Prevent reading uninitialized memory with socket filters
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 Prevent reading uninitialized memory with socket filters
The "mem" array used as scratch space for socket filters is not initialized, allowing unprivileged users to leak kernel stack bytes.
--- net/core/filter.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
net/core/filter.c +2 -0
@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ unsigned int sk_run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock_filter *filter, intint k;int pc; +memset (mem,0 ,sizeof (mem)); +/* * Process array of filter instructions. */
Quoted 2 lines · Dan Rosenberg
The "mem" array used as scratch space for socket filters is not initialized, allowing unprivileged users to leak kernel stack bytes.
Hi Dan.
Using
type var[count] = {};
instead of
type var[count];
...
memset(var, 0, sizeof(var));at least for gcc 4.4 and 4.5 generally results in smaller code.
$ size net/core/filter.o* text data bss dec hex filename 6751 56 1736 8543 215f net/core/filter.o.memset 6749 56 1736 8541 215d net/core/filter.o.init
David Miller
maintainerFrom: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 09 Nov 2010 17:28:44 -0500
Quoted 4 lines
The "mem" array used as scratch space for socket filters is not initialized, allowing unprivileged users to leak kernel stack bytes.
Signed-off-by Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Prove it.
Quoted 9 lines · David Miller
From: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 09 Nov 2010 17:28:44 -0500Quoted 4 lines
The "mem" array used as scratch space for socket filters is not initialized, allowing unprivileged users to leak kernel stack bytes.
Signed-off-by Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>Prove it.
And once done, add the checks in sk_chk_filter() ?
Allow a load of mem[X] only if a prior store of mem[X] is proven.
Quoted 7 lines · Eric Dumazet
Quoted 6 lines · David Miller
From: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 09 Nov 2010 17:28:44 -0500Quoted 3 lines
The "mem" array used as scratch space for socket filters is not initialized, allowing unprivileged users to leak kernel stack bytes.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>Prove it.
And once done, add the checks in
sk_chk_filter()?Allow a load of mem[X] only if a prior store of mem[X] is proven.
This seems complex, and might fail on some valid filters.
What about the following patch then ?
[PATCH] filter: make sure filters dont read uninitialized memory
There is a possibility malicious users can get limited information about uninitialized stack mem array. Even if sk_run_filter() result is bound to packet length (0 .. 65535), we could imagine this can be used by hostile user.
Initializing mem[] array, like Dan Rosenberg suggested in his patch is expensive since most filters dont even use this array.
Its hard to make the filter validation in sk_chk_filter(), because of the jumps. This might be done later.
In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks.
For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction.
--- net/core/filter.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/core/filter.c +8 -2
@@ -117,10 +117,12 @@ unsigned int sk_run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock_filter *filter, intu32 A =0 ;/* Accumulator */ u32 X =0 ;/* Index Register */ u32 mem[BPF_MEMWORDS ];/* Scratch Memory Store */ +unsigned long memvalid =0 ;u32 tmp;int k;int pc; +BUILD_BUG_ON (BPF_MEMWORDS >BITS_PER_LONG );/* * Process array of filter instructions. */
@@ -264,10 +266,12 @@ load_b:X = fentry->k;continue ;case BPF_S_LD_MEM : -A = mem[fentry->k]; +A = (memvalid & (1UL << fentry->k)) ? + mem[fentry->k] :0 ;continue ;case BPF_S_LDX_MEM : -X = mem[fentry->k]; +X = (memvalid & (1UL << fentry->k)) ? + mem[fentry->k] :0 ;continue ;case BPF_S_MISC_TAX :X =A ;
@@ -280,9 +284,11 @@ load_b:case BPF_S_RET_A :return A ;case BPF_S_ST : + memvalid |=1UL << fentry->k; mem[fentry->k] =A ;continue ;case BPF_S_STX : + memvalid |=1UL << fentry->k; mem[fentry->k] =X ;continue ;default :
Quoted 3 lines
Prove it.
I hope this was a joke. In either case, my reply is a joke:
http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/2010-November/077321.html
For reasons I don't understand, this code seems to cause some people's machines to lock up:
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 10s! [dz:11844]
I haven't been able to reproduce this myself. Very strange. I'll send a stack trace if I can reproduce.
-Dan
Quoted 6 lines · Dan Rosenberg
Quoted 2 lines
Prove it.
I hope this was a joke. In either case, my reply is a joke:
http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/2010-November/077321.html
Re: [PATCH] Prevent reading uninitialized memory with socketfilters
In reply to Eric DumazetJust I thought...
Quoted 3 lines
unsigned int
sk_run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock_filter *filter, int flen){
structsock_filter*fentry; /* We walk down these */
Can't this be "const struct sock_filter *"?
Quoted 3 lines
(...snipped...)
for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) { fentry = &filter[pc];
Can't we do
u32 f_k = fentry->k;
and replace 27 repetition of fentry->k with f_k?
David Miller
maintainerFrom: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 06:12:47 -0500
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Prove it.
I hope this was a joke.
It absolutely is not.
You are very much not the first person ever to try and add an expensive memset() here.
So the onus is really on you to prove this assertion and show the exact code path by which the user can actually see any uninitialized kernel stack memory (he can't, he can peek at certain values in a certain extremely contrived range, making the leak useless), rather than point us at some web external site archive of a list posting which we cannot easily quote and reply to here.
I think you cannot do it, really. Except in the AF_PACKET case, the sockets can only see "0" or a negative error code, not the actual sk_run_filter() return value.
In the one exception, AF_PACKET, the range of values the user can see are in the range of MTU of the device being accessed, which realistically is 1500 bytes. This means the user cannot see any kernel stack value outside of the range 0 to 1500, which isn't worth using this expensive memset to guard against at all.
I don't even think it's worth adding all of the extra cpu cycles incurred by Eric Dumazet's scheme of using a bitmap test on every single memory buffer access.
David Miller
maintainerRe: [PATCH] Prevent reading uninitialized memory with socketfilters
In reply to Tetsuo HandaFrom: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 23:25:08 +0900
Quoted 5 lines
Just I thought...
Quoted 3 lines
unsigned int
sk_run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock_filter *filter, int flen){
structsock_filter*fentry; /* We walk down these */
Quoted 7 lines
Can't this be "const struct
sock_filter*"?Quoted 3 lines
(...snipped...)
for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) { fentry = &filter[pc];Can't we do
u32 f_k = fentry->k;and replace 27 repetition of
fentry->kwithf_k?
Yes, this feedback seems reasonable, I'll make these changes when I apply Eric's patch, thanks!
David Miller
maintainerRe: [PATCH] Prevent reading uninitialized memory with socketfilters
In reply to Tetsuo HandaFrom: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 23:25:08 +0900
Quoted 5 lines
Just I thought...
Quoted 3 lines
unsigned int
sk_run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock_filter *filter, int flen){
structsock_filter*fentry; /* We walk down these */
Quoted 7 lines
Can't this be "const struct
sock_filter*"?Quoted 3 lines
(...snipped...)
for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) { fentry = &filter[pc];Can't we do
u32 f_k = fentry->k;and replace 27 repetition of
fentry->kwithf_k?
Ok, here is what I'm adding to net-2.6 (and will submit to -stable), if anyone can spot any silly errors let me know now.
Thanks!
--------------------
filter: make sure filters dont read uninitialized memory
There is a possibility malicious users can get limited information about uninitialized stack mem array. Even if sk_run_filter() result is bound to packet length (0 .. 65535), we could imagine this can be used by hostile user.
Initializing mem[] array, like Dan Rosenberg suggested in his patch is expensive since most filters dont even use this array.
Its hard to make the filter validation in sk_chk_filter(), because of the jumps. This might be done later.
In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks.
For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction.
[ Since we access fentry->k a lot now, cache it in a local variable
and mark filter entry pointer as const. -DaveM ]
--- net/core/filter.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
net/core/filter.c +35 -29
@@ -112,39 +112,41 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sk_filter);*/ unsigned int sk_run_filter (struct sk_buff *skb,struct sock_filter *filter,int flen) { -struct sock_filter *fentry;/* We walk down these */ void *ptr;u32 A =0 ;/* Accumulator */ u32 X =0 ;/* Index Register */ u32 mem[BPF_MEMWORDS ];/* Scratch Memory Store */ +unsigned long memvalid =0 ;u32 tmp;int k;int pc; +BUILD_BUG_ON (BPF_MEMWORDS >BITS_PER_LONG );/* * Process array of filter instructions. */ for (pc =0 ; pc < flen; pc++) { - fentry = &filter[pc]; +const struct sock_filter *fentry = &filter[pc]; +u32 f_k = fentry->k;switch (fentry->code) {case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_X :A +=X ;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_K : -A += fentry->k; +A += f_k;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_X :A -=X ;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_K : -A -= fentry->k; +A -= f_k;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_X :A *=X ;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_K : -A *= fentry->k; +A *= f_k;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_X :if (X ==0 )
@@ -152,49 +154,49 @@ unsigned int sk_run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock_filter *filter, intA /=X ;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_K : -A /= fentry->k; +A /= f_k;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_AND_X :A &=X ;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_AND_K : -A &= fentry->k; +A &= f_k;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_OR_X :A |=X ;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_OR_K : -A |= fentry->k; +A |= f_k;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_X :A <<=X ;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_K : -A <<= fentry->k; +A <<= f_k;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_X :A >>=X ;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_K : -A >>= fentry->k; +A >>= f_k;continue ;case BPF_S_ALU_NEG :A = -A ;continue ;case BPF_S_JMP_JA : - pc += fentry->k; + pc += f_k;continue ;case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_K : - pc += (A > fentry->k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + pc += (A > f_k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;continue ;case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_K : - pc += (A >= fentry->k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + pc += (A >= f_k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;continue ;case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_K : - pc += (A == fentry->k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + pc += (A == f_k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;continue ;case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_K : - pc += (A & fentry->k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf; + pc += (A & f_k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;continue ;case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_X : pc += (A >X ) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
@@ -209,7 +211,7 @@ unsigned int sk_run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock_filter *filter, int pc += (A &X ) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;continue ;case BPF_S_LD_W_ABS : - k = fentry->k; + k = f_k; load_w: ptr =load_pointer (skb, k,4 , &tmp);if (ptr !=NULL ) {
@@ -218,7 +220,7 @@ load_w: }break ;case BPF_S_LD_H_ABS : - k = fentry->k; + k = f_k; load_h: ptr =load_pointer (skb, k,2 , &tmp);if (ptr !=NULL ) {
@@ -227,7 +229,7 @@ load_h: }break ;case BPF_S_LD_B_ABS : - k = fentry->k; + k = f_k; load_b: ptr =load_pointer (skb, k,1 , &tmp);if (ptr !=NULL ) {
@@ -242,32 +244,34 @@ load_b:X = skb->len;continue ;case BPF_S_LD_W_IND : - k =X + fentry->k; + k =X + f_k; goto load_w;case BPF_S_LD_H_IND : - k =X + fentry->k; + k =X + f_k; goto load_h;case BPF_S_LD_B_IND : - k =X + fentry->k; + k =X + f_k; goto load_b;case BPF_S_LDX_B_MSH : - ptr =load_pointer (skb, fentry->k,1 , &tmp); + ptr =load_pointer (skb, f_k,1 , &tmp);if (ptr !=NULL ) {X = (*(u8 *)ptr &0xf ) <<2 ;continue ; }return 0 ;case BPF_S_LD_IMM : -A = fentry->k; +A = f_k;continue ;case BPF_S_LDX_IMM : -X = fentry->k; +X = f_k;continue ;case BPF_S_LD_MEM : -A = mem[fentry->k]; +A = (memvalid & (1UL << f_k)) ? + mem[f_k] :0 ;continue ;case BPF_S_LDX_MEM : -X = mem[fentry->k]; +X = (memvalid & (1UL << f_k)) ? + mem[f_k] :0 ;continue ;case BPF_S_MISC_TAX :X =A ;
@@ -276,14 +280,16 @@ load_b:A =X ;continue ;case BPF_S_RET_K : -return fentry->k; +return f_k;case BPF_S_RET_A :return A ;case BPF_S_ST : - mem[fentry->k] =A ; + memvalid |=1UL << f_k; + mem[f_k] =A ;continue ;case BPF_S_STX : - mem[fentry->k] =X ; + memvalid |=1UL << f_k; + mem[f_k] =X ;continue ;default :WARN_ON (1 );
Signature · 1 line
1.7.3.2
Re: [PATCH] Prevent reading uninitialized memory with socketfilters
On Wed, 2010-11-10 at 10:39 -0800, David Miller wrote:
[...]
Quoted 7 lines
In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks.
For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction.
[ Since we access
fentry->ka lot now, cache it in a local variable
and mark filter entry pointer as const. -DaveM ]
[...]
I don't see the justification for combining these changes. One patch, one fix, right?
Ben.
Signature · 3 lines
Ben Hutchings, Senior Software Engineer, Solarflare Communications Not speaking for my employer; that's the marketing department's job. They asked us to note that Solarflare product names are trademarked.
David Miller
maintainerRe: [PATCH] Prevent reading uninitialized memory with socketfilters
From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 20:57:44 +0000
Quoted 5 lines · David Miller
[...]
Quoted 3 lines
In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction.
[ Since we access
fentry->ka lot now, cache it in a local variable
and mark filter entry pointer as const. -DaveM ][...]
I don't see the justification for combining these changes. One patch, one fix, right?
I'm minimizing the performance impact of the new bitmap checks.
Re: [PATCH] Prevent reading uninitialized memory with socketfilters
Quoted 10 lines · David Miller
From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 20:57:44 +0000Quoted 7 lines · David Miller
[...]
Quoted 5 lines
In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks.
For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
[ Since we access
fentry->ka lot now, cache it in a local variable
and mark filter entry pointer as const. -DaveM ][...]
I don't see the justification for combining these changes. One patch, one fix, right?
I'm minimizing the performance impact of the new bitmap checks.
This seems like an entirely separate optimisation, since fentry->k was *already* being used all over the place. (And a smart compiler should optimise that anyway... though I realise gcc is often not that smart.)
Ben.
Signature · 3 lines
Ben Hutchings, Senior Software Engineer, Solarflare Communications Not speaking for my employer; that's the marketing department's job. They asked us to note that Solarflare product names are trademarked.