netfilter: xtables: stricter ruleset validation
Subsystems (2)
Florian Westphal
maintainercover netfilter: xtables: stricter ruleset validation
This series adds more checks on xtables (arp, ip, ip6tables) rulesets.
- check all offsets (target, next) of all rules during initial pass after copy from userspace.
- check targets of jumps (-j bla): offset should be start of a rule
- assert that alleged target size is at least as big as minimum target structure
- change CONFIG_COMPAT code path to push ruleset via normal setsockopt path after initial 32->64 bit conversion to avoid duplicating checks
- use a common helper to copy counters from userspace instead of the ip/ip6/arp implementation.
Tested:
- iptables.git iptables-test.py passes
- made a few performance tests w. really silly rulesets to verify that things don't slow down too much, see individual patches for details.
include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 12 + net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 303 ++++++++++------------------------ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 327 +++++++++---------------------------- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 320 ++++++++---------------------------- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 244 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 506 insertions(+), 700 deletions(-)
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 1/17 netfilter: x_tables: don't move to non-existent next rule
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a counter value at the supplied offset.
Base chains enforce absolute verdict.
User defined chains are supposed to end with an unconditional return, xtables userspace adds them automatically.
But if such return is missing we will move to non-existent next rule.
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 8 +++++--- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 4 ++++ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +5 -3
@@ -439,6 +439,8 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, size = e->next_offset; e = (struct arpt_entry *) (entry0 + pos + size); +if (pos + size >= newinfo->size) +return 0 ; e->counters.pcnt = pos; pos += size; }else {
@@ -461,6 +463,8 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, }else {/* ... this is a fallthru */ newpos = pos + e->next_offset; +if (newpos >= newinfo->size) +return 0 ; } e = (struct arpt_entry *) (entry0 + newpos);
@@ -691,10 +695,8 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, } } -if (!mark_source_chains (newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0)) { -duprintf ("Looping hook\n" ); +if (!mark_source_chains (newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0))return -ELOOP ; - }/* Finally, each sanity check must pass */ i =0 ;
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +4 -0
@@ -520,6 +520,8 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, size = e->next_offset; e = (struct ipt_entry *) (entry0 + pos + size); +if (pos + size >= newinfo->size) +return 0 ; e->counters.pcnt = pos; pos += size; }else {
@@ -541,6 +543,8 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, }else {/* ... this is a fallthru */ newpos = pos + e->next_offset; +if (newpos >= newinfo->size) +return 0 ; } e = (struct ipt_entry *) (entry0 + newpos);
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +4 -0
@@ -532,6 +532,8 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, size = e->next_offset; e = (struct ip6t_entry *) (entry0 + pos + size); +if (pos + size >= newinfo->size) +return 0 ; e->counters.pcnt = pos; pos += size; }else {
@@ -553,6 +555,8 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, }else {/* ... this is a fallthru */ newpos = pos + e->next_offset; +if (newpos >= newinfo->size) +return 0 ; } e = (struct ip6t_entry *) (entry0 + newpos);
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 2/17 netfilter: x_tables: validate targets of jumps
In reply to Florian WestphalWhen we see a jump also check that the offset gets us to beginning of a rule (an ipt_entry).
The extra overhead is negible, even with absurd cases.
300k custom rules, 300k jumps to 'next' user chain:
[ plus one jump from INPUT to first userchain ]:
Before:
real 0m24.874s user 0m7.532s sys 0m16.076s
After:
real 0m27.464s user 0m7.436s sys 0m18.840s
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +16 -0
@@ -367,6 +367,18 @@ static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_entry *e)memcmp (&e->arp, &uncond,sizeof (uncond)) ==0 ; } +static bool find_jump_target (const struct xt_table_info *t, +const struct arpt_entry *target) +{ +struct arpt_entry *iter; + + xt_entry_foreach(iter, t->entries, t->size) { +if (iter == target) +return true; + } +return false; +} +/* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if * there are loops. Puts hook bitmask in comefrom. */
@@ -460,6 +472,10 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,/* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf ("Jump rule %u -> %u\n" , pos, newpos); + e = (struct arpt_entry *) + (entry0 + newpos); +if (!find_jump_target (newinfo, e)) +return 0 ; }else {/* ... this is a fallthru */ newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +16 -0
@@ -443,6 +443,18 @@ ipt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,#endif } +static bool find_jump_target (const struct xt_table_info *t, +const struct ipt_entry *target) +{ +struct ipt_entry *iter; + + xt_entry_foreach(iter, t->entries, t->size) { +if (iter == target) +return true; + } +return false; +} +/* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if there are loops. Puts hook bitmask in comefrom. */ static int
@@ -540,6 +552,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,/* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf ("Jump rule %u -> %u\n" , pos, newpos); + e = (struct ipt_entry *) + (entry0 + newpos); +if (!find_jump_target (newinfo, e)) +return 0 ; }else {/* ... this is a fallthru */ newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +16 -0
@@ -455,6 +455,18 @@ ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,#endif } +static bool find_jump_target (const struct xt_table_info *t, +const struct ip6t_entry *target) +{ +struct ip6t_entry *iter; + + xt_entry_foreach(iter, t->entries, t->size) { +if (iter == target) +return true; + } +return false; +} +/* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if there are loops. Puts hook bitmask in comefrom. */ static int
@@ -552,6 +564,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,/* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf ("Jump rule %u -> %u\n" , pos, newpos); + e = (struct ip6t_entry *) + (entry0 + newpos); +if (!find_jump_target (newinfo, e)) +return 0 ; }else {/* ... this is a fallthru */ newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Re: [PATCH nf 02/17] netfilter: x_tables: validate targets of jumps
Quoted 7 lines · Florian Westphal
The extra overhead is negible, even with absurd cases.
300k custom rules, 300k jumps to 'next' user chain:
[ plus one jump from INPUT to first userchain ]:sys 0m16.076s
sys 0m18.840s
I wouldn't call a 17% increase negligible. But, correctness before speed, I'm onboard even with a 200% jump.
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 3/17 netfilter: x_tables: add and use xt_check_entry_offsets
In reply to Florian WestphalCurrently arp/ip and ip6tables each implement a short helper to check that the target offset is large enough to hold one xt_entry_target struct and that t->u.target_size fits within the current rule.
Unfortunately these checks are not sufficient.
To avoid adding new tests to all of ip/ip6/arptables move the current checks into a helper, then extend this helper in followup patches.
--- include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 4 ++++ net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 11 +---------- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 12 +----------- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 12 +----------- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h +4 -0
@@ -242,6 +242,10 @@ void xt_unregister_match(struct xt_match *target);int xt_register_matches (struct xt_match *match,unsigned int n);void xt_unregister_matches (struct xt_match *match,unsigned int n); +int xt_check_entry_offsets (const void *base, +unsigned int target_offset, +unsigned int next_offset); +int xt_check_match (struct xt_mtchk_param *,unsigned int size,u_int8_t proto,bool inv_proto); int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto,
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +1 -10
@@ -496,19 +496,10 @@ next:static inline int check_entry (const struct arpt_entry *e) { -const struct xt_entry_target *t; -if (!arp_checkentry (&e->arp))return -EINVAL ; -if (e->target_offset +sizeof (struct xt_entry_target ) > e->next_offset) -return -EINVAL ; - - t =arpt_get_target_c (e); -if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset) -return -EINVAL ; - -return 0 ; +return xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset); }static inline int check_target (struct arpt_entry *e,const char *name)
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +1 -11
@@ -590,20 +590,10 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)static int check_entry (const struct ipt_entry *e) { -const struct xt_entry_target *t; -if (!ip_checkentry (&e->ip))return -EINVAL ; -if (e->target_offset +sizeof (struct xt_entry_target ) > - e->next_offset) -return -EINVAL ; - - t =ipt_get_target_c (e); -if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset) -return -EINVAL ; - -return 0 ; +return xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset); } static int
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +1 -11
@@ -602,20 +602,10 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)static int check_entry (const struct ip6t_entry *e) { -const struct xt_entry_target *t; -if (!ip6_checkentry (&e->ipv6))return -EINVAL ; -if (e->target_offset +sizeof (struct xt_entry_target ) > - e->next_offset) -return -EINVAL ; - - t =ip6t_get_target_c (e); -if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset) -return -EINVAL ; - -return 0 ; +return xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset); }static int check_match (struct xt_entry_match *m,struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +34 -0
@@ -541,6 +541,40 @@ int xt_compat_match_to_user(const struct xt_entry_match *m,EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xt_compat_match_to_user);#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ +/** +* xt_check_entry_offsets - validate arp/ip/ip6t_entry +* +* @base: pointer to arp/ip/ip6t_entry +* @target_offset: the arp/ip/ip6_t->target_offset +* @next_offset: the arp/ip/ip6_t->next_offset +* +* validates that target_offset and next_offset are sane. +* +* The arp/ip/ip6t_entry structure @base must have passed following tests: +* - it must point to a valid memory location +* - base to base + next_offset must be accessible, i.e. not exceed allocated +* length. +* +* Return: 0 on success, negative errno on failure. +*/ +int xt_check_entry_offsets (const void *base, +unsigned int target_offset, +unsigned int next_offset) +{ +const struct xt_entry_target *t; +const char *e = base; + +if (target_offset +sizeof (*t) > next_offset) +return -EINVAL ; + + t = (void *)(e + target_offset); +if (target_offset + t->u.target_size > next_offset) +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (xt_check_entry_offsets); +int xt_check_target (struct xt_tgchk_param *par,unsigned int size,u_int8_t proto,bool inv_proto) {
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 4/17 netfilter: x_tables: kill check_entry helper
In reply to Florian WestphalOnce we add more sanity testing to xt_check_entry_offsets it becomes relvant if we're expecting a 32bit 'config_compat' blob or a normal one.
Since we already have a lot of similar-named functions (check_entry, compat_check_entry, find_and_check_entry, etc.) and the current incarnation is short just fold its contents into the callers.
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 19 ++++++++----------- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 20 ++++++++------------ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 20 ++++++++------------ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +8 -11
@@ -494,14 +494,6 @@ next:return 1 ; } -static inline int check_entry (const struct arpt_entry *e) -{ -if (!arp_checkentry (&e->arp)) -return -EINVAL ; - -return xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset); -} -static inline int check_target (struct arpt_entry *e,const char *name) {struct xt_entry_target *t =arpt_get_target (e);
@@ -597,7 +589,10 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,return -EINVAL ; } - err =check_entry (e); +if (!arp_checkentry (&e->arp)) +return -EINVAL ; + + err =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset);if (err)return err;
@@ -1256,8 +1251,10 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,return -EINVAL ; } -/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */ - ret =check_entry ((struct arpt_entry *)e); +if (!arp_checkentry (&e->arp)) +return -EINVAL ; + + ret =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset);if (ret)return ret;
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +8 -12
@@ -588,15 +588,6 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net) }static int -check_entry (const struct ipt_entry *e) -{ -if (!ip_checkentry (&e->ip)) -return -EINVAL ; - -return xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset); -} - -static int check_match (struct xt_entry_match *m,struct xt_mtchk_param *par) {const struct ipt_ip *ip = par->entryinfo;
@@ -760,7 +751,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,return -EINVAL ; } - err =check_entry (e); +if (!ip_checkentry (&e->ip)) +return -EINVAL ; + + err =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset);if (err)return err;
@@ -1516,8 +1510,10 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,return -EINVAL ; } -/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */ - ret =check_entry ((struct ipt_entry *)e); +if (!ip_checkentry (&e->ip)) +return -EINVAL ; + + ret =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset);if (ret)return ret;
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +8 -12
@@ -599,15 +599,6 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)module_put (par.match->me); } -static int -check_entry (const struct ip6t_entry *e) -{ -if (!ip6_checkentry (&e->ipv6)) -return -EINVAL ; - -return xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset); -} -static int check_match (struct xt_entry_match *m,struct xt_mtchk_param *par) {const struct ip6t_ip6 *ipv6 = par->entryinfo;
@@ -772,7 +763,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,return -EINVAL ; } - err =check_entry (e); +if (!ip6_checkentry (&e->ipv6)) +return -EINVAL ; + + err =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset);if (err)return err;
@@ -1528,8 +1522,10 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,return -EINVAL ; } -/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */ - ret =check_entry ((struct ip6t_entry *)e); +if (!ip6_checkentry (&e->ipv6)) +return -EINVAL ; + + ret =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset);if (ret)return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 5/17 netfilter: x_tables: assert minimum target size
In reply to Florian WestphalThe target size includes the size of the xt_entry_target struct.
--- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +3 -0
@@ -568,6 +568,9 @@ int xt_check_entry_offsets(const void *base,return -EINVAL ; t = (void *)(e + target_offset); +if (t->u.target_size <sizeof (*t)) +return -EINVAL ; +if (target_offset + t->u.target_size > next_offset)return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 6/17 netfilter: x_tables: add compat version of xt_check_entry_offsets
In reply to Florian Westphal32bit rulesets have different layout and alignment requirements, so once more integrity checks get added to xt_check_entry_offsets it will reject well-formed 32bit rulesets.
--- include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 3 +++ net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 3 ++- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 3 ++- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 3 ++- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h +3 -0
@@ -494,6 +494,9 @@ void xt_compat_target_from_user(struct xt_entry_target *t, void **dstptr, unsigned int *size);int xt_compat_target_to_user (const struct xt_entry_target *t,void __user **dstptr,unsigned int *size); +int xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (const void *base, +unsigned int target_offset, +unsigned int next_offset);#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ #endif /* _X_TABLES_H */
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +2 -1
@@ -1254,7 +1254,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,if (!arp_checkentry (&e->arp))return -EINVAL ; - ret =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset); + ret =xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, + e->next_offset);if (ret)return ret;
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +2 -1
@@ -1513,7 +1513,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,if (!ip_checkentry (&e->ip))return -EINVAL ; - ret =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset); + ret =xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (e, + e->target_offset, e->next_offset);if (ret)return ret;
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +2 -1
@@ -1525,7 +1525,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,if (!ip6_checkentry (&e->ipv6))return -EINVAL ; - ret =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset); + ret =xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (e, + e->target_offset, e->next_offset);if (ret)return ret;
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +22 -0
@@ -539,6 +539,27 @@ int xt_compat_match_to_user(const struct xt_entry_match *m, return 0; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xt_compat_match_to_user); + +int xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (const void *base, +unsigned int target_offset, +unsigned int next_offset) +{ +const struct compat_xt_entry_target *t; +const char *e = base; + +if (target_offset +sizeof (*t) > next_offset) +return -EINVAL ; + + t = (void *)(e + target_offset); +if (t->u.target_size <sizeof (*t)) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (target_offset + t->u.target_size > next_offset) +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (xt_compat_check_entry_offsets);#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ /**
@@ -549,6 +570,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_compat_match_to_user);* @next_offset: the arp/ip/ip6_t->next_offset * * validates that target_offset and next_offset are sane. +* Also see xt_compat_check_entry_offsets for CONFIG_COMPAT version. * * The arp/ip/ip6t_entry structure @base must have passed following tests: * - it must point to a valid memory location
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 7/17 netfilter: x_tables: check standard target size too
In reply to Florian WestphalWe have targets and standard targets -- the latter carries a verdict.
The ip/ip6tables validation functions will access t->verdict for the standard targets to fetch the jump offset or verdict for chainloop detection, but this happens before the targets get checked/validated.
Thus we also need to check for verdict presence here, else t->verdict can point right after a blob.
Spotted with UBSAN while testing malformed blobs.
--- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +15 -0
@@ -540,6 +540,13 @@ int xt_compat_match_to_user(const struct xt_entry_match *m, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xt_compat_match_to_user); +/* non-compat version may have padding after verdict */ +struct compat_xt_standard_target { +struct compat_xt_entry_target t; +compat_uint_t verdict; +}; + +/* see xt_check_entry_offsets */ int xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (const void *base,unsigned int target_offset,unsigned int next_offset)
@@ -557,6 +564,10 @@ int xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(const void *base,if (target_offset + t->u.target_size > next_offset)return -EINVAL ; +if (strcmp (t->u.user.name,XT_STANDARD_TARGET ) ==0 && + target_offset +sizeof (struct compat_xt_standard_target ) != next_offset) +return -EINVAL ; +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (xt_compat_check_entry_offsets);
@@ -596,6 +607,10 @@ int xt_check_entry_offsets(const void *base,if (target_offset + t->u.target_size > next_offset)return -EINVAL ; +if (strcmp (t->u.user.name,XT_STANDARD_TARGET ) ==0 && + target_offset +sizeof (struct xt_standard_target ) != next_offset) +return -EINVAL ; +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (xt_check_entry_offsets);
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 8/17 netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
In reply to Florian WestphalWe're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry). Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
--- include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 5 +++-- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 5 +++-- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 5 +++-- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h +2 -2
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ void xt_unregister_match(struct xt_match *target);int xt_register_matches (struct xt_match *match,unsigned int n);void xt_unregister_matches (struct xt_match *match,unsigned int n); -int xt_check_entry_offsets (const void *base, +int xt_check_entry_offsets (const void *base,const char *elems,unsigned int target_offset,unsigned int next_offset);
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ void xt_compat_target_from_user(struct xt_entry_target *t, void **dstptr, unsigned int *size);int xt_compat_target_to_user (const struct xt_entry_target *t,void __user **dstptr,unsigned int *size); -int xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (const void *base, +int xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (const void *base,const char *elems,unsigned int target_offset,unsigned int next_offset);
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +3 -2
@@ -592,7 +592,8 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,if (!arp_checkentry (&e->arp))return -EINVAL ; - err =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset); + err =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->elems, e->target_offset, + e->next_offset);if (err)return err;
@@ -1254,7 +1255,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,if (!arp_checkentry (&e->arp))return -EINVAL ; - ret =xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, + ret =xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (e, e->elems, e->target_offset, e->next_offset);if (ret)return ret;
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +3 -2
@@ -754,7 +754,8 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,if (!ip_checkentry (&e->ip))return -EINVAL ; - err =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset); + err =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->elems, e->target_offset, + e->next_offset);if (err)return err;
@@ -1513,7 +1514,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,if (!ip_checkentry (&e->ip))return -EINVAL ; - ret =xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (e, + ret =xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (e, e->elems, e->target_offset, e->next_offset);if (ret)return ret;
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +3 -2
@@ -766,7 +766,8 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,if (!ip6_checkentry (&e->ipv6))return -EINVAL ; - err =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset); + err =xt_check_entry_offsets (e, e->elems, e->target_offset, + e->next_offset);if (err)return err;
@@ -1525,7 +1526,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,if (!ip6_checkentry (&e->ipv6))return -EINVAL ; - ret =xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (e, + ret =xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (e, e->elems, e->target_offset, e->next_offset);if (ret)return ret;
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +15 -2
@@ -546,14 +546,17 @@ struct compat_xt_standard_target {compat_uint_t verdict; }; -/* see xt_check_entry_offsets */ -int xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (const void *base, +int xt_compat_check_entry_offsets (const void *base,const char *elems,unsigned int target_offset,unsigned int next_offset) { +long size_of_base_struct = elems - (const char *)base;const struct compat_xt_entry_target *t;const char *e = base; +if (target_offset < size_of_base_struct) +return -EINVAL ; +if (target_offset +sizeof (*t) > next_offset)return -EINVAL ;
@@ -577,12 +580,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_compat_check_entry_offsets);* xt_check_entry_offsets - validate arp/ip/ip6t_entry * * @base: pointer to arp/ip/ip6t_entry +* @elems: pointer to first xt_entry_match, i.e. ip(6)t_entry->elems * @target_offset: the arp/ip/ip6_t->target_offset * @next_offset: the arp/ip/ip6_t->next_offset * * validates that target_offset and next_offset are sane. * Also see xt_compat_check_entry_offsets for CONFIG_COMPAT version. * +* This function does not validate the targets or matches themselves, it +* only tests that all the offsets and sizes are correct. +* * The arp/ip/ip6t_entry structure @base must have passed following tests: * - it must point to a valid memory location * - base to base + next_offset must be accessible, i.e. not exceed allocated
@@ -591,12 +598,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_compat_check_entry_offsets);* Return: 0 on success, negative errno on failure. */ int xt_check_entry_offsets (const void *base, +const char *elems,unsigned int target_offset,unsigned int next_offset) { +long size_of_base_struct = elems - (const char *)base;const struct xt_entry_target *t;const char *e = base; +/* target start is within the ip/ip6/arpt_entry struct */ +if (target_offset < size_of_base_struct) +return -EINVAL ; +if (target_offset +sizeof (*t) > next_offset)return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 9/17 netfilter: x_tables: validate all offsets and sizes in a rule
In reply to Florian WestphalValidate that all matches (if any) add up to the beginning of the target and that each match covers at least the base structure size.
The compat path should be able to safely re-use the function as the structures only differ in alignment; added a BUILD_BUG_ON just in case we have an arch that adds padding as well.
--- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 76 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +76 -5
@@ -416,6 +416,47 @@ int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *par, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xt_check_match); +/** xt_check_entry_match - check that matches end before start of target +* +* @match: beginning of xt_entry_match +* @target: beginning of this rules target (alleged end of matches) +* @alignment: alignment requirement of match structures +* +* Validates that all matches add up to the beginning of the target, +* and that each match covers at least the base structure size. +* +* Return: 0 on success, negative errno on failure. +*/ +static int xt_check_entry_match (const char *match,const char *target, +const size_t alignment) +{ +const struct xt_entry_match *pos; +int length = target - match; + +if (length ==0 )/* no matches */ +return 0 ; + + pos = (struct xt_entry_match *)match; +do { +if ((unsigned long )pos % alignment) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (length < (int )sizeof (struct xt_entry_match )) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (pos->u.match_size <sizeof (struct xt_entry_match )) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (pos->u.match_size > length) +return -EINVAL ; + + length -= pos->u.match_size; + pos = ((void *)((char *)(pos) + (pos)->u.match_size)); + }while (length >0 ); + +return 0 ; +} +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT int xt_compat_add_offset (u_int8_t af,unsigned int offset,int delta) {
@@ -571,7 +612,14 @@ int xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(const void *base, const char *elems, target_offset + sizeof(struct compat_xt_standard_target) != next_offset) return -EINVAL; - return 0; +/* compat_xt_entry match has less strict aligment requirements, +* otherwise they are identical. In case of padding differences +* we need to add compat version of xt_check_entry_match. +*/ +BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (struct compat_xt_entry_match ) !=sizeof (struct xt_entry_match )); + +return xt_check_entry_match (elems, base + target_offset, + __alignof__(struct compat_xt_entry_match)); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (xt_compat_check_entry_offsets);#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
@@ -584,17 +632,39 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_compat_check_entry_offsets);* @target_offset: the arp/ip/ip6_t->target_offset * @next_offset: the arp/ip/ip6_t->next_offset * -* validates that target_offset and next_offset are sane. -* Also see xt_compat_check_entry_offsets for CONFIG_COMPAT version. +* validates that target_offset and next_offset are sane and that all +* match sizes (if any) align with the target offset. * * This function does not validate the targets or matches themselves, it -* only tests that all the offsets and sizes are correct. +* only tests that all the offsets and sizes are correct, that all +* match structures are aligned, and that the last structure ends where +* the target structure begins. +* +* Also see xt_compat_check_entry_offsets for CONFIG_COMPAT version. * * The arp/ip/ip6t_entry structure @base must have passed following tests: * - it must point to a valid memory location * - base to base + next_offset must be accessible, i.e. not exceed allocated * length. * +* A well-formed entry looks like this: +* +* ip(6)t_entry match [mtdata] match [mtdata] target [tgdata] ip(6)t_entry +* e->elems[]-----' | | +* matchsize | | +* matchsize | | +* | | +* target_offset---------------------------------' | +* next_offset---------------------------------------------------' +* +* elems[]: flexible array member at end of ip(6)/arpt_entry struct. +* This is where matches (if any) and the target reside. +* target_offset: beginning of target. +* next_offset: start of the next rule; also: size of this rule. +* Since targets have a minimum size, target_offset + minlen <= next_offset. +* +* Every match stores its size, sum of sizes must not exceed target_offset. +* * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on failure. */ int xt_check_entry_offsets(const void *base,
@@ -624,7 +694,8 @@ int xt_check_entry_offsets(const void *base, target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_standard_target) != next_offset) return -EINVAL; -return 0 ; +return xt_check_entry_match (elems, base + target_offset, + __alignof__(struct xt_entry_match )); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (xt_check_entry_offsets);
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 10/17 netfilter: ip_tables: simplify translate_compat_table args
In reply to Florian Westphal--- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +24 -35
@@ -1449,7 +1449,6 @@ compat_copy_entry_to_user(struct ipt_entry *e, void __user **dstptr,static int compat_find_calc_match (struct xt_entry_match *m, -const char *name,const struct ipt_ip *ip,int *size) {
@@ -1486,8 +1485,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,const unsigned char *base, const unsigned char *limit, const unsigned int *hook_entries, - const unsigned int *underflows, - const char *name) + const unsigned int *underflows) { struct xt_entry_match *ematch;struct xt_entry_target *t;
@@ -1523,7 +1521,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e, entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base; j =0 ; xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) { - ret =compat_find_calc_match (ematch, name, &e->ip, &off); + ret =compat_find_calc_match (ematch, &e->ip, &off);if (ret !=0 ) goto release_matches; ++j;
@@ -1572,7 +1570,7 @@ release_matches:static int compat_copy_entry_from_user (struct compat_ipt_entry *e,void **dstptr, -unsigned int *size,const char *name, +unsigned int *size,struct xt_table_info *newinfo,unsigned char *base) {struct xt_entry_target *t;
@@ -1655,14 +1653,9 @@ compat_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name)static int translate_compat_table (struct net *net, -const char *name, -unsigned int valid_hooks,struct xt_table_info **pinfo,void **pentry0, -unsigned int total_size, -unsigned int number, -unsigned int *hook_entries, -unsigned int *underflows) +const struct compat_ipt_replace *compatr) {unsigned int i, j;struct xt_table_info *newinfo, *info;
@@ -1674,8 +1667,8 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net, info = *pinfo; entry0 = *pentry0; - size = total_size; - info->number = number; + size = compatr->size; + info->number = compatr->num_entries;/* Init all hooks to impossible value. */ for (i =0 ; i <NF_INET_NUMHOOKS ; i++) {
@@ -1686,40 +1679,39 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net,duprintf ("translate_compat_table: size %u\n" , info->size); j =0 ;xt_compat_lock (AF_INET ); -xt_compat_init_offsets (AF_INET , number); +xt_compat_init_offsets (AF_INET , compatr->num_entries);/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */ - xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) { + xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) { ret =check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks (iter0, info, &size, entry0, - entry0 + total_size, - hook_entries, - underflows, - name); + entry0 + compatr->size, + compatr->hook_entry, + compatr->underflow);if (ret !=0 ) goto out_unlock; ++j; } ret = -EINVAL ; -if (j != number) { +if (j != compatr->num_entries) {duprintf ("translate_compat_table: %u not %u entries\n" , - j, number); + j, compatr->num_entries); goto out_unlock; }/* Check hooks all assigned */ for (i =0 ; i <NF_INET_NUMHOOKS ; i++) {/* Only hooks which are valid */ -if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << i))) +if (!(compatr->valid_hooks & (1 << i)))continue ;if (info->hook_entry[i] ==0xFFFFFFFF ) {duprintf ("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n" , - i, hook_entries[i]); + i, info->hook_entry[i]); goto out_unlock; }if (info->underflow[i] ==0xFFFFFFFF ) {duprintf ("Invalid underflow %u %u\n" , - i, underflows[i]); + i, info->underflow[i]); goto out_unlock; } }
@@ -1729,17 +1721,17 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net,if (!newinfo) goto out_unlock; - newinfo->number = number; + newinfo->number = compatr->num_entries;for (i =0 ; i <NF_INET_NUMHOOKS ; i++) { newinfo->hook_entry[i] = info->hook_entry[i]; newinfo->underflow[i] = info->underflow[i]; } entry1 = newinfo->entries; pos = entry1; - size = total_size; - xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) { + size = compatr->size; + xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) { ret =compat_copy_entry_from_user (iter0, &pos, &size, - name, newinfo, entry1); + newinfo, entry1);if (ret !=0 )break ; }
@@ -1749,12 +1741,12 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net, goto free_newinfo; ret = -ELOOP ; -if (!mark_source_chains (newinfo, valid_hooks, entry1)) +if (!mark_source_chains (newinfo, compatr->valid_hooks, entry1)) goto free_newinfo; i =0 ; xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) { - ret =compat_check_entry (iter1, net, name); + ret =compat_check_entry (iter1, net, compatr->name);if (ret !=0 )break ; ++i;
@@ -1794,7 +1786,7 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net, free_newinfo:xt_free_table_info (newinfo); out: - xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) { + xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {if (j-- ==0 )break ;compat_release_entry (iter0);
@@ -1839,10 +1831,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len) goto free_newinfo; } - ret =translate_compat_table (net, tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks, - &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, tmp.size, - tmp.num_entries, tmp.hook_entry, - tmp.underflow); + ret =translate_compat_table (net, &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, &tmp);if (ret !=0 ) goto free_newinfo;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 11/17 netfilter: ip6_tables: simplify translate_compat_table args
In reply to Florian Westphal--- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +24 -35
@@ -1461,7 +1461,6 @@ compat_copy_entry_to_user(struct ip6t_entry *e, void __user **dstptr,static int compat_find_calc_match (struct xt_entry_match *m, -const char *name,const struct ip6t_ip6 *ipv6,int *size) {
@@ -1498,8 +1497,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,const unsigned char *base, const unsigned char *limit, const unsigned int *hook_entries, - const unsigned int *underflows, - const char *name) + const unsigned int *underflows) { struct xt_entry_match *ematch;struct xt_entry_target *t;
@@ -1535,7 +1533,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e, entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base; j =0 ; xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) { - ret =compat_find_calc_match (ematch, name, &e->ipv6, &off); + ret =compat_find_calc_match (ematch, &e->ipv6, &off);if (ret !=0 ) goto release_matches; ++j;
@@ -1584,7 +1582,7 @@ release_matches:static int compat_copy_entry_from_user (struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,void **dstptr, -unsigned int *size,const char *name, +unsigned int *size,struct xt_table_info *newinfo,unsigned char *base) {struct xt_entry_target *t;
@@ -1664,14 +1662,9 @@ static int compat_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net,static int translate_compat_table (struct net *net, -const char *name, -unsigned int valid_hooks,struct xt_table_info **pinfo,void **pentry0, -unsigned int total_size, -unsigned int number, -unsigned int *hook_entries, -unsigned int *underflows) +const struct compat_ip6t_replace *compatr) {unsigned int i, j;struct xt_table_info *newinfo, *info;
@@ -1683,8 +1676,8 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net, info = *pinfo; entry0 = *pentry0; - size = total_size; - info->number = number; + size = compatr->size; + info->number = compatr->num_entries;/* Init all hooks to impossible value. */ for (i =0 ; i <NF_INET_NUMHOOKS ; i++) {
@@ -1695,40 +1688,39 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net,duprintf ("translate_compat_table: size %u\n" , info->size); j =0 ;xt_compat_lock (AF_INET6 ); -xt_compat_init_offsets (AF_INET6 , number); +xt_compat_init_offsets (AF_INET6 , compatr->num_entries);/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */ - xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) { + xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) { ret =check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks (iter0, info, &size, entry0, - entry0 + total_size, - hook_entries, - underflows, - name); + entry0 + compatr->size, + compatr->hook_entry, + compatr->underflow);if (ret !=0 ) goto out_unlock; ++j; } ret = -EINVAL ; -if (j != number) { +if (j != compatr->num_entries) {duprintf ("translate_compat_table: %u not %u entries\n" , - j, number); + j, compatr->num_entries); goto out_unlock; }/* Check hooks all assigned */ for (i =0 ; i <NF_INET_NUMHOOKS ; i++) {/* Only hooks which are valid */ -if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << i))) +if (!(compatr->valid_hooks & (1 << i)))continue ;if (info->hook_entry[i] ==0xFFFFFFFF ) {duprintf ("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n" , - i, hook_entries[i]); + i, info->hook_entry[i]); goto out_unlock; }if (info->underflow[i] ==0xFFFFFFFF ) {duprintf ("Invalid underflow %u %u\n" , - i, underflows[i]); + i, info->underflow[i]); goto out_unlock; } }
@@ -1738,17 +1730,17 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net,if (!newinfo) goto out_unlock; - newinfo->number = number; + newinfo->number = compatr->num_entries;for (i =0 ; i <NF_INET_NUMHOOKS ; i++) { newinfo->hook_entry[i] = info->hook_entry[i]; newinfo->underflow[i] = info->underflow[i]; } entry1 = newinfo->entries; pos = entry1; - size = total_size; - xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) { + size = compatr->size; + xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) { ret =compat_copy_entry_from_user (iter0, &pos, &size, - name, newinfo, entry1); + newinfo, entry1);if (ret !=0 )break ; }
@@ -1758,12 +1750,12 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net, goto free_newinfo; ret = -ELOOP ; -if (!mark_source_chains (newinfo, valid_hooks, entry1)) +if (!mark_source_chains (newinfo, compatr->valid_hooks, entry1)) goto free_newinfo; i =0 ; xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) { - ret =compat_check_entry (iter1, net, name); + ret =compat_check_entry (iter1, net, compatr->name);if (ret !=0 )break ; ++i;
@@ -1803,7 +1795,7 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net, free_newinfo:xt_free_table_info (newinfo); out: - xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) { + xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {if (j-- ==0 )break ;compat_release_entry (iter0);
@@ -1848,10 +1840,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len) goto free_newinfo; } - ret =translate_compat_table (net, tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks, - &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, tmp.size, - tmp.num_entries, tmp.hook_entry, - tmp.underflow); + ret =translate_compat_table (net, &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, &tmp);if (ret !=0 ) goto free_newinfo;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 12/17 netfilter: arp_tables: simplify translate_compat_table args
In reply to Florian Westphal--- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +36 -46
@@ -1214,6 +1214,18 @@ static int do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user, }#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +struct compat_arpt_replace { +char name[XT_TABLE_MAXNAMELEN ]; +u32 valid_hooks; +u32 num_entries; +u32 size; +u32 hook_entry[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS ]; +u32 underflow[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS ]; +u32 num_counters; +compat_uptr_t counters; +struct compat_arpt_entry entries[0 ]; +}; +static inline void compat_release_entry (struct compat_arpt_entry *e) {struct xt_entry_target *t;
@@ -1229,8 +1241,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,const unsigned char *base, const unsigned char *limit, const unsigned int *hook_entries, - const unsigned int *underflows, - const char *name) + const unsigned int *underflows) { struct xt_entry_target *t;struct xt_target *target;
@@ -1301,7 +1312,7 @@ out:static int compat_copy_entry_from_user (struct compat_arpt_entry *e,void **dstptr, -unsigned int *size,const char *name, +unsigned int *size,struct xt_table_info *newinfo,unsigned char *base) {struct xt_entry_target *t;
@@ -1334,14 +1345,9 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_arpt_entry *e, void **dstptr,return ret; } -static int translate_compat_table (const char *name, -unsigned int valid_hooks, -struct xt_table_info **pinfo, +static int translate_compat_table (struct xt_table_info **pinfo,void **pentry0, -unsigned int total_size, -unsigned int number, -unsigned int *hook_entries, -unsigned int *underflows) +const struct compat_arpt_replace *compatr) {unsigned int i, j;struct xt_table_info *newinfo, *info;
@@ -1353,8 +1359,8 @@ static int translate_compat_table(const char *name, info = *pinfo; entry0 = *pentry0; - size = total_size; - info->number = number; + size = compatr->size; + info->number = compatr->num_entries;/* Init all hooks to impossible value. */ for (i =0 ; i <NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS ; i++) {
@@ -1365,40 +1371,39 @@ static int translate_compat_table(const char *name,duprintf ("translate_compat_table: size %u\n" , info->size); j =0 ;xt_compat_lock (NFPROTO_ARP ); -xt_compat_init_offsets (NFPROTO_ARP , number); +xt_compat_init_offsets (NFPROTO_ARP , compatr->num_entries);/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */ - xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) { + xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) { ret =check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks (iter0, info, &size, entry0, - entry0 + total_size, - hook_entries, - underflows, - name); + entry0 + compatr->size, + compatr->hook_entry, + compatr->underflow);if (ret !=0 ) goto out_unlock; ++j; } ret = -EINVAL ; -if (j != number) { +if (j != compatr->num_entries) {duprintf ("translate_compat_table: %u not %u entries\n" , - j, number); + j, compatr->num_entries); goto out_unlock; }/* Check hooks all assigned */ for (i =0 ; i <NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS ; i++) {/* Only hooks which are valid */ -if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << i))) +if (!(compatr->valid_hooks & (1 << i)))continue ;if (info->hook_entry[i] ==0xFFFFFFFF ) {duprintf ("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n" , - i, hook_entries[i]); + i, info->hook_entry[i]); goto out_unlock; }if (info->underflow[i] ==0xFFFFFFFF ) {duprintf ("Invalid underflow %u %u\n" , - i, underflows[i]); + i, info->underflow[i]); goto out_unlock; } }
@@ -1408,17 +1413,17 @@ static int translate_compat_table(const char *name,if (!newinfo) goto out_unlock; - newinfo->number = number; + newinfo->number = compatr->num_entries;for (i =0 ; i <NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS ; i++) { newinfo->hook_entry[i] = info->hook_entry[i]; newinfo->underflow[i] = info->underflow[i]; } entry1 = newinfo->entries; pos = entry1; - size = total_size; - xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) { + size = compatr->size; + xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) { ret =compat_copy_entry_from_user (iter0, &pos, &size, - name, newinfo, entry1); + newinfo, entry1);if (ret !=0 )break ; }
@@ -1428,7 +1433,7 @@ static int translate_compat_table(const char *name, goto free_newinfo; ret = -ELOOP ; -if (!mark_source_chains (newinfo, valid_hooks, entry1)) +if (!mark_source_chains (newinfo, compatr->valid_hooks, entry1)) goto free_newinfo; i =0 ;
@@ -1439,7 +1444,7 @@ static int translate_compat_table(const char *name,break ; } - ret =check_target (iter1, name); + ret =check_target (iter1, compatr->name);if (ret !=0 ) {xt_percpu_counter_free (iter1->counters.pcnt);break ;
@@ -1481,7 +1486,7 @@ static int translate_compat_table(const char *name, free_newinfo:xt_free_table_info (newinfo); out: - xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) { + xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {if (j-- ==0 )break ;compat_release_entry (iter0);
@@ -1493,18 +1498,6 @@ out_unlock: goto out; } -struct compat_arpt_replace { -char name[XT_TABLE_MAXNAMELEN ]; -u32 valid_hooks; -u32 num_entries; -u32 size; -u32 hook_entry[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS ]; -u32 underflow[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS ]; -u32 num_counters; -compat_uptr_t counters; -struct compat_arpt_entry entries[0 ]; -}; -static int compat_do_replace (struct net *net,void __user *user,unsigned int len) {
@@ -1537,10 +1530,7 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, goto free_newinfo; } - ret =translate_compat_table (tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks, - &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, tmp.size, - tmp.num_entries, tmp.hook_entry, - tmp.underflow); + ret =translate_compat_table (&newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, &tmp);if (ret !=0 ) goto free_newinfo;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 13/17 netfilter: x_tables: xt_compat_match_from_user doesn't need a retval
In reply to Florian WestphalAlways returned 0.
--- include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 2 +- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 17 +++++------------ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 26 +++++++++----------------- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 27 +++++++++------------------ net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 5 ++--- 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h +1 -1
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ void xt_compat_init_offsets(u_int8_t af, unsigned int number);int xt_compat_calc_jump (u_int8_t af,unsigned int offset);int xt_compat_match_offset (const struct xt_match *match); -int xt_compat_match_from_user (struct xt_entry_match *m,void **dstptr, +void xt_compat_match_from_user (struct xt_entry_match *m,void **dstptr,unsigned int *size);int xt_compat_match_to_user (const struct xt_entry_match *m,void __user **dstptr,unsigned int *size);
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +5 -12
@@ -1310,7 +1310,7 @@ out:return ret; } -static int +static void compat_copy_entry_from_user (struct compat_arpt_entry *e,void **dstptr,unsigned int *size,struct xt_table_info *newinfo,unsigned char *base)
@@ -1319,9 +1319,8 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_arpt_entry *e, void **dstptr,struct xt_target *target;struct arpt_entry *de;unsigned int origsize; -int ret, h; +int h; - ret =0 ; origsize = *size; de = (struct arpt_entry *)*dstptr;memcpy (de, e,sizeof (struct arpt_entry ));
@@ -1342,7 +1341,6 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_arpt_entry *e, void **dstptr,if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h]) newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size; } -return ret; } static int translate_compat_table(struct xt_table_info **pinfo,
@@ -1421,16 +1419,11 @@ static int translate_compat_table(struct xt_table_info **pinfo, entry1 = newinfo->entries; pos = entry1; size = compatr->size; - xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) { - ret =compat_copy_entry_from_user (iter0, &pos, &size, - newinfo, entry1); -if (ret !=0 ) -break ; - } + xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) +compat_copy_entry_from_user (iter0, &pos, &size, + newinfo, entry1);xt_compat_flush_offsets (NFPROTO_ARP );xt_compat_unlock (NFPROTO_ARP ); -if (ret) - goto free_newinfo; ret = -ELOOP ;if (!mark_source_chains (newinfo, compatr->valid_hooks, entry1))
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +9 -17
@@ -1568,7 +1568,7 @@ release_matches:return ret; } -static int +static void compat_copy_entry_from_user (struct compat_ipt_entry *e,void **dstptr,unsigned int *size,struct xt_table_info *newinfo,unsigned char *base)
@@ -1577,10 +1577,9 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr,struct xt_target *target;struct ipt_entry *de;unsigned int origsize; -int ret, h; +int h;struct xt_entry_match *ematch; - ret =0 ; origsize = *size; de = (struct ipt_entry *)*dstptr;memcpy (de, e,sizeof (struct ipt_entry ));
@@ -1589,11 +1588,9 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr, *dstptr +=sizeof (struct ipt_entry ); *size +=sizeof (struct ipt_entry ) -sizeof (struct compat_ipt_entry ); - xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) { - ret =xt_compat_match_from_user (ematch, dstptr, size); -if (ret !=0 ) -return ret; - } + xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) +xt_compat_match_from_user (ematch, dstptr, size); + de->target_offset = e->target_offset - (origsize - *size); t =compat_ipt_get_target (e); target = t->u.kernel.target;
@@ -1606,7 +1603,6 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr,if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h]) newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size; } -return ret; } static int
@@ -1729,16 +1725,12 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net, entry1 = newinfo->entries; pos = entry1; size = compatr->size; - xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) { - ret =compat_copy_entry_from_user (iter0, &pos, &size, - newinfo, entry1); -if (ret !=0 ) -break ; - } + xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) +compat_copy_entry_from_user (iter0, &pos, &size, + newinfo, entry1); +xt_compat_flush_offsets (AF_INET );xt_compat_unlock (AF_INET ); -if (ret) - goto free_newinfo; ret = -ELOOP ;if (!mark_source_chains (newinfo, compatr->valid_hooks, entry1))
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +9 -18
@@ -1580,7 +1580,7 @@ release_matches:return ret; } -static int +static void compat_copy_entry_from_user (struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,void **dstptr,unsigned int *size,struct xt_table_info *newinfo,unsigned char *base)
@@ -1588,10 +1588,9 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e, void **dstptr,struct xt_entry_target *t;struct ip6t_entry *de;unsigned int origsize; -int ret, h; +int h;struct xt_entry_match *ematch; - ret =0 ; origsize = *size; de = (struct ip6t_entry *)*dstptr;memcpy (de, e,sizeof (struct ip6t_entry ));
@@ -1600,11 +1599,9 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e, void **dstptr, *dstptr +=sizeof (struct ip6t_entry ); *size +=sizeof (struct ip6t_entry ) -sizeof (struct compat_ip6t_entry ); - xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) { - ret =xt_compat_match_from_user (ematch, dstptr, size); -if (ret !=0 ) -return ret; - } + xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) +xt_compat_match_from_user (ematch, dstptr, size); + de->target_offset = e->target_offset - (origsize - *size); t =compat_ip6t_get_target (e);xt_compat_target_from_user (t, dstptr, size);
@@ -1616,7 +1613,6 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e, void **dstptr,if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h]) newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size; } -return ret; } static int compat_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net,
@@ -1737,17 +1733,12 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net, } entry1 = newinfo->entries; pos = entry1; - size = compatr->size; - xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) { - ret =compat_copy_entry_from_user (iter0, &pos, &size, - newinfo, entry1); -if (ret !=0 ) -break ; - } + xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) +compat_copy_entry_from_user (iter0, &pos, &size, + newinfo, entry1); +xt_compat_flush_offsets (AF_INET6 );xt_compat_unlock (AF_INET6 ); -if (ret) - goto free_newinfo; ret = -ELOOP ;if (!mark_source_chains (newinfo, compatr->valid_hooks, entry1))
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +2 -3
@@ -526,8 +526,8 @@ int xt_compat_match_offset(const struct xt_match *match) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xt_compat_match_offset); -int xt_compat_match_from_user (struct xt_entry_match *m,void **dstptr, -unsigned int *size) +void xt_compat_match_from_user (struct xt_entry_match *m,void **dstptr, +unsigned int *size) {const struct xt_match *match = m->u.kernel.match;struct compat_xt_entry_match *cm = (struct compat_xt_entry_match *)m;
@@ -549,7 +549,6 @@ int xt_compat_match_from_user(struct xt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr, *size += off; *dstptr += msize; -return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xt_compat_match_from_user);
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 14/17 netfilter: x_tables: do compat validation via translate_table
In reply to Florian WestphalThis looks like refactoring, but its also a bug fix.
Problem is that the compat path (32bit iptables, 64bit kernel) lacks a few sanity tests that are done in the normal path.
For example, we do not check for underflows and the base chain policies.
While its possible to also add such checks to the compat path, its more copy&pastry, for instance we cannot reuse check_underflow() helper as e->target_offset differs in the compat case.
Other problem is that it makes auditing for validation errors harder; two places need to be checked and kept in sync.
At a high level 32 bit compat works like this:
1- initial pass over blob:
validate match/entry offsets, bounds checking lookup all matches and targets
do bookkeeping wrt. size delta of 32/64bit structures assign match/target.u.kernel pointer (points at kernel implementation, needed to access ->compatsize etc.)
2- allocate memory according to the total bookkeeping size to
contain the translated ruleset
3- second pass over original blob:
for each entry, copy the 32bit representation to the newly allocated memory. This also does any special match translations (e.g. adjust 32bit to 64bit longs, etc).
4- check if ruleset is free of loops (chase all jumps)
5-first pass over translated blob:
call the checkentry function of all matches and targets.
The alternative implemented by this patch is to drop steps 3&4 from the compat process, the translation is changed into an intermediate step rather than a full 1:1 translate_table replacement.
In the 2nd pass (step #3), change the 64bit ruleset back to a kernel representation, i.e. put() the kernel pointer and restore ->u.user.name .
This gets us a 64bit ruleset that is in the format generated by a 64bit iptables userspace -- we can then use translate_table() to get the 'native' sanity checks.
This has two drawbacks:
1. we re-validate all the match and target entry structure sizes even though compat translation is supposed to never generate bogus offsets.
2. we put and then re-lookup each match and target.
THe upside is that we get all sanity tests and ruleset validations provided by the normal path and can remove some duplicated compat code.
iptables-restore time of autogenerated ruleset with 300k chains of form -A CHAIN0001 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0002
-A CHAIN0002 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0003
shows no noticeable differences in restore times:
old: 0m30.796s new: 0m31.521s
64bit: 0m25.674s
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 114 ++++++----------------------- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 155 ++++++++-------------------------------- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 148 ++++++-------------------------------- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 8 +++ 4 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 342 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +23 -91
@@ -1234,19 +1234,17 @@ static inline void compat_release_entry(struct compat_arpt_entry *e)module_put (t->u.kernel.target->me); } -static inline int +static int check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks (struct compat_arpt_entry *e,struct xt_table_info *newinfo,unsigned int *size,const unsigned char *base, -const unsigned char *limit, -const unsigned int *hook_entries, -const unsigned int *underflows) +const unsigned char *limit) {struct xt_entry_target *t;struct xt_target *target;unsigned int entry_offset; -int ret, off, h; +int ret, off;duprintf ("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n" , e); if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 ||
@@ -1291,17 +1289,6 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,if (ret) goto release_target; -/* Check hooks & underflows */ -for (h =0 ; h <NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS ; h++) { -if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h]) - newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h]; -if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) - newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h]; - } - -/* Clear counters and comefrom */ -memset (&e->counters,0 ,sizeof (e->counters)); - e->comefrom =0 ;return 0 ; release_target:
@@ -1351,7 +1338,7 @@ static int translate_compat_table(struct xt_table_info **pinfo,struct xt_table_info *newinfo, *info;void *pos, *entry0, *entry1;struct compat_arpt_entry *iter0; -struct arpt_entry *iter1; +struct arpt_replace repl;unsigned int size;int ret =0 ;
@@ -1360,12 +1347,6 @@ static int translate_compat_table(struct xt_table_info **pinfo, size = compatr->size; info->number = compatr->num_entries; -/* Init all hooks to impossible value. */ -for (i =0 ; i <NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS ; i++) { - info->hook_entry[i] =0xFFFFFFFF ; - info->underflow[i] =0xFFFFFFFF ; - } -duprintf ("translate_compat_table: size %u\n" , info->size); j =0 ;xt_compat_lock (NFPROTO_ARP );
@@ -1374,9 +1355,7 @@ static int translate_compat_table(struct xt_table_info **pinfo, xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) { ret =check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks (iter0, info, &size, entry0, - entry0 + compatr->size, - compatr->hook_entry, - compatr->underflow); + entry0 + compatr->size);if (ret !=0 ) goto out_unlock; ++j;
@@ -1389,23 +1368,6 @@ static int translate_compat_table(struct xt_table_info **pinfo, goto out_unlock; } -/* Check hooks all assigned */ -for (i =0 ; i <NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS ; i++) { -/* Only hooks which are valid */ -if (!(compatr->valid_hooks & (1 << i))) -continue ; -if (info->hook_entry[i] ==0xFFFFFFFF ) { -duprintf ("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n" , - i, info->hook_entry[i]); - goto out_unlock; - } -if (info->underflow[i] ==0xFFFFFFFF ) { -duprintf ("Invalid underflow %u %u\n" , - i, info->underflow[i]); - goto out_unlock; - } - } - ret = -ENOMEM ; newinfo =xt_alloc_table_info (size);if (!newinfo)
@@ -1422,55 +1384,26 @@ static int translate_compat_table(struct xt_table_info **pinfo, xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size)compat_copy_entry_from_user (iter0, &pos, &size, newinfo, entry1); + +/* all module references in entry0 are now gone */ +xt_compat_flush_offsets (NFPROTO_ARP );xt_compat_unlock (NFPROTO_ARP ); - ret = -ELOOP ; -if (!mark_source_chains (newinfo, compatr->valid_hooks, entry1)) - goto free_newinfo; - - i =0 ; - xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) { - iter1->counters.pcnt =xt_percpu_counter_alloc (); -if (IS_ERR_VALUE (iter1->counters.pcnt)) { - ret = -ENOMEM ; -break ; - } +memcpy (&repl, compatr,sizeof (*compatr)); - ret =check_target (iter1, compatr->name); -if (ret !=0 ) { -xt_percpu_counter_free (iter1->counters.pcnt); -break ; - } - ++i; -if (strcmp (arpt_get_target (iter1)->u.user.name, -XT_ERROR_TARGET ) ==0 ) - ++newinfo->stacksize; - } -if (ret) { -/* -* The first i matches need cleanup_entry (calls ->destroy) -* because they had called ->check already. The other j-i -* entries need only release. -*/ -int skip = i; - j -= i; - xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, newinfo->size) { -if (skip-- >0 ) -continue ; -if (j-- ==0 ) -break ; -compat_release_entry (iter0); - } - xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) { -if (i-- ==0 ) -break ; -cleanup_entry (iter1); - } -xt_free_table_info (newinfo); -return ret; +for (i =0 ; i <NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS ; i++) { + repl.hook_entry[i] = newinfo->hook_entry[i]; + repl.underflow[i] = newinfo->underflow[i]; } + repl.num_counters =0 ; + repl.counters =NULL ; + repl.size = newinfo->size; + ret =translate_table (newinfo, entry1, &repl); +if (ret) + goto free_newinfo; + *pinfo = newinfo; *pentry0 = entry1;xt_free_table_info (info);
@@ -1478,17 +1411,16 @@ static int translate_compat_table(struct xt_table_info **pinfo, free_newinfo:xt_free_table_info (newinfo); -out: +return ret; +out_unlock: +xt_compat_flush_offsets (NFPROTO_ARP ); +xt_compat_unlock (NFPROTO_ARP ); xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {if (j-- ==0 )break ;compat_release_entry (iter0); }return ret; -out_unlock: -xt_compat_flush_offsets (NFPROTO_ARP ); -xt_compat_unlock (NFPROTO_ARP ); - goto out; } static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +29 -126
239 lines not on this page · raw message
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +23 -125
227 lines not on this page · raw message
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +8 -0
@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ void xt_compat_match_from_user(struct xt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr,struct compat_xt_entry_match *cm = (struct compat_xt_entry_match *)m;int pad, off =xt_compat_match_offset (match);u_int16_t msize = cm->u.user.match_size; +char name[sizeof (m->u.user.name)]; m = *dstptr;memcpy (m, cm,sizeof (*cm));
@@ -546,6 +547,9 @@ void xt_compat_match_from_user(struct xt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr, msize += off; m->u.user.match_size = msize; +strlcpy (name, match->name,sizeof (name)); +module_put (match->me); +strncpy (m->u.user.name, name,sizeof (m->u.user.name)); *size += off; *dstptr += msize;
@@ -763,6 +767,7 @@ void xt_compat_target_from_user(struct xt_entry_target *t, void **dstptr,struct compat_xt_entry_target *ct = (struct compat_xt_entry_target *)t;int pad, off =xt_compat_target_offset (target);u_int16_t tsize = ct->u.user.target_size; +char name[sizeof (t->u.user.name)]; t = *dstptr;memcpy (t, ct,sizeof (*ct));
@@ -776,6 +781,9 @@ void xt_compat_target_from_user(struct xt_entry_target *t, void **dstptr, tsize += off; t->u.user.target_size = tsize; +strlcpy (name, target->name,sizeof (name)); +module_put (target->me); +strncpy (t->u.user.name, name,sizeof (t->u.user.name)); *size += off; *dstptr += tsize;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 15/17 netfilter: x_tables: remove obsolete overflow check for compat case too
In reply to Florian Westphalcommit 9e67d5a739327c44885adebb4f3a538050be73e4 ("[NETFILTER]: x_tables: remove obsolete overflow check") left the compat parts alone, but we can kill it there as well.
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 2 -- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 2 -- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 2 -- 3 files changed, 6 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +0 -2
@@ -1436,8 +1436,6 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,return -EFAULT ;/* overflow check */ -if (tmp.size >=INT_MAX /num_possible_cpus ()) -return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters >=INT_MAX /sizeof (struct xt_counters ))return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters ==0 )
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +0 -2
@@ -1706,8 +1706,6 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)return -EFAULT ;/* overflow check */ -if (tmp.size >=INT_MAX /num_possible_cpus ()) -return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters >=INT_MAX /sizeof (struct xt_counters ))return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters ==0 )
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +0 -2
@@ -1709,8 +1709,6 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)return -EFAULT ;/* overflow check */ -if (tmp.size >=INT_MAX /num_possible_cpus ()) -return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters >=INT_MAX /sizeof (struct xt_counters ))return -ENOMEM ;if (tmp.num_counters ==0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 16/17 netfilter: x_tables: remove obsolete check
In reply to Florian WestphalSince 'netfilter: x_tables: validate targets of jumps' change we validate that the target aligns exactly with beginning of a rule, so offset test is now redundant.
