Netfilter/IPVS updates for stable 3.0 onwards
Subsystems (4)
[email protected]
maintainerPATCH 1/1 Netfilter/IPVS updates for stable 3.0 onwards
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Hi!
The following patchset aims to reduce the Netfilter debt with stable 3.0 and onwards.
The selected six patches are:
07153c6 netfilter: nf_ct_ipv4: packets with wrong ihl are invalid
3f509c6 netfilter: nf_nat_sip: fix incorrect handling of EBUSY for RTCP expectation
f22eb25 netfilter: nf_nat_sip: fix via header translation with multiple parameters
2614f86 netfilter: nf_ct_expect: fix possible access to uninitialized timer
9e33ce4 ipvs: fix oops on NAT reply in br_nf context
82e6bfe netfilter: xt_limit: have r->cost != 0 case work [REQUIRES 7a909ac netfilter: limit, hashlimit: avoid duplicated inline]
I have read stable_rules.txt and I consider they match the requirements.
Please, cherry-pick them. Thanks!
[email protected]
maintainerPATCH 1/6 netfilter: nf_ct_ipv4: packets with wrong ihl are invalid
From: Jozsef Kadlecsik <[email protected]>
It was reported that the Linux kernel sometimes logs:
klogd: [2629147.402413] kernel BUG at net / netfilter / nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c: 447!
klogd: [1072212.887368] kernel BUG at net / netfilter / nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c: 392
ipv4_get_l4proto() in nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c and tcp_error() in nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c should catch malformed packets, so the errors at the indicated lines - TCP options parsing - should not happen. However, tcp_error() relies on the "dataoff" offset to the TCP header, calculated by ipv4_get_l4proto(). But ipv4_get_l4proto() does not check bogus ihl values in IPv4 packets, which then can slip through tcp_error() and get caught at the TCP options parsing routines.
The patch fixes ipv4_get_l4proto() by invalidating packets with bogus ihl value.
The patch closes netfilter bugzilla id 771.
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c +8 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,14 @@ static int ipv4_get_l4proto(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int nhoff, *dataoff = nhoff + (iph->ihl <<2 ); *protonum = iph->protocol; +/* Check bogus IP headers */ +if (*dataoff > skb->len) { +pr_debug ("nf_conntrack_ipv4: bogus IPv4 packet: " +"nhoff %u, ihl %u, skblen %u\n" , + nhoff, iph->ihl <<2 , skb->len); +return -NF_ACCEPT ; + } +return NF_ACCEPT ; }
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
[email protected]
maintainerPATCH 2/6 netfilter: nf_nat_sip: fix incorrect handling of EBUSY for RTCP expectation
In reply to [email protected]From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
We're hitting bug while trying to reinsert an already existing expectation:
kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:895!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffa0069563>] nf_ct_expect_related_report+0x4a0/0x57a [nf_conntrack] [<ffffffff812d423a>] ? in4_pton+0x72/0x131 [<ffffffffa00ca69e>] ip_nat_sdp_media+0xeb/0x185 [nf_nat_sip] [<ffffffffa00b5b9b>] set_expected_rtp_rtcp+0x32d/0x39b [nf_conntrack_sip] [<ffffffffa00b5f15>] process_sdp+0x30c/0x3ec [nf_conntrack_sip] [<ffffffff8103f1eb>] ? irq_exit+0x9a/0x9c [<ffffffffa00ca738>] ? ip_nat_sdp_media+0x185/0x185 [nf_nat_sip]
We have to remove the RTP expectation if the RTCP expectation hits EBUSY since we keep trying with other ports until we succeed.
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c +4 -1
@@ -502,7 +502,10 @@ static unsigned int ip_nat_sdp_media(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int dataoff, ret =nf_ct_expect_related (rtcp_exp);if (ret ==0 )break ; -else if (ret != -EBUSY ) { +else if (ret == -EBUSY ) { +nf_ct_unexpect_related (rtp_exp); +continue ; + }else if (ret <0 ) {nf_ct_unexpect_related (rtp_exp); port =0 ;break ;
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
[email protected]
maintainerPATCH 3/6 netfilter: nf_nat_sip: fix via header translation with multiple parameters
In reply to [email protected]From: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
Via-headers are parsed beginning at the first character after the Via-address. When the address is translated first and its length decreases, the offset to start parsing at is incorrect and header parameters might be missed.
Update the offset after translating the Via-address to fix this.
