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gnupg: Security Advisory - gnupg - CVE-2019-14855

PATCH New Li Zhou 1 participant 1 message Mar 30, 2020

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PATCH 1/1 gnupg: Security Advisory - gnupg - CVE-2019-14855

Backport patches from
<https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=patch;
h=c4f2d9e3e1d77d2f1f168764fcdfed32f7d1dfc4>
<https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=patch;
h=7d9aad63c4f1aefe97da61baf5acd96c12c0278e>
to solve CVE-2019-14855.

---
 .../gnupg/gnupg/CVE-2019-14855-1.patch             | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++
 .../gnupg/gnupg/CVE-2019-14855-2.patch             |  46 +++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.2.17.bb         |   2 +
 3 files changed, 155 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/CVE-2019-14855-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/CVE-2019-14855-2.patch
meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/CVE-2019-14855-1.patch new file +107 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e3d1bf
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+From 4feb517a550af36b446bbe71dd4f8c52b2ffab41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2019 17:43:26 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] gpg: Be prepared for chosen-prefix SHA-1 collisions in
+ key signatures.
+
+* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature_over_key_or_uid): Reject cewrtain
+SHA-1 based signatures.
+--
+
+Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
+
+(cherry picked from c4f2d9e3e1d77d2f1f168764fcdfed32f7d1dfc4)
+
+Adjusted for changed added arguments in a function.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-14855
+Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <[email protected]>
+---
+ g10/sig-check.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/sig-check.c b/g10/sig-check.c
+index a93b496..2528c25 100644
+--- a/g10/sig-check.c
++++ b/g10/sig-check.c
+@@ -824,6 +824,10 @@ check_signature_over_key_or_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *signer,
+   PKT_public_key *pripk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+   gcry_md_hd_t md;
+   int signer_alloced = 0;
++  int stub_is_selfsig;
++
++  if (!is_selfsig)
++    is_selfsig = &stub_is_selfsig;
+ 
+   rc = openpgp_pk_test_algo (sig->pubkey_algo);
+   if (rc)
+@@ -857,14 +861,11 @@ check_signature_over_key_or_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *signer,
+ 
+   if (signer)
+     {
+-      if (is_selfsig)
+-        {
+-          if (signer->keyid[0] == pripk->keyid[0]
+-              && signer->keyid[1] == pripk->keyid[1])
+-            *is_selfsig = 1;
+-          else
+-            *is_selfsig = 0;
+-        }
++      if (signer->keyid[0] == pripk->keyid[0]
++          && signer->keyid[1] == pripk->keyid[1])
++        *is_selfsig = 1;
++      else
++        *is_selfsig = 0;
+     }
+   else
+     {
+@@ -874,8 +875,7 @@ check_signature_over_key_or_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *signer,
+         {
+           /* Issued by the primary key.  */
+           signer = pripk;
+-          if (is_selfsig)
+-            *is_selfsig = 1;
++          *is_selfsig = 1;
+         }
+       else
+         {
+@@ -904,8 +904,7 @@ check_signature_over_key_or_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *signer,
+           if (! signer)
+             {
+               /* Signer by some other key.  */
+-              if (is_selfsig)
+-                *is_selfsig = 0;
++              *is_selfsig = 0;
+               if (ret_pk)
+                 {
+                   signer = ret_pk;
+@@ -966,9 +965,22 @@ check_signature_over_key_or_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *signer,
+   else if (IS_UID_SIG (sig) || IS_UID_REV (sig))
+     {
+       log_assert (packet->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID);
+-      hash_public_key (md, pripk);
+-      hash_uid_packet (packet->pkt.user_id, md, sig);
+-      rc = check_signature_end_simple (signer, sig, md);
++      if (sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 && !*is_selfsig
++          && sig->timestamp > 1547856000)
++        {
++          /* If the signature was created using SHA-1 we consider this
++           * signature invalid because it makes it possible to mount a
++           * chosen-prefix collision.  We don't do this for
++           * self-signatures or for signatures created before the
++           * somewhat arbitrary cut-off date 2019-01-19.  */
++          rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO);
++        }
++      else
++        {
++          hash_public_key (md, pripk);
++          hash_uid_packet (packet->pkt.user_id, md, sig);
++          rc = check_signature_end_simple (signer, sig, md);
++        }
+     }
+   else
+     {
+-- 
+2.23.0
+
meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/CVE-2019-14855-2.patch new file +46 -0

46 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.2.17.bb +2 -0
index 689cf8a..1ac882e 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNUPG_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://0003-dirmngr-uses-libgpg-error.patch \
            file://0004-autogen.sh-fix-find-version-for-beta-checking.patch \
            file://0001-Woverride-init-is-not-needed-with-gcc-9.patch \
+           file://CVE-2019-14855-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2019-14855-2.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI_append_class-native = " file://0001-configure.ac-use-a-custom-value-for-the-location-of-.patch \
                                 file://relocate.patch"
Signature · 1 line
1.9.1