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Consolidate CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS

PATCH In review Stephen Boyd 6 participants 13 messages Feb 27, 2013

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PATCH 1/1 Consolidate CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS

The help text for this config is duplicated across the x86, parisc, and s390 Kconfig.debug files. Arnd Bergman noted that the help text was slightly misleading and should be fixed to state that enabling this option isn't a problem when using pre 4.4 gcc.

To simplify the rewording, consolidate the text into lib/Kconfig.debug and modify it there to be more explicit about when you should say N to this config.

Also, make the text a bit more generic by stating that this option enables compile time checks so we can cover architectures which emit warnings vs. ones which emit errors. The details of how an architecture decided to implement the checks isn't as important as the concept of compile time checking of copy_from_user() calls.

While we're doing this, remove all the copy_from_user_overflow() code that's duplicated many times and place it into lib/ so that any architecture supporting this option can get the function for free.

Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Cc Helge Deller <[email protected]>
Cc Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]>
Cc Chris Metcalf <[email protected]>

---

Per Helge Deller prodding me, I'm resending just this patch.

https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/833182/

 arch/parisc/Kconfig             |  1 +
 arch/parisc/Kconfig.debug       | 14 --------------
 arch/s390/Kconfig               |  1 +
 arch/s390/Kconfig.debug         | 14 --------------
 arch/s390/lib/Makefile          |  1 -
 arch/s390/lib/usercopy.c        |  8 --------
 arch/sparc/lib/Makefile         |  1 -
 arch/sparc/lib/usercopy.c       |  9 ---------
 arch/tile/Kconfig               |  8 +-------
 arch/tile/include/asm/uaccess.h |  7 ++++++-
 arch/tile/lib/uaccess.c         |  8 --------
 arch/x86/Kconfig                |  1 +
 arch/x86/Kconfig.debug          | 14 --------------
 arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c      |  6 ------
 lib/Kconfig.debug               | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 lib/Makefile                    |  1 +
 lib/usercopy.c                  |  9 +++++++++
 17 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 arch/s390/lib/usercopy.c
 delete mode 100644 arch/sparc/lib/usercopy.c
 create mode 100644 lib/usercopy.c
arch/parisc/Kconfig +1 -0
index a2a47d9..96be92f 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 config PARISC
 	def_bool y
+	select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
 	select HAVE_IDE
 	select HAVE_OPROFILE
 	select HAVE_FUNCTION_TRACER if 64BIT
arch/parisc/Kconfig.debug +0 -14
index 7305ac8..bc989e5 100644
@@ -12,18 +12,4 @@ config DEBUG_RODATA
          portion of the kernel code won't be covered by a TLB anymore.
          If in doubt, say "N".
 
-config DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
-	bool "Strict copy size checks"
-	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && !TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING
-	---help---
-	  Enabling this option turns a certain set of sanity checks for user
-	  copy operations into compile time failures.
-
-	  The copy_from_user() etc checks are there to help test if there
-	  are sufficient security checks on the length argument of
-	  the copy operation, by having gcc prove that the argument is
-	  within bounds.
-
-	  If unsure, or if you run an older (pre 4.4) gcc, say N.
-
 endmenu
arch/s390/Kconfig +1 -0
index 4b50537..516621f 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ config S390
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_BH
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQ
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQRESTORE
+	select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
 	select ARCH_SAVE_PAGE_KEYS if HIBERNATION
 	select ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
 	select BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT
arch/s390/Kconfig.debug +0 -14
index fc32a2d..c56878e 100644
@@ -17,20 +17,6 @@ config STRICT_DEVMEM
 
 	  If you are unsure, say Y.
 
-config DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
-	def_bool n
-	prompt "Strict user copy size checks"
-	---help---
-	  Enabling this option turns a certain set of sanity checks for user
-	  copy operations into compile time warnings.
-
-	  The copy_from_user() etc checks are there to help test if there
-	  are sufficient security checks on the length argument of
-	  the copy operation, by having gcc prove that the argument is
-	  within bounds.
-
-	  If unsure, or if you run an older (pre 4.4) gcc, say N.
-
 config S390_PTDUMP
 	bool "Export kernel pagetable layout to userspace via debugfs"
 	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
arch/s390/lib/Makefile +0 -1
index 6ab0d0b..20b0e97 100644
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 #
 