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c +3 -2
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ static unsigned int ip_nat_sip(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int dataoff,if (ct_sip_parse_header_uri (ct, *dptr,NULL , *datalen, hdr,NULL , &matchoff, &matchlen, &addr, &port) >0 ) { -unsigned int matchend, poff, plen, buflen, n; +unsigned int olen, matchend, poff, plen, buflen, n;char buffer[sizeof ("nnn.nnn.nnn.nnn:nnnnn" )];/* We're only interested in headers related to this
@@ -163,11 +163,12 @@ static unsigned int ip_nat_sip(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int dataoff, goto next; } + olen = *datalen;if (!map_addr (skb, dataoff, dptr, datalen, matchoff, matchlen, &addr, port))return NF_DROP ; - matchend = matchoff + matchlen; + matchend = matchoff + matchlen + *datalen - olen;/* The maddr= parameter (RFC 2361) specifies where to send * the reply. */
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
[email protected]
maintainerPATCH 4/6 netfilter: nf_ct_expect: fix possible access to uninitialized timer
In reply to [email protected]From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
In __nf_ct_expect_check, the function refresh_timer returns 1 if a matching expectation is found and its timer is successfully refreshed. This results in nf_ct_expect_related returning 0. Note that at this point:
- the passed expectation is not inserted in the expectation table and its timer was not initialized, since we have refreshed one matching/existing expectation.
- nf_ct_expect_alloc uses kmem_cache_alloc, so the expectation timer is in some undefined state just after the allocation, until it is appropriately initialized.
This can be a problem for the SIP helper during the expectation addition:
...
if (nf_ct_expect_related(rtp_exp) == 0) {
if (nf_ct_expect_related(rtcp_exp) != 0)
nf_ct_unexpect_related(rtp_exp);...
Note that nf_ct_expect_related(rtp_exp) may return 0 for the timer refresh case that is detailed above. Then, if nf_ct_unexpect_related(rtcp_exp) returns != 0, nf_ct_unexpect_related(rtp_exp) is called, which does:
spin_lock_bh(&nf_conntrack_lock);
if (del_timer(&exp->timeout)) {
nf_ct_unlink_expect(exp);
nf_ct_expect_put(exp); }
spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_lock);
Note that del_timer always returns false if the timer has been initialized. However, the timer was not initialized since setup_timer was not called, therefore, the expectation timer remains in some undefined state. If I'm not missing anything, this may lead to the removal an unexistent expectation.
To fix this, the optimization that allows refreshing an expectation is removed. Now nf_conntrack_expect_related looks more consistent to me since it always add the expectation in case that it returns success.
Thanks to Patrick McHardy for participating in the discussion of this patch.
I think this may be the source of the problem described by:
http://marc.info/?l=netfilter-devel&m=134073514719421&w=2
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c | 29 ++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c +6 -23
@@ -361,23 +361,6 @@ static void evict_oldest_expect(struct nf_conn *master, } } -static inline int refresh_timer (struct nf_conntrack_expect *i) -{ -struct nf_conn_help *master_help =nfct_help (i->master); -const struct nf_conntrack_expect_policy *p; - -if (!del_timer (&i->timeout)) -return 0 ; - - p = &rcu_dereference_protected ( - master_help->helper, -lockdep_is_held (&nf_conntrack_lock) - )->expect_policy[i->class]; - i->timeout.expires = jiffies + p->timeout *HZ ; -add_timer (&i->timeout); -return 1 ; -} -static inline int __nf_ct_expect_check (struct nf_conntrack_expect *expect) {const struct nf_conntrack_expect_policy *p;
@@ -386,7 +369,7 @@ static inline int __nf_ct_expect_check(struct nf_conntrack_expect *expect)struct nf_conn_help *master_help =nfct_help (master);struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper;struct net *net =nf_ct_exp_net (expect); -struct hlist_node *n; +struct hlist_node *n, *next;unsigned int h;int ret =1 ;
@@ -395,12 +378,12 @@ static inline int __nf_ct_expect_check(struct nf_conntrack_expect *expect) goto out; } h =nf_ct_expect_dst_hash (&expect->tuple); -hlist_for_each_entry (i, n, &net->ct.expect_hash[h], hnode) { +hlist_for_each_entry_safe (i, n, next, &net->ct.expect_hash[h], hnode) {if (expect_matches (i, expect)) { -/* Refresh timer: if it's dying, ignore.. */ -if (refresh_timer (i)) { - ret =0 ; - goto out; +if (del_timer (&i->timeout)) { +nf_ct_unlink_expect (i); +nf_ct_expect_put (i); +break ; } }else if (expect_clash (i, expect)) { ret = -EBUSY ;
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
[email protected]
maintainerPATCH 5/6 ipvs: fix oops on NAT reply in br_nf context
In reply to [email protected]From: Lin Ming <[email protected]>
IPVS should not reset skb->nf_bridge in FORWARD hook by calling nf_reset for NAT replies. It triggers oops in br_nf_forward_finish.
[ 579.781508] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004 [ 579.781669] IP: [<ffffffff817b1ca5>] br_nf_forward_finish+0x58/0x112 [ 579.781792] PGD 218f9067 PUD 0 [ 579.781865] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 579.781945] CPU 0 [ 579.781983] Modules linked in: [ 579.782047] [ 579.782080] [ 579.782114] Pid: 4644, comm: qemu Tainted: G W 3.5.0-rc5-00006-g95e69f9 #282 Hewlett-Packard /30E8 [ 579.782300] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff817b1ca5>] [<ffffffff817b1ca5>] br_nf_forward_finish+0x58/0x112 [ 579.782455] RSP: 0018:ffff88007b003a98 EFLAGS: 00010287 [ 579.782541] RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8800762ead00 RCX: 000000000001670a [ 579.782653] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffff8800762ead00 [ 579.782845] RBP: ffff88007b003ac8 R08: 0000000000016630 R09: ffff88007b003a90 [ 579.782957] R10: ffff88007b0038e8 R11: ffff88002da37540 R12: ffff88002da01a02 [ 579.783066] R13: ffff88002da01a80 R14: ffff88002d83c000 R15: ffff88002d82a000 [ 579.783177] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007b000000(0063) knlGS:00000000f62d1b70 [ 579.783306] CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 000000008005003b [ 579.783395] CR2: 0000000000000004 CR3: 00000000218fe000 CR4: 00000000000027f0 [ 579.783505] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 579.783684] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 579.783795] Process qemu (pid: 4644, threadinfo ffff880021b20000, task ffff880021aba760) [ 579.783919] Stack: [ 579.783959] ffff88007693cedc ffff8800762ead00 ffff88002da01a02 ffff8800762ead00 [ 579.784110] ffff88002da01a02 ffff88002da01a80 ffff88007b003b18 ffffffff817b26c7 [ 579.784260] ffff880080000000 ffffffff81ef59f0 ffff8800762ead00 ffffffff81ef58b0 [ 579.784477] Call Trace: [ 579.784523] <IRQ> [ 579.784562] [ 579.784603] [<ffffffff817b26c7>] br_nf_forward_ip+0x275/0x2c8 [ 579.784707] [<ffffffff81704b58>] nf_iterate+0x47/0x7d [ 579.784797] [<ffffffff817ac32e>] ? br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0xae/0xae [ 579.784906] [<ffffffff81704bfb>] nf_hook_slow+0x6d/0x102 [ 579.784995] [<ffffffff817ac32e>] ? br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0xae/0xae [ 579.785175] [<ffffffff8187fa95>] ? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x19/0x1b [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff817ac417>] __br_forward+0x97/0xa2 [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff817ad366>] br_handle_frame_finish+0x1a6/0x257 [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff817b2386>] br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x26d/0x2cb [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff817b2cf0>] br_nf_pre_routing+0x55d/0x5c1 [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff81704b58>] nf_iterate+0x47/0x7d [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff817ad1c0>] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x44/0x44 [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff81704bfb>] nf_hook_slow+0x6d/0x102 [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff817ad1c0>] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x44/0x44 [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff81551525>] ? sky2_poll+0xb35/0xb54 [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff817ad62a>] br_handle_frame+0x213/0x229 [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff817ad417>] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x257/0x257 [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff816e3b47>] __netif_receive_skb+0x2b4/0x3f1 [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff816e69fc>] process_backlog+0x99/0x1e2 [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff816e6800>] net_rx_action+0xdf/0x242 [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff8107e8a8>] __do_softirq+0xc1/0x1e0 [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff8135a5ba>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x3a/0x6c [ 579.785179] [<ffffffff8188812c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
The steps to reproduce as follow,
1. On Host1, setup brige br0(192.168.1.106)
2. Boot a kvm guest(192.168.1.105) on Host1 and start httpd
3. Start IPVS service on Host1
ipvsadm -A -t 192.168.1.106:80 -s rr
ipvsadm -a -t 192.168.1.106:80 -r 192.168.1.105:80 -m
4. Run apache benchmark on Host2(192.168.1.101)
ab -n 1000 http://192.168.1.106/
ip_vs_reply4
ip_vs_out
handle_response
ip_vs_notrack
nf_reset()
{
skb->nf_bridge = NULL;
}Actually, IPVS wants in this case just to replace nfct with untracked version. So replace the nf_reset(skb) call in ip_vs_notrack() with a nf_conntrack_put(skb->nfct) call.
