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linux-user-chroot 2012.2

DISCUSSION Colin Walters 3 participants 3 messages Aug 10, 2012 – Sep 9, 2012

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Hi,

This is the release of linux-user-chroot 2012.2. The major change now is that it makes use of Andy's new PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS. This doesn't close any security hole I'm aware of - our previous use of the MS_NOSUID bind mount over / should work - but, belt and suspenders as they say.

The code:
http://git.gnome.org/browse/linux-user-chroot/commit/?id=515c714471d0b5923f6633ef44a2270b23656ee9

As for how linux-user-chroot and PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS relate, see this thread:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.lsm/15339

Summary
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This tool allows regular (non-root) users to call chroot(2), create Linux bind mounts, and use some Linux container features. It's primarily intended for use by build systems.

Project information
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There's no web page yet; send patches to
Colin Walters <[email protected]>

#1 lore raw
Quoted 14 lines · Colin Walters

Hi,

This is the release of linux-user-chroot 2012.2. The major change now is that it makes use of Andy's new PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS. This doesn't close any security hole I'm aware of - our previous use of the MS_NOSUID bind mount over / should work - but, belt and suspenders as they say.

The code:
http://git.gnome.org/browse/linux-user-chroot/commit/?id=515c714471d0b5923f6633ef44a2270b23656ee9

As for how linux-user-chroot and PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS relate, see this thread:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.lsm/15339

Quoted 6 lines

Summary
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This tool allows regular (non-root) users to call chroot(2), create Linux bind mounts, and use some Linux container features. It's primarily intended for use by build systems.

Nifty.

One of these days, I intend to resurrect my unprivileged chroot kernel patches. My current thought is to add a new syscall weak_chroot, which should have these properties:

1. Can't be used unless no_new_privs is set or you have CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
2. Can't be used if fs->users > 1 (to avoid a trivial no_new_privs bypass).
3. Can't be used to break out of chroot jail.

The interface might be:

weak_chroot_at(int fd, const char *path, int flags)

Sets fs->weak_root to path, as seen from fd, according to flags. Works if (no_new_privs && fs->users == 1) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN).

Modify chroot to change fs->weak_root and fs->root. Further modify the path walking code so that / sees weak_root instead of root and so that .. will not traverse root or weak_root.

I'm somewhat tempted to add a flag to weak_chroot_at to break out of weak_root jail to prevent people from thinking that it's a security feature. I'm not sure about that, though.

--Andy

#2 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Andy Lutomirski

One of these days, I intend to resurrect my unprivileged chroot kernel patches. My current thought is to add a new syscall weak_chroot, which should have these properties:
[...]
3. Can't be used to break out of chroot jail.

Quoted 7 lines

The interface might be:

weak_chroot_at(int fd, const char *path, int flags)
[...]
I'm somewhat tempted to add a flag to weak_chroot_at to break out of weak_root jail to prevent people from thinking that it's a security feature. I'm not sure about that, though.

An at variant of chroot would seem to be even more open than the current name-based variant of chroot.

fd1 = open("/", O_DIRECTORY);
fd2 = open("/home/whatever", O_DIRECTORY);
weak_chroot_at(fd2, ".", 0)
weak_chroot_at(fd1, ".", 0)