Fix issue with newer glibc crypt() function

new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a24656
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+
+staring from glibc 2.17 the crypt() function will error out and return
+NULL if the seed or "correct" is invalid. The failure case for this is
+an unknown user which tinylogin assigns '!' for the password. crypt() 
+now expects a minimum of 2 valid characters. If we get a NULL return
+value from the crypt, assume we fail and return 0.
+
+Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [tinylogin depercated]
+Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <[email protected]>
+
+Index: tinylogin-1.4/libbb/correct_password.c
+===================================================================
+--- tinylogin-1.4.orig/libbb/correct_password.c
++++ tinylogin-1.4/libbb/correct_password.c
+@@ -74,5 +74,8 @@ int correct_password ( const struct pass
+ 	}
+ 	encrypted = crypt ( unencrypted, correct );
+ 	memset ( unencrypted, 0, xstrlen ( unencrypted ));
++        if ( !encrypted )
++		return 0;
++
+ 	return ( strcmp ( encrypted, correct ) == 0 ) ? 1 : 0;
+ }

index aaed92a..6e08011 100644
@@ -18,7 +18,9 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.angstrom-distribution.org/unstable/sources/tinylogin-${PV}
 	file://remove-index.patch \
 	file://use_O2_option.patch \
 	file://passwd_rotate_check.patch \
-	file://avoid_static.patch"
+	file://avoid_static.patch \
+        file://glibc_crypt_fix.patch \
+        "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "44da0ff2b727455669890b24305e351d"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5e542e4b7825305a3678bf73136c392feb0d44b8bbf926e8eda5453eea7ddd6b"

new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7cd45af
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+
+This patch is from Slackware, I tried to find the actual
+author to add that attribution.  The comment below is the
+best summary, I will not repeat it here.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport from slackware
+
+Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <[email protected]>
+
+Index: shadow-4.1.4.3/lib/encrypt.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.1.4.3.orig/lib/encrypt.c
++++ shadow-4.1.4.3/lib/encrypt.c
+@@ -45,15 +45,40 @@ char *pw_encrypt (const char *clear, con
+ 	static char cipher[128];
+ 	char *cp;
+ 
+-	cp = crypt (clear, salt);
+-	if (!cp) {
+-		/*
+-		 * Single Unix Spec: crypt() may return a null pointer,
+-		 * and set errno to indicate an error.  The caller doesn't
+-		 * expect us to return NULL, so...
+-		 */
+-		perror ("crypt");
+-		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++ 	cp = crypt (clear, salt);
++ 	if (!cp) {
++ 		/*
++		 * In glibc-2.17 and newer, crypt() will return NULL if
++		 * it was called using an invalid salt format.  Previous
++		 * versions of glibc would go ahead and compute a DES hash
++		 * using the invalid salt.  The salt value in this case was
++		 * always '!'.  We might arrive at this place if either the
++		 * user does not exist, or if the hash in /etc/shadow doesn't
++		 * have the proper magic for one of the supported hash
++		 * formats (for example, if the account was locked using
++		 * "passwd -l".  To handle this situation, we will recompute
++		 * the hash using a hardcoded salt as was previously done
++		 * by glibc.  The hash returned by the old glibc function
++		 * always began with "!!", which would ensure that it could
++		 * never match an otherwise valid hash in /etc/shadow that
++		 * was disabled with a "!" at the beginning (since the second
++		 * character would never be "!" as well), so we will also
++		 * prepend the resulting hash with "!!".  Finally, in case
++		 * crypt() failed for some other reason we will check to see
++		 * if we still get NULL from crypt even with the valid salt
++		 * and will fail if that's the case.
++ 		 */
++
++		/* Recalculate hash using a hardcoded, valid SHA512 salt: */
++		cp = crypt (clear, "$6$8IIcy/1EPOk/");
++
++		if (!cp) {
++			perror ("crypt");
++			exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++		} else {
++			sprintf (cipher, "!!%s", cp);
++			return cipher;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* The GNU crypt does not return NULL if the algorithm is not

index 8226a6e..caf24c0 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/releases/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://shadow-4.1.4.2-su_no_sanitize_env.patch \
            file://shadow-update-pam-conf.patch \
            file://shadow_fix_for_automake-1.12.patch \
+           file://slackware_fix_for_glib-2.17_crypt.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "b8608d8294ac88974f27b20f991c0e79"