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DECnet: need to validate user data and access data?

SECURITY Dan Rosenberg 4 participants 5 messages Mar 21, 2011 – Mar 22, 2011

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#0 lore raw

In net/decnet/af_decnet.c, in the dn_access_copy() and dn_user_copy() functions, which are called from dn_connect(), length values are retrieved from incoming skb data and used as size values to copy functions:

static void dn_access_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct accessdata_dn *acc)

{
        unsigned char *ptr = skb->data;

        acc->acc_userl = *ptr++;
        memcpy(&acc->acc_user, ptr, acc->acc_userl);
        ptr += acc->acc_userl;

        acc->acc_passl = *ptr++;
        memcpy(&acc->acc_pass, ptr, acc->acc_passl);
        ptr += acc->acc_passl;

        acc->acc_accl = *ptr++;
        memcpy(&acc->acc_acc, ptr, acc->acc_accl);

        skb_pull(skb, acc->acc_accl + acc->acc_passl + acc->acc_userl + 3);

}

static void dn_user_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct optdata_dn *opt)

{
        unsigned char *ptr = skb->data;
        u16 len = *ptr++; /* yes, it's 8bit on the wire */

        BUG_ON(len > 16); /* we've checked the contents earlier */
        opt->opt_optl   = cpu_to_le16(len);
        opt->opt_status = 0;
        memcpy(opt->opt_data, ptr, len);
        skb_pull(skb, len + 1);
}

Despite the BUG_ON and comment suggesting these lengths have been validated, I don't think this is actually the case - it looks like these fields are validated for outbound data, but I see no validation for inbound data (unless I'm mistaken, which is entirely possible). If this is the case, this can allow remote attackers to cause controllable heap corruption. I'd appreciate it if someone who knows this protocol better than I do took a look at this and implemented appropriate error handling if it needs it.

Thanks,
Dan

#1 lore raw

Cc'ed the decnet list. Looks like it's still active even though the status is orphan.

Quoted 45 lines · Dan Rosenberg

In net/decnet/af_decnet.c, in the dn_access_copy() and dn_user_copy() functions, which are called from dn_connect(), length values are retrieved from incoming skb data and used as size values to copy functions:

static void dn_access_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct accessdata_dn *acc) {
       unsigned char *ptr = skb->data;

       acc->acc_userl = *ptr++; memcpy(&acc->acc_user, ptr, acc->acc_userl); ptr += acc->acc_userl;

       acc->acc_passl = *ptr++; memcpy(&acc->acc_pass, ptr, acc->acc_passl); ptr += acc->acc_passl;

       acc->acc_accl = *ptr++;
       memcpy(&acc->acc_acc, ptr, acc->acc_accl);

       skb_pull(skb, acc->acc_accl + acc->acc_passl + acc->acc_userl + 3);

}

static void dn_user_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct optdata_dn *opt) {
       unsigned char *ptr = skb->data;
       u16 len = *ptr++; /* yes, it's 8bit on the wire */

       BUG_ON(len > 16); /* we've checked the contents earlier */ opt->opt_optl   = cpu_to_le16(len); opt->opt_status = 0;
       memcpy(opt->opt_data, ptr, len);
       skb_pull(skb, len + 1);
}

Despite the BUG_ON and comment suggesting these lengths have been validated, I don't think this is actually the case - it looks like these fields are validated for outbound data, but I see no validation for inbound data (unless I'm mistaken, which is entirely possible).  If this is the case, this can allow remote attackers to cause controllable heap corruption.  I'd appreciate it if someone who knows this protocol better than I do took a look at this and implemented appropriate error handling if it needs it.

#2 lore raw

Hi,

Quoted 3 lines · Eugene Teo

Cc'ed the decnet list. Looks like it's still active even though the status is orphan.

Well, kind of active :-) I don't think there is a lot of development going on despite davem's recent changes to the routing code.

These functions are used in relation to conninit messages which, on the incoming side are checked in dn_nsp_in.c:dn_find_listener() via the calls to dn_check_idf() so that we should never queue an incorrectly formatted message to the socket. The intent was that all messages should be checked as early as possible on entry to the code so that we can then rely on their content later on without needing to check again.

I hope that answers your question, but let me know if you need anything else,

Steve.