 lib-y += delay.o string.o uaccess_std.o uaccess_pt.o
-obj-y += usercopy.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_32BIT) += div64.o qrnnd.o ucmpdi2.o mem32.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += mem64.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += uaccess_mvcos.o
arch/s390/lib/usercopy.c deleted +0 -8
deleted file mode 100644
index 14b363f..0000000
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/bug.h>
-
-void copy_from_user_overflow(void)
-{
-	WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_from_user_overflow);
arch/sparc/lib/Makefile +0 -1
index 8410065f2..dbe119b 100644
@@ -45,4 +45,3 @@ obj-y                 += iomap.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SPARC32) += atomic32.o ucmpdi2.o
 obj-y                 += ksyms.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SPARC64) += PeeCeeI.o
-obj-y                 += usercopy.o
arch/sparc/lib/usercopy.c deleted +0 -9
deleted file mode 100644
index 5c4284c..0000000
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/bug.h>
-
-void copy_from_user_overflow(void)
-{
-	WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_from_user_overflow);
arch/tile/Kconfig +1 -7
index 1404497..9d65a48 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ config TILE
 	select HAVE_SYSCALL_WRAPPERS if TILEGX
 	select HAVE_VIRT_TO_BUS
 	select SYS_HYPERVISOR
+	select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
 	select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
 	select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS
 	select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
@@ -117,13 +118,6 @@ config STRICT_DEVMEM
 config SMP
 	def_bool y
 
-# Allow checking for compile-time determined overflow errors in
-# copy_from_user().  There are still unprovable places in the
-# generic code as of 2.6.34, so this option is not really compatible
-# with -Werror, which is more useful in general.
-config DEBUG_COPY_FROM_USER
-	def_bool n
-
 config HVC_TILE
 	depends on TTY
 	select HVC_DRIVER
arch/tile/include/asm/uaccess.h +6 -1
index 9ab078a..8a082bc 100644
@@ -395,7 +395,12 @@ _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 	return n;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_COPY_FROM_USER
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+/*
+ * There are still unprovable places in the generic code as of 2.6.34, so this
+ * option is not really compatible with -Werror, which is more useful in
+ * general.
+ */
 extern void copy_from_user_overflow(void)
 	__compiletime_warning("copy_from_user() size is not provably correct");
 
arch/tile/lib/uaccess.c +0 -8
index f8d398c..030abe3 100644
@@ -22,11 +22,3 @@ int __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 		 is_arch_mappable_range(addr, size));
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__range_ok);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_COPY_FROM_USER
-void copy_from_user_overflow(void)
-{
-       WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_from_user_overflow);
-#endif
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
index a4f24f5..f045e0a 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ config X86_64
 ### Arch settings
 config X86
 	def_bool y
+	select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
 	select HAVE_AOUT if X86_32
 	select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING
arch/x86/Kconfig.debug +0 -14
index b322f12..dea0da5 100644
@@ -292,20 +292,6 @@ config OPTIMIZE_INLINING
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
-config DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
-	bool "Strict copy size checks"
-	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && !TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING
-	---help---
-	  Enabling this option turns a certain set of sanity checks for user
-	  copy operations into compile time failures.
-
-	  The copy_from_user() etc checks are there to help test if there
-	  are sufficient security checks on the length argument of
-	  the copy operation, by having gcc prove that the argument is
-	  within bounds.
-
-	  If unsure, or if you run an older (pre 4.4) gcc, say N.
-
 config DEBUG_NMI_SELFTEST
 	bool "NMI Selftest"
 	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && X86_LOCAL_APIC
arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c +0 -6
index f0312d7..3eb18ac 100644
@@ -689,9 +689,3 @@ _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 	return n;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(_copy_from_user);
-
-void copy_from_user_overflow(void)
-{
-	WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_from_user_overflow);
lib/Kconfig.debug +18 -0
index 28be08c..ae80518 100644
@@ -1292,6 +1292,24 @@ config LATENCYTOP
 	  Enable this option if you want to use the LatencyTOP tool
 	  to find out which userspace is blocking on what kernel operations.
 
