Enable SMEP CPU Feature
Subsystems (2)
cover Enable SMEP CPU Feature
From: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]>
Intel new CPU supports SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection). SMEP prevents kernel from executing code in application. Updated Intel SDM describes this CPU feature. The document will be published soon.
Fenghua Yu (3):
x86, cpu: Add CPU flags for SMEP
x86, cpu: Add SMEP CPU feature in CR4
x86, cpu: Enable/disable SMEP
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
1.7.2
PATCH 1/3 x86, cpu: Add CPU flags for SMEP
From: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]>
Add support for newly documented SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection) CPU feature flags.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +1 -0
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_PLN (7*32+ 5)/* Intel Power Limit Notification */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTS (7*32+ 6)/* Intel Package Thermal Status */ #define X86_FEATURE_DTS (7*32+ 7)/* Digital Thermal Sensor */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SMEP (7*32+ 8)/* Supervisor Mode Execution Protection*/ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW (8*32+ 0)/* Intel TPR Shadow */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +1 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ void __cpuinit init_scattered_cpuid_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { X86_FEATURE_PTS, CR_EAX, 6, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CR_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_EPB, CR_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_SMEP, CR_EBX, 7, 0x00000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT, CR_EAX, 0, 0x0000000d, 1 }, { X86_FEATURE_CPB, CR_EDX, 9, 0x80000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_NPT, CR_EDX, 0, 0x8000000a, 0 },
Signature · 1 line
1.7.2
PATCH 2/3 x86, cpu: Add SMEP CPU feature in CR4
In reply to Fenghua YuFrom: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]>
Add support for newly documented SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection) CPU feature in CR4.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h | 1 + 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h +1 -0
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@#define X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT 0x00000400/* enable unmasked SSE exceptions */ #define X86_CR4_VMXE 0x00002000/* enable VMX virtualization */ #define X86_CR4_OSXSAVE 0x00040000/* enable xsave and xrestore */ +#define X86_CR4_SMEP 0x00100000/* enable SMEP support */ /* * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8
Signature · 1 line
1.7.2
PATCH 3/3 x86, cpu: Enable/disable SMEP
In reply to Fenghua YuFrom: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]>
Enable/disable newly documented SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection) CPU feature in kernel. CR4.SMEP (bit 20) is 0 at power-on. If the feature is supported by CPU (X86_FEATURE_SMEP), enable SMEP by setting CR4.SMEP. New kernel option nosmep disables the feature even if the feature is supported by CPU.
--- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +4 -0
@@ -1664,6 +1664,10 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default) noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings + nosmep [X86] + Disable SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection) + even if it is supported by processor. + noexec32 [X86-64] This affects only 32-bit executables. noexec32=on: enable non-executable mappings (default)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +21 -0
@@ -254,6 +254,25 @@ static inline void squash_the_stupid_serial_number(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) }#endif +static int disable_smep; +static __init int setup_disable_smep (char *arg) +{ + disable_smep =1 ; +return 1 ; +} +__setup ("nosmep" , setup_disable_smep); + +static __init void setup_smep (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ +if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_SMEP )) { +if (unlikely (disable_smep)) { +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SMEP ); +clear_in_cr4 (X86_CR4_SMEP ); + }else +set_in_cr4 (X86_CR4_SMEP ); + } +} +/* * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
@@ -867,6 +886,8 @@ static void __cpuinit identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)/* Init Machine Check Exception if available. */ mcheck_cpu_init (c); +setup_smep (c); +select_idle_routine (c);#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
Signature · 1 line
1.7.2
Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86, cpu: Enable/disable SMEP
Quoted 1 line · Fenghua Yu
+static int
disable_smep;
If you add a __initdata here the whole thing will completely disappear after boot.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c static void __cpuinit identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 889
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +1
-0@@ -867,6 +886,8 @@ static void __cpuinit identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)/* Init Machine Check Exception if available. */ mcheck_cpu_init (c); +setup_smep (c);
My feeling is you're setting this too late. In theory there could be early overflows. Better use a early_param and set it as early as possible, directly after the cpuid flags are set up in early initialization.
-Andi
Signature · 1 line
[email protected] -- Speaking for myself only
H. Peter Anvin
reviewerRe: [PATCH 3/3] x86, cpu: Enable/disable SMEP
Quoted 11 lines · Andi Kleen
Quoted 1 line · Fenghua Yu
+static int
disable_smep;If you add a
__initdatahere the whole thing will completely disappear after boot.Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +0
-0@@ -867,6 +886,8 @@ static void __cpuinit identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)/* Init Machine Check Exception if available. */ mcheck_cpu_init (c);
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c static void __cpuinit identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 889
Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +1
-0+setup_smep (c);My feeling is you're setting this too late. In theory there could be early overflows. Better use a
early_paramand set it as early as possible, directly after the cpuid flags are set up in early initialization.-Andi
SMEP only matters if we can into userspace code, so I *think* the above should be okay. However, the most logical place would be to enable it in the same place(s) where we enable NX.
-hpa
Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86, cpu: Enable/disable SMEP
In reply to Fenghua YuQuoted 6 lines · Fenghua Yu
From: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]>
Enable/disable newly documented SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection) CPU feature in kernel. CR4.SMEP (bit 20) is 0 at power-on. If the feature is supported by CPU (
X86_FEATURE_SMEP), enable SMEP by setting CR4.SMEP. New kernel option nosmep disables the feature even if the feature is supported by CPU.
Please add a clearer explanation to the changelog and the code as well, something like:
SMEP prevents the CPU in kernel-mode to jump to an executable page that does not have the kernel/system flag set in the pte. This prevents the kernel from executing user-space code accidentally or maliciously, so it for example prevents kernel exploits from jumping to specially prepared user-mode shell code.
Quoted 11 lines
Signed-off-by Fenghua Yu <[email protected]>--- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. · line 1669
Quoted 6 lines
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +3
-0@@ -1664,6 +1664,10 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default) noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings + nosmep [X86] + Disable SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection) + even if it is supported by processor.
Typo: s/by processor/by the processor
Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +1
-0+ noexec32 [X86-64] This affects only 32-bit executables. noexec32=on: enable non-executable mappings (default)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c static inline void squash_the_stupid_serial_number(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 258
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +2
-0@@ -254,6 +254,25 @@ static inline void squash_the_stupid_serial_number(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) }#endif +static int disable_smep; +static __init int setup_disable_smep (char *arg)
Nit: please put a newline between variables and the next function.
Also, since setup_smep() is __init this could be __initdata.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c static inline void squash_the_stupid_serial_number(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 263
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +5
-0+{ + disable_smep =1 ; +return 1 ; +} +__setup ("nosmep" , setup_disable_smep);
Naming nit: s/setup_disable_smep/setup_nosmep
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c static inline void squash_the_stupid_serial_number(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 272
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +8
-0+static __init void setup_smep (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ +if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_SMEP )) { +if (unlikely (disable_smep)) { +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SMEP ); +clear_in_cr4 (X86_CR4_SMEP ); + }else +set_in_cr4 (X86_CR4_SMEP );
Nit: Please use symmetric curly braces.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c static void __cpuinit identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 891
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +5
-0+ } +} +/* * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization @@ -867,6 +886,8 @@ static void __cpuinit identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)/* Init Machine Check Exception if available. */ mcheck_cpu_init (c); +setup_smep (c); +select_idle_routine (c);
The other option would be to enable SMEP in arch/x86/kernel/head_32/64.S where we twiddle the cr4 anyway and enable PAE and PGE, and where we do a cpuid to check whether the CPU supports NX.
This means we enable SMEP unconditionally on all CPUs that support it, the nosmep boot option would turn it off shortly afterwards.
Also, is there some KVM impact of this CPU feature? If the hypervisor can pass this to the guest kernel as well then we want to add support there as well, and probably want to turn it on by default. (unless it breaks something in a bad way)
Thanks,
Ingo