Patch "x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
Subsystems (2)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <[email protected]> know about it.
Quoted 1 line
From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:02:28 -0800
Subject: x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit babdde2698d482b6c0de1eab4f697cf5856c5859)
array_index_nospec() uses a mask to sanitize user controllable array indexes, i.e. generate a 0 mask if 'index' >= 'size', and a ~0 mask otherwise. While the default array_index_mask_nospec() handles the carry-bit from the (index - size) result in software.
The x86 array_index_mask_nospec() does the same, but the carry-bit is handled in the processor CF flag without conditional instructions in the control flow.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h +24 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,30 @@#define wmb () asm volatile("sfence" ::: "memory")#endif +/** +* array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a mask that is ~0UL when the +* bounds check succeeds and 0 otherwise +* @index: array element index +* @size: number of elements in array +* +* Returns: +* 0 - (index < size) +*/ +static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec (unsigned long index, +unsigned long size) +{ +unsigned long mask; + + asm ("cmp %1,%2; sbb %0,%0;" + :"=r" (mask) + :"r" (size),"r" (index) + :"cc" ); +return mask; +} + +/* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */ +#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE #define dma_rmb () rmb()#else
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email protected] are
queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch