x86,xen: remove _PAGE_IOMAP PTE flag
Subsystems (4)
cover x86,xen: remove _PAGE_IOMAP PTE flag
The series removes the Xen-specific _PAGE_IOMAP PTE flag, freeing it up for other uses.
I plan to queue this for 3.18 via the Xen tree.
This was previously posted as part of a larger series (x86/xen: fixes for mapping high MMIO regions (and remove _PAGE_IOMAP)), the bulk of which is already merged.
Changes in v1 (from v6 of the previous series):
- Improve comments/description of the spurious fault fix.
David
PATCH 1/3 x86: skip check for spurious faults for non-present faults
If a fault on a kernel address is due to a non-present page, then it cannot be the result of stale TLB entry from a protection change (RO to RW or NX to X). Thus the pagetable walk in spurious_fault() can be skipped.
See the initial if in spurious_fault() and the tests in spurious_fault_check()) for the set of possible error codes checked for spurious faults. These are:
IRUWP
Before x00xx && ( 1xxxx || xxx1x )
After ( 10001 || 00011 ) && ( 1xxxx || xxx1x )
Thus the new condition is a subset of the previous one, excluding only non-present faults (I == 1 and W == 1 are mutually exclusive).
This avoids spurious_fault() oopsing in some cases if the pagetables it attempts to walk are not accessible. This obscures the location of the original fault.
This also fixes a crash with Xen PV guests when they access entries in the M2P corresponding to device MMIO regions. The M2P is mapped (read-only) by Xen into the kernel address space of the guest and this mapping may contains holes for non-RAM regions. Read faults will result in calls to spurious_fault(), but because the page tables for the M2P mappings are not accessible by the guest the pagetable walk would fault.
This was not normally a problem as MMIO mappings would not normally result in a M2P lookup because of the use of the _PAGE_IOMAP bit the PTE. However, removing the _PAGE_IOMAP bit requires M2P lookups for MMIO mappings as well.
--- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +20 -2
@@ -933,8 +933,17 @@ static int spurious_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte)* cross-processor TLB flush, even if no stale TLB entries exist * on other processors. * +* Spurious faults may only occur if the TLB contains an entry with +* fewer permission than the page table entry. Non-present (P = 0) +* and reserved bit (R = 1) faults are never spurious. +* * There are no security implications to leaving a stale TLB when * increasing the permissions on a page. +* +* Returns non-zero if a spurious fault was handled, zero otherwise. +* +* See Intel Developer's Manual Vol 3 Section 4.10.4.3, bullet 3 +* (Optional Invalidation). */ static noinline intspurious_fault (unsigned long error_code,unsigned long address)
@@ -945,8 +954,17 @@ spurious_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)pte_t *pte;int ret; -/* Reserved-bit violation or user access to kernel space? */ -if (error_code & (PF_USER |PF_RSVD )) +/* +* Only writes to RO or instruction fetches from NX may cause +* spurious faults. +* +* These could be from user or supervisor accesses but the TLB +* is only lazily flushed after a kernel mapping protection +* change, so user accesses are not expected to cause spurious +* faults. +*/ +if (error_code != (PF_WRITE |PF_PROT ) + && error_code != (PF_INSTR |PF_PROT ))return 0 ; pgd = init_mm.pgd +pgd_index (address);
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
PATCH 1/3 x86: skip check for spurious faults for non-present faults
In reply to David VrabelIf a fault on a kernel address is due to a non-present page, then it cannot be the result of stale TLB entry from a protection change (RO to RW or NX to X). Thus the pagetable walk in spurious_fault() can be skipped.
See the initial if in spurious_fault() and the tests in spurious_fault_check()) for the set of possible error codes checked for spurious faults. These are:
IRUWP
Before x00xx && ( 1xxxx || xxx1x )
After ( 10001 || 00011 ) && ( 1xxxx || xxx1x )
Thus the new condition is a subset of the previous one, excluding only non-present faults (I == 1 and W == 1 are mutually exclusive).
This avoids spurious_fault() oopsing in some cases if the pagetables it attempts to walk are not accessible. This obscures the location of the original fault.
This also fixes a crash with Xen PV guests when they access entries in the M2P corresponding to device MMIO regions. The M2P is mapped (read-only) by Xen into the kernel address space of the guest and this mapping may contains holes for non-RAM regions. Read faults will result in calls to spurious_fault(), but because the page tables for the M2P mappings are not accessible by the guest the pagetable walk would fault.
This was not normally a problem as MMIO mappings would not normally result in a M2P lookup because of the use of the _PAGE_IOMAP bit the PTE. However, removing the _PAGE_IOMAP bit requires M2P lookups for MMIO mappings as well.
--- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +20 -2
@@ -933,8 +933,17 @@ static int spurious_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte)* cross-processor TLB flush, even if no stale TLB entries exist * on other processors. * +* Spurious faults may only occur if the TLB contains an entry with +* fewer permission than the page table entry. Non-present (P = 0) +* and reserved bit (R = 1) faults are never spurious. +* * There are no security implications to leaving a stale TLB when * increasing the permissions on a page. +* +* Returns non-zero if a spurious fault was handled, zero otherwise. +* +* See Intel Developer's Manual Vol 3 Section 4.10.4.3, bullet 3 +* (Optional Invalidation). */ static noinline intspurious_fault (unsigned long error_code,unsigned long address)
@@ -945,8 +954,17 @@ spurious_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)pte_t *pte;int ret; -/* Reserved-bit violation or user access to kernel space? */ -if (error_code & (PF_USER |PF_RSVD )) +/* +* Only writes to RO or instruction fetches from NX may cause +* spurious faults. +* +* These could be from user or supervisor accesses but the TLB +* is only lazily flushed after a kernel mapping protection +* change, so user accesses are not expected to cause spurious +* faults. +*/ +if (error_code != (PF_WRITE |PF_PROT ) + && error_code != (PF_INSTR |PF_PROT ))return 0 ; pgd = init_mm.pgd +pgd_index (address);
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
PATCH 2/3 x86/xen: do not use _PAGE_IOMAP PTE flag for I/O mappings
In reply to David VrabelSince mfn_to_pfn() returns the correct PFN for identity mappings (as used for MMIO regions), the use of _PAGE_IOMAP is not required in pte_mfn_to_pfn().
Do not set the _PAGE_IOMAP flag in pte_pfn_to_mfn() and do not use it in pte_mfn_to_pfn().
This will allow _PAGE_IOMAP to be removed, making it available for future use.
--- arch/x86/xen/mmu.c | 48 ++++-------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
arch/x86/xen/mmu.c +4 -44
@@ -399,38 +399,14 @@ static pteval_t pte_pfn_to_mfn(pteval_t val)if (unlikely (mfn ==INVALID_P2M_ENTRY )) { mfn =0 ; flags =0 ; - }else { -/* -* Paramount to do this test _after_ the -* INVALID_P2M_ENTRY as INVALID_P2M_ENTRY & -* IDENTITY_FRAME_BIT resolves to true. -*/ - mfn &= ~FOREIGN_FRAME_BIT ; -if (mfn &IDENTITY_FRAME_BIT ) { - mfn &= ~IDENTITY_FRAME_BIT ; - flags |= _PAGE_IOMAP; - } - } + }else + mfn &= ~(FOREIGN_FRAME_BIT |IDENTITY_FRAME_BIT ); val = ((pteval_t )mfn <<PAGE_SHIFT ) | flags; }return val; } -static pteval_t iomap_pte (pteval_t val) -{ -if (val & _PAGE_PRESENT) { -unsigned long pfn = (val &PTE_PFN_MASK ) >>PAGE_SHIFT ; -pteval_t flags = val &PTE_FLAGS_MASK ; - -/* We assume the pte frame number is a MFN, so -just use it as-is. */ - val = ((pteval_t )pfn <<PAGE_SHIFT ) | flags; - } - -return val; -} - __visible pteval_t xen_pte_val(pte_t pte) {pteval_t pteval = pte.pte;
@@ -441,9 +417,6 @@ __visible pteval_t xen_pte_val(pte_t pte) pteval = (pteval & ~_PAGE_PAT) | _PAGE_PWT; }#endif -if (xen_initial_domain () && (pteval & _PAGE_IOMAP)) -return pteval; -return pte_mfn_to_pfn (pteval); }PV_CALLEE_SAVE_REGS_THUNK (xen_pte_val);
@@ -481,7 +454,6 @@ void xen_set_pat(u64 pat) __visible pte_t xen_make_pte(pteval_t pte) { -phys_addr_t addr = (pte &PTE_PFN_MASK );#if 0 /* If Linux is trying to set a WC pte, then map to the Xen WC. * If _PAGE_PAT is set, then it probably means it is really
@@ -496,19 +468,7 @@ __visible pte_t xen_make_pte(pteval_t pte) pte = (pte & ~(_PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT)) | _PAGE_PAT; }#endif -/* -* Unprivileged domains are allowed to do IOMAPpings for -* PCI passthrough, but not map ISA space. The ISA -* mappings are just dummy local mappings to keep other -* parts of the kernel happy. -*/ -if (unlikely (pte & _PAGE_IOMAP) && - (xen_initial_domain () || addr >=ISA_END_ADDRESS )) { - pte =iomap_pte (pte); - }else { - pte &= ~_PAGE_IOMAP; - pte =pte_pfn_to_mfn (pte); - } + pte =pte_pfn_to_mfn (pte);return native_make_pte (pte); }
@@ -2094,7 +2054,7 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)default :/* By default, set_fixmap is used for hardware mappings */ - pte =mfn_pte (phys,__pgprot (pgprot_val (prot) | _PAGE_IOMAP)); + pte =mfn_pte (phys, prot);break ; }
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
PATCH 2/3 x86/xen: do not use _PAGE_IOMAP PTE flag for I/O mappings
In reply to David VrabelSince mfn_to_pfn() returns the correct PFN for identity mappings (as used for MMIO regions), the use of _PAGE_IOMAP is not required in pte_mfn_to_pfn().
Do not set the _PAGE_IOMAP flag in pte_pfn_to_mfn() and do not use it in pte_mfn_to_pfn().
This will allow _PAGE_IOMAP to be removed, making it available for future use.
--- arch/x86/xen/mmu.c | 48 ++++-------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
arch/x86/xen/mmu.c +4 -44
@@ -399,38 +399,14 @@ static pteval_t pte_pfn_to_mfn(pteval_t val)if (unlikely (mfn ==INVALID_P2M_ENTRY )) { mfn =0 ; flags =0 ; - }else { -/* -* Paramount to do this test _after_ the -* INVALID_P2M_ENTRY as INVALID_P2M_ENTRY & -* IDENTITY_FRAME_BIT resolves to true. -*/ - mfn &= ~FOREIGN_FRAME_BIT ; -if (mfn &IDENTITY_FRAME_BIT ) { - mfn &= ~IDENTITY_FRAME_BIT ; - flags |= _PAGE_IOMAP; - } - } + }else + mfn &= ~(FOREIGN_FRAME_BIT |IDENTITY_FRAME_BIT ); val = ((pteval_t )mfn <<PAGE_SHIFT ) | flags; }return val; } -static pteval_t iomap_pte (pteval_t val) -{ -if (val & _PAGE_PRESENT) { -unsigned long pfn = (val &PTE_PFN_MASK ) >>PAGE_SHIFT ; -pteval_t flags = val &PTE_FLAGS_MASK ; - -/* We assume the pte frame number is a MFN, so -just use it as-is. */ - val = ((pteval_t )pfn <<PAGE_SHIFT ) | flags; - } - -return val; -} - __visible pteval_t xen_pte_val(pte_t pte) {pteval_t pteval = pte.pte;
@@ -441,9 +417,6 @@ __visible pteval_t xen_pte_val(pte_t pte) pteval = (pteval & ~_PAGE_PAT) | _PAGE_PWT; }#endif -if (xen_initial_domain () && (pteval & _PAGE_IOMAP)) -return pteval; -return pte_mfn_to_pfn (pteval); }PV_CALLEE_SAVE_REGS_THUNK (xen_pte_val);
@@ -481,7 +454,6 @@ void xen_set_pat(u64 pat) __visible pte_t xen_make_pte(pteval_t pte) { -phys_addr_t addr = (pte &PTE_PFN_MASK );#if 0 /* If Linux is trying to set a WC pte, then map to the Xen WC. * If _PAGE_PAT is set, then it probably means it is really
@@ -496,19 +468,7 @@ __visible pte_t xen_make_pte(pteval_t pte) pte = (pte & ~(_PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT)) | _PAGE_PAT; }#endif -/* -* Unprivileged domains are allowed to do IOMAPpings for -* PCI passthrough, but not map ISA space. The ISA -* mappings are just dummy local mappings to keep other -* parts of the kernel happy. -*/ -if (unlikely (pte & _PAGE_IOMAP) && - (xen_initial_domain () || addr >=ISA_END_ADDRESS )) { - pte =iomap_pte (pte); - }else { - pte &= ~_PAGE_IOMAP; - pte =pte_pfn_to_mfn (pte); - } + pte =pte_pfn_to_mfn (pte);return native_make_pte (pte); }
@@ -2094,7 +2054,7 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)default :/* By default, set_fixmap is used for hardware mappings */ - pte =mfn_pte (phys,__pgprot (pgprot_val (prot) | _PAGE_IOMAP)); + pte =mfn_pte (phys, prot);break ; }
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
PATCH 3/3 x86: remove the Xen-specific _PAGE_IOMAP PTE flag
In reply to David VrabelThe _PAGE_IO_MAP PTE flag was only used by Xen PV guests to mark PTEs that were used to map I/O regions that are 1:1 in the p2m. This allowed Xen to obtain the correct PFN when converting the MFNs read from a PTE back to their PFN.
Xen guests no longer use _PAGE_IOMAP for this. Instead mfn_to_pfn() returns the correct PFN by using a combination of the m2p and p2m to determine if an MFN corresponds to a 1:1 mapping in the the p2m.
Remove _PAGE_IOMAP, replacing it with _PAGE_UNUSED2 to allow for future uses of the PTE flag.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 11 +++++------ arch/x86/mm/init_32.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/pci/i386.c | 2 -- arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c | 2 -- 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +5 -6
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@#define _PAGE_BIT_SPECIAL _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW1#define _PAGE_BIT_CPA_TEST _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW1#define _PAGE_BIT_SPLITTING _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2/* only valid on a PSE pmd */ -#define _PAGE_BIT_IOMAP _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2/* flag used to indicate IO mapping */ #define _PAGE_BIT_HIDDEN _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3/* hidden by kmemcheck */ #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3/* software dirty tracking */ #define _PAGE_BIT_NX 63/* No execute: only valid after cpuid check */
@@ -52,7 +51,7 @@#define _PAGE_PSE (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PSE)#define _PAGE_GLOBAL (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL)#define _PAGE_SOFTW1 (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW1) -#define _PAGE_IOMAP (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_IOMAP) +#define _PAGE_SOFTW2 (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2)#define _PAGE_PAT (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PAT)#define _PAGE_PAT_LARGE (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PAT_LARGE)#define _PAGE_SPECIAL (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SPECIAL)
@@ -168,10 +167,10 @@#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_NOCACHE (__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_CACHE_UC | _PAGE_PSE)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC (__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC | _PAGE_PSE) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO (__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_IOMAP) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE (__PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE | _PAGE_IOMAP) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_UC_MINUS (__PAGE_KERNEL_UC_MINUS | _PAGE_IOMAP) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_WC (__PAGE_KERNEL_WC | _PAGE_IOMAP) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO (__PAGE_KERNEL) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE (__PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_UC_MINUS (__PAGE_KERNEL_UC_MINUS) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_WC (__PAGE_KERNEL_WC)#define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL)#define PAGE_KERNEL_RO __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_RO)
arch/x86/mm/init_32.c +1 -1
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static void __init pagetable_init(void)permanent_kmaps_init (pgd_base); } -pteval_t __supported_pte_mask__read_mostly = ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL | _PAGE_IOMAP); +pteval_t __supported_pte_mask__read_mostly = ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL);EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__supported_pte_mask);/* user-defined highmem size */
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c +1 -1
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ early_param("gbpages", parse_direct_gbpages_on);* around without checking the pgd every time. */ -pteval_t __supported_pte_mask__read_mostly = ~_PAGE_IOMAP; +pteval_t __supported_pte_mask__read_mostly = ~0 ;EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__supported_pte_mask);int force_personality32;
arch/x86/pci/i386.c +0 -2
@@ -442,8 +442,6 @@ int pci_mmap_page_range(struct pci_dev *dev, struct vm_area_struct *vma,*/ prot |= _PAGE_CACHE_UC_MINUS; - prot |= _PAGE_IOMAP;/* creating a mapping for IO */ - vma->vm_page_prot =__pgprot (prot); if (io_remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_pgoff,
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c +0 -2
@@ -1559,8 +1559,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_start_kernel(void)#endif __supported_pte_mask &= ~(_PAGE_PWT | _PAGE_PCD); - __supported_pte_mask |= _PAGE_IOMAP; -/* * Prevent page tables from being allocated in highmem, even * if CONFIG_HIGHPTE is enabled.
