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glib-2.0: Security fix for CVE-2019-12450

PATCH New Armin Kuster 1 participant 3 messages Jun 6, 2019

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 glib-2.0: Security fix for CVE-2019-12450

From: Armin Kuster <[email protected]>

Source: glib-2.0
MR: 98443
Type: Security Fix
Disposition: Backport from https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/commit/d8f8f4d637ce43f8699ba94c9b7648beda0ca174
ChangeID: 880b9b349cb8d82c7c1314a3657ec9094baba741
Description:

---
 .../glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2019-12450.patch         | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0_2.58.0.bb      |  1 +
 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2019-12450.patch
meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2019-12450.patch new file +59 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37ad580
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From d8f8f4d637ce43f8699ba94c9b7648beda0ca174 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Holy <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 10:41:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] gfile: Limit access to files when copying
+
+file_copy_fallback creates new files with default permissions and
+set the correct permissions after the operation is finished. This
+might cause that the files can be accessible by more users during
+the operation than expected. Use G_FILE_CREATE_PRIVATE for the new
+files to limit access to those files.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/commit/d8f8f4d637ce43f8699ba94c9b7648beda0ca174
+CVE: CVE-2019-12450
+Signed-off-by: Armin kuster <[email protected]>
+
+---
+ gio/gfile.c | 11 ++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/gio/gfile.c b/gio/gfile.c
+index 24b136d..74b5804 100644
+--- a/gio/gfile.c
++++ b/gio/gfile.c
+@@ -3284,12 +3284,12 @@ file_copy_fallback (GFile                  *source,
+         out = (GOutputStream*)_g_local_file_output_stream_replace (_g_local_file_get_filename (G_LOCAL_FILE (destination)),
+                                                                    FALSE, NULL,
+                                                                    flags & G_FILE_COPY_BACKUP,
+-                                                                   G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION,
+-                                                                   info,
++                                                                   G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION |
++                                                                   G_FILE_CREATE_PRIVATE, info,
+                                                                    cancellable, error);
+       else
+         out = (GOutputStream*)_g_local_file_output_stream_create (_g_local_file_get_filename (G_LOCAL_FILE (destination)),
+-                                                                  FALSE, 0, info,
++                                                                  FALSE, G_FILE_CREATE_PRIVATE, info,
+                                                                   cancellable, error);
+     }
+   else if (flags & G_FILE_COPY_OVERWRITE)
+@@ -3297,12 +3297,13 @@ file_copy_fallback (GFile                  *source,
+       out = (GOutputStream *)g_file_replace (destination,
+                                              NULL,
+                                              flags & G_FILE_COPY_BACKUP,
+-                                             G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION,
++                                             G_FILE_CREATE_REPLACE_DESTINATION |
++                                             G_FILE_CREATE_PRIVATE,
+                                              cancellable, error);
+     }
+   else
+     {
+-      out = (GOutputStream *)g_file_create (destination, 0, cancellable, error);
++      out = (GOutputStream *)g_file_create (destination, G_FILE_CREATE_PRIVATE, cancellable, error);
+     }
+ 
+   if (!out)
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0_2.58.0.bb +1 -0
index 1271a7c..879bc48 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/glib/${SHRT_VER}/glib-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://0001-Do-not-ignore-return-value-of-write.patch \
            file://0010-Do-not-hardcode-python-path-into-various-tools.patch \
            file://date-lt.patch \
+           file://CVE-2019-12450.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI_append_class-native = " file://relocate-modules.patch"
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 wget: Security fix for CVE-2019-5953

From: Armin Kuster <[email protected]>

Source: http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git
MR: 89341
Type: Security Fix
Disposition: Backport from http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=692d5c5215de0db482c252492a92fc424cc6a97c
ChangeID: 1c19a2fd7ead88cc4ee92d425179d60d4635864b
Description:

Fixes CVE-2019-5953
Affects: < 1.20.1

---
 .../recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2019-5953.patch | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.19.5.bb          |  1 +
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2019-5953.patch
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2019-5953.patch new file +51 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e43e8e5
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 692d5c5215de0db482c252492a92fc424cc6a97c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Ruehsen <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 11:50:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix a buffer overflow vulnerability
+
+* src/iri.c(do_conversion): Reallocate the output buffer to a larger
+  size if it is already full
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=692d5c5215de0db482c252492a92fc424cc6a97c
+CVE: CVE-2019-5953
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <[email protected]>
+
+---
+ src/iri.c | 12 +++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+Index: wget-1.19.5/src/iri.c
+===================================================================
+--- wget-1.19.5.orig/src/iri.c
++++ wget-1.19.5/src/iri.c
+@@ -151,8 +151,11 @@ do_conversion (const char *tocode, const
+   *out = s = xmalloc (outlen + 1);
+   done = 0;
+ 
++  DEBUGP (("iconv %s -> %s\n", tocode, fromcode));
++
+   for (;;)
+     {
++      DEBUGP (("iconv outlen=%d inlen=%d\n", outlen, inlen));
+       if (iconv (cd, (ICONV_CONST char **) &in, &inlen, out, &outlen) != (size_t)(-1) &&
+           iconv (cd, NULL, NULL, out, &outlen) != (size_t)(-1))
+         {
+@@ -187,11 +190,14 @@ do_conversion (const char *tocode, const
+         }
+       else if (errno == E2BIG) /* Output buffer full */
+         {
++          logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE,
++                    _("Reallocate output buffer len=%d outlen=%d inlen=%d\n"), len, outlen, inlen);
+           tooshort++;
+           done = len;
+-          len = outlen = done + inlen * 2;
+-          s = xrealloc (s, outlen + 1);
+-          *out = s + done;
++          len = done + inlen * 2;
++          s = xrealloc (s, len + 1);
++          *out = s + done - outlen;
++          outlen += inlen * 2;
+         }
+       else /* Weird, we got an unspecified error */
+         {
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.19.5.bb +1 -0
index e37d8c7..920b74d 100644
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/wget/wget-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0001-Unset-need_charset_alias-when-building-for-musl.patch \
            file://0002-improve-reproducibility.patch \
+           file://CVE-2019-5953.patch \
           "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2db6f03d655041f82eb64b8c8a1fa7da"
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 Curl: Securiyt fix CVE-2019-5435 CVE-2019-5436

In reply to Armin Kuster

From: Armin Kuster <[email protected]>

Source: CUrl.org
MR: 98455
Type: Security Fix
Disposition: Backport from https://curl.haxx.se/
ChangeID: 86b094a440ea473b114764e8d64df8142d561609 Description:

Fixes CVE-2019-5435 CVE-2019-5436

---
 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-5435.patch | 200 +++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-5436.patch |  32 ++++
 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.61.0.bb           |   2 +
 3 files changed, 234 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-5435.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-5436.patch
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-5435.patch new file +200 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ac5554
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+From 5fc28510a4664f46459d9a40187d81cc08571e60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 08:00:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH: largest acceptable string input size
+
+This limits all accepted input strings passed to libcurl to be less than
+CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH (8000000) bytes, for these API calls:
+curl_easy_setopt() and curl_url_set().
+
+The 8000000 number is arbitrary picked and is meant to detect mistakes
+or abuse, not to limit actual practical use cases. By limiting the
+acceptable string lengths we also reduce the risk of integer overflows
+all over.
+
+NOTE: This does not apply to `CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS`.
+
+Test 1559 verifies.
+
+Closes #3805
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Dropped a few changes to apply against this version
+https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/5fc28510a4664f4
+
+CVE: CVE-2019-5435
+affects: libcurl 7.19.4 to and including 7.64.1
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <[email protected]>
+
+---
+ lib/setopt.c               |  7 +++++
+ lib/urldata.h              |  4 +++
+ 7 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test1559
+ create mode 100644 tests/libtest/lib1559.c
+
+Index: curl-7.61.0/lib/setopt.c
+===================================================================
+--- curl-7.61.0.orig/lib/setopt.c
++++ curl-7.61.0/lib/setopt.c
+@@ -60,6 +60,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_setstropt(char **charp, co
+   if(s) {
+     char *str = strdup(s);
+ 
++    if(str) {
++      size_t len = strlen(str);
++      if(len > CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH) {
++        free(str);
++        return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
++      }
++    }
+     if(!str)
+       return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ 
+Index: curl-7.61.0/lib/urldata.h
+===================================================================
+--- curl-7.61.0.orig/lib/urldata.h
++++ curl-7.61.0/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -79,6 +79,10 @@
+ */
+ #define RESP_TIMEOUT (1800*1000)
+ 
++/* Max string intput length is a precaution against abuse and to detect junk
++   input easier and better. */
++#define CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH 8000000
++
+ #include "cookie.h"
+ #include "psl.h"
+ #include "formdata.h"
+Index: curl-7.61.0/tests/data/test1559
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ curl-7.61.0/tests/data/test1559
+@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
++<testcase>
++<info>
++<keywords>
++CURLOPT_URL
++</keywords>
++</info>
++
++<reply>
++</reply>
++
++<client>
++<server>
++none
++</server>
++
++# require HTTP so that CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS works as assumed
++<features>
++http
++</features>
++<tool>
++lib1559
++</tool>
++
++<name>
++Set excessive URL lengths
++</name>
++</client>
++
++#
++# Verify that the test runs to completion without crashing
++<verify>
++<errorcode>
++0
++</errorcode>
++<stdout>
++CURLOPT_URL 10000000 bytes URL == 43
++CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS 10000000 bytes data == 0
++CURLUPART_URL 10000000 bytes URL == 3
++CURLUPART_SCHEME 10000000 bytes scheme == 3
++CURLUPART_USER 10000000 bytes user == 3
++</stdout>
++</verify>
++
++</testcase>
+Index: curl-7.61.0/tests/libtest/lib1559.c
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ curl-7.61.0/tests/libtest/lib1559.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
++/***************************************************************************
++ *                                  _   _ ____  _
++ *  Project                     ___| | | |  _ \| |
++ *                             / __| | | | |_) | |
++ *                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
++ *                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, <[email protected]>, et al.
++ *
++ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
++ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
++ * are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
++ *
++ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
++ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
++ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
++ *
++ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
++ * KIND, either express or implied.
++ *
++ ***************************************************************************/
++#include "test.h"
++
++#include "testutil.h"
++#include "warnless.h"
++#include "memdebug.h"
++
++#define EXCESSIVE 10*1000*1000
++int test(char *URL)
++{
++  CURLcode res = 0;
++  CURL *curl = NULL;
++  char *longurl = malloc(EXCESSIVE);
++  CURLU *u;
++  (void)URL;
++
++  memset(longurl, 'a', EXCESSIVE);
++  longurl[EXCESSIVE-1] = 0;
++
++  global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_ALL);
++  easy_init(curl);
++
++  res = curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, longurl);
++  printf("CURLOPT_URL %d bytes URL == %d\n",
++         EXCESSIVE, (int)res);
++
++  res = curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, longurl);
++  printf("CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS %d bytes data == %d\n",
++         EXCESSIVE, (int)res);
++
++  u = curl_url();
++  if(u) {
++    CURLUcode uc = curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_URL, longurl, 0);
++    printf("CURLUPART_URL %d bytes URL == %d\n",
++           EXCESSIVE, (int)uc);
++    uc = curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_SCHEME, longurl, CURLU_NON_SUPPORT_SCHEME);
++    printf("CURLUPART_SCHEME %d bytes scheme == %d\n",
++           EXCESSIVE, (int)uc);
++    uc = curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_USER, longurl, 0);
++    printf("CURLUPART_USER %d bytes user == %d\n",
++           EXCESSIVE, (int)uc);
++    curl_url_cleanup(u);
++  }
++
++  free(longurl);
++
++  curl_easy_cleanup(curl);
++  curl_global_cleanup();
++
++  return 0;
++
++test_cleanup:
++
++  curl_easy_cleanup(curl);
++  curl_global_cleanup();
++
++  return res; /* return the final return code */
++}
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-5436.patch new file +32 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05fd8e9
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 2576003415625d7b5f0e390902f8097830b82275 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 3 May 2019 22:20:37 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] tftp: use the current blksize for recvfrom()
+
+bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-5436.html
+Reported-by: l00p3r on hackerone
+CVE-2019-5436
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/2576003415625d7b5f0e390902f8097830b82275
+CVE: CVE-2019-5436
+affects: libcurl 7.19.4 to and including 7.64.1
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <[email protected]>
+
+---
+ lib/tftp.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+Index: curl-7.61.0/lib/tftp.c
+===================================================================
+--- curl-7.61.0.orig/lib/tftp.c
++++ curl-7.61.0/lib/tftp.c
+@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ static CURLcode tftp_connect(struct conn
+   state->sockfd = state->conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET];
+   state->state = TFTP_STATE_START;
+   state->error = TFTP_ERR_NONE;
+-  state->blksize = TFTP_BLKSIZE_DEFAULT;
++  state->blksize = blksize;
+   state->requested_blksize = blksize;
+ 
+   ((struct sockaddr *)&state->local_addr)->sa_family =
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.61.0.bb +2 -0
index 56327a6..1027f75 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://CVE-2018-16839.patch \
            file://CVE-2018-16840.patch \
            file://CVE-2018-16842.patch \
+           file://CVE-2019-5435.patch \
+           file://CVE-2019-5436.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "31d0a9f48dc796a7db351898a1e5058a"
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4