--- include/net/ip_vs.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/net/ip_vs.h +1 -1
@@ -1425,7 +1425,7 @@ static inline void ip_vs_notrack(struct sk_buff *skb)struct nf_conn *ct =nf_ct_get (skb, &ctinfo);if (!ct || !nf_ct_is_untracked (ct)) { -nf_reset (skb); +nf_conntrack_put (skb->nfct); skb->nfct = &nf_ct_untracked_get ()->ct_general; skb->nfctinfo =IP_CT_NEW ;nf_conntrack_get (skb->nfct);
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
[email protected]
maintainerPATCH 6/6 netfilter: xt_limit: have r->cost != 0 case work
In reply to [email protected]From: Jan Engelhardt <[email protected]>
Commit v2.6.19-rc1~1272^2~41 tells us that r->cost != 0 can happen when a running state is saved to userspace and then reinstated from there.
Make sure that private xt_limit area is initialized with correct values. Otherwise, random matchings due to use of uninitialized memory.
---
This patch requires:
commit 7a909ac70f6b0823d9f23a43f19598d4b57ac901
Author: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Date: Mon May 7 10:51:43 2012 +0000
netfilter: limit, hashlimit: avoid duplicated inline
--- net/netfilter/xt_limit.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/xt_limit.c +4 -4
@@ -117,11 +117,11 @@ static int limit_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par)/* For SMP, we only want to use one set of state. */ r->master = priv; +/* User avg in seconds * XT_LIMIT_SCALE: convert to jiffies * +128. */ + priv->prev = jiffies; + priv->credit =user2credits (r->avg * r->burst);/* Credits full. */ if (r->cost ==0 ) { -/* User avg in seconds * XT_LIMIT_SCALE: convert to jiffies * -128. */ - priv->prev = jiffies; - priv->credit =user2credits (r->avg * r->burst);/* Credits full. */ r->credit_cap = priv->credit;/* Credits full. */ r->cost =user2credits (r->avg); }
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
From: [email protected]
Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2012 12:00:01 +0200
Quoted 16 lines
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Hi!
The following patchset aims to reduce the Netfilter debt with stable 3.0 and onwards.
The selected six patches are:
07153c6 netfilter:
nf_ct_ipv4: packets with wrong ihl are invalid
3f509c6 netfilter:nf_nat_sip: fix incorrect handling of EBUSY for RTCP expectation
f22eb25 netfilter:nf_nat_sip: fix via header translation with multiple parameters
2614f86 netfilter:nf_ct_expect: fix possible access to uninitialized timer
9e33ce4 ipvs: fix oops on NAT reply inbr_nfcontext
82e6bfe netfilter:xt_limit: haver->cost!= 0 case work [REQUIRES 7a909ac netfilter: limit, hashlimit: avoid duplicated inline]
Quoted 3 lines
I have read stable_rules.txt and I consider they match the requirements.
Please, cherry-pick them. Thanks!
David Miller
maintainerPablo, the stable kernel address is "[email protected]" not "[email protected]"
Therefore all of your submissions bounced.
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · David Miller
Pablo, the stable kernel address is "[email protected]" not "[email protected]"
Therefore all of your submissions bounced.
I noticed too late so I resent the patches with the correct direction again.
I've already fixed my sendmail scripts.
Can you ack those, please?
Thanks.
David Miller
maintainerFrom: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2012 23:55:15 +0200
Quoted 5 lines · David Miller
Quoted 4 lines
Pablo, the stable kernel address is "[email protected]" not "[email protected]"
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Therefore all of your submissions bounced.
I noticed too late so I resent the patches with the correct direction again.
I've already fixed my sendmail scripts.
Can you ack those, please?
Done.