 ++++-- mm/shmem.c | 4 +++- 12 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/export.c +6 -2
@@ -21,9 +21,13 @@ static int btrfs_encode_fh(struct dentry *dentry, u32 *fh, int *max_len,int len = *max_len;int type; -if ((len <BTRFS_FID_SIZE_NON_CONNECTABLE ) || - (connectable && len <BTRFS_FID_SIZE_CONNECTABLE )) +if (connectable && (len <BTRFS_FID_SIZE_CONNECTABLE )) { + *max_len =BTRFS_FID_SIZE_CONNECTABLE ;return 255 ; + }else if (len <BTRFS_FID_SIZE_NON_CONNECTABLE ) { + *max_len =BTRFS_FID_SIZE_NON_CONNECTABLE ; +return 255 ; + } len =BTRFS_FID_SIZE_NON_CONNECTABLE ; type =FILEID_BTRFS_WITHOUT_PARENT ;
fs/exportfs/expfs.c +7 -2
@@ -319,9 +319,14 @@ static int export_encode_fh(struct dentry *dentry, struct fid *fid,struct inode * inode = dentry->d_inode;int len = *max_len;int type =FILEID_INO32_GEN ; - -if (len <2 || (connectable && len <4 )) + +if (connectable && (len <4 )) { + *max_len =4 ; +return 255 ; + }else if (len <2 ) { + *max_len =2 ;return 255 ; + } len =2 ; fid->i32.ino = inode->i_ino;
fs/fat/inode.c +3 -1
@@ -759,8 +759,10 @@ fat_encode_fh(struct dentry *de, __u32 *fh, int *lenp, int connectable)struct inode *inode = de->d_inode;u32 ipos_h, ipos_m, ipos_l; -if (len <5 ) +if (len <5 ) { + *lenp =5 ;return 255 ;/* no room */ + } ipos_h =MSDOS_I (inode)->i_pos >>8 ; ipos_m = (MSDOS_I (inode)->i_pos &0xf0 ) <<24 ;
fs/fuse/inode.c +3 -1
@@ -640,8 +640,10 @@ static int fuse_encode_fh(struct dentry *dentry, u32 *fh, int *max_len,u64 nodeid;u32 generation; -if (*max_len < len) +if (*max_len < len) { + *max_len = len;return 255 ; + } nodeid =get_fuse_inode (inode)->nodeid; generation = inode->i_generation;
fs/gfs2/export.c +6 -2
@@ -36,9 +36,13 @@ static int gfs2_encode_fh(struct dentry *dentry, __u32 *p, int *len,struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;struct gfs2_inode *ip =GFS2_I (inode); -if (*len <GFS2_SMALL_FH_SIZE || - (connectable && *len <GFS2_LARGE_FH_SIZE )) +if (connectable && (*len <GFS2_LARGE_FH_SIZE )) { + *len =GFS2_LARGE_FH_SIZE ;return 255 ; + }else if (*len <GFS2_SMALL_FH_SIZE ) { + *len =GFS2_SMALL_FH_SIZE ; +return 255 ; + } fh[0 ] =cpu_to_be32 (ip->i_no_formal_ino >>32 ); fh[1 ] =cpu_to_be32 (ip->i_no_formal_ino &0xFFFFFFFF );
fs/isofs/export.c +6 -2
@@ -124,9 +124,13 @@ isofs_export_encode_fh(struct dentry *dentry,* offset of the inode and the upper 16 bits of fh32[1] to * hold the offset of the parent. */ - -if (len <3 || (connectable && len <5 )) +if (connectable && (len <5 )) { + *max_len =5 ; +return 255 ; + }else if (len <3 ) { + *max_len =3 ;return 255 ; + } len =3 ; fh32[0 ] = ei->i_iget5_block;
fs/ocfs2/export.c +7 -1
@@ -201,8 +201,14 @@ static int ocfs2_encode_fh(struct dentry *dentry, u32 *fh_in, int *max_len, dentry->d_name.len, dentry->d_name.name, fh, len, connectable); -if (len <3 || (connectable && len <6 )) { +if (connectable && (len <6 )) {mlog (ML_ERROR ,"fh buffer is too small for encoding\n" ); + *max_len =6 ; + type =255 ; + goto bail; + }else if (len <3 ) { +mlog (ML_ERROR ,"fh buffer is too small for encoding\n" ); + *max_len =3 ; type =255 ; goto bail; }
fs/reiserfs/inode.c +6 -1
@@ -1594,8 +1594,13 @@ int reiserfs_encode_fh(struct dentry *dentry, __u32 * data, int *lenp,struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;int maxlen = *lenp; -if (maxlen <3 ) +if (need_parent && (maxlen <5 )) { + *lenp =5 ;return 255 ; + }else if (maxlen <3 ) { + *lenp =3 ; +return 255 ; + } data[0 ] = inode->i_ino; data[1 ] =le32_to_cpu (INODE_PKEY (inode)->k_dir_id);
fs/udf/namei.c +6 -1
@@ -1336,8 +1336,13 @@ static int udf_encode_fh(struct dentry *de, __u32 *fh, int *lenp,struct fid *fid = (struct fid *)fh;int type =FILEID_UDF_WITHOUT_PARENT ; -if (len <3 || (connectable && len <5 )) +if (connectable && (len <5 )) { + *lenp =5 ; +return 255 ; + }else if (len <3 ) { + *lenp =3 ;return 255 ; + } *lenp =3 ; fid->udf.block = location.logicalBlockNum;
fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_export.c +3 -1
@@ -81,8 +81,10 @@ xfs_fs_encode_fh(* seven combinations work. The real answer is "don't use v2". */ len =xfs_fileid_length (fileid_type); -if (*max_len < len) +if (*max_len < len) { + *max_len = len;return 255 ; + } *max_len = len;switch (fileid_type) {
include/linux/exportfs.h +4 -2
@@ -108,8 +108,10 @@ struct fid {* set, the encode_fh() should store sufficient information so that a good * attempt can be made to find not only the file but also it's place in the * filesystem. This typically means storing a reference to de->d_parent in -* the filehandle fragment. encode_fh() should return the number of bytes -* stored or a negative error code such as %-ENOSPC +* the filehandle fragment. encode_fh() should return the fileid_type on +* success and on error returns 255 (if the space needed to encode fh is +* greater than @max_len*4 bytes). On error @max_len contain the minimum +* size(in 4 byte unit) needed to encode the file handle. * * fh_to_dentry: * @fh_to_dentry is given a &struct super_block (@sb) and a file handle
mm/shmem.c +3 -1
@@ -2143,8 +2143,10 @@ static int shmem_encode_fh(struct dentry *dentry, __u32 *fh, int *len, {struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; -if (*len <3 ) +if (*len <3 ) { + *len =3 ;return 255 ; + }if (hlist_unhashed (&inode->i_hash)) {/* Unfortunately insert_inode_hash is not idempotent,
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
PATCH 2/13 vfs: Add name to file handle conversion support
In reply to Aneesh Kumar K.VThe syscall also return mount id which can be used to lookup file system specific information such as uuid in /proc/<pid>/mountinfo
--- fs/open.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/exportfs.h | 3 + include/linux/fs.h | 8 +++ include/linux/syscalls.h | 5 ++- 4 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
fs/open.c +129 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@#include <linux/fs_struct.h> #include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/dnotify.h> +#include <linux/exportfs.h> #include "internal.h"
@@ -1042,3 +1043,131 @@ int nonseekable_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (nonseekable_open); + +#ifdef CONFIG_EXPORTFS +static long do_sys_name_to_handle (struct path *path, +struct file_handle __user *ufh, +int __user *mnt_id) +{ +long retval; +int handle_size; +struct file_handle f_handle; +struct file_handle *handle =NULL ; + +if (copy_from_user (&f_handle, ufh,sizeof (struct file_handle ))) { + retval = -EFAULT ; + goto err_out; + } +if (f_handle.handle_size >MAX_HANDLE_SZ ) { + retval = -EINVAL ; + goto err_out; + } + handle =kmalloc (sizeof (struct file_handle ) + f_handle.handle_size, +GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!handle) { + retval = -ENOMEM ; + goto err_out; + } + +/* convert handle size to multiple of sizeof(u32) */ + handle_size = f_handle.handle_size >>2 ; + +/* we ask for a non connected handle */ + retval =exportfs_encode_fh (path->dentry, + (struct fid *)handle->f_handle, + &handle_size,0 ); +/* convert handle size to bytes */ + handle_size *=sizeof (u32); + handle->handle_type = retval; + handle->handle_size = handle_size; +if (handle_size > f_handle.handle_size) { +/* +* set the handle_size to zero so we copy only +* non variable part of the file_handle +*/ + handle_size =0 ; + retval = -EOVERFLOW ; + }else + retval =0 ; +/* copy the mount id */ +if (copy_to_user (mnt_id, &path->mnt->mnt_id,sizeof (*mnt_id))) { + retval = -EFAULT ; + goto err_free_out; + } +if (copy_to_user (ufh, handle, +sizeof (struct file_handle ) + handle_size)) + retval = -EFAULT ; +err_free_out: +kfree (handle); +err_out: +return retval; +} + +/** +* sys_name_to_handle_at: convert name to handle +* @dfd: directory relative to which name is interpreted if not absolute +* @name: name that should be converted to handle. +* @handle: resulting file handle +* @mnt_id: mount id of the file system containing the file +* @flag: flag value to indicate whether to follow symlink or not +* +* @handle->handle_size indicate the space available to store the +* variable part of the file handle in bytes. If there is not +* enough space, the field is updated to return the minimum +* value required. +*/ +SYSCALL_DEFINE5(name_to_handle_at, int, dfd, const char __user *, name, + struct file_handle __user *, handle, int __user*, mnt_id, + int, flag) +{ + +int follow; +int fput_needed; +long ret = -EINVAL ; +struct path path, *pp; +struct file *file =NULL ; + +if ((flag & ~AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW ) !=0 ) + goto err_out; + +if (name ==NULL && dfd !=AT_FDCWD ) { + file =fget_light (dfd, &fput_needed); +if (file) { + pp = &file->f_path; + ret =0 ; + }else + ret = -EBADF ; + }else { + follow = (flag &AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW ) ?LOOKUP_FOLLOW :0 ; + ret =user_path_at (dfd, name, follow, &path); + pp = &path; + } +if (ret) + goto err_out; +/* +* We need t make sure wether the file system +* support decoding of the file handle +*/ +if (!pp->mnt->mnt_sb->s_export_op || + !pp->mnt->mnt_sb->s_export_op->fh_to_dentry) { + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP ; + goto out_path; + } + ret =do_sys_name_to_handle (pp, handle, mnt_id); + +out_path: +if (file) +fput_light (file, fput_needed); +else +path_put (&path); +err_out: +return ret; +} +#else +SYSCALL_DEFINE5(name_to_handle_at, int, dfd, const char __user *, name, + struct file_handle __user *, handle, int __user *, mnt_id, + int, flag) +{ +return -ENOSYS ; +} +#endif
include/linux/exportfs.h +3 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ struct inode;struct super_block ;struct vfsmount ; +/* limit the handle size to some value */ +#define MAX_HANDLE_SZ 4096 +/* * The fileid_type identifies how the file within the filesystem is encoded. * In theory this is freely set and parsed by the filesystem, but we try to
include/linux/fs.h +8 -0
@@ -953,6 +953,14 @@ struct file {unsigned long f_mnt_write_state;#endif }; + +struct file_handle { +int handle_size; +int handle_type; +/* file identifier */ +unsigned char f_handle[0 ]; +}; +extern spinlock_t files_lock;#define file_list_lock () spin_lock(&files_lock);#define file_list_unlock () spin_unlock(&files_lock);
include/linux/syscalls.h +4 -1
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct robust_list_head;struct getcpu_cache ;struct old_linux_dirent ;struct perf_event_attr ; +struct file_handle ;#include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h>
@@ -831,5 +832,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mmap_pgoff(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, unsigned long fd, unsigned long pgoff);asmlinkage long sys_old_mmap (struct mmap_arg_struct __user *arg); - +asmlinkage long sys_name_to_handle_at (int dfd,const char __user *name, +struct file_handle __user *handle, +int __user *mnt_id,int flag);#endif
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
PATCH 3/13 vfs: Add open by file handle support
In reply to Aneesh Kumar K.V--- fs/exportfs/expfs.c | 2 + fs/namei.c | 220 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- fs/open.c | 32 ++++++- include/linux/fs.h | 8 ++- include/linux/namei.h | 1 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 3 + 6 files changed, 247 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
fs/exportfs/expfs.c +2 -0
@@ -373,6 +373,8 @@ struct dentry *exportfs_decode_fh(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct fid *fid,/* * Try to get any dentry for the given file handle from the filesystem. */ +if (!nop || !nop->fh_to_dentry) +return ERR_PTR (-ESTALE ); result = nop->fh_to_dentry (mnt->mnt_sb, fid, fh_len, fileid_type);if (!result) result =ERR_PTR (-ESTALE );
fs/namei.c +206 -14
277 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/open.c +28 -4
@@ -652,10 +652,10 @@ static inline int __get_file_write_access(struct inode *inode,return error; } -static struct file *__dentry_open (struct dentry *dentry,struct vfsmount *mnt, -struct file *f, -int (*open)(struct inode *,struct file *), -const struct cred *cred) +struct file *__dentry_open (struct dentry *dentry,struct vfsmount *mnt, +struct file *f, +int (*open)(struct inode *,struct file *), +const struct cred *cred) {struct inode *inode;int error;
@@ -1171,3 +1171,27 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(name_to_handle_at, int, dfd, const char __user *, name,return -ENOSYS ; }#endif + +/** +* sys_open_by_handle_at: Open the file handle +* @mountdirfd: directory file descriptor +* @handle: file handle to be opened +* @flag: open flags. +* +* @mountdirfd indicate the directory file descriptor +* of the mount point. file handle is decoded relative +* to the vfsmount pointed by the @mountdirfd. @flags +* value is same as the open(2) flags. +*/ +SYSCALL_DEFINE3 (open_by_handle_at, int, mountdirfd, + struct file_handle __user *, handle, + int, flags) +{ +long ret; + +if (force_o_largefile ()) + flags |=O_LARGEFILE ; + + ret =do_handle_open (mountdirfd, handle, flags); +return ret; +}
include/linux/fs.h +7 -1
@@ -1939,6 +1939,10 @@ extern int do_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset,extern long do_sys_open (int dfd,const char __user *filename,int flags,int mode);extern struct file *filp_open (const char *,int ,int ); +struct file *__dentry_open (struct dentry *dentry,struct vfsmount *mnt, +struct file *f, +int (*open)(struct inode *,struct file *), +const struct cred *cred);extern struct file *dentry_open (struct dentry *,struct vfsmount *,int ,const struct cred *);extern int filp_close (struct file *,fl_owner_t id);
@@ -2150,11 +2154,13 @@ extern void free_write_pipe(struct file *);extern struct file *do_filp_open (int dfd,const char *pathname,int open_flag,int mode,int acc_mode); +extern long do_handle_open (int mountdirfd, +struct file_handle __user *ufh,int open_flag);extern int may_open (struct path *,int ,int );extern int kernel_read (struct file *,loff_t ,char *,unsigned long );extern struct file *open_exec (const char *); - +/* fs/dcache.c -- generic fs support functions */ extern int is_subdir (struct dentry *,struct dentry *);extern int path_is_under (struct path *,struct path *);
include/linux/namei.h +1 -0
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ extern int user_path_at(int, const char __user *, unsigned, struct path *);#define user_path_dir (name, path) \ user_path_at(AT_FDCWD, name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, path) +extern struct vfsmount *get_vfsmount_from_fd (int );extern int kern_path (const char *,unsigned ,struct path *);extern int path_lookup (const char *,unsigned ,struct nameidata *);
include/linux/syscalls.h +3 -0
@@ -835,4 +835,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_old_mmap(struct mmap_arg_struct __user *arg);asmlinkage long sys_name_to_handle_at (int dfd,const char __user *name,struct file_handle __user *handle,int __user *mnt_id,int flag); +asmlinkage long sys_open_by_handle_at (int mountdirfd, +struct file_handle __user *handle, +int flags);#endif
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
PATCH 4/13 vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
In reply to Aneesh Kumar K.VThe patch update may_open to allow handle based open on symlinks. The file handle based API use file descritor returned from open_by_handle_at to do different file system operations. To find the link target name we need to get a file descriptor on symlinks.
We should be able to read the link target using file handle. The exact usecase is with respect to implementing READLINK operation on a userspace NFS server. The request contain the file handle and the response include target name.
