revamp X.509 name verification option
PATCH 1/1 revamp X.509 name verification option
This patch set tries to do X.509 name verification right. As discussed during FOSDEM 2013, changing --tls-remote to support RFC 2253 style subject DNs only was too radical as it broke more configurations than expected.
This makes --tls-remote work with old configurations again, but deprecates its use. As a replacement it introduces a new option for X.509 name verification that takes RFC 2253 subject DNs only.
[PATCH 1/3] reintroduce --no-name-remapping option [PATCH 2/3] make --tls-remote compatible with pre 2.3 configs [PATCH 3/3] add new option for X.509 name verification
PATCH 1/3 reintroduce --no-name-remapping option
The option is just an alias for --compat-names no-remapping and is introduced so pre-2.3 server configurations don't break.
--- doc/openvpn.8 | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------- src/openvpn/options.c | 21 ++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
doc/openvpn.8 +23 -9
@@ -3462,19 +3462,16 @@ characters in the usernames, X.509 Subject fields and Common Name variables and it complies to the RFC 2253, UTF\-8 String Representation of Distinguished Names. -As a backwards compatibility for the removed \-\-no\-name\-remapping feature in -older OpenVPN versions, the +The .B no\-remapping mode flag can be used with the .B \-\-compat\-names -option. -When this mode flag is used, the Common Name, Subject, and username strings are -allowed to include any printable character including space, but excluding -control characters such as tab, newline, and carriage-return. It ensures -compatibility with the -.B \-\-no\-name\-remapping -option of OpenVPN versions before v2.3. +option to be compatible with the now deprecated \-\-no\-name\-remapping feature +present in older OpenVPN versions. When this mode flag is used, the Common Name, +Subject, and username strings are allowed to include any printable character +including space, but excluding control characters such as tab, newline, and +carriage-return. .B Please note: This option will not be around for a long time. It is only implemented
@@ -3483,6 +3480,23 @@ removed either in OpenVPN v2.4 or v2.5. So please make sure you start the process to support the new formatting as soon as possible. .\"********************************************************* .TP +.B \-\-no\-name\-remapping (DEPRECATED) +The +.B \-\-no\-name\-remapping +option is an alias for +.B \-\-compat\-names\ no\-remapping. +It ensures compatibility with configurations using the +.B \-\-no\-name\-remapping +option. + +.B Please note: +This option is now deprecated. It will be removed either in OpenVPN v2.4 +or v2.5. So please make sure you support the new X.509 name formatting +described with the +.B \-\-compat\-names +option as soon as possible. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP .B \-\-port-share host port [dir] When run in TCP server mode, share the OpenVPN port with another application, such as an HTTPS server. If OpenVPN
src/openvpn/options.c +14 -7
@@ -5561,13 +5561,6 @@ add_option (struct options *options,VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); options->ssl_flags |=SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL ; } -else if (streq (p[0 ],"compat-names" )) - { -VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); -compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_SET |COMPAT_NAMES ); -if (p[1 ] &&streq (p[1 ],"no-remapping" )) -compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_SET |COMPAT_NO_NAME_REMAPPING ); - }else if (streq (p[0 ],"opt-verify" )) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL );
@@ -6518,6 +6511,20 @@ add_option (struct options *options, options->tls_export_cert = p[1 ]; }#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "compat-names")) + { +VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); +compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_SET |COMPAT_NAMES ); +if (p[1 ] &&streq (p[1 ],"no-remapping" )) +compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_SET |COMPAT_NO_NAME_REMAPPING ); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "no-name-remapping")) + { +VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); +msg (M_WARN ,"DEPRECATED OPTION: --no-name-remapping, please update your configuration" ); +compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_SET |COMPAT_NAMES ); +compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_SET |COMPAT_NO_NAME_REMAPPING ); + } else if (streq (p[0], "tls-remote") && p[1]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL );
Signature · 1 line
1.7.9.5
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 1/3] reintroduce --no-name-remapping option
Am 22.02.13 10:44, schrieb Heiko Hund:
Quoted 3 lines
The option is just an alias for --compat-names no-remapping and is introduced so pre-2.3 server configurations don't break.