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
PATCH 3/3 x86: remove the Xen-specific _PAGE_IOMAP PTE flag
In reply to David VrabelThe _PAGE_IO_MAP PTE flag was only used by Xen PV guests to mark PTEs that were used to map I/O regions that are 1:1 in the p2m. This allowed Xen to obtain the correct PFN when converting the MFNs read from a PTE back to their PFN.
Xen guests no longer use _PAGE_IOMAP for this. Instead mfn_to_pfn() returns the correct PFN by using a combination of the m2p and p2m to determine if an MFN corresponds to a 1:1 mapping in the the p2m.
Remove _PAGE_IOMAP, replacing it with _PAGE_UNUSED2 to allow for future uses of the PTE flag.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 11 +++++------ arch/x86/mm/init_32.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/pci/i386.c | 2 -- arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c | 2 -- 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +5 -6
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@#define _PAGE_BIT_SPECIAL _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW1#define _PAGE_BIT_CPA_TEST _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW1#define _PAGE_BIT_SPLITTING _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2/* only valid on a PSE pmd */ -#define _PAGE_BIT_IOMAP _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2/* flag used to indicate IO mapping */ #define _PAGE_BIT_HIDDEN _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3/* hidden by kmemcheck */ #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3/* software dirty tracking */ #define _PAGE_BIT_NX 63/* No execute: only valid after cpuid check */
@@ -52,7 +51,7 @@#define _PAGE_PSE (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PSE)#define _PAGE_GLOBAL (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL)#define _PAGE_SOFTW1 (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW1) -#define _PAGE_IOMAP (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_IOMAP) +#define _PAGE_SOFTW2 (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2)#define _PAGE_PAT (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PAT)#define _PAGE_PAT_LARGE (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PAT_LARGE)#define _PAGE_SPECIAL (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SPECIAL)
@@ -168,10 +167,10 @@#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_NOCACHE (__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_CACHE_UC | _PAGE_PSE)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC (__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC | _PAGE_PSE) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO (__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_IOMAP) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE (__PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE | _PAGE_IOMAP) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_UC_MINUS (__PAGE_KERNEL_UC_MINUS | _PAGE_IOMAP) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_WC (__PAGE_KERNEL_WC | _PAGE_IOMAP) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO (__PAGE_KERNEL) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE (__PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_UC_MINUS (__PAGE_KERNEL_UC_MINUS) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_WC (__PAGE_KERNEL_WC)#define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL)#define PAGE_KERNEL_RO __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_RO)
arch/x86/mm/init_32.c +1 -1
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static void __init pagetable_init(void)permanent_kmaps_init (pgd_base); } -pteval_t __supported_pte_mask__read_mostly = ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL | _PAGE_IOMAP); +pteval_t __supported_pte_mask__read_mostly = ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL);EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__supported_pte_mask);/* user-defined highmem size */
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c +1 -1
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ early_param("gbpages", parse_direct_gbpages_on);* around without checking the pgd every time. */ -pteval_t __supported_pte_mask__read_mostly = ~_PAGE_IOMAP; +pteval_t __supported_pte_mask__read_mostly = ~0 ;EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__supported_pte_mask);int force_personality32;
arch/x86/pci/i386.c +0 -2
@@ -442,8 +442,6 @@ int pci_mmap_page_range(struct pci_dev *dev, struct vm_area_struct *vma,*/ prot |= _PAGE_CACHE_UC_MINUS; - prot |= _PAGE_IOMAP;/* creating a mapping for IO */ - vma->vm_page_prot =__pgprot (prot); if (io_remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_pgoff,
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c +0 -2
@@ -1559,8 +1559,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_start_kernel(void)#endif __supported_pte_mask &= ~(_PAGE_PWT | _PAGE_PCD); - __supported_pte_mask |= _PAGE_IOMAP; -/* * Prevent page tables from being allocated in highmem, even * if CONFIG_HIGHPTE is enabled.
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4