--- fs/namei.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/asm-generic/fcntl.h | 1 + include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +22 -2
@@ -1447,7 +1447,20 @@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)switch (inode->i_mode &S_IFMT ) {case S_IFLNK : -return -ELOOP ; +/* +* Allow only if acc_mode contain +* open link request. +*/ +if (!(acc_mode &MAY_OPEN_LINK )) +return -ELOOP ; +/* +* Allow open on symlink only with +* open flag O_NOACCESS. We don't +* allow read/write on symlinks +*/ +if (flag !=O_NOACCESS ) +return -ELOOP ; +break ;case S_IFDIR :if (acc_mode &MAY_WRITE )return -EISDIR ;
@@ -2038,8 +2051,15 @@ long do_handle_open(int mountdirfd,*/ if (open_flag & __O_SYNC) open_flag |=O_DSYNC ; +/* +* Handle based API allow open on a symlink +*/ +if (S_ISLNK (path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) + acc_mode =MAY_OPEN_LINK ; +else + acc_mode =MAY_OPEN ; - acc_mode =MAY_OPEN |ACC_MODE (open_flag); + acc_mode |=ACC_MODE (open_flag);/* O_TRUNC implies we need access checks for write permissions */ if (open_flag &O_TRUNC )
include/asm-generic/fcntl.h +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@#define O_RDONLY 00000000#define O_WRONLY 00000001#define O_RDWR 00000002 +#define O_NOACCESS 00000003/* No read/write access */ #ifndef O_CREAT #define O_CREAT 00000100/* not fcntl */ #endif
include/linux/fs.h +1 -0
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct inodes_stat_t {#define MAY_ACCESS 16#define MAY_OPEN 32#define MAY_CHDIR 64 +#define MAY_OPEN_LINK 128/* * flags in file.f_mode. Note that FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE must correspond
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 10 lines · Aneesh Kumar K.V
The patch update
may_opento allow handle based open on symlinks. The file handle based API use file descritor returned fromopen_by_handle_atto do different file system operations. To find the link target name we need to get a file descriptor on symlinks.We should be able to read the link target using file handle. The exact usecase is with respect to implementing READLINK operation on a userspace NFS server. The request contain the file handle and the response include target name.
If we don't do this, we will need new syscalls for doing stat, readlink and link on symlinks that take file handle as the argument. If that is ok, I can redo the patch series accordingly.
-aneesh
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 12 lines · Aneesh Kumar K. V
Quoted 10 lines · Aneesh Kumar K.V
The patch update
may_opento allow handle based open on symlinks. The file handle based API use file descritor returned fromopen_by_handle_atto do different file system operations. To find the link target name we need to get a file descriptor on symlinks.We should be able to read the link target using file handle. The exact usecase is with respect to implementing READLINK operation on a userspace NFS server. The request contain the file handle and the response include target name.
Quoted 4 lines
If we don't do this, we will need new syscalls for doing stat, readlink and link on symlinks that take file handle as the argument. If that is ok, I can redo the patch series accordingly.
This ended up with the below new syscalls
sys_handle_readlink, sys_handle_stat64, sys_handle_link, sys_handle_chown, sys_handle_setxattr, sys_handle_getxattr, sys_handle_listxattr, sys_handle_removexattr, sys_handle_utimes, compat_sys_handle_utimes
-aneesh
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
In reply to Aneesh Kumar K.VSuddenly getting an file pointer for a symlink which could never happen before is a really bad idea. Just add a proper readlink_by_handle system call, similar to what's done in the XFS interface.
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 3 lines · On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 04:30:57 -0400 Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> wrote:
Suddenly getting an file pointer for a symlink which could never happen before is a really bad idea. Just add a proper
readlink_by_handlesystem call, similar to what's done in the XFS interface.
Why is that?
With futexes we suddenly get a file descriptor for something we could never get a file descriptor on before and that doesn't seem to be a problem.
Why should symlinks be special as the only thing that you cannot have a file descriptor for? Uniformity of interface is a very valuable property.
NeilBrown
Al Viro
maintainerRe: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 7 lines · Neil Brown
Quoted 3 lines · On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 04:30:57 -0400 Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> wrote:
Suddenly getting an file pointer for a symlink which could never happen before is a really bad idea. Just add a proper
readlink_by_handlesystem call, similar to what's done in the XFS interface.
Quoted 6 lines
Why is that?
With futexes we suddenly get a file descriptor for something we could never get a file descriptor on before and that doesn't seem to be a problem.Why should symlinks be special as the only thing that you cannot have a file descriptor for? Uniformity of interface is a very valuable property.
You are welcome to review the codepaths around pathname resolution for assumptions of presense of ->follow_link() and friends; there _are_ subtle cases and dumping your "opened symlinks" in there is far from a trivial change. Note that it affects more than just the starting points of lookups; /proc/*/fd/* stuff is also involved.
BTW, speaking of NULL pathname, linkat() variant that allows creating a link to an opened file is also a very dubious thing; at the very least, you get non-trivial security implications, since now a process that got an opened descriptor passed to it by somebody else may create hardlinks to the sucker.
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
[[email address for Nick Piggin changed to [email protected]]]
Quoted 12 lines · On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 12:51:35 +0100 Al Viro <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 11 lines · Neil Brown
Quoted 3 lines · On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 04:30:57 -0400 Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> wrote:
Suddenly getting an file pointer for a symlink which could never happen before is a really bad idea. Just add a proper
readlink_by_handlesystem call, similar to what's done in the XFS interface.Why is that?
With futexes we suddenly get a file descriptor for something we could never get a file descriptor on before and that doesn't seem to be a problem.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Why should symlinks be special as the only thing that you cannot have a file descriptor for? Uniformity of interface is a very valuable property.
You are welcome to review the codepaths around pathname resolution for assumptions of presense of ->follow_link() and friends; there _are_ subtle cases and dumping your "opened symlinks" in there is far from a trivial change. Note that it affects more than just the starting points of lookups;
/proc/*/fd/*stuff is also involved.
So as I understand it you aren't rejecting the concept in principle, but you believe non-trivial code review is required before it can be considered an acceptable change?
That's quite reasonable. I hope to find time to have a look at the code.
Quoted 5 lines
BTW, speaking of NULL pathname,
linkat()variant that allows creating a link to an opened file is also a very dubious thing; at the very least, you get non-trivial security implications, since now a process that got an opened descriptor passed to it by somebody else may create hardlinks to the sucker.
Fair comment, and while one could imagine ways around this (such as requiring some Capability to link an fd) they wouldn't be very elegant.
But then nor is inventing a pile of new syscalls for doing different things with handles such as the list Aneesh posted.
Maybe a different approach is needed.
How about a new AT flag: AT_FILE_HANDLE
Meaning is that the 'dirfd' is used only to identify a filesystem (vfsmnt) and the 'name' pointer actually points to a filehandle fragment interpreted in that filesystem.
One problem is that there is no way to pass the length... Options:
fragment is at most 64 bytes nul padded at the end fragment is hex encoded and nul terminated
??
I think I prefer the hex encoding, but I'm hoping someone else has a better idea.
NeilBrown
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 6 lines · Neil Brown
How about a new AT flag:
AT_FILE_HANDLEMeaning is that the 'dirfd' is used only to identify a filesystem (vfsmnt) and the 'name' pointer actually points to a filehandle fragment interpreted in that filesystem.
Quoted 8 lines
One problem is that there is no way to pass the length... Options:
fragment is at most 64 bytes nul padded at the end fragment is hex encoded and nul terminated
??I think I prefer the hex encoding, but I'm hoping someone else has a better idea.
That makes it ugly for the kernel to stringify and parse the file handles.
How about for AT_FILE_HANDLE THE FIRST __u32 (maybe with an extra __u32 for alignment) is the length and the rest of the binary file handle follows this? In fact, doesn't the handle itself already encode the length in the header?
Cheers, Andreas
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 16 lines · Andreas Dilger
Quoted 6 lines · Neil Brown
How about a new AT flag:
AT_FILE_HANDLEMeaning is that the 'dirfd' is used only to identify a filesystem (vfsmnt) and the 'name' pointer actually points to a filehandle fragment interpreted in that filesystem.
Quoted 8 lines
One problem is that there is no way to pass the length... Options:
fragment is at most 64 bytes nul padded at the end fragment is hex encoded and nul terminated
??I think I prefer the hex encoding, but I'm hoping someone else has a better idea.
Quoted 6 lines
That makes it ugly for the kernel to stringify and parse the file handles.
How about for
AT_FILE_HANDLETHE FIRST__u32(maybe with an extra__u32for alignment) is the length and the rest of the binary file handle follows this? In fact, doesn't the handle itself already encode the length in the header?
struct file_handle already include length
-aneesh
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
In reply to Andreas DilgerQuoted 13 lines · On Sat, 21 Aug 2010 01:13:52 -0600 Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>…
Quoted 12 lines · Neil Brown
How about a new AT flag:
AT_FILE_HANDLEMeaning is that the 'dirfd' is used only to identify a filesystem (vfsmnt) and the 'name' pointer actually points to a filehandle fragment interpreted in that filesystem.
One problem is that there is no way to pass the length... Options:
fragment is at most 64 bytes nul padded at the end fragment is hex encoded and nul terminated
??
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think I prefer the hex encoding, but I'm hoping someone else has a better idea.
That makes it ugly for the kernel to stringify and parse the file handles.
We already parse filenames into components separated by '/'. Is HEX decoding that much more ugly.
Filehandles are currently passed between the kernel and mountd as HEX strings, so at least there is some precedent.
Quoted 2 lines
How about for
AT_FILE_HANDLETHE FIRST__u32(maybe with an extra__u32for alignment) is the length and the rest of the binary file handle follows this? In fact, doesn't the handle itself already encode the length in the header?
That part of a filehandle that nfsd gives to the filesystem is one byte out of a 4-byte header, plus the tail of the filehandle after the part that identifies the filesystem.
This 'one byte' does imply the length, but it doesn't necessarily encode it. Rather it is a 'type'. So it cannot really be used to determine the length at the point when the filehandle would need to be copied from userspace into the kernel.
I don't think there is any precedent for passing a 4-byte length followed by a binary string, while there is plenty of precedent for passing a nul-terminated ASCII string.
[[ Following this approach I would like to avoid any filehandle-specific syscalls altogether.
Just use a *at syscall with AT_FILE_HANDLE for filehandle lookup, and use getxattr('system:linux.file_handle') to get the filehandle for a given path.
Ofcourse we would need to at *at versions of the *xattr syscalls, but that is probably a good idea anyway.
]]
NeilBrown
Quoted 6 lines
Cheers, Andreas--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 43 lines · Neil Brown
Quoted 13 lines · On Sat, 21 Aug 2010 01:13:52 -0600 Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>…
Quoted 12 lines · Neil Brown
How about a new AT flag:
AT_FILE_HANDLEMeaning is that the 'dirfd' is used only to identify a filesystem (vfsmnt) and the 'name' pointer actually points to a filehandle fragment interpreted in that filesystem.
One problem is that there is no way to pass the length... Options:
fragment is at most 64 bytes nul padded at the end fragment is hex encoded and nul terminated
??Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think I prefer the hex encoding, but I'm hoping someone else has a better idea.
That makes it ugly for the kernel to stringify and parse the file handles.
We already parse filenames into components separated by '/'. Is HEX decoding that much more ugly.
Filehandles are currently passed between the kernel and mountd as HEX strings, so at least there is some precedent.
Quoted 2 lines
How about for
AT_FILE_HANDLETHE FIRST__u32(maybe with an extra__u32for alignment) is the length and the rest of the binary file handle follows this? In fact, doesn't the handle itself already encode the length in the header?That part of a filehandle that nfsd gives to the filesystem is one byte out of a 4-byte header, plus the tail of the filehandle after the part that identifies the filesystem.
This 'one byte' does imply the length, but it doesn't necessarily encode it. Rather it is a 'type'. So it cannot really be used to determine the length at the point when the filehandle would need to be copied from userspace into the kernel.I don't think there is any precedent for passing a 4-byte length followed by a binary string, while there is plenty of precedent for passing a nul-terminated ASCII string.
Quoted 8 lines
[[ Following this approach I would like to avoid any filehandle-specific syscalls altogether.
Just use a *at syscall withAT_FILE_HANDLEfor filehandle lookup, and usegetxattr('system:linux.file_handle')to get the filehandle for a given path.Ofcourse we would need to at *at versions of the *xattr syscalls, but that is probably a good idea anyway.
]]
There are at* syscalls that doesn't take the additional flags as the argument, like openat, readlinkat. How will handle based open and readlink work with the above interface ?
-aneesh
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 49 lines · On Mon, 23 Aug 2010 06:54:03 +0530 "Aneesh Kumar K. V"…
Quoted 48 lines · Neil Brown
Quoted 13 lines · On Sat, 21 Aug 2010 01:13:52 -0600 Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>…
Quoted 12 lines · Neil Brown
How about a new AT flag:
AT_FILE_HANDLEMeaning is that the 'dirfd' is used only to identify a filesystem (vfsmnt) and the 'name' pointer actually points to a filehandle fragment interpreted in that filesystem.
One problem is that there is no way to pass the length... Options:
fragment is at most 64 bytes nul padded at the end fragment is hex encoded and nul terminated
??Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think I prefer the hex encoding, but I'm hoping someone else has a better idea.
That makes it ugly for the kernel to stringify and parse the file handles.
We already parse filenames into components separated by '/'. Is HEX decoding that much more ugly.
Filehandles are currently passed between the kernel and mountd as HEX strings, so at least there is some precedent.
Quoted 2 lines
How about for
AT_FILE_HANDLETHE FIRST__u32(maybe with an extra__u32for alignment) is the length and the rest of the binary file handle follows this? In fact, doesn't the handle itself already encode the length in the header?That part of a filehandle that nfsd gives to the filesystem is one byte out of a 4-byte header, plus the tail of the filehandle after the part that identifies the filesystem.
This 'one byte' does imply the length, but it doesn't necessarily encode it. Rather it is a 'type'. So it cannot really be used to determine the length at the point when the filehandle would need to be copied from userspace into the kernel.I don't think there is any precedent for passing a 4-byte length followed by a binary string, while there is plenty of precedent for passing a nul-terminated ASCII string.
[[ Following this approach I would like to avoid any filehandle-specific syscalls altogether.
Just use a *at syscall withAT_FILE_HANDLEfor filehandle lookup, and usegetxattr('system:linux.file_handle')to get the filehandle for a given path.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Ofcourse we would need to at *at versions of the *xattr syscalls, but that is probably a good idea anyway.
]]There are at* syscalls that doesn't take the additional flags as the argument, like openat, readlinkat. How will handle based open and readlink work with the above interface ?
Bother... you are right.
I had remembered that at the time that all that *at calls were added there was discussion about how you always need some flags, particularly in the context of adding O_CLOEXEC and (I thought) a flag to allow non-sequential allocation of fds.
I had thought that they all got 'flags' arguments as a result, but it seems not.
For openat you could squeeze something into the current 'flags' arg (O_FILE_HANDLE), but for readlinkat, symlinkat at least there is no such option. Sad really.
NeilBrown
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 63 lines · Neil Brown
Quoted 49 lines · On Mon, 23 Aug 2010 06:54:03 +0530 "Aneesh Kumar K. V"…
Quoted 48 lines · Neil Brown
Quoted 13 lines · On Sat, 21 Aug 2010 01:13:52 -0600 Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>…
Quoted 12 lines · Neil Brown
How about a new AT flag:
AT_FILE_HANDLEMeaning is that the 'dirfd' is used only to identify a filesystem (vfsmnt) and the 'name' pointer actually points to a filehandle fragment interpreted in that filesystem.
One problem is that there is no way to pass the length... Options:
fragment is at most 64 bytes nul padded at the end fragment is hex encoded and nul terminated
??Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think I prefer the hex encoding, but I'm hoping someone else has a better idea.
That makes it ugly for the kernel to stringify and parse the file handles.
We already parse filenames into components separated by '/'. Is HEX decoding that much more ugly.
Filehandles are currently passed between the kernel and mountd as HEX strings, so at least there is some precedent.
Quoted 2 lines
How about for
AT_FILE_HANDLETHE FIRST__u32(maybe with an extra__u32for alignment) is the length and the rest of the binary file handle follows this? In fact, doesn't the handle itself already encode the length in the header?That part of a filehandle that nfsd gives to the filesystem is one byte out of a 4-byte header, plus the tail of the filehandle after the part that identifies the filesystem.
This 'one byte' does imply the length, but it doesn't necessarily encode it. Rather it is a 'type'. So it cannot really be used to determine the length at the point when the filehandle would need to be copied from userspace into the kernel.I don't think there is any precedent for passing a 4-byte length followed by a binary string, while there is plenty of precedent for passing a nul-terminated ASCII string.
[[ Following this approach I would like to avoid any filehandle-specific syscalls altogether.
Just use a *at syscall withAT_FILE_HANDLEfor filehandle lookup, and usegetxattr('system:linux.file_handle')to get the filehandle for a given path.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Ofcourse we would need to at *at versions of the *xattr syscalls, but that is probably a good idea anyway.
]]There are at* syscalls that doesn't take the additional flags as the argument, like openat, readlinkat. How will handle based open and readlink work with the above interface ?
Bother... you are right.
Quoted 10 lines
I had remembered that at the time that all that *at calls were added there was discussion about how you always need some flags, particularly in the context of adding
O_CLOEXECand (I thought) a flag to allow non-sequential allocation of fds.
I had thought that they all got 'flags' arguments as a result, but it seems not.
For openat you could squeeze something into the current 'flags' arg (O_FILE_HANDLE), but for readlinkat, symlinkat at least there is no such option. Sad really.
IMHO that is really bad overloading of flags value. I also find hex encoded handle in pathname argument of *at syscalls confusing. The above discussion also hint that we would need a new syscall for open, readlink and setxattr, So how about me posting the new series which remove open on symlink patch and add a bunch of syscalls to allow operation on symlinks based on handle ?
-aneesh
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
In reply to Neil BrownQuoted 8 lines · Neil Brown
[[ Following this approach I would like to avoid any filehandle-specific syscalls altogether.
Just use a *at syscall withAT_FILE_HANDLEfor filehandle lookup, and usegetxattr('system:linux.file_handle')to get the filehandle for a given path.Ofcourse we would need to at *at versions of the *xattr syscalls, but that is probably a good idea anyway.
]]
sys_setxattrat would take 7 arguments.
-aneesh
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 6 lines · On Mon, 23 Aug 2010 08:19:48 +0530 "Aneesh Kumar K. V"…
Quoted 5 lines · Neil Brown
[[ Following this approach I would like to avoid any filehandle-specific syscalls altogether.
Just use a *at syscall withAT_FILE_HANDLEfor filehandle lookup, and usegetxattr('system:linux.file_handle')to get the filehandle for a given path.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Ofcourse we would need to at *at versions of the *xattr syscalls, but that is probably a good idea anyway.
]]
sys_setxattratwould take 7 arguments.
I count 6 - assuming we share the 'flags' argument. There are only 2 xattr flags currently so there should be room to share.
dirfd path name value size flags == 6
NeilBrown
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
In reply to Neil BrownQuoted 9 lines · Neil Brown
Quoted 6 lines · On Sat, 21 Aug 2010 01:13:52 -0600 Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>…
Quoted 5 lines · Neil Brown
How about a new AT flag: AT_FILE_HANDLE
Meaning is that the 'dirfd' is used only to identify a filesystem (vfsmnt) and the 'name' pointer actually points to a filehandle fragment interpreted in that filesystem.
Why ot creating a special file system for this kind of operation ? I mean a vfsmnt filesystem, with each directory on the root is a symlink to the root of the real vfsmnt root ?
I could be even be in proc space like /proc/self/vfsmnt
path_to_handle will return a relative path from this directory like 0x75843558/somehandle (if X is on /usr/bin/X and usr is mounted by filesystem 0x75843558)path_to_fshandle() will return 0x75843558
opening file handle will be just a matter to thus open /proc/self/vfsmount/0x75843558/somehandle
Permission will be determined by vfsmount filesystem.
No need to create new syscall all te handle to filename will be handle by the vfsmount filesystem
We could even use at existing command. The dirfd will need to be only /proc/self/vfsmnt (and if you need to get a fd without mounting /proc create a syscall to get this fd).
Does sound plausible ?
Bastien
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 27 lines · On Tue, 24 Aug 2010 11:41:10 +0200 Bastien ROUCARIES…
Quoted 9 lines · Neil Brown
Quoted 6 lines · On Sat, 21 Aug 2010 01:13:52 -0600 Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>…
Quoted 5 lines · Neil Brown
How about a new AT flag: AT_FILE_HANDLE
Meaning is that the 'dirfd' is used only to identify a filesystem (vfsmnt) and the 'name' pointer actually points to a filehandle fragment interpreted in that filesystem.
Why ot creating a special file system for this kind of operation ? I mean a vfsmnt filesystem, with each directory on the root is a symlink to the root of the real vfsmnt root ?
I could be even be in proc space like
/proc/self/vfsmnt
path_to_handlewill return a relative path from this directory like 0x75843558/somehandle (if X is on/usr/bin/Xand usr is mounted by filesystem0x75843558)path_to_fshandle()will return0x75843558opening file handle will be just a matter to thus open
/proc/self/vfsmount/0x75843558/somehandlePermission will be determined by vfsmount filesystem.
Quoted 9 lines
No need to create new syscall all te handle to filename will be handle by the vfsmount filesystem
We could even use at existing command. The dirfd will need to be only
/proc/self/vfsmnt(and if you need to get a fd without mounting /proc create a syscall to get this fd).Does sound plausible ?
I don't think so.
I'm not 100% certain what you are proposing, but I think the basic idea is a virtual filesystem where giving a textual filehandle as a name gives access to the file with that filehandle.
This could only work by creating a virtual symlink from the name to the object in whichever filesystem - somewhat like /proc/self/fd/*. This could be used to open the file, not to create a hard-link or read a symlink which are two of the issues we are struggling with.
Maybe I have misunderstood you though.
NeilBrown
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 25 lines · Neil Brown
On Tue, 24 Aug 2010 11:41:10 +0200
Quoted 24 lines
Why ot creating a special file system for this kind of operation ? I mean a vfsmnt filesystem, with each directory on the root is a symlink to the root of the real vfsmnt root ?
I could be even be in proc space like
/proc/self/vfsmnt
path_to_handlewill return a relative path from this directory like 0x75843558/somehandle (if X is on/usr/bin/Xand usr is mounted by filesystem0x75843558)path_to_fshandle()will return0x75843558opening file handle will be just a matter to thus open
/proc/self/vfsmount/0x75843558/somehandlePermission will be determined by vfsmount filesystem.
No need to create new syscall all te handle to filename will be handle by the vfsmount filesystem
We could even use at existing command. The dirfd will need to be only
/proc/self/vfsmnt(and if you need to get a fd without mounting /proc create a syscall to get this fd).
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Does sound plausible ?
I don't think so.
I'm not 100% certain what you are proposing, but I think the basic idea is a virtual filesystem where giving a textual filehandle as a name gives access to the file with that filehandle.
Exactly
Quoted 4 lines
This could only work by creating a virtual symlink from the name to the object in whichever filesystem - somewhat like
/proc/self/fd/*. This could be used to open the file, not to create a hard-link or read a symlink which are two of the issues we are struggling with.
This issue could be raised by the open O_NODE patch
(http://lwn.net/Articles/364735/).
For symlink it will allow to read the symlink.
For hard link some bsd have fsdb that allow this kind of stuff. in our case the security implication are huge, We could undelete a removed file. In fact you need a flink(fd, "new path"). I could be useful in some context note but seriously restricted.
Bastien
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
In reply to Neil BrownThanks, I had both of the same concerns as Christoph with API change and exposing symlink fds last time I looked at the patces, actually.
But they can probably be worked around or avoided. I think the more important thing is whether it is worth supporting. This is all restricted to root (or CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) only, right, and what exact semantics they want. I would like to see more discussion of what this enables and some results.
For the case of avoiding expensive network revalidations in path name lookup, do we even need to open symlinks? Could the security issues be avoided by always having handle attached to an open fd?
Quoted 60 lines · Neil Brown
[[email address for Nick Piggin changed to [email protected]]]
Quoted 12 lines · On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 12:51:35 +0100 Al Viro <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 11 lines · Neil Brown
Quoted 3 lines · On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 04:30:57 -0400 Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> wrote:
Suddenly getting an file pointer for a symlink which could never happen before is a really bad idea. Just add a proper
readlink_by_handlesystem call, similar to what's done in the XFS interface.Why is that?
With futexes we suddenly get a file descriptor for something we could never get a file descriptor on before and that doesn't seem to be a problem.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Why should symlinks be special as the only thing that you cannot have a file descriptor for? Uniformity of interface is a very valuable property.
You are welcome to review the codepaths around pathname resolution for assumptions of presense of ->follow_link() and friends; there _are_ subtle cases and dumping your "opened symlinks" in there is far from a trivial change. Note that it affects more than just the starting points of lookups;
/proc/*/fd/*stuff is also involved.So as I understand it you aren't rejecting the concept in principle, but you believe non-trivial code review is required before it can be considered an acceptable change?
That's quite reasonable. I hope to find time to have a look at the code.Quoted 5 lines
BTW, speaking of NULL pathname,
linkat()variant that allows creating a link to an opened file is also a very dubious thing; at the very least, you get non-trivial security implications, since now a process that got an opened descriptor passed to it by somebody else may create hardlinks to the sucker.Fair comment, and while one could imagine ways around this (such as requiring some Capability to link an fd) they wouldn't be very elegant.
But then nor is inventing a pile of new syscalls for doing different things with handles such as the list Aneesh posted.Maybe a different approach is needed.
How about a new AT flag:
AT_FILE_HANDLEMeaning is that the 'dirfd' is used only to identify a filesystem (vfsmnt) and the 'name' pointer actually points to a filehandle fragment interpreted in that filesystem.
One problem is that there is no way to pass the length... Options:
fragment is at most 64 bytes nul padded at the end fragment is hex encoded and nul terminated
??I think I prefer the hex encoding, but I'm hoping someone else has a better idea.
NeilBrown
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 10 lines · Nick Piggin
Thanks, I had both of the same concerns as Christoph with API change and exposing symlink fds last time I looked at the patces, actually.
But they can probably be worked around or avoided. I think the more important thing is whether it is worth supporting. This is all restricted to root (or
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) only, right, and what exact semantics they want. I would like to see more discussion of what this enables and some results.
Quoted 4 lines
For the case of avoiding expensive network revalidations in path name lookup, do we even need to open symlinks? Could the security issues be avoided by always having handle attached to an open fd?
For implementing a userspace file server that use handle for representing files (like NFS) we would require to have the ability to do different file system operations that can operate on symlink to work on handle too.
-aneesh
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 16 lines · Aneesh Kumar K. V
Quoted 10 lines · Nick Piggin
Thanks, I had both of the same concerns as Christoph with API change and exposing symlink fds last time I looked at the patces, actually.
But they can probably be worked around or avoided. I think the more important thing is whether it is worth supporting. This is all restricted to root (or
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) only, right, and what exact semantics they want. I would like to see more discussion of what this enables and some results.Quoted 4 lines
For the case of avoiding expensive network revalidations in path name lookup, do we even need to open symlinks? Could the security issues be avoided by always having handle attached to an open fd?
Quoted 5 lines
For implementing a userspace file server that use handle for representing files (like NFS) we would require to have the ability to do different file system operations that can operate on symlink to work on handle too.
linkat change to take NULL path name is needed for regular files also. The file server will get a request to create a link with handle of oldpath and directory handle of new path and new name.
The changes would also help in the implementation of 9P server in Qemu for implementing a fast virtualization passthrough file system (aka VirtFS)
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.emulators.qemu/68992
-aneesh
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
In reply to Aneesh Kumar K. VQuoted 16 lines · Aneesh Kumar K. V
Quoted 10 lines · Nick Piggin
Thanks, I had both of the same concerns as Christoph with API change and exposing symlink fds last time I looked at the patces, actually.
But they can probably be worked around or avoided. I think the more important thing is whether it is worth supporting. This is all restricted to root (or
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) only, right, and what exact semantics they want. I would like to see more discussion of what this enables and some results.Quoted 4 lines
For the case of avoiding expensive network revalidations in path name lookup, do we even need to open symlinks? Could the security issues be avoided by always having handle attached to an open fd?
Quoted 4 lines
For implementing a userspace file server that use handle for representing files (like NFS) we would require to have the ability to do different file system operations that can operate on symlink to work on handle too.
Right. Is this a really important goal, I'm wondering? Is it realistic (ie. to be able to remove the nfs server from the kernel)?
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 17 lines · Nick Piggin
Quoted 16 lines · Aneesh Kumar K. V
Quoted 14 lines · Nick Piggin
Thanks, I had both of the same concerns as Christoph with API change and exposing symlink fds last time I looked at the patces, actually.
But they can probably be worked around or avoided. I think the more important thing is whether it is worth supporting. This is all restricted to root (or
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) only, right, and what exact semantics they want. I would like to see more discussion of what this enables and some results.For the case of avoiding expensive network revalidations in path name lookup, do we even need to open symlinks? Could the security issues be avoided by always having handle attached to an open fd?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
For implementing a userspace file server that use handle for representing files (like NFS) we would require to have the ability to do different file system operations that can operate on symlink to work on handle too.
Right. Is this a really important goal, I'm wondering? Is it realistic (ie. to be able to remove the nfs server from the kernel)?
The feature is also needed to implement a 9p virtio pass through file system in Qemu http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.emulators.qemu/68992
-aneesh
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
In reply to Nick PigginQuoted 2 lines · Nick Piggin
Right. Is this a really important goal, I'm wondering? Is it realistic (ie. to be able to remove the nfs server from the kernel)?
I think so.
The hardest part is if you want to export a filesystem that also has non-nfs users--in the kernel it's much easier to maintain consistency between local users of the filesystem and nfs clients.
If the server has no local users, then userspace may turn out to be easier.
In that case you might ask why the server needs a real filesystem to export at all--in theory it could maintain all its data on its own. But I suspect if you try that you find you're reinventing a lot of wheels.
--b.
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
In reply to Nick PigginQuoted 9 lines · On Sat, 21 Aug 2010 18:30:24 +1000 Nick Piggin <[email protected]> wrote:
Thanks, I had both of the same concerns as Christoph with API change and exposing symlink fds last time I looked at the patces, actually.
But they can probably be worked around or avoided. I think the more important thing is whether it is worth supporting. This is all restricted to root (or
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) only, right, and what exact semantics they want. I would like to see more discussion of what this enables and some results.
They allow a credible user-space implementation of the server for some network filesystem protocols such as NFS and apparently 9P.
Quoted 4 lines
For the case of avoiding expensive network revalidations in path name lookup, do we even need to open symlinks? Could the security issues be avoided by always having handle attached to an open fd?
I don't see what you are getting at here... which particular security isses, and what fd would you use?
As I understand it there are only two security issues that have been noted. 1/ lookup-by-filehandle can bypass any 'search' permission tests on ancestor
directories. I cannot see any way to avoid this except require CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
2/ Creating a hardlink to an 'fd' allows a process that was given an 'fd'
that it could not have opened itself to prevent that file from being removed (and space reclaimed) by creating a private hardlink. This could be avoided by requiring CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH for that particular operation (and probably requiring i_nlink > 0 anyway) but that feels like a very special-case restriction.
Was it one of these that you were referring to?
Thanks,
NeilBrown
Quoted 67 lines · Neil Brown
Quoted 56 lines
[[email address for Nick Piggin changed to [email protected]]]
Quoted 12 lines · On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 12:51:35 +0100 Al Viro <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 11 lines · Neil Brown
Quoted 3 lines · On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 04:30:57 -0400 Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> wrote:
Suddenly getting an file pointer for a symlink which could never happen before is a really bad idea. Just add a proper
readlink_by_handlesystem call, similar to what's done in the XFS interface.Why is that?
With futexes we suddenly get a file descriptor for something we could never get a file descriptor on before and that doesn't seem to be a problem.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Why should symlinks be special as the only thing that you cannot have a file descriptor for? Uniformity of interface is a very valuable property.
You are welcome to review the codepaths around pathname resolution for assumptions of presense of ->follow_link() and friends; there _are_ subtle cases and dumping your "opened symlinks" in there is far from a trivial change. Note that it affects more than just the starting points of lookups;
/proc/*/fd/*stuff is also involved.So as I understand it you aren't rejecting the concept in principle, but you believe non-trivial code review is required before it can be considered an acceptable change?
That's quite reasonable. I hope to find time to have a look at the code.Quoted 5 lines
BTW, speaking of NULL pathname,
linkat()variant that allows creating a link to an opened file is also a very dubious thing; at the very least, you get non-trivial security implications, since now a process that got an opened descriptor passed to it by somebody else may create hardlinks to the sucker.Fair comment, and while one could imagine ways around this (such as requiring some Capability to link an fd) they wouldn't be very elegant.
But then nor is inventing a pile of new syscalls for doing different things with handles such as the list Aneesh posted.Maybe a different approach is needed.
How about a new AT flag:
AT_FILE_HANDLEMeaning is that the 'dirfd' is used only to identify a filesystem (vfsmnt) and the 'name' pointer actually points to a filehandle fragment interpreted in that filesystem.
One problem is that there is no way to pass the length... Options:
fragment is at most 64 bytes nul padded at the end fragment is hex encoded and nul terminated
??Quoted 4 lines
I think I prefer the hex encoding, but I'm hoping someone else has a better idea.
NeilBrown
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 17 lines · Neil Brown
Quoted 9 lines · On Sat, 21 Aug 2010 18:30:24 +1000 Nick Piggin <[email protected]> wrote:
Thanks, I had both of the same concerns as Christoph with API change and exposing symlink fds last time I looked at the patces, actually.
But they can probably be worked around or avoided. I think the more important thing is whether it is worth supporting. This is all restricted to root (or
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) only, right, and what exact semantics they want. I would like to see more discussion of what this enables and some results.They allow a credible user-space implementation of the server for some network filesystem protocols such as NFS and apparently 9P.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
For the case of avoiding expensive network revalidations in path name lookup, do we even need to open symlinks? Could the security issues be avoided by always having handle attached to an open fd?
I don't see what you are getting at here... which particular security isses, and what fd would you use?
Well the issue that you need escalated privilges to use it. The other use case for it I understand is Andreas's file-handle-server which avoids a lot of path lookup costs on non-local filesystems. I'm wondering is that really useful if it's not availale to unprivileged users?
Quoted 11 lines
As I understand it there are only two security issues that have been noted. 1/ lookup-by-filehandle can bypass any 'search' permission tests on ancestor
directories. I cannot see any way to avoid this except requireCAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
2/ Creating a hardlink to an 'fd' allows a process that was given an 'fd'
that it could not have opened itself to prevent that file from being removed (and space reclaimed) by creating a private hardlink. This could be avoided by requiringCAP_DAC_READ_SEARCHfor that particular operation (and probably requiringi_nlink> 0 anyway) but that feels like a very special-case restriction.
Just so long as the process could have created a hardlink to the file otherwise via traditional operations, I think it's OK.
Quoted 2 lines
Was it one of these that you were referring to?
Just the general problem of security and inherent restrictions to using the syscalls.
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
In reply to Neil BrownQuoted 26 lines · Neil Brown
[[email address for Nick Piggin changed to [email protected]]]
Quoted 12 lines · On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 12:51:35 +0100 Al Viro <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 11 lines · Neil Brown
Quoted 3 lines · On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 04:30:57 -0400 Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> wrote:
Suddenly getting an file pointer for a symlink which could never happen before is a really bad idea. Just add a proper
readlink_by_handlesystem call, similar to what's done in the XFS interface.Why is that?
With futexes we suddenly get a file descriptor for something we could never get a file descriptor on before and that doesn't seem to be a problem.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Why should symlinks be special as the only thing that you cannot have a file descriptor for? Uniformity of interface is a very valuable property.
