inet_diag insufficient validation?
Subsystems (2)
It seems to me that the auditing performed by inet_diag_bc_audit() is insufficient to prevent pathological INET_DIAG bytecode from doing bad things.
Firstly, it's possible to cause an infinite loop in inet_diag_bc_audit() with a INET_DIAG_BC_JMP opcode with a "yes" value of 0. The valid_cc() function, also called from here, seems suspicious as well.
Once the bytecode is actually run in inet_diag_bc_run(), it looks like more infinite loops are possible, if appropriate "yes" or "no" values are set to zero and weren't validated by the audit.
Finally, I can't seem to find any validation that the reported length of the netlink message header doesn't exceed the skb length, as checked in some other netlink receive functions, which could result in reading beyond the bounds of the socket data. I could just be missing something here though.
Regards,
Dan
Quoted 3 lines · Dan Rosenberg
Once the bytecode is actually run in
inet_diag_bc_run(), it looks like more infinite loops are possible, if appropriate "yes" or "no" values are set to zero and weren't validated by the audit.
On second glance, there don't appear to be any infinite loops at runtime (but the audit loop seems real). Thanks to Nelson Elhage for setting me straight.
-Dan
Quoted 6 lines · Dan Rosenberg
Finally, I can't seem to find any validation that the reported length of the netlink message header doesn't exceed the skb length, as checked in some other netlink receive functions, which could result in reading beyond the bounds of the socket data. I could just be missing something here though.
And for the second time, I was missing something - this validation happens in netlink_rcv_skb().
That leaves the infinite loop in bytecode auditing, which I've confirmed via reproducer.
-Dan
Cc'ed acme.
Quoted 26 lines · Dan Rosenberg
It seems to me that the auditing performed by
inet_diag_bc_audit()is insufficient to prevent pathologicalINET_DIAGbytecode from doing bad things.Firstly, it's possible to cause an infinite loop in
inet_diag_bc_audit()with aINET_DIAG_BC_JMPopcode with a "yes" value of 0. Thevalid_cc()function, also called from here, seems suspicious as well.Once the bytecode is actually run in
inet_diag_bc_run(), it looks like more infinite loops are possible, if appropriate "yes" or "no" values are set to zero and weren't validated by the audit.Finally, I can't seem to find any validation that the reported length of the netlink message header doesn't exceed the skb length, as checked in some other netlink receive functions, which could result in reading beyond the bounds of the socket data. I could just be missing something here though.
Regards,
Dan_______________________________________________
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Quoted 11 lines · Eugene Teo
Cc'ed acme.
Quoted 8 lines · Dan Rosenberg
It seems to me that the auditing performed by
inet_diag_bc_audit()is insufficient to prevent pathologicalINET_DIAGbytecode from doing bad things.Firstly, it's possible to cause an infinite loop in
inet_diag_bc_audit()with aINET_DIAG_BC_JMPopcode with a "yes" value of 0. Thevalid_cc()function, also called from here, seems suspicious as well.
Any chance of getting this fixed? I have a reproducer available if necessary.
-Dan
PATCH 1/1 inet_diag: fix inet_diag_bc_audit()
In reply to Eugene TeoQuoted 24 lines · Eugene Teo
Cc'ed acme.
Quoted 21 lines · Dan Rosenberg
It seems to me that the auditing performed by
inet_diag_bc_audit()is insufficient to prevent pathologicalINET_DIAGbytecode from doing bad things.Firstly, it's possible to cause an infinite loop in
inet_diag_bc_audit()with aINET_DIAG_BC_JMPopcode with a "yes" value of 0. Thevalid_cc()function, also called from here, seems suspicious as well.Once the bytecode is actually run in
inet_diag_bc_run(), it looks like more infinite loops are possible, if appropriate "yes" or "no" values are set to zero and weren't validated by the audit.Finally, I can't seem to find any validation that the reported length of the netlink message header doesn't exceed the skb length, as checked in some other netlink receive functions, which could result in reading beyond the bounds of the socket data. I could just be missing something here though.
Regards,
Dan
Thanks guys, here is the patch I cooked to address this problem, sorry for the long delay again.
[PATCH] inet_diag: fix inet_diag_bc_audit()
A malicious user or buggy application can inject code and trigger an infinite loop in inet_diag_bc_audit()
Also make sure each instruction is aligned on 4 bytes boundary, to avoid unaligned accesses.
--- net/ipv4/inet_diag.c | 14 ++++++-------- 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/inet_diag.c +6 -8
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static int valid_cc(const void *bc, int len, int cc)return 0 ;if (cc == len)return 1 ; -if (op->yes <4 ) +if (op->yes <4 || op->yes &3 )return 0 ; len -= op->yes; bc += op->yes;
@@ -447,11 +447,11 @@ static int valid_cc(const void *bc, int len, int cc)static int inet_diag_bc_audit (const void *bytecode,int bytecode_len) { -const unsigned char *bc = bytecode; +const void *bc = bytecode;int len = bytecode_len;while (len >0 ) { -struct inet_diag_bc_op *op = (struct inet_diag_bc_op *)bc; +const struct inet_diag_bc_op *op = bc;//printk("BC: %d %d %d {%d} / %d\n", op->code, op->yes, op->no, op[1].no, len); switch (op->code) {
@@ -462,22 +462,20 @@ static int inet_diag_bc_audit(const void *bytecode, int bytecode_len)case INET_DIAG_BC_S_LE :case INET_DIAG_BC_D_GE :case INET_DIAG_BC_D_LE : -if (op->yes <4 || op->yes > len +4 ) -return -EINVAL ;case INET_DIAG_BC_JMP : -if (op->no <4 || op->no > len +4 ) +if (op->no <4 || op->no > len +4 || op->no &3 )return -EINVAL ;if (op->no < len && !valid_cc (bytecode, bytecode_len, len - op->no))return -EINVAL ;break ;case INET_DIAG_BC_NOP : -if (op->yes <4 || op->yes > len +4 ) -return -EINVAL ;break ;default :return -EINVAL ; } +if (op->yes <4 || op->yes > len +4 || op->yes &3 ) +return -EINVAL ; bc += op->yes; len -= op->yes; }
David Miller
maintainerRe: [PATCH] inet_diag: fix inet_diag_bc_audit()
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2011 22:19:50 +0200
Quoted 10 lines
[PATCH]
inet_diag: fixinet_diag_bc_audit()A malicious user or buggy application can inject code and trigger an infinite loop in
inet_diag_bc_audit()Also make sure each instruction is aligned on 4 bytes boundary, to avoid unaligned accesses.
Reported-by Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Applied and queued up for -stable, thanks!