Another possible race in put_rpccred / rpcauth_unhash_cred
Subsystems (3)
Hi again Trond,
I've been looking at a customer report of an oops in rpcauth_lookup_credcache.
https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=547137
It appears that one of the hash chains in the cache has become corrupted.
In trying to guess how this might happen, the one possibility I have found is that it might be possible for hlist_del_rcu to be called on an rpc_cred that is not hashed. This certainly could cause list corruption.
put_rpccred checks if the cred is hashed (RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED) and if not, it takes a lock and then - if the cred it not uptodate - calls rpcauth_unhash_cred which will call hlist_del_rcu. If some other thread unhashed the cred while this thread was waiting for rpc_credcache_lock, we could get list corruption.
The kernel in question did not have commit 5f707eb429 which claims to fix a race in much the same place, however I don't think that patch would fix this problem.
I think the simplest fix would be to use hlist_del_init_rcu in place of hlist_del_rcu as shown below. That version protects again deleting the same element multiple times.
Do you agree with this fix?
Thanks,
NeilBrown
net/sunrpc/auth.c +1 -1
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(rpc_credcache_lock);static void rpcauth_unhash_cred_locked (struct rpc_cred *cred) { -hlist_del_rcu (&cred->cr_hash); +hlist_del_init_rcu (&cred->cr_hash);smp_mb__before_clear_bit ();clear_bit (RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED , &cred->cr_flags); }
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): 19203.18009.945354.446817-wvvUuzkyo1EYVZTmpyfIwg@public.gmane.org
Quoted 40 lines · Neil Brown
Hi again Trond,
I've been looking at a customer report of an oops in
rpcauth_lookup_credcache.
https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=547137It appears that one of the hash chains in the cache has become corrupted.
In trying to guess how this might happen, the one possibility I have found is that it might be possible for
hlist_del_rcuto be called on anrpc_credthat is not hashed. This certainly could cause list corruption.
put_rpccredchecks if the cred is hashed (RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED) and if not, it takes a lock and then - if the cred it not uptodate - callsrpcauth_unhash_credwhich will callhlist_del_rcu. If some other thread unhashed the cred while this thread was waiting forrpc_credcache_lock, we could get list corruption.The kernel in question did not have commit
5f707eb429which claims to fix a race in much the same place, however I don't think that patch would fix this problem.I think the simplest fix would be to use
hlist_del_init_rcuin place ofhlist_del_rcuas shown below. That version protects again deleting the same element multiple times.Do you agree with this fix?
Thanks,
NeilBrownnet/sunrpc/auth.c +0
-0
net/sunrpc/auth.c static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(rpc_credcache_lock); · line 124
Quoted 8 lines
net/sunrpc/auth.c +1
-1@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(rpc_credcache_lock);static void rpcauth_unhash_cred_locked (struct rpc_cred *cred) { -hlist_del_rcu (&cred->cr_hash); +hlist_del_init_rcu (&cred->cr_hash);smp_mb__before_clear_bit ();clear_bit (RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED , &cred->cr_flags); }
Hmm... Why not simply convert that 'clear_bit()' into a 'test_and_clear_bit()' and have it protect the hlist_del_rcu?
I can't see anything that would break if we do this. There doesn't seem to be anything that explicitly depends on the ordering of those two operations...
Cheers
Trond
Quoted 8 lines · Neil Brown
Hi again Trond,
I've been looking at a customer report of an oops in
rpcauth_lookup_credcache.
https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=547137It appears that one of the hash chains in the cache has become corrupted.
How about the following patch?
Cheers
Trond
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
RPC: Fix two potential races in put_rpccred
From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
It is possible for rpcauth_destroy_credcache() to cause the rpc credentials to be unhashed while put_rpccred is waiting for the rpc_credcache_lock on another cpu.
Should this happen, then we can end up calling hlist_del_rcu(&cred->cr_hash) a second time, thus causing list corruption.
Should the credential actually be hashed, it is possible for rpcauth_lookup_credcache to find and reference it before we get round to unhashing it. We should therefore check for whether the credential is referenced after we've unhashed it.
See https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=547137
---
net/sunrpc/auth.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/auth.c +23 -16
@@ -123,16 +123,19 @@ rpcauth_unhash_cred_locked(struct rpc_cred *cred)clear_bit (RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED , &cred->cr_flags); } -static void +static int rpcauth_unhash_cred (struct rpc_cred *cred) {spinlock_t *cache_lock; +int ret; cache_lock = &cred->cr_auth->au_credcache->lock;spin_lock (cache_lock); -if (atomic_read (&cred->cr_count) ==0 ) + ret =atomic_read (&cred->cr_count) ==0 ; +if (ret)rpcauth_unhash_cred_locked (cred);spin_unlock (cache_lock); +return ret; }/*
@@ -446,31 +449,35 @@ void put_rpccred(struct rpc_cred *cred) {/* Fast path for unhashed credentials */ -if (test_bit (RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED , &cred->cr_flags) !=0 ) - goto need_lock; - -if (!atomic_dec_and_test (&cred->cr_count)) +if (test_bit (RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED , &cred->cr_flags) ==0 ) { +if (atomic_dec_and_test (&cred->cr_count)) + cred->cr_ops->crdestroy (cred);return ; - goto out_destroy; -need_lock: + } +if (!atomic_dec_and_lock (&cred->cr_count, &rpc_credcache_lock))return ;if (!list_empty (&cred->cr_lru)) { number_cred_unused--;list_del_init (&cred->cr_lru); } -if (test_bit (RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE , &cred->cr_flags) ==0 ) -rpcauth_unhash_cred (cred);if (test_bit (RPCAUTH_CRED_HASHED , &cred->cr_flags) !=0 ) { - cred->cr_expire = jiffies; -list_add_tail (&cred->cr_lru, &cred_unused); - number_cred_unused++; -spin_unlock (&rpc_credcache_lock); -return ; +if (test_bit (RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE , &cred->cr_flags) !=0 ) { + cred->cr_expire = jiffies; +list_add_tail (&cred->cr_lru, &cred_unused); + number_cred_unused++; + goto out_nodestroy; + } +if (!rpcauth_unhash_cred (cred)) { +/* We were hashed and someone looked us up... */ + goto out_nodestroy; + } }spin_unlock (&rpc_credcache_lock); -out_destroy: cred->cr_ops->crdestroy (cred); +return ; +out_nodestroy: +spin_unlock (&rpc_credcache_lock); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (put_rpccred);