You are welcome to review the codepaths around pathname resolution for assumptions of presense of ->follow_link() and friends; there _are_ subtle cases and dumping your "opened symlinks" in there is far from a trivial change. Note that it affects more than just the starting points of lookups;
/proc/*/fd/*stuff is also involved.
Quoted 11 lines
So as I understand it you aren't rejecting the concept in principle, but you believe non-trivial code review is required before it can be considered an acceptable change?
That's quite reasonable. I hope to find time to have a look at the code.Quoted 6 lines
BTW, speaking of NULL pathname,
linkat()variant that allows creating a link to an opened file is also a very dubious thing; at the very least, you get non-trivial security implications, since now a process that got an opened descriptor passed to it by somebody else may create hardlinks to the sucker.
Why would that be an issue ? Even though a hardlink can be created, only process with right privileges can access them. One problem is; being able to create hardlinks at different directory location as above implies that there is no way to guarantee that the file got completely removed from the system. Is this the security risk that you are pointing above ?
Quoted 3 lines
Fair comment, and while one could imagine ways around this (such as requiring some Capability to link an fd) they wouldn't be very elegant.
a sys_handle_link that limits to CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH is a nice compromise.
Quoted 10 lines
But then nor is inventing a pile of new syscalls for doing different things with handles such as the list Aneesh posted.
Maybe a different approach is needed.
How about a new AT flag:
AT_FILE_HANDLEMeaning is that the 'dirfd' is used only to identify a filesystem (vfsmnt) and the 'name' pointer actually points to a filehandle fragment interpreted in that filesystem.
But that would imply once can guess the handle and create a hardlink to it.
Quoted 2 lines
One problem is that there is no way to pass the length...
struct file_handle already include the length.
Quoted 8 lines
Options:
fragment is at most 64 bytes nul padded at the end fragment is hex encoded and nul terminated ??I think I prefer the hex encoding, but I'm hoping someone else has a better idea.
-aneesh
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
In reply to Neil BrownQuoted 2 lines · Neil Brown
With futexes we suddenly get a file descriptor for something we could never get a file descriptor on before and that doesn't seem to be a problem.
FWIW
commit 82af7aca56c67061420d618cc5a30f0fd4106b80
Author: Eric Sesterhenn <[email protected]> Date: Fri Jan 25 10:40:46 2008 +0100
Removal of FUTEX_FD
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
Quoted 11 lines · On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 15:25:29 +0200 Peter Dijkstra <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · Neil Brown
With futexes we suddenly get a file descriptor for something we could never get a file descriptor on before and that doesn't seem to be a problem.
FWIW
commit
82af7aca56c67061420d618cc5a30f0fd4106b80Author: Eric Sesterhenn <[email protected]> Date: Fri Jan 25 10:40:46 2008 +0100Removal of
FUTEX_FD
Interesting - thanks.
OK, adjust my argument to reference signalfd, timerfs and pollfd.
I haven't looked at that code before - "anon_inode_getfd" gives you an fd on an inode for which
(stat.st_mode & S_IFMT) == 0
Cool! They have no format at all :-)
NeilBrown
Re: [PATCH -V18 04/13] vfs: Allow handle based open on symlinks
In reply to Christoph HellwigQuoted 3 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Suddenly getting an file pointer for a symlink which could never happen before is a really bad idea. Just add a proper
readlink_by_handlesystem call, similar to what's done in the XFS interface.
It is not just readlink that we would need. We would require
sys_handle_readlink, sys_handle_stat64, sys_handle_link, sys_handle_chown, sys_handle_setxattr, sys_handle_getxattr, sys_handle_listxattr, sys_handle_removexattr, sys_handle_utimes, compat_sys_handle_utimes
I have most of the changes done, so if we are ok adding all these new syscalls i can post the patch series.
-aneesh
PATCH 5/13 vfs: Support null pathname in readlink
In reply to Aneesh Kumar K.VFrom: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
This enables to use readlink to get the link target name from a file descriptor point to the link. This can be used with open_by_handle syscall that returns a file descriptor for a link. We can then use this file descriptor to get the target name.
This is similar to utimensat(2) interface
--- fs/stat.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/stat.c +22 -8
@@ -289,26 +289,40 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(newfstat, unsigned int, fd, struct stat __user *, statbuf) SYSCALL_DEFINE4(readlinkat, int, dfd, const char __user *, pathname, char __user *, buf, int, bufsiz) { -struct path path; -int error; +int error =0 , fput_needed; +struct path path, *pp; +struct file *file =NULL ;if (bufsiz <=0 )return -EINVAL ; - error =user_path_at (dfd, pathname,0 , &path); +if (pathname ==NULL && dfd !=AT_FDCWD ) { + file =fget_light (dfd, &fput_needed); + +if (file) + pp = &file->f_path; +else + error = -EBADF ; + }else { + error =user_path_at (dfd, pathname,0 , &path); + pp = &path; + }if (!error) { -struct inode *inode = path.dentry->d_inode; +struct inode *inode = pp->dentry->d_inode; error = -EINVAL ;if (inode->i_op->readlink) { - error =security_inode_readlink (path.dentry); + error =security_inode_readlink (pp->dentry);if (!error) { -touch_atime (path.mnt, path.dentry); - error = inode->i_op->readlink (path.dentry, +touch_atime (pp->mnt, pp->dentry); + error = inode->i_op->readlink (pp->dentry, buf, bufsiz); } } -path_put (&path); +if (file) +fput_light (file, fput_needed); +else +path_put (&path); }return error; }
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
Re: [PATCH -V18 05/13] vfs: Support null pathname in readlink
Changing the interfaces of existing system calls to accept a NULL name which previously wasn't acceptable is not valid. Even for new system calls I think it's a bad idea. utimensat already has the most ugly code of all fs related system calls because of that.
Re: [PATCH -V18 05/13] vfs: Support null pathname in readlink
Quoted 4 lines · On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 04:32:13 -0400 Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> wrote:
Changing the interfaces of existing system calls to accept a NULL name which previously wasn't acceptable is not valid. Even for new system calls I think it's a bad idea. utimensat already has the most ugly code of all fs related system calls because of that.
Again, you have made an assertion without justifying it. I disagree, I think it is perfectly valid.
The function would still return an error in every case that it previously returned an error, because in every previous case the fd would not have referred to a symlink so the new version will have nothing to perform a readlink on when NULL is passed. The error would probably be EINVAL rather than EFAULT but even that difference could be avoided if it was really important (I doubt it is).
You only get different behaviour if the path name is NULL and the fd refers to a symlink. This is a completely new situation for which there is no precedent for how the syscall should behave. We are free to create whatever behaviour is most consistent. I believe the proposed behaviour is the correct one.
The code may be ugly, but I'm sure it can be tidied up, particularly if several system-calls adopted the same calling convention.
NeilBrown
Re: [PATCH -V18 05/13] vfs: Support null pathname in readlink
In reply to Christoph HellwigQuoted 5 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Changing the interfaces of existing system calls to accept a NULL name which previously wasn't acceptable is not valid. Even for new system calls I think it's a bad idea. utimensat already has the most ugly code of all fs related system calls because of that.
But from an interface point, it seems nice to say if the relative name from an fd is NULL, the operation should happen on fd itself.
-aneesh
PATCH 6/13 vfs: Support null pathname in faccessat
In reply to Aneesh Kumar K.VThis enables to use faccessat to get the access check details from a file descriptor pointing to the file. This can be used with open_by_handle syscall that returns a file descriptor.
--- fs/open.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/open.c +21 -8
@@ -288,9 +288,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(faccessat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, int, mode) {const struct cred *old_cred;struct cred *override_cred; -struct path path; +struct file *file =NULL ; +struct path path, *pp;struct inode *inode; -int res; +int res, fput_needed;if (mode & ~S_IRWXO )/* where's F_OK, X_OK, W_OK, R_OK? */ return -EINVAL ;
@@ -312,12 +313,21 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(faccessat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, int, mode) } old_cred =override_creds (override_cred); - - res =user_path_at (dfd, filename,LOOKUP_FOLLOW , &path); +if (filename ==NULL && dfd !=AT_FDCWD ) { + file =fget_light (dfd, &fput_needed); +if (file) { + pp = &file->f_path; + res =0 ; + }else + res = -EBADF ; + }else { + res =user_path_at (dfd, filename,LOOKUP_FOLLOW , &path); + pp = &path; + }if (res) goto out; - inode = path.dentry->d_inode; + inode = pp->dentry->d_inode;if ((mode &MAY_EXEC ) &&S_ISREG (inode->i_mode)) {/*
@@ -325,7 +335,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(faccessat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, int, mode)* with the "noexec" flag. */ res = -EACCES ; -if (path.mnt->mnt_flags &MNT_NOEXEC ) +if (pp->mnt->mnt_flags &MNT_NOEXEC ) goto out_path_release; }
@@ -343,11 +353,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(faccessat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, int, mode)* inherently racy and know that the fs may change * state before we even see this result. */ -if (__mnt_is_readonly (path.mnt)) +if (__mnt_is_readonly (pp->mnt)) res = -EROFS ; out_path_release: -path_put (&path); +if (file) +fput_light (file, fput_needed); +else +path_put (&path); out:revert_creds (old_cred);put_cred (override_cred);
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
PATCH 7/13 vfs: Support null pathname in linkat
In reply to Aneesh Kumar K.VThis enables to use linkat to create hardlinks from a file descriptor pointing to the file. This can be used with open_by_handle syscall that returns a file descriptor.
--- fs/namei.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +26 -10
@@ -2627,7 +2627,7 @@ int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_destruct inode *inode = old_dentry->d_inode;int error; -if (!inode) +if (!inode || inode->i_nlink ==0 )return -ENOENT ; error =may_create (dir, new_dentry);
@@ -2673,16 +2673,28 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(linkat, int, olddfd, const char __user *, oldname, {struct dentry *new_dentry;struct nameidata nd; -struct path old_path; -int error; +struct path old_path, *old_pathp; +struct file *file =NULL ; +int error, fput_needed;char *to;if ((flags & ~AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW ) !=0 )return -EINVAL ; - error =user_path_at (olddfd, oldname, - flags &AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW ?LOOKUP_FOLLOW :0 , - &old_path); +if (oldname ==NULL && olddfd !=AT_FDCWD ) { + file =fget_light (olddfd, &fput_needed); +if (file) { + old_pathp = &file->f_path; + error =0 ; + }else + error = -EBADF ; + }else { + error =user_path_at (olddfd, oldname, + flags &AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW ? +LOOKUP_FOLLOW :0 , + &old_path); + old_pathp = &old_path; + }if (error)return error;
@@ -2690,7 +2702,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(linkat, int, olddfd, const char __user *, oldname,if (error) goto out; error = -EXDEV ; -if (old_path.mnt != nd.path.mnt) +if (old_pathp->mnt != nd.path.mnt) goto out_release; new_dentry =lookup_create (&nd,0 ); error =PTR_ERR (new_dentry);
@@ -2699,10 +2711,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(linkat, int, olddfd, const char __user *, oldname, error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; - error =security_path_link (old_path.dentry, &nd.path, new_dentry); + error =security_path_link (old_pathp->dentry, &nd.path, new_dentry);if (error) goto out_drop_write; - error =vfs_link (old_path.dentry, nd.path.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry); + error =vfs_link (old_pathp->dentry, + nd.path.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry); out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:
@@ -2713,7 +2726,10 @@ out_release:path_put (&nd.path);putname (to); out: -path_put (&old_path); +if (file) +fput_light (file, fput_needed); +else +path_put (&old_path);return error; }
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
PATCH 8/13 x86: Add new syscalls for x86_32
In reply to Aneesh Kumar K.VThis patch adds sys_name_to_handle_at and sys_open_by_handle_at syscalls to x86_32
--- arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_32.h | 5 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_32.h +4 -1
@@ -346,10 +346,13 @@#define __NR_fanotify_init 338#define __NR_fanotify_mark 339#define __NR_prlimit64 340 +#define __NR_name_to_handle_at 341 +#define __NR_open_by_handle_at 342 +#ifdef __KERNEL__ -#define NR_syscalls 341 +#define NR_syscalls 343#define __ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION#define __ARCH_WANT_OLD_READDIR
arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S +2 -0
@@ -340,3 +340,5 @@ ENTRY(sys_call_table) .long sys_fanotify_init .long sys_fanotify_mark .long sys_prlimit64 /* 340 */ + .long sys_name_to_handle_at + .long sys_open_by_handle_at
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
PATCH 9/13 x86: Add new syscalls for x86_64
In reply to Aneesh Kumar K.VAdd sys_name_to_handle_at and sys_open_by_handle_at syscalls for x86_64
--- arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_64.h | 5 +++++ fs/compat.c | 11 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S +2 -0
@@ -845,4 +845,6 @@ ia32_sys_call_table: .quad sys_fanotify_init .quad sys32_fanotify_mark .quad sys_prlimit64 /* 340 */ + .quad sys_name_to_handle_at + .quad compat_sys_open_by_handle_at ia32_syscall_end:
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_64.h +5 -0
@@ -669,6 +669,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_fanotify_init, sys_fanotify_init) __SYSCALL(__NR_fanotify_mark, sys_fanotify_mark)#define __NR_prlimit64 302 __SYSCALL(__NR_prlimit64, sys_prlimit64) +#define __NR_name_to_handle_at 303 +__SYSCALL(__NR_name_to_handle_at, sys_name_to_handle_at) +#define __NR_open_by_handle_at 304 +__SYSCALL(__NR_open_by_handle_at, sys_open_by_handle_at) +#ifndef __NO_STUBS#define __ARCH_WANT_OLD_READDIR
fs/compat.c +11 -0
@@ -2334,3 +2334,14 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_timerfd_gettime(int ufd, }#endif /* CONFIG_TIMERFD */ + +/* +* Exactly like fs/open.c:sys_open_by_handle_at(), except that it +* doesn't set the O_LARGEFILE flag. +*/ +asmlinkage long +compat_sys_open_by_handle_at (int mountdirfd, +struct file_handle __user *handle,int flags) +{ +return do_handle_open (mountdirfd, handle, flags); +}
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
PATCH 10/13 unistd.h: Add new syscalls numbers to asm-generic
In reply to Aneesh Kumar K.V--- include/asm-generic/unistd.h | 6 +++++- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
include/asm-generic/unistd.h +5 -1
@@ -646,9 +646,13 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_prlimit64, sys_prlimit64) __SYSCALL(__NR_fanotify_init, sys_fanotify_init)#define __NR_fanotify_mark 263 __SYSCALL(__NR_fanotify_mark, sys_fanotify_mark) +#define __NR_name_to_handle_at 264 +__SYSCALL(__NR_name_to_handle_at, sys_name_to_handle_at) +#define __NR_open_by_handle_at 265 +__SYSCALL(__NR_open_by_handle_at, sys_open_by_handle_at)#undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 264 +#define __NR_syscalls 266/* * All syscalls below here should go away really,
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
PATCH 11/13 vfs: Export file system uuid via /proc/<pid>/mountinfo
In reply to Aneesh Kumar K.VWe add a per superblock uuid field. File systems should update the uuid in the fill_super callback
--- fs/namespace.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/namespace.c +16 -0
@@ -837,6 +837,18 @@ const struct seq_operations mounts_op = { .show = show_vfsmnt }; +static int uuid_is_nil (u8 *uuid) +{ +int i; +u8 *cp = (u8 *)uuid; + +for (i =0 ; i <16 ; i++) { +if (*cp++) +return 0 ; + } +return 1 ; +} +static int show_mountinfo (struct seq_file *m,void *v) {struct proc_mounts *p = m->private;
@@ -875,6 +887,10 @@ static int show_mountinfo(struct seq_file *m, void *v)if (IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE (mnt))seq_puts (m," unbindable" ); +if (!uuid_is_nil (mnt->mnt_sb->s_uuid)) +/* print the uuid */ +seq_printf (m," uuid:%pU" , mnt->mnt_sb->s_uuid); +/* Filesystem specific data */ seq_puts (m," - " );show_type (m, sb);
include/linux/fs.h +1 -0
@@ -1370,6 +1370,7 @@ struct super_block {wait_queue_head_t s_wait_unfrozen;char s_id[32 ];/* Informational name */ +u8 s_uuid[16 ];/* UUID */ void *s_fs_info;/* Filesystem private info */ fmode_t s_mode;
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
PATCH 12/13 ext3: Copy fs UUID to superblock.
In reply to Aneesh Kumar K.VFile system UUID is made available to application
via /proc/<pid>/mountinfo
--- fs/ext3/super.c | 1 + 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/ext3/super.c +1 -0
@@ -1918,6 +1918,7 @@ static int ext3_fill_super (struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) sb->s_qcop = &ext3_qctl_operations; sb->dq_op = &ext3_quota_operations;#endif +memcpy (sb->s_uuid, es->s_uuid,sizeof (es->s_uuid));INIT_LIST_HEAD (&sbi->s_orphan);/* unlinked but open files */ mutex_init (&sbi->s_orphan_lock);mutex_init (&sbi->s_resize_lock);
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
PATCH 13/13 ext4: Copy fs UUID to superblock
In reply to Aneesh Kumar K.VFile system UUID is made available to application
via /proc/<pid>/mountinfo
--- fs/ext4/super.c | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/super.c +2 -0
@@ -2941,6 +2941,8 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) sb->s_qcop = &ext4_qctl_operations; sb->dq_op = &ext4_quota_operations;#endif +memcpy (sb->s_uuid, es->s_uuid,sizeof (es->s_uuid)); +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&sbi->s_orphan);/* unlinked but open files */ mutex_init (&sbi->s_orphan_lock);mutex_init (&sbi->s_resize_lock);
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4