Quoted 50 lines · Dan Rosenberg
Quoted 37 lines

In net/decnet/af_decnet.c, in the dn_access_copy() and dn_user_copy() functions, which are called from dn_connect(), length values are retrieved from incoming skb data and used as size values to copy functions:

static void dn_access_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct accessdata_dn *acc)

{
       unsigned char *ptr = skb->data;

       acc->acc_userl = *ptr++;
       memcpy(&acc->acc_user, ptr, acc->acc_userl);
       ptr += acc->acc_userl;

       acc->acc_passl = *ptr++;
       memcpy(&acc->acc_pass, ptr, acc->acc_passl);
       ptr += acc->acc_passl;

       acc->acc_accl = *ptr++;
       memcpy(&acc->acc_acc, ptr, acc->acc_accl);

       skb_pull(skb, acc->acc_accl + acc->acc_passl + acc->acc_userl + 3);

}

static void dn_user_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct optdata_dn *opt)

{
       unsigned char *ptr = skb->data;
       u16 len = *ptr++; /* yes, it's 8bit on the wire */

       BUG_ON(len > 16); /* we've checked the contents earlier */
       opt->opt_optl   = cpu_to_le16(len);
       opt->opt_status = 0;
       memcpy(opt->opt_data, ptr, len);
       skb_pull(skb, len + 1);
}
Quoted 8 lines

Despite the BUG_ON and comment suggesting these lengths have been validated, I don't think this is actually the case - it looks like these fields are validated for outbound data, but I see no validation for inbound data (unless I'm mistaken, which is entirely possible). If this is the case, this can allow remote attackers to cause controllable heap corruption. I'd appreciate it if someone who knows this protocol better than I do took a look at this and implemented appropriate error handling if it needs it.

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maintainer
#3 lore raw

From: Steven Whitehouse <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2011 09:13:50 +0000

Quoted 6 lines

These functions are used in relation to conninit messages which, on the incoming side are checked in dn_nsp_in.c:dn_find_listener() via the calls to dn_check_idf() so that we should never queue an incorrectly formatted message to the socket. The intent was that all messages should be checked as early as possible on entry to the code so that we can then rely on their content later on without needing to check again.

Ok, so we should be find here.

Thanks for the explanation Steven.

#4 lore raw
In reply to Steven Whitehouse
Quoted 16 lines · Steven Whitehouse

Hi,

Quoted 3 lines · Eugene Teo

Cc'ed the decnet list. Looks like it's still active even though the status is orphan.

Well, kind of active :-) I don't think there is a lot of development going on despite davem's recent changes to the routing code.

These functions are used in relation to conninit messages which, on the incoming side are checked in dn_nsp_in.c:dn_find_listener() via the calls to dn_check_idf() so that we should never queue an incorrectly formatted message to the socket. The intent was that all messages should be checked as early as possible on entry to the code so that we can then rely on their content later on without needing to check again.

Quoted 2 lines

I hope that answers your question, but let me know if you need anything else,

Thanks very much, that does clear it up. I must have missed it because I was expecting it to use the array size macro (DN_MAXACCL) rather than a hard-coded value. Glad it's a non-issue.

-Dan

Quoted 52 lines

Steve.

Quoted 50 lines · Dan Rosenberg
Quoted 37 lines

In net/decnet/af_decnet.c, in the dn_access_copy() and dn_user_copy() functions, which are called from dn_connect(), length values are retrieved from incoming skb data and used as size values to copy functions:

static void dn_access_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct accessdata_dn *acc)

{
       unsigned char *ptr = skb->data;

       acc->acc_userl = *ptr++;
       memcpy(&acc->acc_user, ptr, acc->acc_userl);
       ptr += acc->acc_userl;

       acc->acc_passl = *ptr++;
       memcpy(&acc->acc_pass, ptr, acc->acc_passl);
       ptr += acc->acc_passl;

       acc->acc_accl = *ptr++;
       memcpy(&acc->acc_acc, ptr, acc->acc_accl);

       skb_pull(skb, acc->acc_accl + acc->acc_passl + acc->acc_userl + 3);

}

static void dn_user_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct optdata_dn *opt)

{
       unsigned char *ptr = skb->data;
       u16 len = *ptr++; /* yes, it's 8bit on the wire */

       BUG_ON(len > 16); /* we've checked the contents earlier */
       opt->opt_optl   = cpu_to_le16(len);
       opt->opt_status = 0;
       memcpy(opt->opt_data, ptr, len);
       skb_pull(skb, len + 1);
}
Quoted 8 lines

Despite the BUG_ON and comment suggesting these lengths have been validated, I don't think this is actually the case - it looks like these fields are validated for outbound data, but I see no validation for inbound data (unless I'm mistaken, which is entirely possible). If this is the case, this can allow remote attackers to cause controllable heap corruption. I'd appreciate it if someone who knows this protocol better than I do took a look at this and implemented appropriate error handling if it needs it.

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