ACK.
Arne
[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: reintroduce --no-name-remapping option
In reply to Heiko HundYour patch has been applied to the master and release/2.3 branch.
commit 26b0433c4a642f8d2197f3fd371759f0047bd0bd (master) commit c86d09c7c115eeda96ea0b2a400c3ce57bd90292 (release/2.3)
Author: Heiko Hund Date: Fri Feb 22 10:44:20 2013 +0100
reintroduce --no-name-remapping option
Signed-off-by: Heiko Hund <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: [email protected]...
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/7364
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
PATCH 2/3 make --tls-remote compatible with pre 2.3 configs
In reply to Heiko HundIn openvpn 2.3.0 the semantics of the --tls-remote option changed. That broke more configurations than anticipated. To not break configurations that use --tls-remote with a legacy OpenSSL style DN anymore, it is now detected when such a DN is configured. When necessary the --compat-names option is then automatically enabled.
--- src/openvpn/options.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
src/openvpn/options.c +6 -0
@@ -6528,6 +6528,12 @@ add_option (struct options *options,else if (streq (p[0 ],"tls-remote" ) && p[1 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL ); +/* +* Enable legacy openvpn format for DNs that have not been converted +* yet and X.509 common names (not containing an '=' or ', ') +*/ +if (p[1 ][0 ] =='/' || !strchr (p[1 ],'=' ) || !strstr (p[1 ],", " )) +compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_SET |COMPAT_NAMES ); options->tls_remote = p[1 ]; }else if (streq (p[0 ],"ns-cert-type" ) && p[1 ])
Signature · 1 line
1.7.9.5
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 2/3] make --tls-remote compatible with pre 2.3 configs
Am 22.02.13 10:44, schrieb Heiko Hund:
Quoted 6 lines
In openvpn 2.3.0 the semantics of the --tls-remote option changed. That broke more configurations than anticipated. To not break configurations that use --tls-remote with a legacy OpenSSL style DN anymore, it is now detected when such a DN is configured. When necessary the --compat-names option is then automatically enabled.
Ack.
Arne
[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: make --tls-remote compatible with pre 2.3 configs
In reply to Heiko HundYour patch has been applied to the master and release/2.3 branch.
commit ad532bba896875e56488e69ec16212a77787c57b (master) commit 0f92b3b4170dab29aaf5cb4e6a0d00d37bf418b4 (release/2.3)
Author: Heiko Hund Date: Fri Feb 22 10:44:21 2013 +0100
make --tls-remote compatible with pre 2.3 configs
Signed-off-by: Heiko Hund <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: [email protected]...
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/7366
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
PATCH 3/3 add new option for X.509 name verification
In reply to Heiko HundAdd the option --verify-x509-name to provide the functionality of the now deprecated --tls-remote.
The new option accepts RFC 2253 subject DNs only and compares RDN or RDN prefix only if configured explicitly.
--- doc/openvpn.8 | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- src/openvpn/init.c | 7 ++-- src/openvpn/options.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ src/openvpn/options.h | 3 +- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 3 +- src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c | 15 +++++--- src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h | 6 +++ 7 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
doc/openvpn.8 +65 -13
@@ -3431,7 +3431,7 @@ the authenticated username as the common name, rather than the common name from the client cert. .\"********************************************************* .TP -.B \-\-compat\-names [no\-remapping] +.B \-\-compat\-names [no\-remapping] (DEPRECATED) Until OpenVPN v2.3 the format of the X.509 Subject fields was formatted like this: .IP
@@ -3467,17 +3467,20 @@ The mode flag can be used with the .B \-\-compat\-names -option to be compatible with the now deprecated \-\-no\-name\-remapping feature -present in older OpenVPN versions. When this mode flag is used, the Common Name, +option to be compatible with the now deprecated \-\-no\-name\-remapping option. +It is only available at the server. When this mode flag is used, the Common Name, Subject, and username strings are allowed to include any printable character including space, but excluding control characters such as tab, newline, and -carriage-return. +carriage-return. no-remapping is only available on the server side. .B Please note: -This option will not be around for a long time. It is only implemented +This option is immediately deprecated. It is only implemented to make the transition to the new formatting less intrusive. It will be -removed either in OpenVPN v2.4 or v2.5. So please make sure you start -the process to support the new formatting as soon as possible. +removed either in OpenVPN v2.4 or v2.5. So please make sure you use the +.B \-\-verify-x509-name +option instead of +.B \-\-tls-remote +as soon as possible and update your scripts where necessary. .\"********************************************************* .TP .B \-\-no\-name\-remapping (DEPRECATED)
@@ -3485,7 +3488,7 @@ The .B \-\-no\-name\-remapping option is an alias for .B \-\-compat\-names\ no\-remapping. -It ensures compatibility with configurations using the +It ensures compatibility with server configurations using the .B \-\-no\-name\-remapping option.
@@ -4671,11 +4674,11 @@ is available via the peer_cert environment variable. Field in x509 certificate subject to be used as username (default=CN). .B Fieldname will be uppercased before matching. When this option is used, the ---tls-remote option will match against the chosen fieldname instead -of the CN. +.B \-\-verify-x509-username +option will match against the chosen fieldname instead of the CN. .\"********************************************************* .TP -.B \-\-tls-remote name +.B \-\-tls-remote name (DEPRECATED) Accept connections only from a host with X509 name or common name equal to .B name.
@@ -4707,6 +4710,55 @@ option to verify the remote host, because works in a .B \-\-chroot environment too. + +.B Please also note: +This option is now deprecated. It will be removed either in OpenVPN v2.4 +or v2.5. So please make sure you support the new X.509 name formatting +described with the +.B \-\-compat-names +option as soon as possible by updating your configurations to use +.B \-\-verify-x509-name +instead. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-verify-x509-name name type +Accept connections only if a host's X.509 name is equal to +.B name. +The remote host must also pass all other tests of verification. + +Which X.509 name is compared to +.B name +depends on the setting of type. +.B type +can be "subject" to match the complete subject DN (default), +"name" to match a subject RDN or "name-prefix" to match a subject RDN prefix. +Which RDN is verified as name depends on the +.B \-\-x509-username-field +option. But it defaults to the common name (CN). + +.B \-\-verify-x509-name +is a useful replacement for the +.B \-\-tls-verify +option to verify the remote host, because +.B \-\-verify-x509-name +works in a +.B \-\-chroot +environment too. + +If you want a client to only accept connections +to "Server-1", "Server-2", etc., you can simply use +.B \-\-verify-x509-name Server- name-prefix + +Using a name prefix is a useful alternative to managing +a CRL (Certificate Revocation List) on the client, since it allows the client +to refuse all certificates except for those associated +with designated servers. + +.B NOTE: +Test against a name prefix only when you are using OpenVPN with +a custom CA certificate that is under your control. +Never use this option with type "name-prefix" when your client certificates +are signed by a third party, such as a commercial web CA. .\"********************************************************* .TP .B \-\-x509-track attribute
@@ -4744,7 +4796,7 @@ a man-in-the-middle attack where an authorized client attempts to connect to another client by impersonating the server. The attack is easily prevented by having clients verify the server certificate using any one of -.B \-\-ns-cert-type, \-\-tls-remote, +.B \-\-ns-cert-type, \-\-verify-x509-name, or .B \-\-tls-verify. .\"*********************************************************
@@ -4802,7 +4854,7 @@ a man-in-the-middle attack where an authorized client attempts to connect to another client by impersonating the server. The attack is easily prevented by having clients verify the server certificate using any one of -.B \-\-remote-cert-tls, \-\-tls-remote, +.B \-\-remote-cert-tls, \-\-verify-x509-name, or .B \-\-tls-verify. .\"*********************************************************
src/openvpn/init.c +3 -4
@@ -2205,7 +2205,8 @@ do_init_crypto_tls (struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.verify_command = options->tls_verify; to.verify_export_cert = options->tls_export_cert; - to.verify_x509name = options->tls_remote; + to.verify_x509_type = (options->verify_x509_type &0xff ); + to.verify_x509_name = options->verify_x509_name; to.crl_file = options->crl_file; to.ssl_flags = options->ssl_flags; to.ns_cert_type = options->ns_cert_type;
@@ -2467,12 +2468,10 @@ do_option_warnings (struct context *c)warn_on_use_of_common_subnets ();if (o->tls_client && !o->tls_verify - && !o->tls_remote + && o->verify_x509_type ==VERIFY_X509_NONE && !(o->ns_cert_type &NS_CERT_CHECK_SERVER ) && !o->remote_cert_eku)msg (M_WARN ,"WARNING: No server certificate verification method has been enabled. See http://openvpn.net/howto.html#mitm for more info." ); -if (o->tls_remote) -msg (M_WARN ,"WARNING: Make sure you understand the semantics of --tls-remote before using it (see the man page)." );#endif #endif
src/openvpn/options.c +82 -12
138 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/options.h +2 -1
@@ -506,8 +506,9 @@ struct optionsconst char *pkcs12_file;const char *cipher_list;const char *tls_verify; +int verify_x509_type; +const char *verify_x509_name;const char *tls_export_cert; -const char *tls_remote;const char *crl_file;const char *ca_file_inline;
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +2 -1
@@ -245,7 +245,8 @@ struct tls_options/* cert verification parms */ const char *verify_command;const char *verify_export_cert; -const char *verify_x509name; +int verify_x509_type; +const char *verify_x509_name;const char *crl_file;int ns_cert_type;unsigned remote_cert_ku[MAX_PARMS ];
src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c +10 -5
@@ -369,16 +369,21 @@ verify_peer_cert(const struct tls_options *opt, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert,#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ -/* verify X509 name or common name against --tls-remote */ -if (opt->verify_x509name &&strlen (opt->verify_x509name) >0 ) +/* verify X509 name or username against --verify-x509-[user]name */ +if (opt->verify_x509_type !=VERIFY_X509_NONE ) { -if (strcmp (opt->verify_x509name, subject) ==0 - ||strncmp (opt->verify_x509name, common_name,strlen (opt->verify_x509name)) ==0 ) +if ( (opt->verify_x509_type ==VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_DN + &&strcmp (opt->verify_x509_name, subject) ==0 ) + || (opt->verify_x509_type ==VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN + &&strcmp (opt->verify_x509_name, common_name) ==0 ) + || (opt->verify_x509_type ==VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX + &&strncmp (opt->verify_x509_name, common_name, +strlen (opt->verify_x509_name)) ==0 ) )msg (D_HANDSHAKE ,"VERIFY X509NAME OK: %s" , subject);else {msg (D_HANDSHAKE ,"VERIFY X509NAME ERROR: %s, must be %s" , - subject, opt->verify_x509name); + subject, opt->verify_x509_name);return FAILURE ;/* Reject connection */ } }
src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h +6 -0
@@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ struct cert_hash_set {struct cert_hash *ch[MAX_CERT_DEPTH ];/**< Array of certificate hashes */ }; +#define VERIFY_X509_NONE 0 +#define VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_DN 1 +#define VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN 2 +#define VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX 3 +#define TLS_REMOTE_SUBJECT_DN 1 + 0x100 +#define TLS_REMOTE_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX 3 + 0x100#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED 0#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 1
Signature · 1 line
1.7.9.5
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 3/3] add new option for X.509 name verification
Am 22.02.13 10:44, schrieb Heiko Hund:
Quoted 6 lines
Add the option --verify-x509-name to provide the functionality of the now deprecated --tls-remote.
The new option accepts RFC 2253 subject DNs only and compares RDN or RDN prefix only if configured explicitly.
