Patch "[PATCH 70/76] x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
Subsystems (4)
[email protected]
AppliedThis is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
[PATCH 70/76] x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
0070-x86-speculation-Support-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <[email protected]> know about it.
From 9137d21d9fdd50e1615bdd4be82dd9921376c2b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:29 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 70/76] x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
commit d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812 upstream.
Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.
The default behavior is unchanged.
--- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 +++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 +++++++++-- arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +11 -5
@@ -2474,15 +2474,20 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git mitigations= - Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities. - This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each - of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific - options. + [X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU + vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated, + arch-independent options, each of which is an + aggregation of existing arch-specific options. off Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This improves system performance, but it may also expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities. + Equivalent to: nopti [X86] + nospectre_v2 [X86] + spectre_v2_user=off [X86] + spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86] + l1tf=off [X86] auto (default) Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -2490,12 +2495,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. users who don't want to be surprised by SMT getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks. - This is the default behavior. + Equivalent to: (default behavior) auto,nosmt Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT if needed. This is for users who always want to be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT. + Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86] mminit_loglevel= [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +9 -2
@@ -500,7 +500,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)char arg[20 ];int ret, i; -if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nospectre_v2" )) +if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nospectre_v2" ) || +cpu_mitigations_off ())return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE ; ret =cmdline_find_option (boot_command_line,"spectre_v2" , arg,sizeof (arg));
@@ -764,7 +765,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)char arg[20 ];int ret, i; -if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nospec_store_bypass_disable" )) { +if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nospec_store_bypass_disable" ) || +cpu_mitigations_off ()) {return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE ; }else { ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
@@ -1085,6 +1087,11 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_L1TF ))return ; +if (cpu_mitigations_off ()) + l1tf_mitigation =L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF ; +else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt ()) + l1tf_mitigation =L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT ; +override_cache_bits (&boot_cpu_data);switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c +3 -1
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/cpu.h> #undef pr_fmt#define pr_fmt (fmt) "Kernel/User page tables isolation: " fmt
@@ -297,7 +298,8 @@ void __init kaiser_check_boottime_disable(void) goto skip; } -if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nopti" )) +if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nopti" ) || +cpu_mitigations_off ()) goto disable; skip:
Signature · 51 lines
2.21.0 Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email protected] are queue-4.9/0037-x86-speculation-Add-command-line-control-for-indirec.patch queue-4.9/0026-x86-speculation-Disable-STIBP-when-enhanced-IBRS-is-.patch queue-4.9/0022-x86-speculation-Update-the-TIF_SSBD-comment.patch queue-4.9/0046-x86-speculation-Enable-prctl-mode-for-spectre_v2_use.patch queue-4.9/0042-x86-speculation-Split-out-TIF-update.patch queue-4.9/0044-x86-speculation-Prevent-stale-SPEC_CTRL-msr-content.patch queue-4.9/0069-cpu-speculation-Add-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/0047-x86-speculation-Add-seccomp-Spectre-v2-user-space-pr.patch queue-4.9/0038-x86-speculation-Prepare-for-per-task-indirect-branch.patch queue-4.9/0034-x86-speculation-Mark-string-arrays-const-correctly.patch queue-4.9/0068-x86-speculation-mds-Print-SMT-vulnerable-on-MSBDS-wi.patch queue-4.9/0035-x86-speculataion-Mark-command-line-parser-data-__ini.patch queue-4.9/0041-x86-speculation-Prepare-for-conditional-IBPB-in-swit.patch queue-4.9/0033-x86-speculation-Reorder-the-spec_v2-code.patch queue-4.9/0045-x86-speculation-Add-prctl-control-for-indirect-branc.patch queue-4.9/0025-x86-speculation-Move-STIPB-IBPB-string-conditionals-.patch queue-4.9/0040-x86-speculation-Avoid-__switch_to_xtra-calls.patch queue-4.9/0043-x86-speculation-Prepare-arch_smt_update-for-PRCTL-mo.patch queue-4.9/0028-x86-speculation-Reorganize-speculation-control-MSRs-.patch queue-4.9/0031-x86-speculation-Rework-SMT-state-change.patch queue-4.9/0024-x86-speculation-Remove-unnecessary-ret-variable-in-c.patch queue-4.9/0018-x86-speculation-Apply-IBPB-more-strictly-to-avoid-cr.patch queue-4.9/0029-x86-Kconfig-Select-SCHED_SMT-if-SMP-enabled.patch queue-4.9/0071-x86-speculation-mds-Add-mitigations-support-for-MDS.patch queue-4.9/0070-x86-speculation-Support-mitigations-cmdline-option.patch queue-4.9/0065-x86-speculation-Move-arch_smt_update-call-to-after-m.patch queue-4.9/0017-Documentation-l1tf-Fix-small-spelling-typo.patch queue-4.9/0067-x86-speculation-mds-Fix-comment.patch queue-4.9/0064-x86-speculation-mds-Add-mds-full-nosmt-cmdline-optio.patch queue-4.9/0036-x86-speculation-Unify-conditional-spectre-v2-print-f.patch queue-4.9/0027-x86-speculation-Rename-SSBD-update-functions.patch queue-4.9/0074-x86-speculation-mds-Fix-documentation-typo.patch queue-4.9/0020-x86-speculation-Propagate-information-about-RSB-fill.patch queue-4.9/0032-x86-l1tf-Show-actual-SMT-state.patch queue-4.9/0023-x86-speculation-Clean-up-spectre_v2_parse_cmdline.patch queue-4.9/0066-x86-speculation-mds-Add-SMT-warning-message.patch queue-4.9/0048-x86-speculation-Provide-IBPB-always-command-line-opt.patch queue-4.9/0039-x86-process-Consolidate-and-simplify-switch_to_xtra-.patch queue-4.9/0019-x86-speculation-Enable-cross-hyperthread-spectre-v2-.patch queue-4.9/0011-x86-mm-Use-WRITE_ONCE-when-setting-PTEs.patch _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel