Patch "[Variant 2/Spectre-v2] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for Falkor" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree
Subsystems (3)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
[Variant 2/Spectre-v2] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for Falkor
to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
arm64-implement-branch-predictor-hardening-for-falkor.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <[email protected]> know about it.
Quoted 1 line
From foo@baz Tue Feb 13 17:25:10 CET 2018
From: Shanker Donthineni <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 14:28:59 -0600
Subject: [Variant 2/Spectre-v2] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for Falkor
From: Shanker Donthineni <[email protected]>
Commit ec82b567a74f upstream.
Falkor is susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a mitigation for these attacks, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S | 8 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S | 12 +++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c | 8 +++++++ 6 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +2 -1
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@#define ARM64_SVE 22#define ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 23#define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR 24 +#define ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT 25 -#define ARM64_NCAPS 25 +#define ARM64_NCAPS 26#endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +2 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ extern u32 __kvm_get_mdcr_el2(void);extern u32 __init_stage2_translation (void ); +extern void __qcom_hyp_sanitize_btac_predictors (void ); +#endif #endif /* __ARM_KVM_ASM_H__ */
arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S +8 -0
@@ -77,3 +77,11 @@ ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_start) ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)] add sp, sp, #(8 * 18) ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_end) + +ENTRY(__qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_start) + stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! + .rept 16 + bl . + 4 + .endr + ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 +ENTRY(__qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_end)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +38 -2
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_har#ifdef CONFIG_KVM extern char __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start[], __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end[]; +extern char __qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_start[]; +extern char __qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_end[];static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi (int slot,const char *hyp_vecs_start,const char *hyp_vecs_end)
@@ -110,8 +112,10 @@ static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bpspin_unlock (&bp_lock); }#else -#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start NULL -#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end NULL +#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start NULL +#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end NULL +#define __qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_start NULL +#define __qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_end NULL static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, const char *hyp_vecs_start,
@@ -152,6 +156,29 @@ static int enable_psci_bp_hardening(void return 0; } + +static void qcom_link_stack_sanitization (void ) +{ +u64 tmp; + + asmvolatile ("mov %0, x30 \n" +".rept 16 \n" +"bl . + 4 \n" +".endr \n" +"mov x30, %0 \n" + :"=&r" (tmp)); +} + +static int qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization (void *data) +{ +const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry = data; + +install_bp_hardening_cb (entry, qcom_link_stack_sanitization, + __qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_start, + __qcom_hyp_sanitize_link_stack_end); + +return 0 ; +}#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ #define MIDR_RANGE (model, min, max) \
@@ -323,6 +350,15 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6 MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75), .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, }, + { + .capability =ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR , +MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS (MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1 ), + .enable = qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization, + }, + { + .capability =ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT , + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1), + }, #endif { }
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S +12 -0
@@ -196,3 +196,15 @@ alternative_endif eret ENDPROC(__fpsimd_guest_restore) + +ENTRY(__qcom_hyp_sanitize_btac_predictors) + /** + * Call SMC64 with Silicon provider serviceID 23<<8 (0xc2001700) + * 0xC2000000-0xC200FFFF: assigned to SiP Service Calls + * b15-b0: contains SiP functionID + */ + movz x0, #0x1700 + movk x0, #0xc200, lsl #16 + smc #0 + ret +ENDPROC(__qcom_hyp_sanitize_btac_predictors)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c +8 -0
@@ -393,6 +393,14 @@ again:/* 0 falls through to be handled out of EL2 */ } +if (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT )) { +u32 midr =read_cpuid_id (); + +/* Apply BTAC predictors mitigation to all Falkor chips */ +if ((midr &MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK ) ==MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1 ) +__qcom_hyp_sanitize_btac_predictors (); + } + fp_enabled =__fpsimd_enabled ();__sysreg_save_guest_state (guest_ctxt);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email protected] are
queue-4.15/arm64-mm-remove-pre_ttbr0_update_workaround-for-falkor-erratum-e1003.patch queue-4.15/arm64-mm-add-arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0-helper.patch queue-4.15/arm64-kaslr-put-kernel-vectors-address-in-separate-data-page.patch queue-4.15/arm64-mm-allocate-asids-in-pairs.patch queue-4.15/arm64-tls-avoid-unconditional-zeroing-of-tpidrro_el0-for-native-tasks.patch queue-4.15/arm64-entry-explicitly-pass-exception-level-to-kernel_ventry-macro.patch queue-4.15/arm64-mm-use-non-global-mappings-for-kernel-space.patch queue-4.15/arm64-entry-hook-up-entry-trampoline-to-exception-vectors.patch queue-4.15/arm64-erratum-work-around-falkor-erratum-e1003-in-trampoline-code.patch queue-4.15/arm64-mm-fix-and-re-enable-arm64_sw_ttbr0_pan.patch queue-4.15/arm64-mm-invalidate-both-kernel-and-user-asids-when-performing-tlbi.patch queue-4.15/arm64-mm-rename-post_ttbr0_update_workaround.patch queue-4.15/arm64-mm-map-entry-trampoline-into-trampoline-and-kernel-page-tables.patch queue-4.15/arm64-mm-move-asid-from-ttbr0-to-ttbr1.patch queue-4.15/arm64-mm-introduce-ttbr_asid_mask-for-getting-at-the-asid-in-the-ttbr.patch queue-4.15/perf-arm_spe-fail-device-probe-when-arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0.patch queue-4.15/arm64-implement-branch-predictor-hardening-for-falkor.patch queue-4.15/arm64-kconfig-add-config_unmap_kernel_at_el0.patch queue-4.15/arm64-mm-temporarily-disable-arm64_sw_ttbr0_pan.patch queue-4.15/arm64-entry-add-exception-trampoline-page-for-exceptions-from-el0.patch queue-4.15/arm64-entry-add-fake-cpu-feature-for-unmapping-the-kernel-at-el0.patch