FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree
Subsystems (2)
[email protected]
maintainerThe patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From d8778e393afa421f1f117471144f8ce6deb6953a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 16:36:19 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a
user buffer
Both Intel and AMD consider it to be architecturally valid for XRSTOR to fail with #PF but nonetheless change the register state. The actual conditions under which this might occur are unclear [1], but it seems plausible that this might be triggered if one sibling thread unmaps a page and invalidates the shared TLB while another sibling thread is executing XRSTOR on the page in question.
__fpu__restore_sig() can execute XRSTOR while the hardware registers are preserved on behalf of a different victim task (using the fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx mechanism), and, in theory, XRSTOR could fail but modify the registers.
If this happens, then there is a window in which __fpu__restore_sig() could schedule out and the victim task could schedule back in without reloading its own FPU registers. This would result in part of the FPU state that __fpu__restore_sig() was attempting to load leaking into the victim task's user-visible state.
Invalidate preserved FPU registers on XRSTOR failure to prevent this situation from corrupting any state.
[1] Frequent readers of the errata lists might imagine "complex microarchitectural conditions".
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c +19 -0
@@ -369,6 +369,25 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)fpregs_unlock ();return 0 ; } + +/* +* The above did an FPU restore operation, restricted to +* the user portion of the registers, and failed, but the +* microcode might have modified the FPU registers +* nevertheless. +* +* If the FPU registers do not belong to current, then +* invalidate the FPU register state otherwise the task might +* preempt current and return to user space with corrupted +* FPU registers. +* +* In case current owns the FPU registers then no further +* action is required. The fixup below will handle it +* correctly. +*/ +if (test_thread_flag (TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD )) +__cpu_invalidate_fpregs_state (); +fpregs_unlock (); }else {/*
Quoted 70 lines · On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 12:51:46PM +0200, [email protected] wrote:
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From
d8778e393afa421f1f117471144f8ce6deb6953aMon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 16:36:19 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a
user bufferBoth Intel and AMD consider it to be architecturally valid for XRSTOR to fail with #PF but nonetheless change the register state. The actual conditions under which this might occur are unclear [1], but it seems plausible that this might be triggered if one sibling thread unmaps a page and invalidates the shared TLB while another sibling thread is executing XRSTOR on the page in question.
__fpu__restore_sig()can execute XRSTOR while the hardware registers are preserved on behalf of a different victim task (using thefpu_fpregs_owner_ctxmechanism), and, in theory, XRSTOR could fail but modify the registers.If this happens, then there is a window in which
__fpu__restore_sig()could schedule out and the victim task could schedule back in without reloading its own FPU registers. This would result in part of the FPU state that__fpu__restore_sig()was attempting to load leaking into the victim task's user-visible state.Invalidate preserved FPU registers on XRSTOR failure to prevent this situation from corrupting any state.
[1] Frequent readers of the errata lists might imagine "complex microarchitectural conditions".
Fixes 1d731e731c4c ("x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to __fpu__restore_sig()")Signed-off-by Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Acked-by Dave Hansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Rik van Riel <[email protected]>arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c +11
-0@@ -369,6 +369,25 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)fpregs_unlock ();return 0 ; } + +/* +* The above did an FPU restore operation, restricted to +* the user portion of the registers, and failed, but the +* microcode might have modified the FPU registers +* nevertheless. +* +* If the FPU registers do not belong to current, then +* invalidate the FPU register state otherwise the task might +* preempt current and return to user space with corrupted +* FPU registers.
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size) · line 392
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c +8
-0+* +* In case current owns the FPU registers then no further +* action is required. The fixup below will handle it +* correctly. +*/ +if (test_thread_flag (TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD )) +__cpu_invalidate_fpregs_state (); +fpregs_unlock (); }else {
So I'm looking at this and 5.4.127 has:
if (!ret) {
fpregs_mark_activate();
fpregs_unlock();
return 0;
}
fpregs_deactivate(fpu); <---
fpregs_unlock();i.e., an unconditional fpu invalidation there. Which got removed by:
98265c17efa9 ("x86/fpu/xstate: Preserve supervisor states for the slow path in __fpu__restore_sig()")
in 5.7.
so that Fixes: commit above which points to a 5.1 kernel is probably wrong-ish.
amluto?
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG NürnbergQuoted 94 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 70 lines · On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 12:51:46PM +0200, [email protected] wrote:
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From
d8778e393afa421f1f117471144f8ce6deb6953aMon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 16:36:19 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a
user bufferBoth Intel and AMD consider it to be architecturally valid for XRSTOR to fail with #PF but nonetheless change the register state. The actual conditions under which this might occur are unclear [1], but it seems plausible that this might be triggered if one sibling thread unmaps a page and invalidates the shared TLB while another sibling thread is executing XRSTOR on the page in question.
__fpu__restore_sig()can execute XRSTOR while the hardware registers are preserved on behalf of a different victim task (using thefpu_fpregs_owner_ctxmechanism), and, in theory, XRSTOR could fail but modify the registers.If this happens, then there is a window in which
__fpu__restore_sig()could schedule out and the victim task could schedule back in without reloading its own FPU registers. This would result in part of the FPU state that__fpu__restore_sig()was attempting to load leaking into the victim task's user-visible state.Invalidate preserved FPU registers on XRSTOR failure to prevent this situation from corrupting any state.
[1] Frequent readers of the errata lists might imagine "complex microarchitectural conditions".
Fixes 1d731e731c4c ("x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to __fpu__restore_sig()")Signed-off-by Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Acked-by Dave Hansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Rik van Riel <[email protected]>arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c +11
-0@@ -369,6 +369,25 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)fpregs_unlock ();return 0 ; } + +/* +* The above did an FPU restore operation, restricted to +* the user portion of the registers, and failed, but the +* microcode might have modified the FPU registers +* nevertheless. +* +* If the FPU registers do not belong to current, then +* invalidate the FPU register state otherwise the task might +* preempt current and return to user space with corrupted +* FPU registers. arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size) · line 392
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c +8
-0+* +* In case current owns the FPU registers then no further +* action is required. The fixup below will handle it +* correctly. +*/ +if (test_thread_flag (TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD )) +__cpu_invalidate_fpregs_state (); +fpregs_unlock (); }else {So I'm looking at this and 5.4.127 has:
if (!ret) { fpregs_mark_activate(); fpregs_unlock(); return 0; } fpregs_deactivate(fpu); <--- fpregs_unlock();i.e., an unconditional fpu invalidation there. Which got removed by:
Quoted 8 lines
98265c17efa9("x86/fpu/xstate: Preserve supervisor states for the slow path in__fpu__restore_sig()")in 5.7.
so that Fixes: commit above which points to a 5.1 kernel is probably wrong-ish.
amluto?
I agree. The fixes line is indeed wrong, and the (horribly misnamed) fpu_deactivate() call did the right thing.
Quoted 2 lines · Andy Lutomirski
I agree. The fixes line is indeed wrong, and the (horribly misnamed)
fpu_deactivate()call did the right thing.
Thanks!
@gregkh, then, you can ignore that one for 5.4.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg