aio: Fix use after free bugs
Jan Kara
reviewercover aio: Fix use after free bugs
Hi Andrew,
The following two patches fix use after free bugs in AIO code. Could you
please merge them? Thanks.
Honza
Jan Kara
reviewerPATCH 1/2 fs: Fix aio rcu ioctx lookup
From: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
aio-dio-invalidate-failure GPFs in aio_put_req from io_submit.
lookup_ioctx doesn't implement the rcu lookup pattern properly. rcu_read_lock does not prevent refcount going to zero, so we might take a refcount on a zero count ioctx.
Fix the bug by atomically testing for zero refcount before incrementing.
[JK: Added comment into the code]
--- fs/aio.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/aio.c +24 -11
@@ -239,15 +239,23 @@ static void __put_ioctx(struct kioctx *ctx)call_rcu (&ctx->rcu_head, ctx_rcu_free); } -#define get_ioctx (kioctx) do { \ - BUG_ON(atomic_read(&(kioctx)->users) <= 0); \ - atomic_inc(&(kioctx)->users); \ -} while (0) -#define put_ioctx (kioctx) do { \ - BUG_ON(atomic_read(&(kioctx)->users) <= 0); \ - if (unlikely(atomic_dec_and_test(&(kioctx)->users))) \ - __put_ioctx(kioctx); \ -} while (0) +static inline void get_ioctx (struct kioctx *kioctx) +{ +BUG_ON (atomic_read (&kioctx->users) <=0 ); +atomic_inc (&kioctx->users); +} + +static inline int try_get_ioctx (struct kioctx *kioctx) +{ +return atomic_inc_not_zero (&kioctx->users); +} + +static inline void put_ioctx (struct kioctx *kioctx) +{ +BUG_ON (atomic_read (&kioctx->users) <=0 ); +if (unlikely (atomic_dec_and_test (&kioctx->users))) +__put_ioctx (kioctx); +}/* ioctx_alloc * Allocates and initializes an ioctx. Returns an ERR_PTR if it failed.
@@ -601,8 +609,13 @@ static struct kioctx *lookup_ioctx(unsigned long ctx_id)rcu_read_lock ();hlist_for_each_entry_rcu (ctx, n, &mm->ioctx_list, list) { -if (ctx->user_id == ctx_id && !ctx->dead) { -get_ioctx (ctx); +/* +* RCU protects us against accessing freed memory but +* we have to be careful not to get a reference when the +* reference count already dropped to 0 (ctx->dead test +* is unreliable because of races). +*/ +if (ctx->user_id == ctx_id && !ctx->dead &&try_get_ioctx (ctx)){ ret = ctx;break ; }
Signature · 1 line
1.7.1
Jan Kara
reviewerPATCH 2/2 fs: Fix race between io_destroy() and io_submit() in AIO
In reply to Jan KaraA race can occur when io_submit() races with io_destroy():
CPU1 CPU2io_submit()
do_io_submit()
...
ctx = lookup_ioctx(ctx_id);
io_destroy()
Now do_io_submit() holds the last reference to ctx.
...
queue new AIO
put_ioctx(ctx) - frees ctx with active AIOs
We solve this issue by checking whether ctx is being destroyed in AIO submission path after adding new AIO to ctx. Then we are guaranteed that either io_destroy() waits for new AIO or we see that ctx is being destroyed and bail out.
--- fs/aio.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/aio.c +17 -0
@@ -1642,6 +1642,23 @@ static int io_submit_one(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *user_iocb, goto out_put_req;spin_lock_irq (&ctx->ctx_lock); +/* +* We could have raced with io_destroy() and are currently holding a +* reference to ctx which should be destroyed. We cannot submit IO +* since ctx gets freed as soon as io_submit() puts its reference. The +* check here is reliable: io_destroy() sets ctx->dead before waiting +* for outstanding IO and the barrier between these two is realized by +* unlock of mm->ioctx_lock and lock of ctx->ctx_lock. Analogously we +* increment ctx->reqs_active before checking for ctx->dead and the +* barrier is realized by unlock and lock of ctx->ctx_lock. Thus if we +* don't see ctx->dead set here, io_destroy() waits for our IO to +* finish. +*/ +if (ctx->dead) { +spin_unlock_irq (&ctx->ctx_lock); + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out_put_req; + }aio_run_iocb (req);if (!list_empty (&ctx->run_list)) {/* drain the run list */
Signature · 1 line
1.7.1