x86_64: Add safe check in a.out loaders and some coding style
PATCH 2/2 x86_64: Add safe check in a.out loaders and some coding style
ia32_aout had no safe checks concerning the mmap and f_op in this module. It's not necessary to verify f_op in the load_aout_library, since the prior kernel_read/vfs_read function already does.
Coding style and printks fixes.
Tested using qemu, a handcrafted a.out binary and a a.out linked with a cross-compiled ld.
--- arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c +25 -26
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@#include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/init.h> -#include <linux/jiffies.h> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -271,10 +271,17 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) N_MAGIC(ex) != QMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != NMAGIC) ||N_TRSIZE (ex) ||N_DRSIZE (ex) ||i_size_read (file_inode (bprm->file)) < - ex.a_text+ex.a_data+N_SYMSIZE(ex)+N_TXTOFF(ex)) { + ex.a_text + ex.a_data + N_SYMSIZE(ex) + N_TXTOFF(ex)) { return -ENOEXEC; } +/* +* Requires a mmap handler. This prevents people from using a.out +* as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related vulnerabilities. +*/ +if (!bprm->file->f_op || !bprm->file->f_op->mmap) +return -ENOEXEC ; + fd_offset =N_TXTOFF (ex);/* Check initial limits. This avoids letting people circumvent
@@ -339,25 +346,16 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } }else {#ifdef WARN_OLD -static unsigned long error_time, error_time2;if ((ex.a_text &0xfff || ex.a_data &0xfff ) && - (N_MAGIC (ex) !=NMAGIC ) && -time_after (jiffies, error_time2 +5 *HZ )) { -printk (KERN_NOTICE "executable not page aligned\n" ); - error_time2 = jiffies; - } + (N_MAGIC (ex) !=NMAGIC )) +pr_notice_ratelimited ("executable not page aligned\n" ); -if ((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK ) !=0 && -time_after (jiffies, error_time +5 *HZ )) { -printk (KERN_WARNING -"fd_offset is not page aligned. Please convert " -"program: %s\n" , - bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name); - error_time = jiffies; - } +if ((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK ) !=0 ) +pr_warn_ratelimited ("fd_offset is not page aligned. Please convert program: %s\n" , + bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name);#endif -if (!bprm->file->f_op->mmap || (fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK ) !=0 ) { +if ((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK ) !=0 ) {vm_brk (N_TXTADDR (ex), ex.a_text+ex.a_data);read_code (bprm->file,N_TXTADDR (ex), fd_offset, ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
@@ -424,10 +422,17 @@ static int load_aout_library(struct file *file)if ((N_MAGIC (ex) !=ZMAGIC &&N_MAGIC (ex) !=QMAGIC ) ||N_TRSIZE (ex) ||N_DRSIZE (ex) || ((ex.a_entry &0xfff ) &&N_MAGIC (ex) ==ZMAGIC ) ||i_size_read (file_inode (file)) < - ex.a_text+ex.a_data+N_SYMSIZE (ex)+N_TXTOFF (ex)) { + ex.a_text + ex.a_data +N_SYMSIZE (ex) +N_TXTOFF (ex)) { goto out; } +/* +* Requires a mmap handler. This prevents people from using a.out +* as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related vulnerabilities. +*/ +if (!file->f_op->mmap) + goto out; +if (N_FLAGS (ex)) goto out;
@@ -438,14 +443,8 @@ static int load_aout_library(struct file *file)if ((N_TXTOFF (ex) & ~PAGE_MASK ) !=0 ) {#ifdef WARN_OLD -static unsigned long error_time; -if (time_after (jiffies, error_time +5 *HZ )) { -printk (KERN_WARNING -"N_TXTOFF is not page aligned. Please convert " -"library: %s\n" , - file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name); - error_time = jiffies; - } +pr_warn_ratelimited ("N_TXTOFF is not page aligned. Please convert library: %s\n" , + file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name);#endif vm_brk (start_addr, ex.a_text + ex.a_data + ex.a_bss);
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4
Now it's ok.
Geyslan Gregório Bem
hackingbits.com
2013/9/18 Geyslan G. Bem <[email protected]>:
Quoted 116 lines
ia32_aouthad no safe checks concerning the mmap andf_opin this module. It's not necessary to verifyf_opin theload_aout_library, since the prior kernel_read/vfs_read function already does.
Coding style and printks fixes.Tested using qemu, a handcrafted a.out binary and a a.out linked with a cross-compiled ld.
Signed-off-by Geyslan G. Bem <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c +25
-27@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@#include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/init.h> -#include <linux/jiffies.h> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/pgalloc.h> @@ -271,10 +271,17 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) N_MAGIC(ex) != QMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != NMAGIC) ||N_TRSIZE (ex) ||N_DRSIZE (ex) ||i_size_read (file_inode (bprm->file)) < - ex.a_text+ex.a_data+N_SYMSIZE(ex)+N_TXTOFF(ex)) { + ex.a_text + ex.a_data + N_SYMSIZE(ex) + N_TXTOFF(ex)) { return -ENOEXEC; } +/* +* Requires a mmap handler. This prevents people from using a.out +* as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related vulnerabilities. +*/ +if (!bprm->file->f_op || !bprm->file->f_op->mmap) +return -ENOEXEC ; + fd_offset =N_TXTOFF (ex);/* Check initial limits. This avoids letting people circumvent @@ -339,25 +346,16 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } }else {#ifdef WARN_OLD -static unsigned long error_time, error_time2;if ((ex.a_text &0xfff || ex.a_data &0xfff ) && - (N_MAGIC (ex) !=NMAGIC ) && -time_after (jiffies, error_time2 +5 *HZ )) { -printk (KERN_NOTICE "executable not page aligned\n" ); - error_time2 = jiffies; - } + (N_MAGIC (ex) !=NMAGIC )) +pr_notice_ratelimited ("executable not page aligned\n" ); -if ((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK ) !=0 && -time_after (jiffies, error_time +5 *HZ )) { -printk (KERN_WARNING -"fd_offset is not page aligned. Please convert " -"program: %s\n" , - bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name); - error_time = jiffies; - } +if ((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK ) !=0 ) +pr_warn_ratelimited ("fd_offset is not page aligned. Please convert program: %s\n" , + bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name);#endif -if (!bprm->file->f_op->mmap || (fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK ) !=0 ) { +if ((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK ) !=0 ) {vm_brk (N_TXTADDR (ex), ex.a_text+ex.a_data);read_code (bprm->file,N_TXTADDR (ex), fd_offset, ex.a_text+ex.a_data);@@ -424,10 +422,17 @@ static int load_aout_library(struct file *file)if ((N_MAGIC (ex) !=ZMAGIC &&N_MAGIC (ex) !=QMAGIC ) ||N_TRSIZE (ex) ||N_DRSIZE (ex) || ((ex.a_entry &0xfff ) &&N_MAGIC (ex) ==ZMAGIC ) ||i_size_read (file_inode (file)) < - ex.a_text+ex.a_data+N_SYMSIZE (ex)+N_TXTOFF (ex)) { + ex.a_text + ex.a_data +N_SYMSIZE (ex) +N_TXTOFF (ex)) { goto out; } +/* +* Requires a mmap handler. This prevents people from using a.out +* as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related vulnerabilities. +*/ +if (!file->f_op->mmap) + goto out; +if (N_FLAGS (ex)) goto out;@@ -438,14 +443,8 @@ static int load_aout_library(struct file *file)if ((N_TXTOFF (ex) & ~PAGE_MASK ) !=0 ) {#ifdef WARN_OLD -static unsigned long error_time; -if (time_after (jiffies, error_time +5 *HZ )) { -printk (KERN_WARNING -"N_TXTOFF is not page aligned. Please convert " -"library: %s\n" , - file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name); - error_time = jiffies; - } +pr_warn_ratelimited ("N_TXTOFF is not page aligned. Please convert library: %s\n" , + file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name);#endif vm_brk (start_addr, ex.a_text + ex.a_data + ex.a_bss); --1.8.4