Patch "x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12]" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
Subsystems (2)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12]
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <[email protected]> know about it.
Quoted 1 line
From
99c6fa2511d8a683e61468be91b83f85452115faMon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 11:49:23 +0000
Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12]
From: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
commit 99c6fa2511d8a683e61468be91b83f85452115fa upstream.
Add the bug bits for spectre v1/2 and force them unconditionally for all cpus.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +2 -0
@@ -317,5 +317,7 @@#define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12)/* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */ #define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13)/* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */ #define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14)/* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */ +#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15)/* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */ +#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16)/* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +3 -0
@@ -886,6 +886,9 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st/* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */ setup_force_cpu_bug (X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN ); +setup_force_cpu_bug (X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 ); +setup_force_cpu_bug (X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 ); +fpu__init_system (c); }
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email protected] are
queue-4.9/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-mm-32-move-setup_clear_cpu_cap-x86_feature_pcid-earlier.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch