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using TPM2 NVRAM for storing LUKS password

tpm2 Patrick Ohly 4 participants 11 messages Nov 9, 2017 – Nov 27, 2017

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Patrick Ohly

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#0 lore raw

Hello!

I am trying to port the refkit support for whole-disk encryption from TPM 1.2 to TPM 2.0. In refkit, an installer image sets up the internal disk with the root partition encrypted with LUKS. The initramfs then unlocks that partition before mounting it and transferring control to /bin/init. TPM NVRAM is used to store a per-machine LUKS password.

The automated tests uses QEMU + swtpm. More precisely, I am using QEMU 2.10.0 with backported chardev patches plus a custom patch that makes it possible to have QEMU start swtpm.  swtpm and libtpms are from the current tpm2-preview branches (5c70e401824e4f3f0900bddb50e7ea5fb7bbd84f resp. e0331c6d71b273ef7f71ce6fa17306f6773f543e).

I'm using tpm2.0-tools v2.1.0. Kernel is 4.9.

In this setup, I get a TPM2.0 /dev/tpm0 in the virtual machine when I start QEMU with:

-chardev 'socket,id=chrtpm0,cmd=exec swtpm_oe.sh socket --terminate --ctrl type=unixio,,clientfd=0 --tpmstate dir=... --log level=10,,file=.../swtpm.log --tpm2' \
-tpmdev emulator,id=tpm0,chardev=chrtpm0 \
-device tpm-tis,tpmdev=tpm0

The whole thing is built with Yocto/OE-Core, hence the swtpm_oe.sh wrapper script. It just sets some paths, then calls swtpm.

There are automated tests, too. All of this was working with TPM1.2. With TPM2.0, I have everything set up and installing to internal disk works without issues. But after rebooting the virtual machine, the NVRAM no longer contains the password. tpm2_nvlist shows nothing.

I'm unsure whether this is an issue in tpm2.0-tools, in swtpm2, or my usage of both. Let me describe in more details what commands are used.

The virtual TPM gets initialized with:

    swtpm_setup_oe.sh --tpm2 --tpm-state ... --createe

The commands that run as part of installation are:

    tpm2_takeownership -o ownerpass -e endorsepass -l lockpass
    tpm2_nvdefine -x 0x1500001 -s 40 -a 0x40000001 -t 0x80020002 -P ownerpass
    tpm2_nvwrite -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -f /dev/shm/keydir.sVrmLQ/keyfile -P ownerpass
    52 45 46 4b 49 54 5f 30 70 e6 2b b9 ca 0c 1c 00 1d 6d eb 58 a1 7a cf 0d 1d 71 46 bc fd 7a 80 a0 8f 8b 0a 30 fc 89 9b db 

    tpm2_nvlist
    1 NV indexes defined.

      0. NV Index: 0x1500001
      {
    	    Hash algorithm(nameAlg):11
         	    The Index attributes(attributes):0xa0020002
         	    The size of the data area(dataSize):40
       }

    tpm2_nvreadlock -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -P ownerpass

Then the initramfs does:

    tpm2_nvlist
    0 NV indexes defined.

    tpm2_nvread -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -s 40 -o 0 -P ownerpass
    ERROR: Failed to read NVRAM area at index 0x1500001 (22020097). Error:0x28b

I tried also without tpm2_nvreadlock and without tpm2_takeownership, but neither of that made a difference.

Conceptually this is similar to the commands used with TPM 1.2. The simplifying assumption is that only a single OS is getting installed to virgin hardware and then Secure Boot ensures that no other code ever gets access to the active TPM. Therefore a fixed index and no real access protection for the slot are okay. A read-lock is set to ensure that the key is protected from potentially malicious applications which
might have access to /dev/tpm0. Does that sound alright?

The index was chosen as in the tpm2.0-tools Wiki (https://github.com/in
tel/tpm2-tools/wiki/How-to-use-tpm2-tools). Is there anything special about that index?

I checked the swtpm.log (log level 10). Somehow it only contains SWTPM_IO_Read/Write entries. I'll check whether logging perhaps also needs to be enabled during compilation.

Any other suggestions for how I could debug this?

Signature · 6 lines
Best Regards, Patrick Ohly

The content of this message is my personal opinion only and although
I am an employee of Intel, the statements I make here in no way
represent Intel's position on the issue, nor am I authorized to speak
on behalf of Intel on this matter.
#1 lore raw

Hello Patrick,

Quoted 57 lines · Patrick Ohly

Hello!

