Patch "x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
Subsystems (2)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <[email protected]> know about it.
Quoted 1 line
From foo@baz Thu Feb 8 03:32:24 CET 2018
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:02:49 -0800
Subject: x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 304ec1b050310548db33063e567123fae8fd0301)
Quoting Linus:
I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends, but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_ accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.
__uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 6 +++--- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 12 ++++++------ arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 12 ++++++------ arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +3 -3
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ do { \ ({ \ int __gu_err; \ __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \ - __uaccess_begin(); \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ __get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \ __uaccess_end(); \ (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long bu* get_user_ex(...); * } get_user_catch(err) */ -#define get_user_try uaccess_try +#define get_user_try uaccess_try_nospec#define get_user_catch (err) uaccess_catch(err)#define get_user_ex (x, ptr) do { \
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ extern void __cmpxchg_wrong_size(void)__typeof__ (ptr) __uval = (uval); \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __old = (old); \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __new = (new); \ -__uaccess_begin (); \ +__uaccess_begin_nospec (); \switch (size) { \case 1 : \ { \
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h +6 -6
@@ -102,17 +102,17 @@ __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __switch (n) {case 1 : -__uaccess_begin (); +__uaccess_begin_nospec ();__get_user_size (*(u8 *)to, from,1 , ret,1 );__uaccess_end ();return ret;case 2 : -__uaccess_begin (); +__uaccess_begin_nospec ();__get_user_size (*(u16 *)to, from,2 , ret,2 );__uaccess_end ();return ret;case 4 : -__uaccess_begin (); +__uaccess_begin_nospec ();__get_user_size (*(u32 *)to, from,4 , ret,4 );__uaccess_end ();return ret;
@@ -130,17 +130,17 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long __cswitch (n) {case 1 : -__uaccess_begin (); +__uaccess_begin_nospec ();__get_user_size (*(u8 *)to, from,1 , ret,1 );__uaccess_end ();return ret;case 2 : -__uaccess_begin (); +__uaccess_begin_nospec ();__get_user_size (*(u16 *)to, from,2 , ret,2 );__uaccess_end ();return ret;case 4 : -__uaccess_begin (); +__uaccess_begin_nospec ();__get_user_size (*(u32 *)to, from,4 , ret,4 );__uaccess_end ();return ret;
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h +6 -6
@@ -59,31 +59,31 @@ int __copy_from_user_nocheck(void *dst,return copy_user_generic (dst, (__force void *)src, size);switch (size) {case 1 : -__uaccess_begin (); +__uaccess_begin_nospec ();__get_user_asm (*(u8 *)dst, (u8 __user *)src, ret,"b" ,"b" ,"=q" ,1 );__uaccess_end ();return ret;case 2 : -__uaccess_begin (); +__uaccess_begin_nospec ();__get_user_asm (*(u16 *)dst, (u16 __user *)src, ret,"w" ,"w" ,"=r" ,2 );__uaccess_end ();return ret;case 4 : -__uaccess_begin (); +__uaccess_begin_nospec ();__get_user_asm (*(u32 *)dst, (u32 __user *)src, ret,"l" ,"k" ,"=r" ,4 );__uaccess_end ();return ret;case 8 : -__uaccess_begin (); +__uaccess_begin_nospec ();__get_user_asm (*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret,"q" ,"" ,"=r" ,8 );__uaccess_end ();return ret;case 10 : -__uaccess_begin (); +__uaccess_begin_nospec ();__get_user_asm (*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret,"q" ,"" ,"=r" ,10 );if (likely (!ret))
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int __copy_from_user_nocheck(void *dst,__uaccess_end ();return ret;case 16 : -__uaccess_begin (); +__uaccess_begin_nospec ();__get_user_asm (*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src, ret,"q" ,"" ,"=r" ,16 );if (likely (!ret))
arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c +2 -2
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ do { \unsigned long __copy_to_user_ll (void __user *to,const void *from,unsigned long n) { -__uaccess_begin (); +__uaccess_begin_nospec ();if (movsl_is_ok (to, from, n))__copy_user (to, from, n);else
@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nocachunsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero (void *to,const void __user *from,unsigned long n) { -__uaccess_begin (); +__uaccess_begin_nospec ();#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY if (n >64 &&static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_XMM2 )) n =__copy_user_intel_nocache (to, from, n);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email protected] are
queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-usercopy-replace-open-coded-stac-clac-with-__uaccess_-begin-end.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch queue-4.9/x86-uaccess-use-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch queue-4.9/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch queue-4.9/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch queue-4.9/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-introduce-__uaccess_begin_nospec-and-uaccess_try_nospec.patch queue-4.9/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch