audit: add restricted capability read-only netlink multicast socket
Subsystems (4)
cover audit: add restricted capability read-only netlink multicast socket
From: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Hi,
This is a patch set Eric Paris and I have been working on to add a restricted capability read-only netlink multicast socket to kaudit to enable userspace clients such as systemd to consume audit logs, in addition to the bidirectional auditd userspace client.
Currently, auditd has the CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL and CAP_AUDIT_WRITE capabilities (bot uses CAP_NET_ADMIN). The CAP_AUDIT_READ capability will be added for use by read-only AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG multicast group clients to the kaudit subsystem.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=887992
Feedback please!
Richard Guy Briggs (6):
audit: refactor hold queue flush
audit: flatten kauditd_thread wait queue code
audit: move kaudit thread start from auditd registration to kaudit
init
netlink: add send and receive capability requirement and capability
flags
audit: add the first netlink multicast socket group
audit: send multicast messages only if there are listeners
include/linux/netlink.h | 4 + include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 8 ++ include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 5 +- kernel/audit.c | 142 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 35 +++++++-- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- 6 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
1.8.0.2
PATCH 1/6 audit: refactor hold queue flush
From: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
The hold queue flush code is an autonomous chunk of code that can be refactored, removed from kauditd_thread() into flush_hold_queue() and flattenned for better legibility.
---
This is a code clean up in preparation to add a multicast netlink socket to kaudit for read-only userspace clients such as systemd, in addition to the bidirectional audit userspace client.
kernel/audit.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
kernel/audit.c +40 -22
@@ -417,34 +417,52 @@ static void kauditd_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)consume_skb (skb); } +/* +* flush_hold_queue - empty the hold queue if auditd appears +* +* If auditd just started, drain the queue of messages already +* sent to syslog/printk. Remember loss here is ok. We already +* called audit_log_lost() if it didn't go out normally. so the +* race between the skb_dequeue and the next check for audit_pid +* doesn't matter. +* +* If you ever find kauditd to be too slow we can get a perf win +* by doing our own locking and keeping better track if there +* are messages in this queue. I don't see the need now, but +* in 5 years when I want to play with this again I'll see this +* note and still have no friggin idea what i'm thinking today. +*/ +static void flush_hold_queue (void ) +{ +struct sk_buff *skb; + +if (!audit_default || !audit_pid) +return ; + + skb =skb_dequeue (&audit_skb_hold_queue); +if (likely (!skb)) +return ; + +while (skb && audit_pid) { +kauditd_send_skb (skb); + skb =skb_dequeue (&audit_skb_hold_queue); + } + +/* +* if auditd just disappeared but we +* dequeued an skb we need to drop ref +*/ +if (skb) +consume_skb (skb); +} +static int kauditd_thread (void *dummy) {struct sk_buff *skb;set_freezable ();while (!kthread_should_stop ()) { -/* -* if auditd just started drain the queue of messages already -* sent to syslog/printk. remember loss here is ok. we already -* called audit_log_lost() if it didn't go out normally. so the -* race between the skb_dequeue and the next check for audit_pid -* doesn't matter. -* -* if you ever find kauditd to be too slow we can get a perf win -* by doing our own locking and keeping better track if there -* are messages in this queue. I don't see the need now, but -* in 5 years when I want to play with this again I'll see this -* note and still have no friggin idea what i'm thinking today. -*/ -if (audit_default && audit_pid) { - skb =skb_dequeue (&audit_skb_hold_queue); -if (unlikely (skb)) { -while (skb && audit_pid) { -kauditd_send_skb (skb); - skb =skb_dequeue (&audit_skb_hold_queue); - } - } - } +flush_hold_queue (); skb =skb_dequeue (&audit_skb_queue);wake_up (&audit_backlog_wait);
Signature · 1 line
1.8.0.2
PATCH 2/6 audit: flatten kauditd_thread wait queue code
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsFrom: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
The wait queue control code in kauditd_thread() was nested deeper than necessary. The function has been flattened for better legibility.
---
This is a code clean up in preparation to add a multicast netlink socket to kaudit for read-only userspace clients such as systemd, in addition to the bidirectional audit userspace client.
kernel/audit.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
kernel/audit.c +13 -13
@@ -458,10 +458,11 @@ static void flush_hold_queue(void)static int kauditd_thread (void *dummy) { -struct sk_buff *skb; -set_freezable ();while (!kthread_should_stop ()) { +struct sk_buff *skb; +DECLARE_WAITQUEUE (wait, current); +flush_hold_queue (); skb =skb_dequeue (&audit_skb_queue);
@@ -471,19 +472,18 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)kauditd_send_skb (skb); elseaudit_printk_skb (skb ); - }else { -DECLARE_WAITQUEUE (wait, current); -set_current_state (TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE ); -add_wait_queue (&kauditd_wait, &wait); - -if (!skb_queue_len (&audit_skb_queue)) { -try_to_freeze (); -schedule (); - } +continue ; + } +set_current_state (TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE ); +add_wait_queue (&kauditd_wait, &wait); -__set_current_state (TASK_RUNNING ); -remove_wait_queue (&kauditd_wait, &wait); +if (!skb_queue_len (&audit_skb_queue)) { +try_to_freeze (); +schedule (); } + +__set_current_state (TASK_RUNNING ); +remove_wait_queue (&kauditd_wait, &wait); }return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
1.8.0.2
PATCH 3/6 audit: move kaudit thread start from auditd registration to kaudit init
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsFrom: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
The kauditd_thread() task was started only after the auditd userspace daemon registers itself with kaudit. This was fine when only auditd consumed messages from the kaudit netlink unicast socket. With the addition of a multicast group to that socket it is more convenient to have the thread start on init of the kaudit kernel subsystem.
---
This is a code clean up in preparation to add a multicast netlink socket to kaudit for read-only userspace clients such as systemd, in addition to the bidirectional audit userspace client.
kernel/audit.c | 14 ++++---------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
kernel/audit.c +4 -10
@@ -676,16 +676,6 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)if (err)return err; -/* As soon as there's any sign of userspace auditd, -* start kauditd to talk to it */ -if (!kauditd_task) - kauditd_task =kthread_run (kauditd_thread,NULL ,"kauditd" ); -if (IS_ERR (kauditd_task)) { - err =PTR_ERR (kauditd_task); - kauditd_task =NULL ; -return err; - } - loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current);security_task_getsecid (current, &sid);
@@ -974,6 +964,10 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)else audit_sock->sk_sndtimeo =MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT ; + kauditd_task =kthread_run (kauditd_thread,NULL ,"kauditd" ); +if (IS_ERR (kauditd_task)) +return PTR_ERR (kauditd_task); +skb_queue_head_init (&audit_skb_queue);skb_queue_head_init (&audit_skb_hold_queue); audit_initialized =AUDIT_INITIALIZED ;
Signature · 1 line
1.8.0.2
PATCH 4/6 netlink: add send and receive capability requirement and capability flags
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsFrom: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Currently netlink socket permissions are controlled by the NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_{RECV,SEND} flags in the kernel socket configuration or by the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability of the client. The former allows non-root users access to the socket. The latter allows all network admin clients access to the socket. It would be useful to be able to further restrict this access to send or receive capabilities individually within specific subsystems with a more targetted capability. Two more flags, NL_CFG_F_CAPABILITY_{RECV,SEND}, have been added to specifically require a named capability should the subsystem request it, allowing the client to drop other broad unneeded capabilities.
---
This is a feature addition in preparation to add a multicast netlink socket to kaudit for read-only userspace clients such as systemd, in addition to the bidirectional unicast auditd userspace client.
Currently, auditd has the CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL and CAP_AUDIT_WRITE capabilities (bot uses CAP_NET_ADMIN). The CAP_AUDIT_READ capability will be added for use by read-only AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG multicast group clients to the kaudit subsystem.
include/linux/netlink.h | 4 ++++ net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/linux/netlink.h +4 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ extern void netlink_table_ungrab(void);#define NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV (1 << 0)#define NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND (1 << 1) +#define NL_CFG_F_CAPABILITY_RECV (1 << 2) +#define NL_CFG_F_CAPABILITY_SEND (1 << 3)/* optional Netlink kernel configuration parameters */ struct netlink_kernel_cfg {
@@ -39,6 +41,8 @@ struct netlink_kernel_cfg {void (*input)(struct sk_buff *skb);struct mutex *cb_mutex;void (*bind)(int group); +int cap_send_requires; +int cap_recv_requires; }; extern struct sock *__netlink_kernel_create(struct net *net, int unit,
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +29 -6
@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ struct netlink_table {struct module *module;void (*bind)(int group);int registered; +int cap_send_requires; +int cap_recv_requires; };static struct netlink_table *nl_table;
@@ -552,6 +554,8 @@ static int netlink_release(struct socket *sock) nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].bind =NULL ; nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].flags =0 ; nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].registered =0 ; + nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].cap_send_requires =0 ; + nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].cap_recv_requires =0 ; } }else if (nlk->subscriptions) {netlink_update_listeners (sk);
@@ -611,8 +615,20 @@ retry:static inline int netlink_capable (const struct socket *sock,unsigned int flag) { -return (nl_table[sock->sk->sk_protocol].flags & flag) || -ns_capable (sock_net (sock->sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_ADMIN ); +struct netlink_table *nlt = &nl_table[sock->sk->sk_protocol]; + +switch (flag & nlt->flags) { +case NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV : +case NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND : +return true; +case NL_CFG_F_CAPABILITY_RECV : +return capable (nlt->cap_recv_requires); +case NL_CFG_F_CAPABILITY_SEND : +return capable (nlt->cap_send_requires); +default : +return capable (CAP_NET_ADMIN ); + } +return false; } static void
@@ -677,7 +693,8 @@ static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,/* Only superuser is allowed to listen multicasts */ if (nladdr->nl_groups) { -if (!netlink_capable (sock,NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV )) +if (!netlink_capable (sock,NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV | +NL_CFG_F_CAPABILITY_RECV ))return -EPERM ; err =netlink_realloc_groups (sk);if (err)
@@ -739,7 +756,9 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,return -EINVAL ;/* Only superuser is allowed to send multicasts */ -if (nladdr->nl_groups && !netlink_capable (sock,NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND )) +if (nladdr->nl_groups && + !netlink_capable (sock,NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND | +NL_CFG_F_CAPABILITY_SEND ))return -EPERM ;if (!nlk->portid)
@@ -1262,7 +1281,8 @@ static int netlink_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,break ;case NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP :case NETLINK_DROP_MEMBERSHIP : { -if (!netlink_capable (sock,NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV )) +if (!netlink_capable (sock,NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV | +NL_CFG_F_CAPABILITY_RECV ))return -EPERM ; err =netlink_realloc_groups (sk);if (err)
@@ -1394,7 +1414,8 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock, dst_group =ffs (addr->nl_groups); err = -EPERM ;if ((dst_group || dst_portid) && - !netlink_capable (sock,NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND )) + !netlink_capable (sock,NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND | +NL_CFG_F_CAPABILITY_SEND )) goto out; }else { dst_portid = nlk->dst_portid;
@@ -1600,6 +1621,8 @@ __netlink_kernel_create(struct net *net, int unit, struct module *module,if (cfg) { nl_table[unit].bind = cfg->bind; nl_table[unit].flags = cfg->flags; + nl_table[unit].cap_send_requires = cfg->cap_send_requires; + nl_table[unit].cap_recv_requires = cfg->cap_recv_requires; } nl_table[unit].registered =1 ; }else {
Signature · 1 line
1.8.0.2
PATCH 5/6 audit: add restricted capability read-only netlink multicast socket
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsFrom: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Add a netlink multicast socket with one group to kaudit for "best-effort" delivery to read-only userspace clients such as systemd, in addition to the existing bidirectional unicast auditd userspace client.
Currently, auditd is intended to use the CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL and CAP_AUDIT_WRITE capabilities, but actually uses CAP_NET_ADMIN. The CAP_AUDIT_READ capability is added for use by read-only AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG netlink multicast group clients to the kaudit subsystem.
This will safely give access to services such as systemd to consume audit logs while ensuring write access remains restricted for integrity.