+config ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	bool
+
+config DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	bool "Strict user copy size checks"
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && !TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING
+	help
+	  Enabling this option turns a certain set of sanity checks for user
+	  copy operations into compile time failures.
+
+	  The copy_from_user() etc checks are there to help test if there
+	  are sufficient security checks on the length argument of
+	  the copy operation, by having gcc prove that the argument is
+	  within bounds.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 source mm/Kconfig.debug
 source kernel/trace/Kconfig
 
lib/Makefile +1 -0
index 32f4455..59fabd0 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
 	 is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o kobject_uevent.o \
 	 earlycpio.o percpu-refcount.o
 
+lib-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS) += usercopy.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_MMU) += ioremap.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_SMP) += cpumask.o
 
lib/usercopy.c new file +9 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f5b1dd
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+void copy_from_user_overflow(void)
+{
+	WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_from_user_overflow);
Signature · 2 lines
The Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of the Code Aurora Forum,
hosted by The Linux Foundation
Acked-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Consolidate CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECK

Quoted 16 lines · Stephen Boyd
lib/Kconfig.debug +8 -0
index 28be08c..ae80518 100644
@@ -1292,6 +1292,24 @@ config LATENCYTOP
 	  Enable this option if you want to use the LatencyTOP tool
 	  to find out which userspace is blocking on what kernel operations.
 
+config ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	bool
+
+config DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	bool "Strict user copy size checks"
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && !TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING
+	help

lib/Kconfig.debug config LATENCYTOP · line 1312

Quoted 10 lines
lib/Kconfig.debug +10 -0
+	  Enabling this option turns a certain set of sanity checks for user
+	  copy operations into compile time failures.
+
+	  The copy_from_user() etc checks are there to help test if there
+	  are sufficient security checks on the length argument of
+	  the copy operation, by having gcc prove that the argument is
+	  within bounds.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+

Is there actually any architecture dependency left after this? I wonder if we actually need the ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS symbol, or could just show the DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS option on all architectures.

It's fine to do your patch as a first step though, which would not change the behavior.

lib/Makefile lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \ · line 21

Quoted 12 lines
lib/Makefile +1 -0
index 32f4455..59fabd0 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
 	 is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o kobject_uevent.o \
 	 earlycpio.o percpu-refcount.o
 
+lib-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS) += usercopy.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_MMU) += ioremap.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_SMP) += cpumask.o
 

I think this should instead be

+lib-$(DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS) += usercopy.o

No point building that file if we are not using it.

Other than that,

#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Consolidate CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECK

Quoted 32 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 16 lines · Stephen Boyd
lib/Kconfig.debug +8 -0
index 28be08c..ae80518 100644
@@ -1292,6 +1292,24 @@ config LATENCYTOP
 	  Enable this option if you want to use the LatencyTOP tool
 	  to find out which userspace is blocking on what kernel operations.
 
+config ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	bool
+
+config DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	bool "Strict user copy size checks"
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && !TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING
+	help

lib/Kconfig.debug config LATENCYTOP · line 1312

Quoted 10 lines
lib/Kconfig.debug +10 -0
+	  Enabling this option turns a certain set of sanity checks for user
+	  copy operations into compile time failures.
+
+	  The copy_from_user() etc checks are there to help test if there
+	  are sufficient security checks on the length argument of
+	  the copy operation, by having gcc prove that the argument is
+	  within bounds.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+

Is there actually any architecture dependency left after this? I wonder if we actually need the ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS symbol, or could just show the DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS option on all architectures.

Quoted 2 lines

It's fine to do your patch as a first step though, which would not change the behavior.

A lot of arches seem to not want to enable it because false positives are everywhere. It really depends on how good the compiler is at doing constant propagation and dead code removal.

Quoted 15 lines

lib/Makefile lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \ · line 21

Quoted 13 lines
lib/Makefile +1 -0
index 32f4455..59fabd0 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
 	 is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o kobject_uevent.o \
 	 earlycpio.o percpu-refcount.o
 
+lib-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS) += usercopy.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_MMU) += ioremap.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_SMP) += cpumask.o
 

I think this should instead be

Quoted 3 lines

+lib-$(DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS) += usercopy.o

No point building that file if we are not using it.

We still need it to link the kernel because the callers of the function don't have ifdefs. Also, all arches were doing an obj-y before, so this is equivalent.

Signature · 2 lines
Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum,
hosted by The Linux Foundation
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Consolidate CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECK

Quoted 33 lines · Stephen Boyd
Quoted 32 lines · Arnd Bergmann
Quoted 16 lines · Stephen Boyd
lib/Kconfig.debug +8 -0
index 28be08c..ae80518 100644
@@ -1292,6 +1292,24 @@ config LATENCYTOP
 	  Enable this option if you want to use the LatencyTOP tool
 	  to find out which userspace is blocking on what kernel operations.
 
+config ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	bool
+
+config DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	bool "Strict user copy size checks"
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && !TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING
+	help

lib/Kconfig.debug config LATENCYTOP · line 1312

Quoted 10 lines
lib/Kconfig.debug +10 -0
+	  Enabling this option turns a certain set of sanity checks for user
+	  copy operations into compile time failures.
+
+	  The copy_from_user() etc checks are there to help test if there
+	  are sufficient security checks on the length argument of
+	  the copy operation, by having gcc prove that the argument is
+	  within bounds.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+

Is there actually any architecture dependency left after this? I wonder if we actually need the ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS symbol, or could just show the DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS option on all architectures.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

It's fine to do your patch as a first step though, which would not change the behavior.

A lot of arches seem to not want to enable it because false positives are everywhere. It really depends on how good the compiler is at doing constant propagation and dead code removal.

Ok, I see. Of course they would not need to enable that option, but I guess if we know that enabling it doesn't work, there is no point in providing the option.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

lib/Kconfig.debug config LATENCYTOP · line 1315

Quoted 5 lines
lib/Kconfig.debug +1 -0
+lib-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS) += usercopy.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_MMU) += ioremap.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_SMP) += cpumask.o

I think this should instead be

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

+lib-$(DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS) += usercopy.o

No point building that file if we are not using it.

We still need it to link the kernel because the callers of the function don't have ifdefs. Also, all arches were doing an obj-y before, so this is equivalent.

Ok.

Arnd

#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Consolidate CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECK

In reply to Stephen Boyd
Quoted 8 lines · Stephen Boyd
Quoted 3 lines

It's fine to do your patch as a first step though, which would not change the behavior.

A lot of arches seem to not want to enable it because false positives are everywhere. It really depends on how good the compiler is at doing constant propagation and dead code removal.

Although some of the cases I have seen being flagged as "false positives" have been real bugs.

-hpa

maintainer Acked-by on v1 1/1
#12 lore raw
In reply to Stephen Boyd
Quoted 32 lines · Stephen Boyd

The help text for this config is duplicated across the x86, parisc, and s390 Kconfig.debug files. Arnd Bergman noted that the help text was slightly misleading and should be fixed to state that enabling this option isn't a problem when using pre 4.4 gcc.

To simplify the rewording, consolidate the text into lib/Kconfig.debug and modify it there to be more explicit about when you should say N to this config.

Also, make the text a bit more generic by stating that this option enables compile time checks so we can cover architectures which emit warnings vs. ones which emit errors. The details of how an architecture decided to implement the checks isn't as important as the concept of compile time checking of copy_from_user() calls.

While we're doing this, remove all the copy_from_user_overflow() code that's duplicated many times and place it into lib/ so that any architecture supporting this option can get the function for free.

Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Cc Helge Deller <[email protected]>
Cc Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]>
Cc Chris Metcalf <[email protected]>
Quoted 3 lines

---

Per Helge Deller prodding me, I'm resending just this patch.

Yes, I found it in kernel patchwork and I think it's a good cleanup. Tested OK on parisc:

Quoted 313 lines

https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/833182/

 arch/parisc/Kconfig             |  1 +
 arch/parisc/Kconfig.debug       | 14 --------------
 arch/s390/Kconfig               |  1 +
 arch/s390/Kconfig.debug         | 14 --------------
 arch/s390/lib/Makefile          |  1 -
 arch/s390/lib/usercopy.c        |  8 --------
 arch/sparc/lib/Makefile         |  1 -
 arch/sparc/lib/usercopy.c       |  9 ---------
 arch/tile/Kconfig               |  8 +-------
 arch/tile/include/asm/uaccess.h |  7 ++++++-
 arch/tile/lib/uaccess.c         |  8 --------
 arch/x86/Kconfig                |  1 +
 arch/x86/Kconfig.debug          | 14 --------------
 arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c      |  6 ------
 lib/Kconfig.debug               | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 lib/Makefile                    |  1 +
 lib/usercopy.c                  |  9 +++++++++
 17 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 arch/s390/lib/usercopy.c
 delete mode 100644 arch/sparc/lib/usercopy.c
 create mode 100644 lib/usercopy.c
arch/parisc/Kconfig +1 -0
index a2a47d9..96be92f 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 config PARISC
 	def_bool y
+	select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
 	select HAVE_IDE
 	select HAVE_OPROFILE
 	select HAVE_FUNCTION_TRACER if 64BIT
arch/parisc/Kconfig.debug +0 -14
index 7305ac8..bc989e5 100644
@@ -12,18 +12,4 @@ config DEBUG_RODATA
          portion of the kernel code won't be covered by a TLB anymore.
          If in doubt, say "N".
 
-config DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
-	bool "Strict copy size checks"
-	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && !TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING
-	---help---
-	  Enabling this option turns a certain set of sanity checks for user
-	  copy operations into compile time failures.
-
-	  The copy_from_user() etc checks are there to help test if there
-	  are sufficient security checks on the length argument of
-	  the copy operation, by having gcc prove that the argument is
-	  within bounds.
-
-	  If unsure, or if you run an older (pre 4.4) gcc, say N.
-
 endmenu
arch/s390/Kconfig +1 -0
index 4b50537..516621f 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ config S390
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_BH
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQ
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQRESTORE
+	select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
 	select ARCH_SAVE_PAGE_KEYS if HIBERNATION
 	select ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
 	select BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT
arch/s390/Kconfig.debug +0 -14
index fc32a2d..c56878e 100644
@@ -17,20 +17,6 @@ config STRICT_DEVMEM
 
 	  If you are unsure, say Y.
 
-config DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
-	def_bool n
-	prompt "Strict user copy size checks"
-	---help---
-	  Enabling this option turns a certain set of sanity checks for user
-	  copy operations into compile time warnings.
-
-	  The copy_from_user() etc checks are there to help test if there
-	  are sufficient security checks on the length argument of
-	  the copy operation, by having gcc prove that the argument is
-	  within bounds.
-
-	  If unsure, or if you run an older (pre 4.4) gcc, say N.
-
 config S390_PTDUMP
 	bool "Export kernel pagetable layout to userspace via debugfs"
 	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
arch/s390/lib/Makefile +0 -1
index 6ab0d0b..20b0e97 100644
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 #
 
 lib-y += delay.o string.o uaccess_std.o uaccess_pt.o
-obj-y += usercopy.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_32BIT) += div64.o qrnnd.o ucmpdi2.o mem32.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += mem64.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += uaccess_mvcos.o
arch/s390/lib/usercopy.c deleted +0 -8
deleted file mode 100644
index 14b363f..0000000
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/bug.h>
-
-void copy_from_user_overflow(void)
-{
-	WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_from_user_overflow);
arch/sparc/lib/Makefile +0 -1
index 8410065f2..dbe119b 100644
@@ -45,4 +45,3 @@ obj-y                 += iomap.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SPARC32) += atomic32.o ucmpdi2.o
 obj-y                 += ksyms.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SPARC64) += PeeCeeI.o
-obj-y                 += usercopy.o
arch/sparc/lib/usercopy.c deleted +0 -9
deleted file mode 100644
index 5c4284c..0000000
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/bug.h>
-
-void copy_from_user_overflow(void)
-{
-	WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_from_user_overflow);
arch/tile/Kconfig +1 -7
index 1404497..9d65a48 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ config TILE
 	select HAVE_SYSCALL_WRAPPERS if TILEGX
 	select HAVE_VIRT_TO_BUS
 	select SYS_HYPERVISOR
+	select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
 	select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
 	select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS
 	select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
@@ -117,13 +118,6 @@ config STRICT_DEVMEM
 config SMP
 	def_bool y
 
-# Allow checking for compile-time determined overflow errors in
-# copy_from_user().  There are still unprovable places in the
-# generic code as of 2.6.34, so this option is not really compatible
-# with -Werror, which is more useful in general.
-config DEBUG_COPY_FROM_USER
-	def_bool n
-
 config HVC_TILE
 	depends on TTY
 	select HVC_DRIVER
arch/tile/include/asm/uaccess.h +6 -1
index 9ab078a..8a082bc 100644
@@ -395,7 +395,12 @@ _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 	return n;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_COPY_FROM_USER
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+/*
+ * There are still unprovable places in the generic code as of 2.6.34, so this
+ * option is not really compatible with -Werror, which is more useful in
+ * general.
+ */
 extern void copy_from_user_overflow(void)
 	__compiletime_warning("copy_from_user() size is not provably correct");
 
arch/tile/lib/uaccess.c +0 -8
index f8d398c..030abe3 100644
@@ -22,11 +22,3 @@ int __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 		 is_arch_mappable_range(addr, size));
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__range_ok);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_COPY_FROM_USER
-void copy_from_user_overflow(void)
-{
-       WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_from_user_overflow);
-#endif
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
index a4f24f5..f045e0a 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ config X86_64
 ### Arch settings
 config X86
 	def_bool y
+	select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
 	select HAVE_AOUT if X86_32
 	select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING
arch/x86/Kconfig.debug +0 -14
index b322f12..dea0da5 100644
@@ -292,20 +292,6 @@ config OPTIMIZE_INLINING
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
-config DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
-	bool "Strict copy size checks"
-	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && !TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING
-	---help---
-	  Enabling this option turns a certain set of sanity checks for user
-	  copy operations into compile time failures.
-
-	  The copy_from_user() etc checks are there to help test if there
-	  are sufficient security checks on the length argument of
-	  the copy operation, by having gcc prove that the argument is
-	  within bounds.
-
-	  If unsure, or if you run an older (pre 4.4) gcc, say N.
-
 config DEBUG_NMI_SELFTEST
 	bool "NMI Selftest"
 	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && X86_LOCAL_APIC
arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c +0 -6
index f0312d7..3eb18ac 100644
@@ -689,9 +689,3 @@ _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 	return n;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(_copy_from_user);
-
-void copy_from_user_overflow(void)
-{
-	WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_from_user_overflow);
lib/Kconfig.debug +18 -0
index 28be08c..ae80518 100644
@@ -1292,6 +1292,24 @@ config LATENCYTOP
 	  Enable this option if you want to use the LatencyTOP tool
 	  to find out which userspace is blocking on what kernel operations.
 
+config ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	bool
+
+config DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	bool "Strict user copy size checks"
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS
+	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && !TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING
+	help
+	  Enabling this option turns a certain set of sanity checks for user
+	  copy operations into compile time failures.
+
+	  The copy_from_user() etc checks are there to help test if there
+	  are sufficient security checks on the length argument of
+	  the copy operation, by having gcc prove that the argument is
+	  within bounds.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 source mm/Kconfig.debug
 source kernel/trace/Kconfig
 
lib/Makefile +1 -0
index 32f4455..59fabd0 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
 	 is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o kobject_uevent.o \
 	 earlycpio.o percpu-refcount.o
 
+lib-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS) += usercopy.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_MMU) += ioremap.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_SMP) += cpumask.o
 
lib/usercopy.c new file +9 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f5b1dd
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+void copy_from_user_overflow(void)
+{
+	WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_from_user_overflow);
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Consolidate CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECK

In reply to H. Peter Anvin

Hi all,

Quoted 3 lines · On Wed, 27 Feb 2013 14:19:16 -0800 "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> wrote:

Although some of the cases I have seen being flagged as "false positives" have been real bugs.

[hijacking the thread :-)]

I have been getting this warning for a very long time ( which would be an error if CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECK was set):

i386 defconfig
i386-linux-gcc (GCC) 4.6.3

In file included from arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:537:0,

                 from include/linux/uaccess.h:5,
                 from include/linux/highmem.h:8,
                 from include/linux/pagemap.h:10,
                 from fs/binfmt_misc.c:27:

arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h: In function 'parse_command.part.2':
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: warning: call to 'copy_from_user_overflow' declared with attribute warning: copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct [enabled by default]

Signature · 2 lines
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell                    [email protected]
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Consolidate CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECK

In reply to H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 9 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Boyd
Quoted 2 lines

It's fine to do your patch as a first step though, which would not change the behavior.

A lot of arches seem to not want to enable it because false positives are everywhere. It really depends on how good the compiler is at doing constant propagation and dead code removal.

Although some of the cases I have seen being flagged as "false positives" have been real bugs.

There were so many false-positives on x86_64 that Andrew eventually dropped my patch to add support for this option to the copy_from_user() function there.

Signature · 2 lines
Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum,
hosted by The Linux Foundation
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Consolidate CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECK

In reply to Stephen Rothwell
Quoted 15 lines · Stephen Rothwell

Hi all,

Quoted 3 lines · On Wed, 27 Feb 2013 14:19:16 -0800 "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> wrote:

Although some of the cases I have seen being flagged as "false positives" have been real bugs.

[hijacking the thread :-)]

I have been getting this warning for a very long time ( which would be an error if CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECK was set):

i386 defconfig i386-linux-gcc (GCC) 4.6.3

Quoted 9 lines

In file included from arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:537:0, from include/linux/uaccess.h:5, from include/linux/highmem.h:8, from include/linux/pagemap.h:10, from fs/binfmt_misc.c:27:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h: In function 'parse_command.part.2': arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26:
warning: call to 'copy_from_user_overflow' declared with attribute
warning: copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct [enabled by default]

OK, that is surprising, because that copy is very clearly properly guarded:

static int parse_command(const char __user *buffer, size_t count)

{
	char s[4];

	if (!count)
		return 0;
	if (count > 3)
		return -EINVAL;
	if (copy_from_user(s, buffer, count))
		return -EFAULT;

It isn't possible for count to be anything other than 1, 2 or 3 there, and it is very surprising that gcc can't see it.

This might be worth filing a gcc bug for.

-hpa

#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Consolidate CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECK

In reply to Stephen Boyd
Quoted 8 lines · Stephen Boyd
Quoted 7 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Boyd
Quoted 2 lines

It's fine to do your patch as a first step though, which would not change the behavior.

A lot of arches seem to not want to enable it because false positives are everywhere. It really depends on how good the compiler is at doing constant propagation and dead code removal.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Although some of the cases I have seen being flagged as "false positives" have been real bugs.

There were so many false-positives on x86_64 that Andrew eventually dropped my patch to add support for this option to the copy_from_user() function there.

I would probably have taken it, especially if it came with more x86-64 to i386 unification.

It's an option, though.

-hpa

#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Consolidate CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECK

In reply to Stephen Rothwell
Quoted 15 lines · Stephen Rothwell

Hi all,

Quoted 3 lines · On Wed, 27 Feb 2013 14:19:16 -0800 "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> wrote:

Although some of the cases I have seen being flagged as "false positives" have been real bugs.

[hijacking the thread :-)]

I have been getting this warning for a very long time ( which would be an error if CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECK was set):

i386 defconfig
i386-linux-gcc (GCC) 4.6.3

Quoted 8 lines

In file included from arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:537:0,

                  from include/linux/uaccess.h:5,
                  from include/linux/highmem.h:8,
                  from include/linux/pagemap.h:10,
                  from fs/binfmt_misc.c:27:

arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h: In function 'parse_command.part.2':
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: warning: call to 'copy_from_user_overflow' declared with attribute warning: copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct [enabled by default]

http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=35392

the gcc folks finally fixed that one it seems

(but while there are some false positives, esp with older gcc, the majority were real originally.. just those all got fixed)

#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Consolidate CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECK

In reply to H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 11 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 10 lines · Stephen Boyd
Quoted 9 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Boyd
Quoted 2 lines

It's fine to do your patch as a first step though, which would not change the behavior.

A lot of arches seem to not want to enable it because false positives are everywhere. It really depends on how good the compiler is at doing constant propagation and dead code removal.

Although some of the cases I have seen being flagged as "false positives" have been real bugs.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

There were so many false-positives on x86_64 that Andrew eventually dropped my patch to add support for this option to the copy_from_user() function there.

I would probably have taken it, especially if it came with more x86-64 to i386 unification.

It's an option, though.

You acked the patch[1]. Will you pick it up?

[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/833192/

Signature · 2 lines
Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum,
hosted by The Linux Foundation
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH] Consolidate CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECK

Quoted 16 lines · Stephen Boyd
Quoted 15 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 14 lines · Stephen Boyd
Quoted 9 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Boyd
Quoted 2 lines

It's fine to do your patch as a first step though, which would not change the behavior.

A lot of arches seem to not want to enable it because false positives are everywhere. It really depends on how good the compiler is at doing constant propagation and dead code removal.

Although some of the cases I have seen being flagged as "false positives" have been real bugs.

There were so many false-positives on x86_64 that Andrew eventually dropped my patch to add support for this option to the copy_from_user() function there.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines

I would probably have taken it, especially if it came with more x86-64 to i386 unification.

It's an option, though.

You acked the patch[1]. Will you pick it up?

[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/833192/

I can, although I would prefer if it came with the uaccess/usercopy unification.

-hpa