Patch "x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
Subsystems (4)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <[email protected]> know about it.
Quoted 1 line
From
117cc7a908c83697b0b737d15ae1eb5943afe35bMon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 11:11:27 +0000
Subject: x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
From: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
commit 117cc7a908c83697b0b737d15ae1eb5943afe35b upstream.
In accordance with the Intel and AMD documentation, we need to overwrite all entries in the RSB on exiting a guest, to prevent malicious branch target predictions from affecting the host kernel. This is needed both for retpoline and for IBRS.
[ak: numbers again for the RSB stuffing labels]
--- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 + 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +77 -1
@@ -7,6 +7,48 @@#include <asm/alternative-asm.h> #include <asm/cpufeatures.h> +/* +* Fill the CPU return stack buffer. +* +* Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an +* infinite 'pause; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. +* +* This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based +* mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to +* eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes +* purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would +* allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. +* +* We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and +* inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that +* from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there. +*/ + +#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32/* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ +#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16/* To avoid underflow */ + +/* +* Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be +* the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation +* trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. +*/ +#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \ + mov $(nr/2), reg; \ +771: \ + call 772f; \ +773: /* speculation trap */ \ + pause; \ + jmp 773b; \ +772: \ + call 774f; \ +775: /* speculation trap */ \ + pause; \ + jmp 775b; \ +774: \ + dec reg; \ + jnz 771b; \ + add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; +#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__/*
@@ -76,6 +118,20 @@#endif .endm + /* + * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP + * monstrosity above, manually. + */ +.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \ + __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \ + \ftr +.Lskip_rsb_\@: +#endif +.endm +#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
@@ -119,7 +175,7 @@ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)# define THUNK_TARGET (addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) -#else /* No retpoline */ +#else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */ # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"# define THUNK_TARGET (addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)#endif
@@ -134,5 +190,25 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_IBRS, }; +/* +* On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest +* can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both +* retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future +* CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided. +*/ +static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB (void ) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +unsigned long loops =RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS /2 ; + + asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE + ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f", + __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)), + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) + "910:" + : "=&r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT + : "r" (loops) : "memory" ); +#endif +}#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +4 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@#include <asm/debugreg.h> #include <asm/kvm_para.h> #include <asm/irq_remapping.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/virtext.h> #include "trace.h"
@@ -4917,6 +4918,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu#endif ); +/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ +vmexit_fill_RSB (); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 wrmsrl (MSR_GS_BASE , svm->host.gs_base);#else
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +4 -0
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@#include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/apic.h> #include <asm/irq_remapping.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include "trace.h" #include "pmu.h"
@@ -9026,6 +9027,9 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc#endif ); +/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ +vmexit_fill_RSB (); +/* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */ if (debugctlmsr)update_debugctlmsr (debugctlmsr);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email protected] are
queue-4.9/x86-spectre-add-boot-time-option-to-select-spectre-v2-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-irq32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-detect-jumps-to-retpoline-thunks.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_spectre_v.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-add-missing-n-at-end-of-alternative-inline-asm.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-hyperv-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-entry-convert-entry-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-fix-typos-in-vulnerability-documentation.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-make-cpu-bugs-sticky.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-make-lfence-a-serializing-instruction.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-ftrace-convert-ftrace-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/objtool-allow-alternatives-to-be-ignored.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-implement-cpu-vulnerabilites-sysfs-functions.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-crypto-convert-crypto-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-factor-out-application-of-forced-cpu-caps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-xen-convert-xen-hypercall-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-checksum32-convert-assembler-indirect-jumps.patch queue-4.9/x86-mm-32-move-setup_clear_cpu_cap-x86_feature_pcid-earlier.patch queue-4.9/sysfs-cpu-add-vulnerability-folder.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-fill-return-stack-buffer-on-vmexit.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-rename-bug_cpu_insecure-to-bug_cpu_meltdown.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-compile-time-warning.patch queue-4.9/x86-alternatives-fix-optimize_nops-checking.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpu-amd-use-lfence_rdtsc-in-preference-to-mfence_rdtsc.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-add-initial-retpoline-support.patch