libnl: fix CVE-2017-0553
PATCH 1/1 libnl: fix CVE-2017-0553
An elevation of privilege vulnerability in libnl could enable a local malicious application to execute arbitrary code within the context of the Wi-Fi service. This issue is rated as Moderate because it first requires compromising a privileged process and is mitigated by current platform configurations. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-32342065. NOTE: this issue also exists in the upstream libnl before 3.3.0 library.
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-0553
Backport fix from upstream libnl 3.3.0 release:
https://github.com/thom311/libnl/commit/3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/libnl/2017-May/002313.html
--- ...eck-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.2.29.bb | 2 + 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl/lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch
meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl/lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch new file +43 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Haller <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 22:23:52 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] lib: check for integer-overflow in nlmsg_reserve() + +In general, libnl functions are not robust against calling with +invalid arguments. Thus, never call libnl functions with invalid +arguments. In case of nlmsg_reserve() this means never provide +a @len argument that causes overflow. + +Still, add an additional safeguard to avoid exploiting such bugs. + +Assume that @pad is a trusted, small integer. +Assume that n->nm_size is a valid number of allocated bytes (and thus +much smaller then SIZE_T_MAX). +Assume, that @len may be set to an untrusted value. Then the patch +avoids an integer overflow resulting in reserving too few bytes. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/thom311/libnl/commit/3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb] +CVE: CVE-2017-0553 + +Signed-off-by: Andre McCurdy <[email protected]> +--- + lib/msg.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/lib/msg.c b/lib/msg.c +index 9af3f3a..3e27d4e 100644 +--- a/lib/msg.c ++++ b/lib/msg.c +@@ -411,6 +411,9 @@ void *nlmsg_reserve(struct nl_msg *n, size_t len, int pad) + size_t nlmsg_len = n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len; + size_t tlen; + ++ if (len > n->nm_size) ++ return NULL; ++ + tlen = pad ? ((len + (pad - 1)) & ~(pad - 1)) : len; + + if ((tlen + nlmsg_len) > n->nm_size) +-- +1.9.1 +
meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.2.29.bb +2 -0
@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ DEPENDS = "flex-native bison-native" SRC_URI = "https://github.com/thom311/${BPN}/releases/download/${BPN}${@d.getVar('PV').replace('.','_')}/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://fix-pktloc_syntax_h-race.patch \ file://fix-pc-file.patch \ + file://lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch \ " + UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/thom311/${BPN}/releases" SRC_URI[md5sum] = "a8ba62a5c4f883f4e493a46d1f3733fe"
Signature · 1 line
1.9.1
Quoted 8 lines · Andre McCurdy
An elevation of privilege vulnerability in libnl could enable a local malicious application to execute arbitrary code within the context of the Wi-Fi service. This issue is rated as Moderate because it first requires compromising a privileged process and is mitigated by current platform configurations. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-32342065. NOTE: this issue also exists in the upstream libnl before 3.3.0 library.
Quoted 6 lines
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-0553
Backport fix from upstream libnl 3.3.0 release:
https://github.com/thom311/libnl/commit/3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/libnl/2017-May/002313.html
Armin, please let me know if this is OK and I'll send the same fix for pyro and morty.
Quoted 73 lines
Signed-off-by Andre McCurdy <[email protected]>--- ...eck-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.2.29.bb | 2 + 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl/lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patchmeta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl/lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch new file +43
-0@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Haller <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 22:23:52 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] lib: check for integer-overflow in nlmsg_reserve() + +In general, libnl functions are not robust against calling with +invalid arguments. Thus, never call libnl functions with invalid +arguments. In case of nlmsg_reserve() this means never provide +a @len argument that causes overflow. + +Still, add an additional safeguard to avoid exploiting such bugs. + +Assume that @pad is a trusted, small integer. +Assume that n->nm_size is a valid number of allocated bytes (and thus +much smaller then SIZE_T_MAX). +Assume, that @len may be set to an untrusted value. Then the patch +avoids an integer overflow resulting in reserving too few bytes. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/thom311/libnl/commit/3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb] +CVE: CVE-2017-0553 + +Signed-off-by: Andre McCurdy <[email protected]> +--- + lib/msg.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/lib/msg.c b/lib/msg.c +index 9af3f3a..3e27d4e 100644 +--- a/lib/msg.c ++++ b/lib/msg.c +@@ -411,6 +411,9 @@ void *nlmsg_reserve(struct nl_msg *n, size_t len, int pad) + size_t nlmsg_len = n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len; + size_t tlen; + ++ if (len > n->nm_size) ++ return NULL; ++ + tlen = pad ? ((len + (pad - 1)) & ~(pad - 1)) : len; + + if ((tlen + nlmsg_len) > n->nm_size) +-- +1.9.1 +meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.2.29.bb +2
-1@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ DEPENDS = "flex-native bison-native" SRC_URI = "https://github.com/thom311/${BPN}/releases/download/${BPN}${@d.getVar('PV').replace('.','_')}/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://fix-pktloc_syntax_h-race.patch \ file://fix-pc-file.patch \ + file://lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch \ " + UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/thom311/${BPN}/releases" SRC_URI[md5sum] = "a8ba62a5c4f883f4e493a46d1f3733fe" --1.9.1
Quoted 9 lines · Andre McCurdy
Quoted 8 lines · Andre McCurdy
An elevation of privilege vulnerability in libnl could enable a local malicious application to execute arbitrary code within the context of the Wi-Fi service. This issue is rated as Moderate because it first requires compromising a privileged process and is mitigated by current platform configurations. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1. Android ID: A-32342065. NOTE: this issue also exists in the upstream libnl before 3.3.0 library.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-0553
Backport fix from upstream libnl 3.3.0 release:
https://github.com/thom311/libnl/commit/3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/libnl/2017-May/002313.htmlArmin, please let me know if this is OK and I'll send the same fix for pyro and morty.
this is fine. I have it in stable/rocko-mnut pending build rotation
thanks,
Armin
Quoted 74 lines
Quoted 74 lines
Signed-off-by Andre McCurdy <[email protected]>--- ...eck-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.2.29.bb | 2 + 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl/lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patchmeta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl/lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch new file +43
-0@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Haller <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 22:23:52 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] lib: check for integer-overflow in nlmsg_reserve() + +In general, libnl functions are not robust against calling with +invalid arguments. Thus, never call libnl functions with invalid +arguments. In case of nlmsg_reserve() this means never provide +a @len argument that causes overflow. + +Still, add an additional safeguard to avoid exploiting such bugs. + +Assume that @pad is a trusted, small integer. +Assume that n->nm_size is a valid number of allocated bytes (and thus +much smaller then SIZE_T_MAX). +Assume, that @len may be set to an untrusted value. Then the patch +avoids an integer overflow resulting in reserving too few bytes. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/thom311/libnl/commit/3e18948f17148e6a3c4255bdeaaf01ef6081ceeb] +CVE: CVE-2017-0553 + +Signed-off-by: Andre McCurdy <[email protected]> +--- + lib/msg.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/lib/msg.c b/lib/msg.c +index 9af3f3a..3e27d4e 100644 +--- a/lib/msg.c ++++ b/lib/msg.c +@@ -411,6 +411,9 @@ void *nlmsg_reserve(struct nl_msg *n, size_t len, int pad) + size_t nlmsg_len = n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len; + size_t tlen; + ++ if (len > n->nm_size) ++ return NULL; ++ + tlen = pad ? ((len + (pad - 1)) & ~(pad - 1)) : len; + + if ((tlen + nlmsg_len) > n->nm_size) +-- +1.9.1 +meta/recipes-support/libnl/libnl_3.2.29.bb +2
-1@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ DEPENDS = "flex-native bison-native" SRC_URI = "https://github.com/thom311/${BPN}/releases/download/${BPN}${@d.getVar('PV').replace('.','_')}/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://fix-pktloc_syntax_h-race.patch \ file://fix-pc-file.patch \ + file://lib-check-for-integer-overflow-in-nlmsg_reserve.patch \ " + UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/thom311/${BPN}/releases" SRC_URI[md5sum] = "a8ba62a5c4f883f4e493a46d1f3733fe" --1.9.1