I am trying to port the refkit support for whole-disk encryption from TPM 1.2 to TPM 2.0. In refkit, an installer image sets up the internal disk with the root partition encrypted with LUKS. The initramfs then unlocks that partition before mounting it and transferring control to /bin/init. TPM NVRAM is used to store a per-machine LUKS password.

The automated tests uses QEMU + swtpm. More precisely, I am using QEMU 2.10.0 with backported chardev patches plus a custom patch that makes it possible to have QEMU start swtpm. swtpm and libtpms are from the current tpm2-preview branches (5c70e401824e4f3f0900bddb50e7ea5fb7bbd84f resp. e0331c6d71b273ef7f71ce6fa17306f6773f543e).

I'm using tpm2.0-tools v2.1.0. Kernel is 4.9.

In this setup, I get a TPM2.0 /dev/tpm0 in the virtual machine when I start QEMU with:

(quoted diff) +0 -3
-chardev 'socket,id=chrtpm0,cmd=exec swtpm_oe.sh socket --terminate --ctrl type=unixio,,clientfd=0 --tpmstate dir=... --log level=10,,file=.../swtpm.log --tpm2' \
-tpmdev emulator,id=tpm0,chardev=chrtpm0 \
-device tpm-tis,tpmdev=tpm0 

The whole thing is built with Yocto/OE-Core, hence the swtpm_oe.sh wrapper script. It just sets some paths, then calls swtpm.

There are automated tests, too. All of this was working with TPM1.2. With TPM2.0, I have everything set up and installing to internal disk works without issues. But after rebooting the virtual machine, the NVRAM no longer contains the password. tpm2_nvlist shows nothing.

I'm unsure whether this is an issue in tpm2.0-tools, in swtpm2, or my usage of both. Let me describe in more details what commands are used.

The virtual TPM gets initialized with:

    swtpm_setup_oe.sh --tpm2 --tpm-state ... --createe

The commands that run as part of installation are:

    tpm2_takeownership -o ownerpass -e endorsepass -l lockpass
    tpm2_nvdefine -x 0x1500001 -s 40 -a 0x40000001 -t 0x80020002 -P ownerpass
    tpm2_nvwrite -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -f /dev/shm/keydir.sVrmLQ/keyfile -P ownerpass
    52 45 46 4b 49 54 5f 30 70 e6 2b b9 ca 0c 1c 00 1d 6d eb 58 a1 7a cf 0d 1d 71 46 bc fd 7a 80 a0 8f 8b 0a 30 fc 89 9b db 

    tpm2_nvlist
    1 NV indexes defined.

      0. NV Index: 0x1500001
      {
    	    Hash algorithm(nameAlg):11
         	    The Index attributes(attributes):0xa0020002
         	    The size of the data area(dataSize):40
       }

    tpm2_nvreadlock -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -P ownerpass

Then the initramfs does:

Quoted 9 lines
    tpm2_nvlist
    0 NV indexes defined.

    tpm2_nvread -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -s 40 -o 0 -P ownerpass
    ERROR: Failed to read NVRAM area at index 0x1500001 (22020097). Error:0x28b

I tried also without tpm2_nvreadlock and without tpm2_takeownership, but neither of that made a difference.

Are you sure that the TPM2 state is maintained between VM reboots? I mean, did you try for example making a transient object (i.e: a key) persistent using the TPM2_EvictControl command and then check if is still listed after a VM reboot?

I wonder if the problem is only with the objects written with tpm2_nvwrite or anything that ends being persisted in the NVRAM.

For example, you can try something like the following commands:

$ tpm2_createprimary -A o -g 0x4 -G 0x25 -C primary.context          
nameAlg = 0x0004            
type = 0x0025               
contextFile = primary.context                           

CreatePrimary Succeed ! Handle: 0x80ffffff

$ tpm2_evictcontrol -A o -c primary.context -S 0x81000000            
persistentHandle: 0x8100000

And then after a reboot:

$ tpm2_listpersistent 
1 persistent objects defined.
  0. Persistent handle: 0x81000000
  {
        Type: 0x25
        Hash algorithm(nameAlg): 0x4
        Attributes: 0x30072
  }
Quoted 8 lines

Conceptually this is similar to the commands used with TPM 1.2. The simplifying assumption is that only a single OS is getting installed to virgin hardware and then Secure Boot ensures that no other code ever gets access to the active TPM. Therefore a fixed index and no real access protection for the slot are okay. A read-lock is set to ensure that the key is protected from potentially malicious applications which
might have access to /dev/tpm0. Does that sound alright?

That sounds reasonable. There are other attack vectors like someone replacing your initramfs (that's not signed in a Secure Boot) and reading the LUKS pass before the tpm2_nvreadlock.

Quoted 4 lines

The index was chosen as in the tpm2.0-tools Wiki (https://github.com/in
tel/tpm2-tools/wiki/How-to-use-tpm2-tools). Is there anything special about that index?

The index seems correct, the NV Index Areas start at the 0x01000000 address.

Quoted 6 lines

I checked the swtpm.log (log level 10). Somehow it only contains SWTPM_IO_Read/Write entries. I'll check whether logging perhaps also needs to be enabled during compilation.

Any other suggestions for how I could debug this?

Unfortunately I'm not familiar with swtpm and QEMU but I would test the commands I mentioned above.

Best regards,

Signature · 3 lines
Javier Martinez Canillas
Software Engineer - Desktop Hardware Enablement
Red Hat
author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Javier Martinez Canillas

Hello Patrick,

Quoted 4 lines · Patrick Ohly

I tried also without tpm2_nvreadlock and without
tpm2_takeownership,
but neither of that made a difference.

Are you sure that the TPM2 state is maintained between VM reboots?

It should be.

Quoted 27 lines

I mean, did
you try for example making a transient object (i.e: a key) persistent using the
TPM2_EvictControl command and then check if is still listed after a VM reboot?

I wonder if the problem is only with the objects written with tpm2_nvwrite or
anything that ends being persisted in the NVRAM.

For example, you can try something like the following commands:

$ tpm2_createprimary -A o -g 0x4 -G 0x25 -C primary.context          
nameAlg = 0x0004            
type = 0x0025               
contextFile = primary.context                           

CreatePrimary Succeed ! Handle: 0x80ffffff

$ tpm2_evictcontrol -A o -c primary.context -S 0x81000000            
persistentHandle: 0x8100000

And then after a reboot:

$ tpm2_listpersistent 
1 persistent objects defined.
Quoted 6 lines

  0. Persistent handle: 0x81000000
  {
        Type: 0x25
        Hash algorithm(nameAlg): 0x4
        Attributes: 0x30072
  }

That works if I keep swtpm running across the reboot. But as with tpm2_nvdefine (see my other mail to Stefan), the persistent object is gone after restarting swtpm.

Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 12 lines

Conceptually this is similar to the commands used with TPM 1.2. The simplifying assumption is that only a single OS is getting installed to
virgin hardware and then Secure Boot ensures that no other code ever
gets access to the active TPM. Therefore a fixed index and no real access protection for the slot are okay. A read-lock is set to ensure
that the key is protected from potentially malicious applications which
 might have access to /dev/tpm0. Does that sound alright?

Quoted 3 lines

That sounds reasonable. There are other attack vectors like someone replacing your initramfs (that's not signed in a Secure Boot) and reading the LUKS pass before the tpm2_nvreadlock.

True. In refkit, the UEFI firmware directly loads a signed UEFI combined app which contains initramfs, kernel and boot parameters, so there shouldn't be a way for an attacker to intercept booting before the initramfs runs.

Signature · 6 lines
Best Regards, Patrick Ohly

The content of this message is my personal opinion only and although
I am an employee of Intel, the statements I make here in no way
represent Intel's position on the issue, nor am I authorized to speak
on behalf of Intel on this matter.
#3 lore raw
In reply to Patrick Ohly

Hi Patrick,

Quoted 7 lines · Patrick Ohly

Hello!

I am trying to port the refkit support for whole-disk encryption from TPM 1.2 to TPM 2.0. In refkit, an installer image sets up the internal disk with the root partition encrypted with LUKS. The initramfs then unlocks that partition before mounting it and transferring control to /bin/init. TPM NVRAM is used to store a per-machine LUKS password.

You may also want to take a look at similar work WindRiver has done with tying disk encryption to the TPM2. Checking your code against an existing implementation may be a good way to remove some variables from your debugging:

https://github.com/WindRiver-OpenSourceLabs/cryptfs-tpm2

Regards,
Philip

Quoted 76 lines

The automated tests uses QEMU + swtpm. More precisely, I am using QEMU 2.10.0 with backported chardev patches plus a custom patch that makes it possible to have QEMU start swtpm.  swtpm and libtpms are from the current tpm2-preview branches (5c70e401824e4f3f0900bddb50e7ea5fb7bbd84f resp. e0331c6d71b273ef7f71ce6fa17306f6773f543e).

I'm using tpm2.0-tools v2.1.0. Kernel is 4.9.

In this setup, I get a TPM2.0 /dev/tpm0 in the virtual machine when I start QEMU with:

(quoted diff) +0 -3
-chardev 'socket,id=chrtpm0,cmd=exec swtpm_oe.sh socket --terminate --ctrl type=unixio,,clientfd=0 --tpmstate dir=... --log level=10,,file=.../swtpm.log --tpm2' \
-tpmdev emulator,id=tpm0,chardev=chrtpm0 \
-device tpm-tis,tpmdev=tpm0 

The whole thing is built with Yocto/OE-Core, hence the swtpm_oe.sh wrapper script. It just sets some paths, then calls swtpm.

There are automated tests, too. All of this was working with TPM1.2. With TPM2.0, I have everything set up and installing to internal disk works without issues. But after rebooting the virtual machine, the NVRAM no longer contains the password. tpm2_nvlist shows nothing.

I'm unsure whether this is an issue in tpm2.0-tools, in swtpm2, or my usage of both. Let me describe in more details what commands are used.

The virtual TPM gets initialized with:

    swtpm_setup_oe.sh --tpm2 --tpm-state ... --createe

The commands that run as part of installation are:

    tpm2_takeownership -o ownerpass -e endorsepass -l lockpass
    tpm2_nvdefine -x 0x1500001 -s 40 -a 0x40000001 -t 0x80020002 -P ownerpass
    tpm2_nvwrite -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -f /dev/shm/keydir.sVrmLQ/keyfile -P ownerpass
    52 45 46 4b 49 54 5f 30 70 e6 2b b9 ca 0c 1c 00 1d 6d eb 58 a1 7a cf 0d 1d 71 46 bc fd 7a 80 a0 8f 8b 0a 30 fc 89 9b db 

    tpm2_nvlist
    1 NV indexes defined.

      0. NV Index: 0x1500001
      {
    	    Hash algorithm(nameAlg):11
         	    The Index attributes(attributes):0xa0020002
         	    The size of the data area(dataSize):40
       }

    tpm2_nvreadlock -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -P ownerpass

Then the initramfs does:

    tpm2_nvlist
    0 NV indexes defined.

    tpm2_nvread -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -s 40 -o 0 -P ownerpass
    ERROR: Failed to read NVRAM area at index 0x1500001 (22020097). Error:0x28b

I tried also without tpm2_nvreadlock and without tpm2_takeownership, but neither of that made a difference.

Conceptually this is similar to the commands used with TPM 1.2. The simplifying assumption is that only a single OS is getting installed to virgin hardware and then Secure Boot ensures that no other code ever gets access to the active TPM. Therefore a fixed index and no real access protection for the slot are okay. A read-lock is set to ensure that the key is protected from potentially malicious applications which
might have access to /dev/tpm0. Does that sound alright?

The index was chosen as in the tpm2.0-tools Wiki (https://github.com/in
tel/tpm2-tools/wiki/How-to-use-tpm2-tools). Is there anything special about that index?

I checked the swtpm.log (log level 10). Somehow it only contains SWTPM_IO_Read/Write entries. I'll check whether logging perhaps also needs to be enabled during compilation.

Any other suggestions for how I could debug this?

author
#4 lore raw
In reply to Patrick Ohly
Quoted 26 lines · Patrick Ohly

The commands that run as part of installation are:
    tpm2_takeownership -o ownerpass -e endorsepass -l lockpass tpm2_nvdefine -x 0x1500001 -s 40 -a 0x40000001 -t 0x80020002 -P ownerpass
    tpm2_nvwrite -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -f /dev/shm/keydir.sVrmLQ/keyfile -P ownerpass
    52 45 46 4b 49 54 5f 30 70 e6 2b b9 ca 0c 1c 00 1d 6d eb 58 a1 7a cf 0d 1d 71 46 bc fd 7a 80 a0 8f 8b 0a 30 fc 89 9b db

    tpm2_nvlist
    1 NV indexes defined.

      0. NV Index: 0x1500001
      {
         Hash algorithm(nameAlg):11
              The Index attributes(attributes):0xa0020002 The size of the data area(dataSize):40 }

    tpm2_nvreadlock -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -P ownerpass

Then the initramfs does:
    tpm2_nvlist
    0 NV indexes defined.

Quoted 6 lines

    tpm2_nvread -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -s 40 -o 0 -P ownerpass
    ERROR: Failed to read NVRAM area at index 0x1500001 (22020097). Error:0x28b

I tried also without tpm2_nvreadlock and without tpm2_takeownership, but neither of that made a difference.

I forgot to ask one conceptual question: in the proposed usage scenario, does it make sense to take ownership of the TPM? All passwords would have to be well-known, because there is no user or other form of input available which could provide them. So taking ownership doesn't really change much from a security perspective.

https://github.com/intel/tpm2-tools/wiki/How-to-use-tpm2-tools shows that all NVRAM operations also work without taking ownership, but doesn't go into the pros and cons of that.

Signature · 6 lines
Best Regards, Patrick Ohly

The content of this message is my personal opinion only and although
I am an employee of Intel, the statements I make here in no way
represent Intel's position on the issue, nor am I authorized to speak
on behalf of Intel on this matter.
author
#5 lore raw
In reply to Patrick Ohly
Quoted 9 lines · Patrick Ohly

Hello!

I am trying to port the refkit support for whole-disk encryption from TPM 1.2 to TPM 2.0. In refkit, an installer image sets up the internal
disk with the root partition encrypted with LUKS. The initramfs then unlocks that partition before mounting it and transferring control to /bin/init. TPM NVRAM is used to store a per-machine LUKS password.

Quoted 7 lines

The automated tests uses QEMU + swtpm. More precisely, I am using QEMU
2.10.0 with backported chardev patches plus a custom patch that makes it possible to have QEMU start swtpm.  swtpm and libtpms are from the current tpm2-preview branches (5c70e401824e4f3f0900bddb50e7ea5fb7bbd84f
resp. e0331c6d71b273ef7f71ce6fa17306f6773f543e).

I found that I was accidentally building with a different swtpm2 recipe in a local workspace, which used an older revision. I also noticed that the libtpms tpm2-preview branch doesn't actually have the latest
revision: tpm2-preview.rev146 is more recent.

To cut a long story short, with swtpm = 2dfd15d22b425c1ca92c9bc9f03c84634e6e344a and libtpms = 14cb73d6658a9baa41a5e2ff542168463b7becf0 it now works :-)

Stefan, I know you said that you still want to continue rebasing your tpm2 branches because they aren't ready for use. Do you have an estimate when the code might become released officially?

I'm also still curious about taking ownership of the TPM.

Signature · 6 lines
Best Regards, Patrick Ohly

The content of this message is my personal opinion only and although
I am an employee of Intel, the statements I make here in no way
represent Intel's position on the issue, nor am I authorized to speak
on behalf of Intel on this matter.
#6 lore raw
Quoted 17 lines · Patrick Ohly
Quoted 9 lines · Patrick Ohly

Hello!

I am trying to port the refkit support for whole-disk encryption from TPM 1.2 to TPM 2.0. In refkit, an installer image sets up the internal
disk with the root partition encrypted with LUKS. The initramfs then unlocks that partition before mounting it and transferring control to /bin/init. TPM NVRAM is used to store a per-machine LUKS password.

Quoted 7 lines

The automated tests uses QEMU + swtpm. More precisely, I am using QEMU
2.10.0 with backported chardev patches plus a custom patch that makes it possible to have QEMU start swtpm. swtpm and libtpms are from the current tpm2-preview branches (5c70e401824e4f3f0900bddb50e7ea5fb7bbd84f
resp. e0331c6d71b273ef7f71ce6fa17306f6773f543e).

Quoted 8 lines

I found that I was accidentally building with a different swtpm2 recipe in a local workspace, which used an older revision. I also noticed that the libtpms tpm2-preview branch doesn't actually have the latest
revision: tpm2-preview.rev146 is more recent.

To cut a long story short, with swtpm = 2dfd15d22b425c1ca92c9bc9f03c84634e6e344a and libtpms = 14cb73d6658a9baa41a5e2ff542168463b7becf0 it now works :-)

Should have read the most recent message first :-)

Quoted 4 lines

Stefan, I know you said that you still want to continue rebasing your tpm2 branches because they aren't ready for use. Do you have an estimate when the code might become released officially?

