audit bug in fd handling
It seems that when a file handle open read/write is inherited by a domain that is permitted read access only, an error about write access will be logged - even if there is a dontaudit rule!
Here's the dmesg log:
avc: denied { write } for pid=4731 exe=/usr/sbin/sendmail path=/spool/fcron/fcrjob-Ldo3Uf (deleted) dev=03:08 ino=27923 scontext=system_u:system_r:system_mail_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:system_crond_tmp_t tclass=file
Here's a grep from policy.conf:
dontaudit system_mail_t system_crond_tmp_t:file write;
Incidentally I'm changing the way mail sending operates. Having daemons send mail as sysadm_mail_t is ugly, and having them send mail as user_mail_t is wrong. I've created a new system_mail_t for this.
Signature · 3 lines
I do not get viruses because I do not use MS software. If you use Outlook then please do not put my email address in your address-book so that WHEN you get a virus it won't use my address in the
Quoted 1 line
From field.
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Quoted 3 lines · Russell Coker
It seems that when a file handle open read/write is inherited by a domain that is permitted read access only, an error about write access will be logged - even if there is a dontaudit rule!
Congratulations, you've found a bug. It isn't limited to file descriptor inheritance - it occurs whenever multiple permissions are checked simultaneously and at least one of the permissions is allowed. A workaround would be to specify the full set of permissions in the dontaudit rule, e.g. 'dontaudit system_mail_t system_crond_tmp_t:file { read write };'. I'll post a patch for the SELinux module shortly.
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Quoted 3 lines · Russell Coker
It seems that when a file handle open read/write is inherited by a domain that is permitted read access only, an error about write access will be logged - even if there is a dontaudit rule!
The attached patch (also committed to the sourceforge CVS tree) fixes this bug in the auditdeny logic. To apply, save the patch to ~/auditdeny.patch, cd lsm-2.4, and patch -p0 < ~/auditdeny.patch. Then, rebuild your kernel.
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Index: security/selinux/include/linux/flask/avc.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvsroot/selinux/nsa/lsm-2.4/security/selinux/include/linux/flask/avc.h,v retrieving revision 1.3
selinux/include/linux/flask/avc.h +6 -3
@@ -214,6 +214,7 @@unsigned long flags;struct avc_entry entry;__u32 seqno; +access_vector_t denied;spin_lock_irqsave (&avc_lock, flags);avc_cache_stats_incr (AVC_ENTRY_LOOKUPS );
@@ -254,9 +255,11 @@ ae = aeref->ae; } -if (!requested || (requested & ae->allowed) != requested) { -if (!requested || (requested & ae->auditdeny)) -avc_audit (ssid, tsid, tclass, requested & ~(ae->allowed), ae, + denied = requested & ~(ae->allowed); + +if (!requested || denied) { +if (!requested || (denied & ae->auditdeny)) +avc_audit (ssid, tsid, tclass, denied, ae,AVC_AUDITDENY , auditdata);#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP if (avc_debug_always_allow) {
Hello,
Perhaps this is why mail is the #1 exploited service. So what's the solution?
Ed
=> -----Original Message-----
=> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On
=> Behalf Of Russell Coker
=> Sent: Wednesday, July 10, 2002 3:46 AM
=> To: SE Linux
=> Subject: audit bug in fd handling
=>
=> It seems that when a file handle open read/write is inherited by a domain
=> that is permitted read access only, an error about write access will be
=> logged - even if there is a dontaudit rule!
=>
=> Here's the dmesg log:
=> avc: denied { write } for pid=4731 exe=/usr/sbin/sendmail => path=/spool/fcron/fcrjob-Ldo3Uf (deleted) dev=03:08 ino=27923 => scontext=system_u:system_r:system_mail_t
=> tcontext=system_u:object_r:system_crond_tmp_t tclass=file =>
=> Here's a grep from policy.conf:
=> dontaudit system_mail_t system_crond_tmp_t:file write;
=>
=>
=> Incidentally I'm changing the way mail sending operates. Having daemons
=> send
=> mail as sysadm_mail_t is ugly, and having them send mail as user_mail_t
=> is
=> wrong. I've created a new system_mail_t for this.
=>
=> --
=> I do not get viruses because I do not use MS software.
=> If you use Outlook then please do not put my email address in your => address-book so that WHEN you get a virus it won't use my address in the
=> >From field.
=>
=> --
=> You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux
=> list.
=> If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected]
=> with
=> the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
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Quoted 2 lines · Ed Street
Perhaps this is why mail is the #1 exploited service. So what's the solution?
I'm not sure what you mean by this. The bug I found was just a case of excessive logging and does no harm (apart from possibly encouraging inexperienced SE Linux administrators to grant excessive permissions).
The issue of an application granting write access to the file is annoying, however it is apparently operating on an open file handle pointing to a deleted file, after deleting the file you can't re-open it in read-only mode.
In this case fcron could either open the file twice before deleting it (once for read and once for write), or it could pipe the data to /usr/bin/mail (either directly from the cron job, or it could spool it in RAM).
What should it do? I am happy to write a patch for fcron and get it submitted through the Debian bug tracking system if a consensus of opinion is reached here on the right way of doing it.
Quoted 47 lines
=> -----Original Message-----
=> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On
=> Behalf Of Russell Coker
=> Sent: Wednesday, July 10, 2002 3:46 AM
=> To: SE Linux
=> Subject: audit bug in fd handling
=>
=> It seems that when a file handle open read/write is inherited by a domain
=> that is permitted read access only, an error about write access will be
=> logged - even if there is a dontaudit rule!
=>
=> Here's the dmesg log:
=> avc: denied { write } for pid=4731 exe=/usr/sbin/sendmail => path=/spool/fcron/fcrjob-Ldo3Uf (deleted) dev=03:08 ino=27923 => scontext=system_u:system_r:system_mail_t
=> tcontext=system_u:object_r:system_crond_tmp_t tclass=file =>
=> Here's a grep from policy.conf:
=> dontauditsystem_mail_tsystem_crond_tmp_t:file write;
=>
=>
=> Incidentally I'm changing the way mail sending operates. Having daemons
=> send
=> mail assysadm_mail_tis ugly, and having them send mail asuser_mail_t
=> is
=> wrong. I've created a newsystem_mail_tfor this.
=>
=> --
=> I do not get viruses because I do not use MS software.
=> If you use Outlook then please do not put my email address in your => address-book so that WHEN you get a virus it won't use my address in the
=> >From field.
=>
=> --
=> You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux
=> list.
=> If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected]
=> with
=> the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Signature · 3 lines
I do not get viruses because I do not use MS software. If you use Outlook then please do not put my email address in your address-book so that WHEN you get a virus it won't use my address in the
Quoted 1 line
From field.
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sysadm_tty_device_t
Hello,
Was working with putting syslog on /dev/tty24 (entry in /etc/syslog.conf is
*.* /dev/tty24
Selinux shows /dev/tty1 as syadm_tty_device_t but /dev/tty24 is just tty_device_t. I started poking around looking for sysadm_tty_device_t but not exactly sure what tty's are being set to this. My question is where is the control file, is it /etc/securetty?
Ed
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Re: sysadm_tty_device_t
Quoted 8 lines · Ed Street
Was working with putting syslog on
/dev/tty24(entry in/etc/syslog.confis
*.*/dev/tty24Selinux shows
/dev/tty1assyadm_tty_device_tbut/dev/tty24is justtty_device_t. I started poking around looking forsysadm_tty_device_tbut not exactly sure what tty's are being set to this. My question is where is the control file, is it/etc/securetty?
ttys are initialized to tty_device_t by 'make relabel'. They are then relabeled by the modified login program based on the user's context for user sessions, and are also relabeled by the newrole program for shells in different roles.
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RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
Hello,
And sysadm_tty_device_t?
Ed
=>
=> ttys are initialized to tty_device_t by 'make relabel'. They are then
=> relabeled by the modified login program based on the user's context for
=> user sessions, and are also relabeled by the newrole program for shells
=> in different roles.
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RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
Quoted 1 line · Ed Street
And
sysadm_tty_device_t?
That was my point. The ttys start in tty_device_t. If login or newrole creates a sysadm_r:sysadm_t shell, then it relabels the tty to sysadm_tty_device_t. If login or newrole creates a user_r:user_t shell, then it relabels the tty to user_tty_device_t. These relabeling operations are based on type_change rules in the policy configuration.
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RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
Hello,
OK my /etc/syslogd.conf file contains this
*.* /dev/tty24
when I boot or run-init I get this
allow syslogd_t tty_device_t:chr_file { append };
#EXE=/sbin/syslogd PATH=/dev/tty24 : append
The avc from kern.log is this
Jul 11 13:51:17 debian kernel: avc: denied { append } for pid=160exe=/sbin/syslogd path=/dev/tty24 dev=72:01 ino=2175725 scontext=system_u:system_r:syslogd_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tty_device_t tclass=chr_file
Syntax is this:
debian:~# id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) context=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t sid=222
run_init /etc/init.d/sysklogd restart
Also states permission denied for /dev/tty24. BTW in case anyone is wondering /dev/tty1-12 is the left alt key, /dev/tty13-24 is the right alt key.
Ed
=> -----Original Message-----
=> From: Stephen Smalley [mailto:[email protected]]
=> Sent: Thursday, July 11, 2002 1:39 PM
=> To: Ed Street
=> Cc: 'SE Linux'
=> Subject: RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
=>
=>
=> On Thu, 11 Jul 2002, Ed Street wrote:
=>
=> > And sysadm_tty_device_t?
=>
=> That was my point. The ttys start in tty_device_t. If login or newrole
=> creates a sysadm_r:sysadm_t shell, then it relabels the tty to => sysadm_tty_device_t. If login or newrole creates a user_r:user_t shell,
=> then it relabels the tty to user_tty_device_t. These relabeling => operations are based on type_change rules in the policy configuration.
=>
=> --
=> Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
=> [email protected]
=>
=>
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RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
Quoted 11 lines · Ed Street
Hello,
OK my
/etc/syslogd.conffile contains this*.*
/dev/tty24when I boot or run-init I get this
allow
syslogd_ttty_device_t:chr_file { append };
#EXE=/sbin/syslogd PATH=/dev/tty24 : append
Quoted 6 lines
The avc from kern.log is this
Jul 11 13:51:17 debian kernel: avc: denied { append } for pid=160exe=/sbin/syslogd path=/dev/tty24 dev=72:01 ino=2175725 scontext=system_u:system_r:syslogd_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tty_device_t tclass=chr_file
Right, this is what I would expect to happen. What is your question, exactly? If you want syslogd to be able to write to a tty, you need to grant syslogd_t the necessary permission. If you want to ensure that only syslogd can write to the tty, then define a new type, assign it to the tty in types.fc (or use chcon directly), and grant syslogd_t permission to the new type. Otherwise, just allow syslogd_t tty_device_t:chr_file append;
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RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
Hello,
Should the /dev/tty24 be sysadm_tty_device_t instead of tty_device_t? Now here's the odd thing, I change /dev/tty24 to tty1, tty2 or tt3 and I get sysadm_tty_device_t and there's no denied messages
Ed
=> -----Original Message-----
=> From: Stephen Smalley [mailto:[email protected]]
=> Sent: Thursday, July 11, 2002 2:20 PM
=> To: Ed Street
=> Cc: 'SE Linux'
=> Subject: RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
=>
=>
=> On Thu, 11 Jul 2002, Ed Street wrote:
=>
=> > Hello,
=> >
=> > OK my /etc/syslogd.conf file contains this
=> >
=> > *.* /dev/tty24
=> >
=> > when I boot or run-init I get this
=> >
=> > allow syslogd_t tty_device_t:chr_file { append };
=> > #EXE=/sbin/syslogd PATH=/dev/tty24 : append
=> >
=> > The avc from kern.log is this
=> >
=> > Jul 11 13:51:17 debian kernel: avc: denied { append } for pid=160
=> > exe=/sbin/syslogd path=/dev/tty24 dev=72:01 ino=2175725 => > scontext=system_u:system_r:syslogd_t
=> > tcontext=system_u:object_r:tty_device_t tclass=chr_file =>
=> Right, this is what I would expect to happen. What is your question, => exactly? If you want syslogd to be able to write to a tty, you need to
=> grant syslogd_t the necessary permission. If you want to ensure that => only
=> syslogd can write to the tty, then define a new type, assign it to the
=> tty
=> in types.fc (or use chcon directly), and grant syslogd_t permission to
=> the
=> new type. Otherwise, just allow syslogd_t tty_device_t:chr_file append;
=>
=> --
=> Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
=> [email protected]
=>
=>
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RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
Quoted 3 lines · Ed Street
Should the
/dev/tty24besysadm_tty_device_tinstead oftty_device_t? Now here's the odd thing, I change/dev/tty24to tty1, tty2 or tt3 and I getsysadm_tty_device_tand there's no denied messages
So this suggests that:
a) Your policy includes a 'allow syslogd_t sysadm_tty_device_t:chr_file..." rule. Check your policy.conf.
b) tty[1-3] are currently in use or were last used by a sysadm_r:sysadm_t user session.
You can certainly assign sysadm_tty_device_t to /dev/tty24 if you want.
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RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
In reply to Stephen SmalleyHello,
Forgot one thing.
*.* /dev/tty1-3 does work correctly (from /etc/syslog.conf)
Ed
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RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
In reply to Stephen SmalleyВ Чтв, 11.07.2002, в 13:39, Stephen Smalley написал:
Quoted 11 lines · Ed Street
Quoted 2 lines
And
sysadm_tty_device_t?That was my point. The ttys start in
tty_device_t. If login or newrole creates a sysadm_r:sysadm_t shell, then it relabels the tty tosysadm_tty_device_t. If login or newrole creates a user_r:user_t shell, then it relabels the tty touser_tty_device_t. These relabeling operations are based ontype_changerules in the policy configuration.
Quoted 4 lines
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[email protected]
So no matter what the file context is login and newrole relabel them when they take control of the tty, correct? If so, then it is really up to the controlling program (or program that needs control in this case) and so syslog needs premissions to relabel and/or control the tty, yes/no?
Timothy,
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RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
Hello,
That's what it seems to be. It does look like an accident waiting to happen as well.
Ed
=> -----Original Message-----
=> From: Timothy Wood [mailto:[email protected]]
=> Sent: Thursday, July 11, 2002 3:55 PM
=> To: Stephen Smalley
=> Cc: Ed Street; 'SE Linux'
=> Subject: RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
=>
=> В Чтв, 11.07.2002, в 13:39, Stephen Smalley написал:
=> >
=> > On Thu, 11 Jul 2002, Ed Street wrote:
=> >
=> > > And sysadm_tty_device_t?
=> >
=> > That was my point. The ttys start in tty_device_t. If login or => newrole
=> > creates a sysadm_r:sysadm_t shell, then it relabels the tty to => > sysadm_tty_device_t. If login or newrole creates a user_r:user_t => shell,
=> > then it relabels the tty to user_tty_device_t. These relabeling => > operations are based on type_change rules in the policy configuration.
=> >
=> > --
=> > Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
=> > [email protected]
=> >
=>
=> So no matter what the file context is login and newrole relabel them => when they take control of the tty, correct? If so, then it is really up
=> to the controlling program (or program that needs control in this case)
=> and so syslog needs premissions to relabel and/or control the tty, => yes/no?
=>
=> Timothy,
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RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
Quoted 2 lines · Ed Street
That's what it seems to be. It does look like an accident waiting to happen as well.
I'm not sure what you mean. The relabeling of the terminal devices by login is just like the setting of the uid on the device by login. Nothing unusual here.
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RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
In reply to Ed StreetВ Чтв, 11.07.2002, в 15:53, Ed Street написал:
Quoted 6 lines
Hello,
That's what it seems to be. It does look like an accident waiting to happen as well.
Ed
I would not nessicarily call it an accident waiting to happen. More like something that needs configured if you want it. You have to remember that basic idea here is no access to something you don't need (as far as processes are concerned). Syslog really only needs access to the log files it writes to, with the exception of severe kernel messages. The latter I suppose works (/dev/console not /dev/tty*) but I have never noticed any kernel warnings or avc messages denying syslog write to /dev/console. So I could easily be wrong about that.
Timothy,
Quoted 29 lines
=> -----Original Message-----
=> From: Timothy Wood [mailto:[email protected]]
=> Sent: Thursday, July 11, 2002 3:55 PM
=> To: Stephen Smalley
=> Cc: Ed Street; 'SE Linux'
=> Subject: RE:sysadm_tty_device_t
=>
=> В Чтв, 11.07.2002, в 13:39, Stephen Smalley написал:
=> >
=> > On Thu, 11 Jul 2002, Ed Street wrote:
=> >
=> > > Andsysadm_tty_device_t?
=> >
=> > That was my point. The ttys start intty_device_t. If login or => newrole
=> > creates a sysadm_r:sysadm_t shell, then it relabels the tty to => >sysadm_tty_device_t. If login or newrole creates a user_r:user_t => shell,
=> > then it relabels the tty touser_tty_device_t. These relabeling => > operations are based ontype_changerules in the policy configuration.
=> >
=> > --
=> > Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
=> > [email protected]
=> >
=>
=> So no matter what the file context is login and newrole relabel them
Quoted 10 lines
=> when they take control of the tty, correct? If so, then it is really up
=> to the controlling program (or program that needs control in this case)
=> and so syslog needs premissions to relabel and/or control the tty, => yes/no?
=>
=> Timothy,
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RE: sysadm_tty_device_t
In reply to Timothy WoodQuoted 5 lines · Timothy Wood
So no matter what the file context is login and newrole relabel them when they take control of the tty, correct? If so, then it is really up to the controlling program (or program that needs control in this case) and so syslog needs premissions to relabel and/or control the tty, yes/no?
The modified login and newrole programs (and sshd program, but it only deals with ptys) relabel the terminal device based on the user's context and the original context on the device. The proper SID is obtained via the security_change_sid call, which computes a SID based on the type_change rules in the policy configuration.
This is only necessary when you have a dynamic situation where the proper context for the device needs to be adjusted for the current "owner" of the device, and is parallel to the existing Linux handling of setting the uid on such devices.
If you are dedicating a terminal for syslogd output, then you can statically label it with a type, grant syslogd permission to append to that type, and be done with it.
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Re: booting problem
In reply to Stephen SmalleyStephen,
I am having a problem of booting selinux on my machine. I have modified the kernel and finished off with a the quick install command.
The specific error is a kernel panic on boot of the selinux kernel and an error point to correcting the referrence for "ROOT="
The reference "ROOT=" is the same for the none linux kernels. Thanks for the help in advance.
Also I originally used GRUB as the boot loader the first time I ran Redhat 7.2 with SE-linux. If you know how to change the boot loader from lilo to GRUB that could be one option.
Charles R. Fuller
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Re: booting problem
Quoted 5 lines · Charles R. Fuller
The specific error is a kernel panic on boot of the selinux kernel and an error point to correcting the referrence for "ROOT="
The reference "ROOT=" is the same for the none linux kernels. Thanks for the help in advance.
Could you provide the exact output, along with a copy of your lilo.conf or grub.conf (omitting any passwords, of course)?
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Re: sysadm_tty_device_t
In reply to Ed StreetВ Чтв, 11.07.2002, в 12:13, Ed Street написал:
Quoted 11 lines
Hello,
Was working with putting syslog on
/dev/tty24(entry in/etc/syslog.confis
*.*/dev/tty24Selinux shows
/dev/tty1assyadm_tty_device_tbut/dev/tty24is justtty_device_t. I started poking around looking forsysadm_tty_device_tbut not exactly sure what tty's are being set to this. My question is where is the control file, is it/etc/securetty?
Quoted 8 lines
Ed
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you need to edit the file context for the tty devices. I think it is in /usr/src/selinux/policy/file_contexts/dev.fc (I do not have my SE box up and running at the moment so I do not know for certain. Can any acknowledge if that is the right file please). Now changing it there will make the change permanent but you still need to either relabel the file system (do a make relabel from the policy directory) or use chcon to change just the one device (eg chcon <file_context> /dev/tty24)
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