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 8 -------- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 7 ------- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 7 ------- 3 files changed, 22 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +0 -8
@@ -461,14 +461,6 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,if (strcmp (t->target.u.user.name,XT_STANDARD_TARGET ) ==0 && newpos >=0 ) { -if (newpos > newinfo->size - -sizeof (struct arpt_entry )) { -duprintf ("mark_source_chains: " -"bad verdict (%i)\n" , - newpos); -return 0 ; - } -/* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf ("Jump rule %u -> %u\n" , pos, newpos);
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +0 -7
@@ -542,13 +542,6 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,if (strcmp (t->target.u.user.name,XT_STANDARD_TARGET ) ==0 && newpos >=0 ) { -if (newpos > newinfo->size - -sizeof (struct ipt_entry )) { -duprintf ("mark_source_chains: " -"bad verdict (%i)\n" , - newpos); -return 0 ; - }/* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf ("Jump rule %u -> %u\n" , pos, newpos);
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +0 -7
@@ -554,13 +554,6 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,if (strcmp (t->target.u.user.name,XT_STANDARD_TARGET ) ==0 && newpos >=0 ) { -if (newpos > newinfo->size - -sizeof (struct ip6t_entry )) { -duprintf ("mark_source_chains: " -"bad verdict (%i)\n" , - newpos); -return 0 ; - }/* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf ("Jump rule %u -> %u\n" , pos, newpos);
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH 17/17 netfilter: x_tables: introduce and use xt_copy_counters_from_user
In reply to Florian WestphalThe three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a helper and use that.
Make sure info.name is 0-terminated.
--- include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 3 ++ net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 48 +++---------------------- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 48 +++---------------------- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 49 +++---------------------- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-)
include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h +3 -0
@@ -251,6 +251,9 @@ int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto,int xt_check_target (struct xt_tgchk_param *,unsigned int size,u_int8_t proto,bool inv_proto); +void *xt_copy_counters_from_user (const void __user *user,unsigned int len, +struct xt_counters_info *info,bool compat); + struct xt_table *xt_register_table(struct net *net, const struct xt_table *table, struct xt_table_info *bootstrap,
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +5 -43
67 lines not on this page · raw message
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +5 -43
67 lines not on this page · raw message
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +5 -44
67 lines not on this page · raw message
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +73 -0
79 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
kbuild test robot
build botRe: [PATCH nf 17/17] netfilter: x_tables: introduce and use xt_copy_counters_from_user
reproduce: wget https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/wfg/lkp-tests.git/plain/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross # save the attached .config to linux build tree…
Hi Florian,
[auto build test ERROR on nf/master]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Florian-Westphal/netfilter-x_tables-don-t-move-to-non-existent-next-rule/20160401-202022 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf master config: avr32-atngw100_defconfig (attached as .config)
reproduce:
wget https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/wfg/lkp-tests.git/plain/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
make.cross ARCH=avr32
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
ERROR: "xt_copy_counters_from_user" [net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.ko] undefined!
>> ERROR: "xt_copy_counters_from_user" [net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.ko] undefined!
WARNING: modpost: Found 5 section mismatch(es). To see full details build your kernel with:
'make CONFIG_DEBUG_SECTION_MISMATCH=y'
---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation
kbuild test robot
build botRe: [PATCH nf 17/17] netfilter: x_tables: introduce and use xt_copy_counters_from_user
In reply to Florian Westphalreproduce: wget https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/wfg/lkp-tests.git/plain/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross # save the attached .config to linux build tree…
Hi Florian,
[auto build test ERROR on nf/master]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Florian-Westphal/netfilter-x_tables-don-t-move-to-non-existent-next-rule/20160401-202022 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf master config: sh-titan_defconfig (attached as .config)
reproduce:
wget https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/wfg/lkp-tests.git/plain/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
make.cross ARCH=sh
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
ERROR: "xt_copy_counters_from_user" [net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "xt_copy_counters_from_user" [net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.ko] undefined!
>> ERROR: "xt_copy_counters_from_user" [net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.ko] undefined!
---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation
kbuild test robot
build botRe: [PATCH nf 17/17] netfilter: x_tables: introduce and use xt_copy_counters_from_user
In reply to Florian Westphalreproduce:
Hi Florian,
[auto build test ERROR on nf/master]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Florian-Westphal/netfilter-x_tables-don-t-move-to-non-existent-next-rule/20160401-202022 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf master config: i386-randconfig-s0-201613 (attached as .config) reproduce: # save the attached .config to linux build tree make ARCH=i386
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> ERROR: "xt_copy_counters_from_user" [net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.ko] undefined!
---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH v2 17/17 netfilter: x_tables: introduce and use xt_copy_counters_from_user
In reply to Florian WestphalThe three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a helper and use that.
Make sure info.name is 0-terminated.
---
V2: add EXPORT_SYMBOL(), else iptables=m builds fail.
include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 3 ++ net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 48 +++---------------------- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 48 +++---------------------- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 49 +++---------------------- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-)
include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h +3 -0
@@ -251,6 +251,9 @@ int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto,int xt_check_target (struct xt_tgchk_param *,unsigned int size,u_int8_t proto,bool inv_proto); +void *xt_copy_counters_from_user (const void __user *user,unsigned int len, +struct xt_counters_info *info,bool compat); + struct xt_table *xt_register_table(struct net *net, const struct xt_table *table, struct xt_table_info *bootstrap,
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +5 -43
67 lines not on this page · raw message
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +5 -43
67 lines not on this page · raw message
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +5 -44
67 lines not on this page · raw message
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +74 -0
80 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.7.3
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerHi Florian,
Quoted 17 lines · Florian Westphal
This series adds more checks on xtables (arp, ip, ip6tables) rulesets.
- check all offsets (target, next) of all rules during initial pass after copy from userspace.
- check targets of jumps (-j bla): offset should be start of a rule
- assert that alleged target size is at least as big as minimum target structure
- changeCONFIG_COMPATcode path to push ruleset via normal setsockopt path after initial 32->64 bit conversion to avoid duplicating checks
- use a common helper to copy counters from userspace instead of the ip/ip6/arp implementation.Tested:
- iptables.gitiptables-test.pypasses
- made a few performance tests w. really silly rulesets to verify that things don't slow down too much, see individual patches for details.
Quoted 6 lines
include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 12 + net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 303 ++++++++++------------------------ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 327 +++++++++---------------------------- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 320 ++++++++---------------------------- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 244 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 506 insertions(+), 700 deletions(-)
Nice work, and we got less code to maintain, good :)
I'm starting to consider that, given that this has been broken since day 1, we pass this through nf-next and then later on we request inclusion for -stable.
We'll have more time in case of fallout (I know you have done a great effort to intensively test this) but this batch looks large that why I'm thinking about this route change.
Let me know, thanks!
Florian Westphal
maintainerQuoted 25 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 17 lines · Florian Westphal
This series adds more checks on xtables (arp, ip, ip6tables) rulesets.
- check all offsets (target, next) of all rules during initial pass after copy from userspace.
- check targets of jumps (-j bla): offset should be start of a rule
- assert that alleged target size is at least as big as minimum target structure
- changeCONFIG_COMPATcode path to push ruleset via normal setsockopt path after initial 32->64 bit conversion to avoid duplicating checks
- use a common helper to copy counters from userspace instead of the ip/ip6/arp implementation.Tested:
- iptables.gitiptables-test.pypasses
- made a few performance tests w. really silly rulesets to verify that things don't slow down too much, see individual patches for details.Quoted 6 lines
include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 12 + net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 303 ++++++++++------------------------ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 327 +++++++++---------------------------- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 320 ++++++++---------------------------- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 244 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 506 insertions(+), 700 deletions(-)
Quoted 5 lines
Nice work, and we got less code to maintain, good :)
I'm starting to consider that, given that this has been broken since day 1, we pass this through nf-next and then later on we request inclusion for -stable.
Fine with me.
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Florian Westphal
Quoted 3 lines
I'm starting to consider that, given that this has been broken since day 1, we pass this through nf-next and then later on we request inclusion for -stable.
Fine with me.
Florian, I'm going to send a pull request to David, then resync and place this into nf-next. But first I'm going to send a pull request with the little stuff I have in that tree.
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerQuoted 12 lines · Florian Westphal
This series adds more checks on xtables (arp, ip, ip6tables) rulesets.
- check all offsets (target, next) of all rules during initial pass after copy from userspace.
- check targets of jumps (-j bla): offset should be start of a rule
- assert that alleged target size is at least as big as minimum target structure
- changeCONFIG_COMPATcode path to push ruleset via normal setsockopt path after initial 32->64 bit conversion to avoid duplicating checks
- use a common helper to copy counters from userspace instead of the ip/ip6/arp implementation.
Quoted 4 lines
Tested:
- iptables.gitiptables-test.pypasses
- made a few performance tests w. really silly rulesets to verify that things don't slow down too much, see individual patches for details.
Series applied to nf-next, thanks for your patience.