revising the su decision
Up until now the su program was not modified, so changing to a different UID was a separate and independant operation from changing domain via newrole.
However now that the sshd policy has been set to default to not allow logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t this causes some inconveniance. I have to ssh in to my server as a non-root account with a non-sysadm_r context. Then I have to use newrole to change to sysadm_r (entering the password), and then I have to su to the root account (entering the root password).
This requires entering the password two times (or three if not using ssh authorized_keys).
This is excessively painful, and I think that to make SE Linux more usable we need to address this issue, possibly by changing su to allow it to change roles too.
What do you think?
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Hi Russell,
I was about to pose the same comment on newrole/su. :) I guess
there was some idea behine creating newrole as independent program instead of extending su. Could someone share the idea?
Thanks,
Simon
Quoted 9 lines · Russell Coker
Up until now the su program was not modified, so changing to a different UID was a separate and independant operation from changing domain via newrole.
However now that the sshd policy has been set to default to not allow logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t this causes some inconveniance. I have to ssh in to my server as a non-root account with a non-sysadm_r context. Then I have to use newrole to change to
sysadm_r(entering the password), and then I have to su to the root account (entering the root password).
Quoted 20 lines
This requires entering the password two times (or three if not using ssh
authorized_keys).This is excessively painful, and I think that to make SE Linux more usable we need to address this issue, possibly by changing su to allow it to change roles too.
What do you think?
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Quoted 8 lines · Russell Coker
However now that the sshd policy has been set to default to not allow logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t this causes some inconveniance. I have to ssh in to my server as a non-root account with a non-sysadm_r context. Then I have to use newrole to change to
sysadm_r(entering the password), and then I have to su to the root account (entering the root password).This requires entering the password two times (or three if not using ssh
authorized_keys).
Which is exactly what we want. You authenticate to the sshd daemon to login as the user (authenticate user to sshd). Then, you re-authenticate to newrole to verify that the user truly wants to change roles (authenticate user to newrole to ensure that newrole wasn't called by malicious code unwittingly run by the user or by a compromised sshd). You then use su to assume Linux capabilities (authenticate as root user), which is orthogonal to the SELinux security context (user, role, and domain). This is precisely how I have been using SELinux for a long time. Hurdles to remote logins with administrator privileges are a good thing, IMHO.
Notice that you can still directly ssh into a root account if your sshd_config permits it and then use newrole -r sysadm_r, avoiding the separate su step. This works, although you start off without a home directory and without having run your dotfiles due to a lack of access to /root. However, I don't recommend this approach.
Quoted 5 lines
This is excessively painful, and I think that to make SE Linux more usable we need to address this issue, possibly by changing su to allow it to change roles too.
What do you think?
I think you need to carefully consider what this would mean. 'su' authenticates the new user identity to control entry to the new Linux uid. 'newrole' re-authenticates the existing SELinux user identity (not the current Linux uid, and there is no new Linux uid for newrole) to guard against calls by malicious code; in this newrole case, the control over entry is truly provided by the policy configuration. 'su' involves a change only to the Linux uid, not the SELinux user identity.
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Mr. Coker,
Quoted 13 lines · --- Russell Coker
Up until now the su program was not modified, so changing to a different UID was a separate and independant operation from changing domain via newrole.
However now that the sshd policy has been set to default to not allow logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t this causes some inconveniance. I have to ssh in to my server as a non-root account with a non-sysadm_r context. Then I have to use
newrole to change to
sysadm_r(entering the password), and then I have to su to the root account (entering the root password).This requires entering the password two times (or three if not using ssh
authorized_keys).
Quoted 6 lines
This is excessively painful, and I think that to make SE Linux more usable we
need to address this issue, possibly by changing su to allow it to change roles too.
What do you think?
Why do you have to change your role to sysadm_r before su'ing to
root? I was under the impression that becoming uid 0 by either logging in or su'ing was sufficient.....
Brad
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Quoted 3 lines · Brad Chapman
Why do you have to change your role to
sysadm_rbefore su'ing to
root? I was under the impression that becoming uid 0 by either logging in or su'ing was sufficient.....
The Linux root uid is not privileged with respect to the SELinux mandatory access controls. Hence, in order to perform most administrative operations, you have to be both sysadm_r:sysadm_t and have the Linux root uid (or at least the proper Linux capabilities).
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Quoted 9 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 3 lines · Brad Chapman
Why do you have to change your role to
sysadm_rbefore su'ing
to root? I was under the impression that becoming uid 0 by either logging in or su'ing was sufficient.....The Linux root uid is not privileged with respect to the SELinux mandatory access controls. Hence, in order to perform most administrative operations, you have to be both sysadm_r:sysadm_t and have the Linux root uid (or at least the proper Linux capabilities).
I think that Brad was asking why I login to a non-root account first.
One issue is the lack of dotfile support you mentioned before, although I could probably address that by having a PAM module that sets a different home directory used by the ssh config.
Another issue is that of auditing. Having a non-root identity makes many things easy to solve when a number of people have root and sysadm_r access.
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Just joined this mailing list so perhaps my question is already answered however...
... I work in an R&D environment with machines that are usually up and configured for the duration of the experiment and then scrapped and reloaded for the next experiment. Usually a time span of two months at the most. While in the experiment there are several tasks that must be done consistently across all of my machines such as verifying time sync with ntp etc. In the past we used rsh (no really) with .rhosts files and wrote scripts to push from a single entry point to manage all the machines at the same time. We also use this configuration to push new software builds (every morning) across all machines. When I say all machines I am addressing 30-65 or more PCs. Using SELINUX is a requirement at the facility I am at even though no one knows anything about selinux expect how to spell it so I guess I am the expert. (Haven't got the T-Shirt yet) but I have got people looking at my configuration as a starting point for future projects. Now to my question...
... What is this lists proposal for how to manage and push to multiple machines quickly and securely based on the above comments?
Nate Brazell
BMH Associates, Inc
Leaders in Modeling and Simulation
System Administrator
Quoted 46 lines
Mr. Coker,
Quoted 15 lines · --- Russell Coker
Up until now the su program was not modified, so changing to a different UID was a separate and independant operation from changing domain via newrole.
However now that the sshd policy has been set to default to not allow logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t this causes some inconveniance. I have to ssh in to my server as a non-root account with a non-sysadm_r context. Then I have to use
newrole to change to
sysadm_r(entering the password), and then I have to su to the root account (entering the root password).This requires entering the password two times (or three if not using ssh
authorized_keys).Quoted 7 lines
This is excessively painful, and I think that to make SE Linux more usable we
need to address this issue, possibly by changing su to allow it to change roles too.
What do you think?
Why do you have to change your role to
sysadm_rbefore su'ing to
root? I was under the impression that becoming uid 0 by either logging in or su'ing was sufficient.....Brad
=====
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[email protected]
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Quoted 5 lines
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Quoted 7 lines · Natr Brazell
facility I am at even though no one knows anything about selinux expect how to spell it so I guess I am the expert. (Haven't got the T-Shirt yet) but I have got people looking at my configuration as a starting point for future projects. Now to my question...
... What is this lists proposal for how to manage and push to multiple machines quickly and securely based on the above comments?
I'm probably about as much expert as you are (no T-shirt, either) so don't trust me unless someone else says I got it right, but this is what I think would be the right way to do it:
a) SELinux basic assumption is not to trust, especially not remote parties. that's a Good Thing(tm).
b) so, what you need is a trusted process ON the machines. ideally, with a policy crafted specifically for it. I'll call this process instwa, the "install watcher". it could be as simple as a cronjob called every 5 minutes that essentially does:
if ( any file in /var/install ) then ( rpm/dpkg/whatever -i $file )
c) give your remote/install user write priviledges for /var/install
d) voila. you can push software unto the machines and the instwa will take care of the installation.
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Quoted 11 lines · Tom
b) so, what you need is a trusted process ON the machines. ideally, with a policy crafted specifically for it. I'll call this process instwa, the "install watcher". it could be as simple as a cronjob called every 5 minutes that essentially does:
if ( any file in
/var/install) then ( rpm/dpkg/whatever -i $file )c) give your remote/install user write priviledges for
/var/installd) voila. you can push software unto the machines and the instwa will take care of the installation.
Try cfengine2. That's what I use. (Not on selinux systems yet, but I don't see why not)
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the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.Quoted 8 lines · Tom
b) so, what you need is a trusted process ON the machines. ideally, with a policy crafted specifically for it. I'll call this process instwa, the "install watcher". it could be as simple as a cronjob called every 5 minutes that essentially does:
if ( any file in
/var/install) then ( rpm/dpkg/whatever -i $file )c) give your remote/install user write priviledges for
/var/install
If someone can write to /var/install in that case, then why not just allow them to login directly with full admin privs?
Writing a RPM or DEB package to take over or destroy a system is easy enough...
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I do not get viruses because I do not use MS software. If you use Outlook then please do not put my email address in your address-book so that WHEN you get a virus it won't use my address in the
Quoted 1 line
From field.
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This is a great idea for managing packages on the workstation however your recommendation is a pull instead of a push. I need something that allows a developer the ability to push a single file or whole new software distribution depending on the needs. We work with developers on hand to isolate and resolve issues on the fly (R&D remember). Changes have to be released en mass on the fly.
Thanks,
Your suggestion has definate value. I will use it for managing system related packages.
Natr
Quoted 21 lines · Natr Brazell
Quoted 7 lines
facility I am at even though no one knows anything about selinux expect how to spell it so I guess I am the expert. (Haven't got the T-Shirt yet) but I have got people looking at my configuration as a starting point for future projects. Now to my question...
... What is this lists proposal for how to manage and push to multiple machines quickly and securely based on the above comments?
I'm probably about as much expert as you are (no T-shirt, either) so don't trust me unless someone else says I got it right, but this is what I think would be the right way to do it:
a) SELinux basic assumption is not to trust, especially not remote parties. that's a Good Thing(tm).
b) so, what you need is a trusted process ON the machines. ideally, with a policy crafted specifically for it. I'll call this process instwa, the "install watcher". it could be as simple as a cronjob called every 5 minutes that essentially does:
Quoted 19 lines
if ( any file in
/var/install) then ( rpm/dpkg/whatever -i $file )c) give your remote/install user write priviledges for
/var/installd) voila. you can push software unto the machines and the instwa will take care of the installation.
Signature · 11 lines
New GPG Key issued (old key expired): http://web.lemuria.org/pubkey.html pub 1024D/2D7A04F5 2002-05-16 Tom Vogt <[email protected]> Key fingerprint = C731 64D1 4BCF 4C20 48A4 29B2 BF01 9FA1 2D7A 04F5 -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
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Quoted 9 lines · Natr Brazell
Just joined this mailing list so perhaps my question is already answered however...
... I work in an R&D environment with machines that are usually up and configured for the duration of the experiment and then scrapped and reloaded for the next experiment. Usually a time span of two months at the most. While in the experiment there are several tasks that must be done consistently across all of my machines such as verifying time sync with ntp etc. In the past we used rsh (no really) with .rhosts files and
It seems that your demands for security aren't as high as many of the people on this list, and your demands for usability are very high. So I suggest just configuring the policy to allow sshd to transition to sysadm_r:sysadm_t and then make the default context of the root account be sysadm_r:sysadm_t, so you can ssh in as root to do whatever you need to do.
I'm sure that many people will disagree, and it's not how I'd setup a serious production server. But for the type of environment you describe it should work fine.
Signature · 3 lines
I do not get viruses because I do not use MS software. If you use Outlook then please do not put my email address in your address-book so that WHEN you get a virus it won't use my address in the
Quoted 1 line
From field.
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Russell Coker <[email protected]>
Quoted 10 lines
Up until now the su program was not modified, so changing to a different UID was a separate and independant operation from changing domain via newrole.
However now that the sshd policy has been set to default to not allow logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t this causes some inconveniance. I have to ssh in to my server as a non-root account with a non-sysadm_r context. Then I have to use newrole to change to
sysadm_r(entering the password), and then I have to su to the root account (entering the root password).
Quoted 8 lines
This requires entering the password two times (or three if not using ssh
authorized_keys).This is excessively painful, and I think that to make SE Linux more usable we need to address this issue, possibly by changing su to allow it to change roles too.
What do you think?
I'm not sure that is a good thing - (depends on the security policy).
The separation now means that a root compromise is not all that usefull.
Consider what happes if a root compromise performs a "su - root". It currently looks like the compromise would suddenly get whatever role has been assiged to root.
The advantage of the newrole is to REQUIRE a password before gaining sysadm_r.
Now, If you merge the newrole functions into su and remove the automatic su to itself (ie su root when root still requires a password, AND su to any account requires a password), then my objections are much weaker.
My experience are from non SELinux systems (UNICOS MLS, where this wasn't allowed either). IF the user logged in a non-privileged account, then that user couldn't GAIN privileges just by performing a su (even with the password). In this situation (connections over an untrusted network), the privileged user DIDN'T get even the privilege the account was authorized (got the security level and compartment authorized on the network instead). Whichever was minimum (network label or account minimum).
This eliminates the ability of an account compromise (from offsite) gaining access to sensitive files, even if the account was authorized access.
As an aside - this level of security weakened considerably after SGI took over UNICOS.
Another item - su is designed to set UID access (files and such), not external privileges. Used with the root account which had UID access to everything, you gained all priveleges. This change looks like a step toward an all powerful account.
Yes it is convienent for some things - but it also makes the system more vulnerable.
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Any opinions expressed are solely my own.
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Quoted 5 lines · Jesse Pollard
The separation now means that a root compromise is not all that usefull.
Consider what happes if a root compromise performs a "su - root". It currently looks like the compromise would suddenly get whatever role has been assiged to root.
You are assuming here that root:user_r:user_t can su to any domain without a password, and that a default su to a domain will get the maximum SE Linux privs.
The former assumption is not what I had been thinking of, and the latter is a matter of policy.
I had imagined that the ability to do "su - account" without a password would depend on both UID=0 and being sysadm_r:sysadm_t.
Quoted 2 lines
The advantage of the newrole is to REQUIRE a password before gaining
sysadm_r.
Yes, but that doesn't stop us from having one program doing both "newrole -r sysadm_r" and "su -" functionality.
Quoted 3 lines
Now, If you merge the newrole functions into su and remove the automatic su to itself (ie su root when root still requires a password, AND su to any account requires a password), then my objections are much weaker.
How about su to any account without a password gets the same result as such a su operation now, the source UID must be 0 and the context doesn't change.
I think that your disagreement is due to imagining a different way of implementing it to that which I had imagined.
Russell Coker
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Russell Coker <[email protected]>:
Quoted 7 lines · Jesse Pollard
Quoted 5 lines
The separation now means that a root compromise is not all that usefull.
Consider what happes if a root compromise performs a "su - root". It currently looks like the compromise would suddenly get whatever role has been assiged to root.
Quoted 6 lines
You are assuming here that root:user_r:user_t can su to any domain without a password, and that a default su to a domain will get the maximum SE Linux privs.
The former assumption is not what I had been thinking of, and the latter is a matter of policy.
I was basing it on the current functionality of "su". Right now, any use of su will succeed for root. If additional options (not just "-") are provided to establish a different security context, and that context change requires a password, then my objections are overcome. The advantage of a different option to set security context is that some (like some user support activity) want to be able to switch to the users environment (minus the security context). This would be accomplished by "su - user". To complete the security context too, another option (how about something like "su - -s user") would allow switching to user environment context and security context; but requires a password (not necessarily the users password but that's a different subject).
It would also allow a "su -s user" to only setup the security context of that target user account (good for verifying that the user context is correct).
Quoted 8 lines
I had imagined that the ability to do "su - account" without a password would depend on both UID=0 and being sysadm_r:sysadm_t.
Quoted 2 lines
The advantage of the newrole is to REQUIRE a password before gaining
sysadm_r.Yes, but that doesn't stop us from having one program doing both "newrole -r
sysadm_r" and "su -" functionality.
No it doesn't. Should work fine, with the additional safegards that are implicit in the "newrole".
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Now, If you merge the newrole functions into su and remove the automatic su to itself (ie su root when root still requires a password, AND su to any account requires a password), then my objections are much weaker.
How about su to any account without a password gets the same result as such a su operation now, the source UID must be 0 and the context doesn't change.
I think that your disagreement is due to imagining a different way of implementing it to that which I had imagined.
I was just imagining some of the various attacks using "su" to gain privileges or context. I think that any security context change sould always require a password, and hence, a real tty structure associated with the "su" process for additional audit information (as to who/what is connected to that tty/pty).
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Email: [email protected]
Any opinions expressed are solely my own.
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