more thoughts on the ssh policy
Do we need two types for the files under ~/.ssh?
With the current setup in my policy tree the sshd can read the ~/.ssh/id* files from all users, which of course could be useful in attacking other machines.
Of course if you have a bug in sshd then you can (in theory at least) cause it to execute a shell in the user's security context which runs "scp" to transfer the ~/.ssh/id* files to a host controlled by the attacker. Although such exploits may be easier said than done (maybe there's a bug in sshd that doesn't allow executing arbitary code but merely allows reading arbitary files and sending the result out the TCP socket).
What do you think?
If I am to use two types then I will have to modify ssh-keygen to use open_secure...
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Quoted 5 lines · Russell Coker
Do we need two types for the files under ~/.ssh?
With the current setup in my policy tree the sshd can read the ~/.ssh/id* files from all users, which of course could be useful in attacking other machines.
Sounds like a good idea.
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Of course if you have a bug in sshd then you can (in theory at least) cause it to execute a shell in the user's security context which runs "scp" to transfer the ~/.ssh/id* files to a host controlled by the attacker. Although such exploits may be easier said than done (maybe there's a bug in sshd that doesn't allow executing arbitary code but merely allows reading arbitary files and sending the result out the TCP socket).
Also, don't forget ssh-agents socket files, eg:/tmp/ssh-XXDe4IRT/agent.768
Ideally, only trusted user programs should be able to run ssh in a domain that has access to these sockets. That might mean any *interactive* shell, cvs, rsync, etc.
ie. it may not be sufficient just to allow ssh to access it, if an "untrusted" program can execute ssh, as this program could execute "ssh remotehost rm -rf ."
Getting all of these requirements might be difficult, so a compromise may be required.
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