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patch "staging: rtl8723bs: Fix potential security hole" added to staging-linus

PATCH [email protected] 1 participant 1 message Feb 10, 2020

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This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

staging: rtl8723bs: Fix potential security hole

to my staging git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/staging.git
in the staging-linus branch.

The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree (usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)

The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the next -rc kernel release.

If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.

From ac33597c0c0d1d819dccfe001bcd0acef7107e7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Larry Finger <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2020 12:02:31 -0600
Subject: staging: rtl8723bs: Fix potential security hole

In routine rtw_hostapd_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is assumed to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but this assumption is never checked. This could result in out-of-bounds read/write on kernel heap in case a p->length less than the size of struct ieee_param is specified by the user. If p->length is allowed to be greater than the size of the struct, then a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory. Fixes commit 554c0a3abf216 ("0taging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver").

Reported by: Pietro Oliva <[email protected]>
Cc: Pietro Oliva <[email protected]>
Cc: Stable <[email protected]>
Fixes 554c0a3abf216 ("0taging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver").

---
 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c +1 -1
index db6528a01229..3128766dd50e 100644
@@ -4207,7 +4207,7 @@ static int rtw_hostapd_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct iw_point *p)
 
 
 	/* if (p->length < sizeof(struct ieee_param) || !p->pointer) { */
-	if (!p->pointer) {
+	if (!p->pointer || p->length != sizeof(*param)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
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2.25.0