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selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix

PATCH In review Andreas Gruenbacher 3 participants 3 messages Jan 5, 2016 – Jan 8, 2016 SELinux security module

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix

Commit 5d226df4 has introduced a performance regression of about 10% in the UnixBench pipe benchmark. It turns out that the call to inode_security in selinux_file_permission can be moved below the zero-mask test and that inode_security_revalidate can be removed entirely, which brings us back to roughly the original performance.

---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 ++--------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +2 -8
index 40e071a..f8110cf 100644
@@ -273,11 +273,6 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	__inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
-}
-
 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	return inode->i_security;
@@ -3277,19 +3272,19 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	if (!mask)
 		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
 		return 0;
 
+	isec = inode_security(inode);
 	if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
 	    fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
 		/* No change since file_open check. */
 		return 0;
 
-	inode_security_revalidate(inode);
 	return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
 }
 
@@ -3595,7 +3590,6 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 	 * new inode label or new policy.
 	 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
 	 */
-	inode_security_revalidate(file_inode(file));
 	return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.7.0
Acked-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Andreas Gruenbacher

Commit 5d226df4 has introduced a performance regression of about 10% in the UnixBench pipe benchmark. It turns out that the call to inode_security in selinux_file_permission can be moved below the zero-mask test and that inode_security_revalidate can be removed entirely, which brings us back to roughly the original performance.

Quoted 51 lines
---
  security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 ++--------
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +2 -8
index 40e071a..f8110cf 100644
@@ -273,11 +273,6 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
  	return 0;
  }
 
-static void inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	__inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
-}
-
  static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
  {
  	return inode->i_security;
@@ -3277,19 +3272,19 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
  {
  	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
  	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
  	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
  	if (!mask)
  		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
  		return 0;
 
+	isec = inode_security(inode);
  	if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
  	    fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
  		/* No change since file_open check. */
  		return 0;
 
-	inode_security_revalidate(inode);
  	return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
  }
 
@@ -3595,7 +3590,6 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
  	 * new inode label or new policy.
  	 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
  	 */
-	inode_security_revalidate(file_inode(file));
  	return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
  }
 
maintainer
#2 lore raw
In reply to Andreas Gruenbacher
Quoted 11 lines · Andreas Gruenbacher

Commit 5d226df4 has introduced a performance regression of about 10% in the UnixBench pipe benchmark. It turns out that the call to inode_security in selinux_file_permission can be moved below the zero-mask test and that inode_security_revalidate can be removed entirely, which brings us back to roughly the original performance.

---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 ++--------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

Applied to selinux#stable-4.5, thank you. As soon as I can get a kernel built and tested I'll send this up to James.

Quoted 45 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +2 -7
index 40e071a..f8110cf 100644
@@ -273,11 +273,6 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode
 *inode, return 0;
 }
 
-static void inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	__inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
-}
-
 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode
 *inode) {
 	return inode->i_security;
@@ -3277,19 +3272,19 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
 *file, int mask) {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	if (!mask)
 		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
 		return 0;
 
+	isec = inode_security(inode);
 	if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
 	    fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
 		/* No change since file_open check. */
 		return 0;
 
-	inode_security_revalidate(inode);
 	return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
 }
 
@@ -3595,7 +3590,6 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const

struct cred *cred) * new inode label or new policy.

security/selinux/hooks.c +0 -1
 	 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
 	 */
-	inode_security_revalidate(file_inode(file));
 	return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
 }
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com