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KVM: s390: vsie: fix Do the CRYCB validation first

PATCH New Pierre Morel 4 participants 10 messages Feb 1, 2019 – Feb 4, 2019

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 KVM: s390: vsie: fix Do the CRYCB validation first

This is a BUGFIX

Surely must be CC stable.

Pierre Morel (1):
KVM: s390: vsie: fix Do the CRYCB validation first

 arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 KVM: s390: vsie: fix Do the CRYCB validation first

The case when the SIE for guest3 is not setup for using encryption keys nor Adjunct processor but the guest2 does use these features was not properly handled.

This leads SIE entry for guest3 to crash with validity intercept because the guest2, not having the use of encryption keys nor Adjunct Processor did not initialize the CRYCB designation.

In the case where none of ECA_APIE, ECB3_AES or ECB3_DEA are set in guest3 a format 0 CRYCB is allowed for guest3 and the CRYCB designation in the SIE for guest3 is not checked on SIE entry.

Let's allow the CRYCD designation to be ignored when the SIE for guest3 is not initialized for encryption key usage nor AP.

Fixup: d6f6959 (KVM: s390: vsie: Do the CRYCB validation first)

---
 arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +3 -0
index a153257..a748f76 100644
@@ -300,6 +300,9 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
 	if (!apie_h && !key_msk)
 		return 0;
 
+	if (!(scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE) && !(scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA)))
+		return 0;
+
 	if (!crycb_addr)
 		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0039U);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#2 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · On Fri, 1 Feb 2019 10:52:05 +0100 Pierre Morel <[email protected]> wrote:

The case when the SIE for guest3 is not setup for using encryption keys nor Adjunct processor but the guest2 does use these features was not properly handled.

This leads SIE entry for guest3 to crash with validity intercept because the guest2, not having the use of encryption keys nor Adjunct Processor did not initialize the CRYCB designation.

Quoted 6 lines

In the case where none of ECA_APIE, ECB3_AES or ECB3_DEA are set in guest3 a format 0 CRYCB is allowed for guest3 and the CRYCB designation in the SIE for guest3 is not checked on SIE entry.

Let's allow the CRYCD designation to be ignored when the

s/CRYCD/CRYCB/

Quoted 4 lines

SIE for guest3 is not initialized for encryption key usage nor AP.

Fixup: d6f6959 (KVM: s390: vsie: Do the CRYCB validation first)

I think the canonical format is

Fixes d6f6959ac587 ("KVM: s390: vsie: Do the CRYCB validation first")
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 11 lines
---
 arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +0 -0
index a153257..a748f76 100644

arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) · line 308

Quoted 9 lines
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +3 -0
@@ -300,6 +300,9 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
 	if (!apie_h && !key_msk)
 		return 0;
 
+	if (!(scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE) && !(scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA)))
+		return 0;
+
 	if (!crycb_addr)
 		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0039U);
 

Looks sane to me, but I'll let vsie experts comment.

#3 lore raw
Quoted 47 lines · Cornelia Huck
Quoted 8 lines · On Fri, 1 Feb 2019 10:52:05 +0100 Pierre Morel <[email protected]> wrote:

The case when the SIE for guest3 is not setup for using encryption keys nor Adjunct processor but the guest2 does use these features was not properly handled.

This leads SIE entry for guest3 to crash with validity intercept because the guest2, not having the use of encryption keys nor Adjunct Processor did not initialize the CRYCB designation.

Quoted 6 lines

In the case where none of ECA_APIE, ECB3_AES or ECB3_DEA are set in guest3 a format 0 CRYCB is allowed for guest3 and the CRYCB designation in the SIE for guest3 is not checked on SIE entry.

Let's allow the CRYCD designation to be ignored when the

s/CRYCD/CRYCB/

Quoted 4 lines

SIE for guest3 is not initialized for encryption key usage nor AP.

Fixup: d6f6959 (KVM: s390: vsie: Do the CRYCB validation first)

I think the canonical format is

Fixes d6f6959ac587 ("KVM: s390: vsie: Do the CRYCB validation first")
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 14 lines
---
  arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 3 +++
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +0 -0
index a153257..a748f76 100644
@@ -300,6 +300,9 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
  	if (!apie_h && !key_msk)
  		return 0;
 
Quoted 9 lines

arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) · line 308

Quoted 6 lines
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +3 -0
+	if (!(scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE) && !(scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA)))
+		return 0;
+
  	if (!crycb_addr)
  		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0039U);
 

Looks sane to me, but I'll let vsie experts comment.

Thanks
Pierre

Signature · 2 lines
Pierre Morel
Linux/KVM/QEMU in Böblingen - Germany
#4 lore raw
In reply to Pierre Morel
Quoted 31 lines · Pierre Morel

The case when the SIE for guest3 is not setup for using encryption keys nor Adjunct processor but the guest2 does use these features was not properly handled.

This leads SIE entry for guest3 to crash with validity intercept because the guest2, not having the use of encryption keys nor Adjunct Processor did not initialize the CRYCB designation.

In the case where none of ECA_APIE, ECB3_AES or ECB3_DEA are set in guest3 a format 0 CRYCB is allowed for guest3 and the CRYCB designation in the SIE for guest3 is not checked on SIE entry.

Let's allow the CRYCD designation to be ignored when the SIE for guest3 is not initialized for encryption key usage nor AP.

Fixup: d6f6959 (KVM: s390: vsie: Do the CRYCB validation first)

---
 arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +0 -0
index a153257..a748f76 100644

arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) · line 308

Quoted 9 lines
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +3 -0
@@ -300,6 +300,9 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
 	if (!apie_h && !key_msk)
 		return 0;
 
+	if (!(scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE) && !(scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA)))
+		return 0;
+
 	if (!crycb_addr)
 		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0039U);
 

The original patch said

"We need to handle the validity checks for the crycb, no matter what the
settings for the keywrappings are. So lets move the keywrapping checks after we have done the validy checks."

Can you explain why keywrapping now is important? These patches seem to contradict.

Signature · 3 lines
Thanks,

David / dhildenb
#5 lore raw
Quoted 44 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 31 lines · Pierre Morel

The case when the SIE for guest3 is not setup for using encryption keys nor Adjunct processor but the guest2 does use these features was not properly handled.

This leads SIE entry for guest3 to crash with validity intercept because the guest2, not having the use of encryption keys nor Adjunct Processor did not initialize the CRYCB designation.

In the case where none of ECA_APIE, ECB3_AES or ECB3_DEA are set in guest3 a format 0 CRYCB is allowed for guest3 and the CRYCB designation in the SIE for guest3 is not checked on SIE entry.

Let's allow the CRYCD designation to be ignored when the SIE for guest3 is not initialized for encryption key usage nor AP.

Fixup: d6f6959 (KVM: s390: vsie: Do the CRYCB validation first)

---
  arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 3 +++
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +0 -0
index a153257..a748f76 100644

arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) · line 308

Quoted 9 lines
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +3 -0
@@ -300,6 +300,9 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
  	if (!apie_h && !key_msk)
  		return 0;
 
+	if (!(scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE) && !(scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA)))
+		return 0;
+
  	if (!crycb_addr)
  		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0039U);
 

The original patch said

Quoted 7 lines

"We need to handle the validity checks for the crycb, no matter what the
settings for the keywrappings are. So lets move the keywrapping checks after we have done the validy checks."

Can you explain why keywrapping now is important? These patches seem to contradict.

No it does not, having the flags set or not is part of the validity check. but, I acted too fast.

The problem seems to be even clearer:
key_msk is defined as
int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);

If it is defined, as it should for a mask, as

	(scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA))

all is clear..., key_msk is not use but for this test, so I do not understand why it is set as facility 76.

so I think I better do:

arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +1 -1
index a153257..30843a8 100644
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
        unsigned long *b1, *b2;
        u8 ecb3_flags;
        int apie_h;
-       int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);
+       int key_msk = scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA);
        int fmt_o = crycbd_o & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
        int fmt_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
        int ret = 0;

So just define a mask a mask.
I verify the functionality and test on Monday and if in between it seems better to you so too I post the patch.

Thanks,
Pierre

Signature · 2 lines
Pierre Morel
Linux/KVM/QEMU in Böblingen - Germany
#6 lore raw
Quoted 81 lines · Pierre Morel
Quoted 42 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 37 lines · Pierre Morel

The case when the SIE for guest3 is not setup for using encryption keys nor Adjunct processor but the guest2 does use these features was not properly handled.

This leads SIE entry for guest3 to crash with validity intercept because the guest2, not having the use of encryption keys nor Adjunct Processor did not initialize the CRYCB designation.

In the case where none of ECA_APIE, ECB3_AES or ECB3_DEA are set in guest3 a format 0 CRYCB is allowed for guest3 and the CRYCB designation in the SIE for guest3 is not checked on SIE entry.

Let's allow the CRYCD designation to be ignored when the SIE for guest3 is not initialized for encryption key usage nor AP.

Fixup: d6f6959 (KVM: s390: vsie: Do the CRYCB validation first)

---
  arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 3 +++

  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +2 -0
index a153257..a748f76 100644
@@ -300,6 +300,9 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
       if (!apie_h && !key_msk)
           return 0;
   +    if (!(scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE) && !(scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA)))
+        return 0;
+
       if (!crycb_addr)
           return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0039U);
Quoted 1 line

The original patch said

Quoted 7 lines

"We need to handle the validity checks for the crycb, no matter what the settings for the keywrappings are. So lets move the keywrapping checks after we have done the validy checks."

Can you explain why keywrapping now is important? These patches seem to contradict.

No it does not, having the flags set or not is part of the validity check. but, I acted too fast.

The problem seems to be even clearer:
key_msk is defined as
   int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);

If it is defined, as it should for a mask, as
    (scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA))

all is clear..., key_msk is not use but for this test, so I do not understand why it is set as facility 76.

so I think I better do:

arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +1 -1
index a153257..30843a8 100644
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
         unsigned long *b1, *b2;
         u8 ecb3_flags;
         int apie_h;
-       int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);
+       int key_msk = scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA);
         int fmt_o = crycbd_o & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
         int fmt_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
         int ret = 0;
Quoted 2 lines

So just define a mask a mask.
I verify the functionality and test on Monday  and if in between it seems better to you so too I post the patch.

Can you spin a v2 with an improved patch description outlining the problem according to this discussion?

#7 lore raw
Quoted 84 lines · Christian Borntraeger
Quoted 81 lines · Pierre Morel
Quoted 42 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 30 lines · Pierre Morel

The case when the SIE for guest3 is not setup for using encryption keys nor Adjunct processor but the guest2 does use these features was not properly handled.

This leads SIE entry for guest3 to crash with validity intercept because the guest2, not having the use of encryption keys nor Adjunct Processor did not initialize the CRYCB designation.

In the case where none of ECA_APIE, ECB3_AES or ECB3_DEA are set in guest3 a format 0 CRYCB is allowed for guest3 and the CRYCB designation in the SIE for guest3 is not checked on SIE entry.

Let's allow the CRYCD designation to be ignored when the SIE for guest3 is not initialized for encryption key usage nor AP.

Fixup: d6f6959 (KVM: s390: vsie: Do the CRYCB validation first)

---
   arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 3 +++
   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +0 -0
index a153257..a748f76 100644

arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) · line 307

Quoted 8 lines
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +2 -0
@@ -300,6 +300,9 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
       if (!apie_h && !key_msk)
           return 0;
   +    if (!(scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE) && !(scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA)))
+        return 0;
+
       if (!crycb_addr)
           return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0039U);
 

The original patch said

Quoted 7 lines

"We need to handle the validity checks for the crycb, no matter what the
  settings for the keywrappings are. So lets move the keywrapping checks after we have done the validy checks."

Can you explain why keywrapping now is important? These patches seem to contradict.

No it does not, having the flags set or not is part of the validity check. but, I acted too fast.

The problem seems to be even clearer:
key_msk is defined as
   int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);

If it is defined, as it should for a mask, as
    (scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA))

all is clear..., key_msk is not use but for this test, so I do not understand why it is set as facility 76.

so I think I better do:

arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +1 -1
index a153257..30843a8 100644
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
         unsigned long *b1, *b2;
         u8 ecb3_flags;
         int apie_h;
-       int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);
+       int key_msk = scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA);
         int fmt_o = crycbd_o & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
         int fmt_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
         int ret = 0;
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

So just define a mask a mask.
I verify the functionality and test on Monday  and if in between it seems better to you so too I post the patch.

Can you spin a v2 with an improved patch description outlining the problem according to this discussion?

Yes I will do.
Seems I need more analyzing of the problem

Regards,
Pierre

Signature · 2 lines
Pierre Morel
Linux/KVM/QEMU in Böblingen - Germany
#8 lore raw
In reply to Pierre Morel
Quoted 85 lines · Pierre Morel
Quoted 44 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 31 lines · Pierre Morel

The case when the SIE for guest3 is not setup for using encryption keys nor Adjunct processor but the guest2 does use these features was not properly handled.

This leads SIE entry for guest3 to crash with validity intercept because the guest2, not having the use of encryption keys nor Adjunct Processor did not initialize the CRYCB designation.

In the case where none of ECA_APIE, ECB3_AES or ECB3_DEA are set in guest3 a format 0 CRYCB is allowed for guest3 and the CRYCB designation in the SIE for guest3 is not checked on SIE entry.

Let's allow the CRYCD designation to be ignored when the SIE for guest3 is not initialized for encryption key usage nor AP.

Fixup: d6f6959 (KVM: s390: vsie: Do the CRYCB validation first)

---
  arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 3 +++
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +0 -0
index a153257..a748f76 100644

arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) · line 308

Quoted 9 lines
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +3 -0
@@ -300,6 +300,9 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
  	if (!apie_h && !key_msk)
  		return 0;
 
+	if (!(scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE) && !(scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA)))
+		return 0;
+
  	if (!crycb_addr)
  		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0039U);
 

The original patch said

Quoted 7 lines

"We need to handle the validity checks for the crycb, no matter what the
settings for the keywrappings are. So lets move the keywrapping checks after we have done the validy checks."

Can you explain why keywrapping now is important? These patches seem to contradict.

No it does not, having the flags set or not is part of the validity check. but, I acted too fast.

The problem seems to be even clearer:
key_msk is defined as

    int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);

If it is defined, as it should for a mask, as

	(scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA))

all is clear..., key_msk is not use but for this test, so I do not understand why it is set as facility 76.

so I think I better do:

arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +1 -1
index a153257..30843a8 100644
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, 
 struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
         unsigned long *b1, *b2;
         u8 ecb3_flags;
         int apie_h;
-       int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);
+       int key_msk = scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA);
         int fmt_o = crycbd_o & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
         int fmt_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
         int ret = 0;
Quoted 3 lines

So just define a mask a mask.
I verify the functionality and test on Monday and if in between it seems better to you so too I post the patch.

Without documentation at hand I cannot really judge what is the right approach. You have to read the architecture description very carefully and thimk about the different scenarios. I cannot help here.

test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76) means "hardware knows key wrapping exists"

scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA) means "key wrapping was actually enabled for AES or DEA"

Quoted 4 lines

Thanks,
Pierre

Signature · 3 lines
Thanks,

David / dhildenb
#9 lore raw
Quoted 94 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 85 lines · Pierre Morel
Quoted 44 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 31 lines · Pierre Morel

The case when the SIE for guest3 is not setup for using encryption keys nor Adjunct processor but the guest2 does use these features was not properly handled.

This leads SIE entry for guest3 to crash with validity intercept because the guest2, not having the use of encryption keys nor Adjunct Processor did not initialize the CRYCB designation.

In the case where none of ECA_APIE, ECB3_AES or ECB3_DEA are set in guest3 a format 0 CRYCB is allowed for guest3 and the CRYCB designation in the SIE for guest3 is not checked on SIE entry.

Let's allow the CRYCD designation to be ignored when the SIE for guest3 is not initialized for encryption key usage nor AP.

Fixup: d6f6959 (KVM: s390: vsie: Do the CRYCB validation first)

---
   arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 3 +++
   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +0 -0
index a153257..a748f76 100644

arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) · line 308

Quoted 9 lines
arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +3 -0
@@ -300,6 +300,9 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
   	if (!apie_h && !key_msk)
   		return 0;
 
+	if (!(scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE) && !(scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA)))
+		return 0;
+
   	if (!crycb_addr)
   		return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0039U);
 

The original patch said

Quoted 7 lines

"We need to handle the validity checks for the crycb, no matter what the
settings for the keywrappings are. So lets move the keywrapping checks after we have done the validy checks."

Can you explain why keywrapping now is important? These patches seem to contradict.

No it does not, having the flags set or not is part of the validity check. but, I acted too fast.

The problem seems to be even clearer:
key_msk is defined as

     int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);

If it is defined, as it should for a mask, as

	(scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA))

all is clear..., key_msk is not use but for this test, so I do not understand why it is set as facility 76.

so I think I better do:

arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +1 -1
index a153257..30843a8 100644
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
          unsigned long *b1, *b2;
          u8 ecb3_flags;
          int apie_h;
-       int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);
+       int key_msk = scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA);
          int fmt_o = crycbd_o & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
          int fmt_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
          int ret = 0;
Quoted 3 lines

So just define a mask a mask.
I verify the functionality and test on Monday and if in between it seems better to you so too I post the patch.

Without documentation at hand I cannot really judge what is the right approach. You have to read the architecture description very carefully and thimk about the different scenarios. I cannot help here.

Quoted 4 lines

test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76) means "hardware knows key wrapping exists"

scb_o->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA) means "key wrapping was actually enabled for AES or DEA"

Right.
We also must take care of the format. So not sure my propositions are right. And helas I have the documentation :) So ... I have to read it again again.

Regards,
Pierre

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Thanks,
Pierre

Signature · 2 lines
Pierre Morel
Linux/KVM/QEMU in Böblingen - Germany