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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/speculation/l1tf: Drop the swap storage limit restriction" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

PATCH [email protected] 1 participant 1 message Jan 5, 2019

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The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

Quoted 1 line

From 5b5e4d623ec8a34689df98e42d038a3b594d2ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 19:49:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation/l1tf: Drop the swap storage limit restriction
when l1tf=off

Swap storage is restricted to max_swapfile_size (~16TB on x86_64) whenever the system is deemed affected by L1TF vulnerability. Even though the limit is quite high for most deployments it seems to be too restrictive for deployments which are willing to live with the mitigation disabled.

We have a customer to deploy 8x 6,4TB PCIe/NVMe SSD swap devices which is clearly out of the limit.

Drop the swap restriction when l1tf=off is specified. It also doesn't make much sense to warn about too much memory for the l1tf mitigation when it is forcefully disabled by the administrator.

[ tglx: Folded the documentation delta change ]

Fixes 377eeaa8e11f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2")
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3 -0
index 05a252e5178d..835e422572eb 100644
@@ -2095,6 +2095,9 @@
 			off
 				Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't
 				emit any warnings.
+				It also drops the swap size and available
+				RAM limit restriction on both hypervisor and
+				bare metal.
 
 			Default is 'flush'.
 
Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst +5 -1
index b85dd80510b0..9af977384168 100644
@@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
 
   off		Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
 		warnings.
+		It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions
+		on both hypervisor and bare metal.
+
   ============  =============================================================
 
 The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
@@ -576,7 +579,8 @@ Default mitigations
   The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
 
   - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
-    unconditionally and cannot be controlled.
+    unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited
+    to ~16TB.
 
   - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
     a guest.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2 -1
index a68b32cb845a..58689ac64440 100644
@@ -1002,7 +1002,8 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 #endif
 
 	half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT;
-	if (e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {
+	if (l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+			e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {
 		pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n");
 		pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n",
 				half_pa);
arch/x86/mm/init.c +1 -1
index ef99f3892e1f..427a955a2cf2 100644
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ unsigned long max_swapfile_size(void)
 
 	pages = generic_max_swapfile_size();
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) && l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF) {
 		/* Limit the swap file size to MAX_PA/2 for L1TF workaround */
 		unsigned long long l1tf_limit = l1tf_pfn_limit();
 		/*