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xserver_domain(xdm)

DISCUSSION Russell Coker 2 participants 2 messages Apr 24, 2002 SELinux security module

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Currently in my sample policy I have an "xdm" xserver domain which is entered when the xdm runs the X server.

The problem with this is that the X server needs to access resources from the X client programs and the client programs need to use X resources. This means allowing access from the user_t to the xdm_server_t and from xdm_xserver_t for shared memory, which I don't like.

I am now thinking that to login to an X server as sysadm_t is probably a bad idea anyway, so maybe I should just have xdm run the X server as user_xserver_t.

What do you think?

Also is anyone looking into extra security hooks for X? Is it at all possible to prevent keyboard snooping by any misbehaving X program?

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#1 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Russell Coker

I am now thinking that to login to an X server as sysadm_t is probably a bad idea anyway, so maybe I should just have xdm run the X server as user_xserver_t.

What do you think?

So, what is the expected usage of the system by an administrator? If you login to [gkx]dm as user_r and then use newrole in a terminal, your X server will still be running in user_xserver_t.

At present, if you want to maintain separation, you have to run X via startx after a normal login, in which case it will pick up the appropriate user_xserver_t or sysadm_xserver_t domain.

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Also is anyone looking into extra security hooks for X? Is it at all possible to prevent keyboard snooping by any misbehaving X program?

We are interested in integrating security hooks and access controls into the X server to support enforcement of policies. This was previously explored for DTOS, a predecessor of SELinux, in the DX server (Kirk Joseph Bittler, A Policy-Independent Secure X Server, Master's Thesis, Portland State University, 1997).

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