I looked through these and I think they are okay. Since most users don't know what RDN, RDN prefix and DN are an example like
A certificate with a DN CN=openvpn.example.com, OU=Avian IP Carriers, L=NRW would be matched by:
verify-x509-name "C=DE, OU=BLINKT, CN=openvpn.blinkt.de"
or
verify-x509-name openvpn.blinkt.de subject
or
verify-x509-name openvpn.bl name-prefix
Most user and certificates will probably use the second form with subject. I also think that for standard x509 certificates it may be a good option to also include name-suffix so you can do:
verify-x509-name .blinkt.de name-suffix
+ || (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN
+ && strcmp (opt->verify_x509_name, common_name) == 0)
+ || (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX
+ && strncmp (opt->verify_x509_name, common_name,
+ strlen (opt->verify_x509_name)) == 0) )
This is correct but it took me a while to understand that strcmp will compare the 0 btye in opt-verify_x509_name and strncmp with strln as length will not include the 0. The joys of C...
Arne
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 3/3] add new option for X.509 name verification
Hi Arne,
Quoted 2 lines · On Wednesday 06 March 2013 22:38:56 Arne Schwabe wrote:
I looked through these and I think they are okay. Since most users don't know what RDN, RDN prefix and DN are an example like
I just sent a second version of 3/3 including examples in the man page, as you suggested.
Quoted 5 lines
Most user and certificates will probably use the second form with subject. I also think that for standard x509 certificates it may be a good option to also include name-suffix so you can do:
verify-x509-name .blinkt.de name-suffix
While this could be added, I'd rather wait until someone demands it strongly, as I think the "name-prefix" flags is of use for a very limited audience already and included mostly for compatibility with the --tls-remote feature set.
Thanks for the review!
Heiko
PATCH v2 3/3 add new option for X.509 name verification
In reply to Heiko HundAdd the option --verify-x509-name to provide the functionality of the now deprecated --tls-remote.
The new option accepts RFC 2253 subject DNs only and compares RDN or RDN prefix only if configured explicitly.
--- doc/openvpn.8 | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- src/openvpn/init.c | 7 ++-- src/openvpn/options.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ src/openvpn/options.h | 3 +- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 3 +- src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c | 15 +++++--- src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h | 6 +++ 7 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
doc/openvpn.8 +69 -13
@@ -3431,7 +3431,7 @@ the authenticated username as the common name, rather than the common name from the client cert. .\"********************************************************* .TP -.B \-\-compat\-names [no\-remapping] +.B \-\-compat\-names [no\-remapping] (DEPRECATED) Until OpenVPN v2.3 the format of the X.509 Subject fields was formatted like this: .IP
@@ -3467,17 +3467,20 @@ The mode flag can be used with the .B \-\-compat\-names -option to be compatible with the now deprecated \-\-no\-name\-remapping feature -present in older OpenVPN versions. When this mode flag is used, the Common Name, +option to be compatible with the now deprecated \-\-no\-name\-remapping option. +It is only available at the server. When this mode flag is used, the Common Name, Subject, and username strings are allowed to include any printable character including space, but excluding control characters such as tab, newline, and -carriage-return. +carriage-return. no-remapping is only available on the server side. .B Please note: -This option will not be around for a long time. It is only implemented +This option is immediately deprecated. It is only implemented to make the transition to the new formatting less intrusive. It will be -removed either in OpenVPN v2.4 or v2.5. So please make sure you start -the process to support the new formatting as soon as possible. +removed either in OpenVPN v2.4 or v2.5. So please make sure you use the +.B \-\-verify-x509-name +option instead of +.B \-\-tls-remote +as soon as possible and update your scripts where necessary. .\"********************************************************* .TP .B \-\-no\-name\-remapping (DEPRECATED)
@@ -3485,7 +3488,7 @@ The .B \-\-no\-name\-remapping option is an alias for .B \-\-compat\-names\ no\-remapping. -It ensures compatibility with configurations using the +It ensures compatibility with server configurations using the .B \-\-no\-name\-remapping option.
@@ -4671,11 +4674,11 @@ is available via the peer_cert environment variable. Field in x509 certificate subject to be used as username (default=CN). .B Fieldname will be uppercased before matching. When this option is used, the ---tls-remote option will match against the chosen fieldname instead -of the CN. +.B \-\-verify-x509-username +option will match against the chosen fieldname instead of the CN. .\"********************************************************* .TP -.B \-\-tls-remote name +.B \-\-tls-remote name (DEPRECATED) Accept connections only from a host with X509 name or common name equal to .B name.
@@ -4707,6 +4710,59 @@ option to verify the remote host, because works in a .B \-\-chroot environment too. + +.B Please also note: +This option is now deprecated. It will be removed either in OpenVPN v2.4 +or v2.5. So please make sure you support the new X.509 name formatting +described with the +.B \-\-compat-names +option as soon as possible by updating your configurations to use +.B \-\-verify-x509-name +instead. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-verify-x509-name name type +Accept connections only if a host's X.509 name is equal to +.B name. +The remote host must also pass all other tests of verification. + +Which X.509 name is compared to +.B name +depends on the setting of type. +.B type +can be "subject" to match the complete subject DN (default), +"name" to match a subject RDN or "name-prefix" to match a subject RDN prefix. +Which RDN is verified as name depends on the +.B \-\-x509-username-field +option. But it defaults to the common name (CN), e.g. a certificate with a +subject DN "C=KG, ST=NA, L=Bishkek, CN=Server-1" would be matched by: + +.B \-\-verify-x509-name 'C=KG, ST=NA, L=Bishkek, CN=Server-1' +and +.B \-\-verify-x509-name Server-1 name +or you could use +.B \-\-verify-x509-name Server- name-prefix +if you want a client to only accept connections to "Server-1", "Server-2", etc. + +.B \-\-verify-x509-name +is a useful replacement for the +.B \-\-tls-verify +option to verify the remote host, because +.B \-\-verify-x509-name +works in a +.B \-\-chroot +environment without any dependencies. + +Using a name prefix is a useful alternative to managing +a CRL (Certificate Revocation List) on the client, since it allows the client +to refuse all certificates except for those associated +with designated servers. + +.B NOTE: +Test against a name prefix only when you are using OpenVPN with +a custom CA certificate that is under your control. +Never use this option with type "name-prefix" when your client certificates +are signed by a third party, such as a commercial web CA. .\"********************************************************* .TP .B \-\-x509-track attribute
@@ -4744,7 +4800,7 @@ a man-in-the-middle attack where an authorized client attempts to connect to another client by impersonating the server. The attack is easily prevented by having clients verify the server certificate using any one of -.B \-\-ns-cert-type, \-\-tls-remote, +.B \-\-ns-cert-type, \-\-verify-x509-name, or .B \-\-tls-verify. .\"*********************************************************
@@ -4802,7 +4858,7 @@ a man-in-the-middle attack where an authorized client attempts to connect to another client by impersonating the server. The attack is easily prevented by having clients verify the server certificate using any one of -.B \-\-remote-cert-tls, \-\-tls-remote, +.B \-\-remote-cert-tls, \-\-verify-x509-name, or .B \-\-tls-verify. .\"*********************************************************
src/openvpn/init.c +3 -4
@@ -2205,7 +2205,8 @@ do_init_crypto_tls (struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.verify_command = options->tls_verify; to.verify_export_cert = options->tls_export_cert; - to.verify_x509name = options->tls_remote; + to.verify_x509_type = (options->verify_x509_type &0xff ); + to.verify_x509_name = options->verify_x509_name; to.crl_file = options->crl_file; to.ssl_flags = options->ssl_flags; to.ns_cert_type = options->ns_cert_type;
@@ -2467,12 +2468,10 @@ do_option_warnings (struct context *c)warn_on_use_of_common_subnets ();if (o->tls_client && !o->tls_verify - && !o->tls_remote + && o->verify_x509_type ==VERIFY_X509_NONE && !(o->ns_cert_type &NS_CERT_CHECK_SERVER ) && !o->remote_cert_eku)msg (M_WARN ,"WARNING: No server certificate verification method has been enabled. See http://openvpn.net/howto.html#mitm for more info." ); -if (o->tls_remote) -msg (M_WARN ,"WARNING: Make sure you understand the semantics of --tls-remote before using it (see the man page)." );#endif #endif
src/openvpn/options.c +82 -12
138 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/options.h +2 -1
@@ -506,8 +506,9 @@ struct optionsconst char *pkcs12_file;const char *cipher_list;const char *tls_verify; +int verify_x509_type; +const char *verify_x509_name;const char *tls_export_cert; -const char *tls_remote;const char *crl_file;const char *ca_file_inline;
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +2 -1
@@ -245,7 +245,8 @@ struct tls_options/* cert verification parms */ const char *verify_command;const char *verify_export_cert; -const char *verify_x509name; +int verify_x509_type; +const char *verify_x509_name;const char *crl_file;int ns_cert_type;unsigned remote_cert_ku[MAX_PARMS ];
src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c +10 -5
@@ -369,16 +369,21 @@ verify_peer_cert(const struct tls_options *opt, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert,#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ -/* verify X509 name or common name against --tls-remote */ -if (opt->verify_x509name &&strlen (opt->verify_x509name) >0 ) +/* verify X509 name or username against --verify-x509-[user]name */ +if (opt->verify_x509_type !=VERIFY_X509_NONE ) { -if (strcmp (opt->verify_x509name, subject) ==0 - ||strncmp (opt->verify_x509name, common_name,strlen (opt->verify_x509name)) ==0 ) +if ( (opt->verify_x509_type ==VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_DN + &&strcmp (opt->verify_x509_name, subject) ==0 ) + || (opt->verify_x509_type ==VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN + &&strcmp (opt->verify_x509_name, common_name) ==0 ) + || (opt->verify_x509_type ==VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX + &&strncmp (opt->verify_x509_name, common_name, +strlen (opt->verify_x509_name)) ==0 ) )msg (D_HANDSHAKE ,"VERIFY X509NAME OK: %s" , subject);else {msg (D_HANDSHAKE ,"VERIFY X509NAME ERROR: %s, must be %s" , - subject, opt->verify_x509name); + subject, opt->verify_x509_name);return FAILURE ;/* Reject connection */ } }
src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h +6 -0
@@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ struct cert_hash_set {struct cert_hash *ch[MAX_CERT_DEPTH ];/**< Array of certificate hashes */ }; +#define VERIFY_X509_NONE 0 +#define VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_DN 1 +#define VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN 2 +#define VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX 3 +#define TLS_REMOTE_SUBJECT_DN 1 + 0x100 +#define TLS_REMOTE_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX 3 + 0x100#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED 0#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 1
Signature · 1 line
1.7.9.5
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 3/3 v2] add new option for X.509 name verification
Am 07.03.13 16:36, schrieb Heiko Hund:
Quoted 5 lines
Add the option --verify-x509-name to provide the functionality of the now deprecated --tls-remote.
The new option accepts RFC 2253 subject DNs only and compares RDN or RDN prefix only if configured explicitly.
ACK to man page changes. ACK to the rest of the patch if unchanged.
Arne
[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: add new option for X.509 name verification
In reply to Heiko HundYour patch has been applied to the master and release/2.3 branch.
commit 9f0fc745664fd0fc6a1c6785e101bf912088db16 (master) commit f6e12862cefd054eb1a44c18ea1dfb4cba7d007a (release/2.3)
Author: Heiko Hund Date: Thu Mar 7 16:36:41 2013 +0100
add new option for X.509 name verification
Signed-off-by: Heiko Hund <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: [email protected]...
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/7376
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
Hi,
Quoted 4 lines · Heiko Hund
This patch set tries to do X.509 name verification right. As discussed during FOSDEM 2013, changing --tls-remote to support RFC 2253 style subject DNs only was too radical as it broke more configurations than expected.
Acked by Arne, now all committed and pushed.
(I have reviewed the code as well, and even test compiled the trees before pushing them :-) - so not just relying on the ACK)
gert
Signature · 4 lines
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