QEMU will create version 2.11 in mid December. I would like to have an official version for 2.12, so that would probably be March 2018. I hope we can have some more people testing it or looking at the code until then... I want to be able to support TPM migration in QEMU once it opens up for new code in mid December. And migration needs testers.

The proportion between lines of code and eyes looking at it isn't quite right when it comes to TPM and especially swtpm and libtpms.

Quoted 3 lines

I'm also still curious about taking ownership of the TPM.

author
#7 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines · Stefan Berger
Quoted 4 lines · Patrick Ohly

Stefan, I know you said that you still want to continue rebasing your
tpm2 branches because they aren't ready for use. Do you have an estimate when the code might become released officially?

QEMU will create version 2.11 in mid December. I would like to have an
official version for 2.12, so that would probably be March 2018. I hope
we can have some more people testing it or looking at the code until then... I want to be able to support TPM migration in QEMU once it opens
up for new code in mid December. And migration needs testers.

Quoted 3 lines

The proportion between lines of code and eyes looking at it isn't quite
right when it comes to TPM and especially swtpm and libtpms.

Perhaps it would help to advertise some versions of the tpm2-preview code as "ready for testing", for example by tagging them?

I've mentioned it to you before, but let me repeat it here because others might also have an opinion. Providing ready-to-use recipes for the preview code is tricky because build recipes (at least in Yocto) don't include source directly and instead fetch from the upstream git. That has the effect that such recipes can become unbuildable anytime you rebase and the old revisions get garbage-collected in the GitHub repo.

I want to merge my TPM2 code into refkit, but I can't risk making the master branch unbuildable. So what I'll do is tag and mirror the code that is needed by the recipes under github.com/pohly.

Signature · 6 lines
Best Regards, Patrick Ohly

The content of this message is my personal opinion only and although
I am an employee of Intel, the statements I make here in no way
represent Intel's position on the issue, nor am I authorized to speak
on behalf of Intel on this matter.
#8 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines · Patrick Ohly
Quoted 14 lines · Stefan Berger
Quoted 4 lines · Patrick Ohly

Stefan, I know you said that you still want to continue rebasing your
tpm2 branches because they aren't ready for use. Do you have an estimate when the code might become released officially?

QEMU will create version 2.11 in mid December. I would like to have an
official version for 2.12, so that would probably be March 2018. I hope
we can have some more people testing it or looking at the code until then... I want to be able to support TPM migration in QEMU once it opens
up for new code in mid December. And migration needs testers.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

The proportion between lines of code and eyes looking at it isn't quite
right when it comes to TPM and especially swtpm and libtpms.

Perhaps it would help to advertise some versions of the tpm2-preview code as "ready for testing", for example by tagging them?

I'll do that next week, after some changes/fixes, and post here and on the QEMU devel mailing list.

author
#9 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Stefan Berger
Quoted 3 lines · Patrick Ohly

Perhaps it would help to advertise some versions of the tpm2- preview
code as "ready for testing", for example by tagging them?

I'll do that next week, after some changes/fixes, and post here and on the QEMU devel mailing list.

How is it going with that?

FWIW, I updated my build recipes to your latest snapshots (adf9b3fe5d4df6708e9f801b8c9dcfdf7274d457 for swtpm, 42a5d1ca4680b1caba67c06fe2011fdc5b253785 for libswtpm) and it continued to work for me.

Signature · 6 lines
Best Regards, Patrick Ohly

The content of this message is my personal opinion only and although
I am an employee of Intel, the statements I make here in no way
represent Intel's position on the issue, nor am I authorized to speak
on behalf of Intel on this matter.
#10 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Patrick Ohly
Quoted 6 lines · Stefan Berger
Quoted 3 lines · Patrick Ohly

Perhaps it would help to advertise some versions of the tpm2- preview
code as "ready for testing", for example by tagging them?

I'll do that next week, after some changes/fixes, and post here and on the QEMU devel mailing list.

How is it going with that?

Soon :-)

Quoted 6 lines

FWIW, I updated my build recipes to your latest snapshots (adf9b3fe5d4df6708e9f801b8c9dcfdf7274d457 for swtpm, 42a5d1ca4680b1caba67c06fe2011fdc5b253785 for libswtpm) and it continued to work for me.