---
(The seemingly wasteful skb_copy() is necessary because the original kaudit unicast socket sends up messages with nlmsg_len set to the payload length rather than the entire message length. This breaks the convention used by netlink. The existing auditd daemon assumes this breakage. Fixing this would require co-ordinating a change in the established protocol between kaudit kernel code and auditd userspace code. There is no reason for new multicast clients to continue with this breakage.)
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++++++ include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 5 ++++- kernel/audit.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +8 -0
@@ -357,6 +357,14 @@ enum {#define AUDIT_PERM_READ 4#define AUDIT_PERM_ATTR 8 +/* Multicast Netlink socket groups (default up to 32) */ +enum audit_nlgrps { +AUDIT_NLGRP_NONE ,/* Group 0 not used */ +AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG ,/* "best effort" read only socket */ + __AUDIT_NLGRP_MAX +}; +#define AUDIT_NLGRP_MAX (__AUDIT_NLGRP_MAX - 1) +struct audit_status {__u32 mask;/* Bit mask for valid entries */ __u32 enabled;/* 1 = enabled, 0 = disabled */
include/uapi/linux/capability.h +4 -1
@@ -343,7 +343,10 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {#define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND 36 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND +/* Allowed to read the audit log */ +#define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 + +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ#define cap_valid (x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
kernel/audit.c +40 -0
@@ -418,6 +418,37 @@ static void kauditd_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) }/* +* kauditd_send_multicast_skb - send the skb to multicast userspace listeners +* +* This function doesn't consume an skb as might be expected since it has to +* copy it anyways. +*/ +static void kauditd_send_multicast_skb (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +struct sk_buff *copy; +struct nlmsghdr *nlh; + +/* +* The seemingly wasteful skb_copy() is necessary because the original +* kaudit unicast socket sends up messages with nlmsg_len set to the +* payload length rather than the entire message length. This breaks +* the standard set by netlink. The existing auditd daemon assumes +* this breakage. Fixing this would require co-ordinating a change in +* the established protocol between the kaudit kernel subsystem and +* the auditd userspace code. There is no reason for new multicast +* clients to continue with this non-compliance. +*/ + copy =skb_copy (skb,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!copy) +return ; + + nlh =nlmsg_hdr (copy); + nlh->nlmsg_len = copy->len; + +nlmsg_multicast (audit_sock, copy,0 ,AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG ,GFP_KERNEL ); +} + +/* * flush_hold_queue - empty the hold queue if auditd appears * * If auditd just started, drain the queue of messages already
@@ -468,6 +499,12 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy) skb =skb_dequeue (&audit_skb_queue);wake_up (&audit_backlog_wait);if (skb) { +/* Don't bump skb refcount for multicast send since +* kauditd_send_multicast_skb() copies the skb anyway +* due to audit unicast netlink protocol +* non-compliance. +*/ +kauditd_send_multicast_skb (skb);if (audit_pid)kauditd_send_skb (skb);else
@@ -951,6 +988,9 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)int i;struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = { .input = audit_receive, + .groups =AUDIT_NLGRP_MAX , + .flags =NL_CFG_F_CAPABILITY_RECV , + .cap_recv_requires =CAP_AUDIT_READ , };if (audit_initialized ==AUDIT_DISABLED )
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +1 -1
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { "peer", { "recv", NULL } }, {"capability2" , { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", - NULL } }, + "audit_read", NULL } }, { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } }, { "tun_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
Signature · 1 line
1.8.0.2
PATCH 6/6 audit: send multicast messages only if there are listeners
In reply to Richard Guy BriggsFrom: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Test first to see if there are any userspace multicast listeners bound to the socket before starting the multicast send work.
--- kernel/audit.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
kernel/audit.c +2 -0
@@ -428,6 +428,8 @@ static void kauditd_send_multicast_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)struct sk_buff *copy;struct nlmsghdr *nlh; +if (!netlink_has_listeners (audit_sock,AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG )) +return ;/* * The seemingly wasteful skb_copy() is necessary because the original * kaudit unicast socket sends up messages with nlmsg_len set to the
Signature · 1 line
1.8.0.2