vsprintf: kptr_restrict is okay in IRQ when 2
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 vsprintf: kptr_restrict is okay in IRQ when 2
The kptr_restrict flag, when set to 1, only prints the kernel address when the user has CAP_SYSLOG. When it is set to 2, the kernel address is always printed as zero. When set to 1, this needs to check whether or not we're in IRQ. However, when set to 2, this check is unneccessary, and produces confusing results in dmesg. Thus, only make sure we're not in IRQ when mode 1 is used, but not mode 2.
--- lib/vsprintf.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
lib/vsprintf.c +2 -2
@@ -1609,8 +1609,8 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,* %pK cannot be used in IRQ context because its test * for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. */ -if (kptr_restrict && (in_irq () ||in_serving_softirq () || -in_nmi ())) { +if (kptr_restrict ==1 && (in_irq () ||in_serving_softirq () || +in_nmi ())) {if (spec.field_width ==-1 ) spec.field_width = default_width;return string (buf, end,"pK-error" , spec);
Signature · 1 line
2.7.0
Quoted 7 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
The
kptr_restrictflag, when set to 1, only prints the kernel address when the user hasCAP_SYSLOG. When it is set to 2, the kernel address is always printed as zero. When set to 1, this needs to check whether or not we're in IRQ. However, when set to 2, this check is unneccessary, and produces confusing results in dmesg. Thus, only make sure we're not in IRQ when mode 1 is used, but not mode 2.
Cool, nice fix.
Quoted 11 lines
Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>--- lib/vsprintf.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)lib/vsprintf.c +0
-0
lib/vsprintf.c char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, · line 1613
Quoted 7 lines
lib/vsprintf.c +2
-2@@ -1609,8 +1609,8 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,* %pK cannot be used in IRQ context because its test * for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. */ -if (kptr_restrict && (in_irq () ||in_serving_softirq () || -in_nmi ())) { +if (kptr_restrict ==1 && (in_irq () ||in_serving_softirq () || +in_nmi ())) {
Instead of doing a double-check of kptr_restrict, how about moving this logic down into the "case 1" test? I think that would be more readable in the end.
-Kees
Quoted 6 lines
lib/vsprintf.c +0
-1if (spec.field_width ==-1 ) spec.field_width = default_width;return string (buf, end,"pK-error" , spec); --2.7.0
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security
Quoted 4 lines · Kees Cook
Instead of doing a double-check of
kptr_restrict, how about moving this logic down into the "case 1" test? I think that would be more readable in the end.
Good thinking. Will roll v2.
PATCH v2 1/1 vsprintf: kptr_restrict is okay in IRQ when 2
In reply to Kees CookThe kptr_restrict flag, when set to 1, only prints the kernel address when the user has CAP_SYSLOG. When it is set to 2, the kernel address is always printed as zero. When set to 1, this needs to check whether or not we're in IRQ. However, when set to 2, this check is unneccessary, and produces confusing results in dmesg. Thus, only make sure we're not in IRQ when mode 1 is used, but not mode 2.
--- lib/vsprintf.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
lib/vsprintf.c +13 -13
@@ -1605,22 +1605,23 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,return buf; }case 'K' : -/* -* %pK cannot be used in IRQ context because its test -* for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. -*/ -if (kptr_restrict && (in_irq () ||in_serving_softirq () || -in_nmi ())) { -if (spec.field_width ==-1 ) - spec.field_width = default_width; -return string (buf, end,"pK-error" , spec); - } -switch (kptr_restrict) {case 0 :/* Always print %pK values */ break ;case 1 : { +const struct cred *cred; + +/* +* kptr_restrict==2 cannot be used in IRQ context because +* its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. +*/ +if (in_irq () ||in_serving_softirq () ||in_nmi ()) { +if (spec.field_width ==-1 ) + spec.field_width = default_width; +return string (buf, end,"pK-error" , spec); + } +/* * Only print the real pointer value if the current * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
@@ -1630,8 +1631,7 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,* leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it. */ -const struct cred *cred =current_cred (); - + cred =current_cred ();if (!has_capability_noaudit (current,CAP_SYSLOG ) || !uid_eq (cred->euid, cred->uid) || !gid_eq (cred->egid, cred->gid))
Signature · 1 line
2.7.0
Quoted 9 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
The
kptr_restrictflag, when set to 1, only prints the kernel address when the user hasCAP_SYSLOG. When it is set to 2, the kernel address is always printed as zero. When set to 1, this needs to check whether or not we're in IRQ. However, when set to 2, this check is unneccessary, and produces confusing results in dmesg. Thus, only make sure we're not in IRQ when mode 1 is used, but not mode 2.Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Thanks!
-Kees
Quoted 56 lines
--- lib/vsprintf.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)lib/vsprintf.c +13
-14@@ -1605,22 +1605,23 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,return buf; }case 'K' : -/* -* %pK cannot be used in IRQ context because its test -* for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. -*/ -if (kptr_restrict && (in_irq () ||in_serving_softirq () || -in_nmi ())) { -if (spec.field_width ==-1 ) - spec.field_width = default_width; -return string (buf, end,"pK-error" , spec); - } -switch (kptr_restrict) {case 0 :/* Always print %pK values */ break ;case 1 : { +const struct cred *cred; + +/* +* kptr_restrict==2 cannot be used in IRQ context because +* its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. +*/ +if (in_irq () ||in_serving_softirq () ||in_nmi ()) { +if (spec.field_width ==-1 ) + spec.field_width = default_width; +return string (buf, end,"pK-error" , spec); + } +/* * Only print the real pointer value if the current * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the @@ -1630,8 +1631,7 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,* leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it. */ -const struct cred *cred =current_cred (); - + cred =current_cred ();if (!has_capability_noaudit (current,CAP_SYSLOG ) || !uid_eq (cred->euid, cred->uid) || !gid_eq (cred->egid, cred->gid)) --2.7.0
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security
Rasmus Villemoes
reviewerQuoted 9 lines · Kees Cook
lib/vsprintf.c char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, · line 1616
Quoted 9 lines
switch (kptr_restrict) { case 0: /* Always print %pK values */ break; case 1: {lib/vsprintf.c +4
-0+const struct cred *cred; + +/* +* kptr_restrict==2 cannot be used in IRQ context because
^
should be 1, right?
Rasmus
PATCH v3 1/1 vsprintf: kptr_restrict is okay in IRQ when 2
The kptr_restrict flag, when set to 1, only prints the kernel address when the user has CAP_SYSLOG. When it is set to 2, the kernel address is always printed as zero. When set to 1, this needs to check whether or not we're in IRQ. However, when set to 2, this check is unneccessary, and produces confusing results in dmesg. Thus, only make sure we're not in IRQ when mode 1 is used, but not mode 2.
--- lib/vsprintf.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
lib/vsprintf.c +13 -13
@@ -1605,22 +1605,23 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,return buf; }case 'K' : -/* -* %pK cannot be used in IRQ context because its test -* for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. -*/ -if (kptr_restrict && (in_irq () ||in_serving_softirq () || -in_nmi ())) { -if (spec.field_width ==-1 ) - spec.field_width = default_width; -return string (buf, end,"pK-error" , spec); - } -switch (kptr_restrict) {case 0 :/* Always print %pK values */ break ;case 1 : { +const struct cred *cred; + +/* +* kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context because +* its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless. +*/ +if (in_irq () ||in_serving_softirq () ||in_nmi ()) { +if (spec.field_width ==-1 ) + spec.field_width = default_width; +return string (buf, end,"pK-error" , spec); + } +/* * Only print the real pointer value if the current * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
@@ -1630,8 +1631,7 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,* leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it. */ -const struct cred *cred =current_cred (); - + cred =current_cred ();if (!has_capability_noaudit (current,CAP_SYSLOG ) || !uid_eq (cred->euid, cred->uid) || !gid_eq (cred->egid, cred->gid))
Signature · 1 line
2.7.0